APPENDIX 19
Supplementary memorandum submitted by
Dr Michael Dillon, University of Durham
XINJIANG UYGHUR
AUTONOMOUS REGION
(EASTERN TURKESTAN)
1. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
to give it its full name, is the largest administrative unit in
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and is approximately three
times the size of France. The majority of the population are Uyghur
Muslims, who speak a language distantly related to Turkish and
whose culture has nothing in common with that of China. Eastern
Turkestan is the name used for the region by local people). Chinese
immigration since 1949 has brought the Han population up to over
40 per cent: the Muslims remain in the majority, but are also
divided linguistically and culturally. The largest single group
are the Uyghurs, historically agriculturalists, craftsmen and
traders, who have a distinctive language and culture of their
own, but are also related to other Turkic peoples in Xinjiang
and the rest of Central Asia. The great majority of Uyghurs live
in Xinjiang which they see as their homeland, but there are also
émigré communities in Kazakhstan and other Central
Asian states, Turkey and western Europe.
2. Other significant non-Han ethnic groups
living in Zinjiang include the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tajiks,
all, as their names indicate, with relatives in the newly emerging
Central Asian states and the Hui (known as Dungans in the former
Soviet Union), whose language and culture is closer to that of
the Han Chinese, although they are also Muslims.
3. Uyghur nationalism is sometimes considered
to be a relatively recent phenomenon since Uyghurs in the past
tended to identify primarily with the main oasis town of the region
in which they were born rather than an Uyghur nation, but after
centuries of Chinese rule, and inspired by the post 1991 independence
of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, there is a growing
consciousness of an Uyghur identity, especially in the Altishahr
region in the south of Xinjiang, which borders on Pakistan
and Afghanistan, and is home to 80 per cent of Xinjiang's Uyghurs.
4. Separatist sentiment was ruthlessly suppressed
by the government of the PRC after 1949 but re-emerged as a major
force in the 1990s, fuelled by optimism that the creation of post-Soviet
independent Central Asian states would lead to an independent
Xinjiang. There has been continuous conflict, sometimes violent,
between Beijing and groups in Xinjiang. This has included mass
demonstrations, guerrilla attacks on Chinese police and military
bases, and bomb attacks on military and civilian targets in Xinjiang
and in Beijing.
5. There was resistance to Chinese Communist
Party control from Islamic and nationalist groups in the early
1950s and in the chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966 to the
early 1970s) it was possible for the East Turkestan People's Party
to form inside Xinjiang, probably with help from within the Soviet
Union. However, it was after the Cultural Revolution in the period
of "Reform and Opening" that serious disturbances with
separatist overtones began to be reported.
6. There were disturbances in Aksu in April
1980, which were suppressed by People's Liberation Army troops
with great loss of life, a riot in Kashghar in the same year in
which many hundreds were injured and many demonstrations against
ethnic and religious discrimination, which came to a head in 1989
at the same time as the suppression of the Democracy Movement
in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. In April 1990, the opposition
to Chinese control reached a new level of intensity when riots
at Baren in the Kyrgyz region of southern Xinjiang called for
a jihad against the Chinese and the establishment of an
independent Eastern Turkestani state. The insurgents had acquired
small arms and bombs and the rising was only suppressed after
large numbers of troops were brought in from outside Xinjiang.
The Chinese media reported that young Uyghur militants were being
trained and armed by Islamic groups in Afghanistan. In May and
June 1991, there were also armed insurrections in the cities of
Bole and Dacheng in the north-western part of Xinjiang. Bomb attacks
on buses in the Xinjiang capital Urumqi in February 1992 injured
many and there are reports of bombings in many other towns in
Xinjiang in March the same year. In June 1993, a bomb exploded
at government buildings in Kashghar, killing at least 10 people
and others were reported. In April 1995, there were serious disturbances
in the area around the town of Yining/Ghulja near to the border
with Kazakhstan, and some demonstrators demanded that the Yining
area be incorporated into Kazakhstan. Nearly two years later in
February 1997, the most serious insurrection in Xinjiang since
the foundation of the PRC took place in Yining/Ghulja. It cost
many lives although the precise number is disputed by the Chinese
and sympathisers of the local Uyghurs. Many more were injured
and thousands were arrested in the mass repression that followed.
7. The Chinese government's strategy to
deal with nationalist, Islamist and separatist movements has been
twofold. On the one hand separatism is to be suppressed ruthlessly.
On the other, economic development and investment designed to
improve the living conditions of the population of Xinjiang is
seen as the long-term answer to the Xinjiang question.
(a) The fear of the need to suppress "splittism"
as separatism is often called, is a constant in the politics of
Xinjiang. There have been countless statements, speeches and articles
attacking separatism in Xinjiang, both in the region itself and
centrally, including those associated with Jiang Zemin's visit
in July 1998. Perhaps the clearest expression of the degree of
concern felt by the central government is in a classified Central
Committee paper, Document Number 7 of 1996.
"Within our national borders, illegal religious
activities are widespread, sabotaging activities such as the instigation
of problematic situations, the breaking and entering of party
and government offices, explosions and terrorism are occurring
sporadically. Some of these activities have changed from completely
hidden to semi-open activities, even to the extent of challenging
the government's authority. . . If we do not increase our vigilance
and strengthen work in every respect, large-scale incidents might
suddenly occur and confusion and disruption could break out and
affect the stability of Xinjiang and the whole nation." [Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee, Central Committee Document
Number 7 (1996), Record of the meeting of the Standing Committee
of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the
maintenance of stability in Xinjiang (in Uyghur)].
(b) To counter the threat of separatism,
the central and regional governments are pursuing the economic
development of Xinjiang through investment and trade both with
Central Asia and other regions of China. Regular trade fairs are
held in Urumqi to encourage investment and commerce, particularly
with the Soviet Union and in general most of the border posts
opened in the early 1990s still remain in use. While this development
does have the effect of creating jobs these jobs are not made
available equally. There is considerable anecdotal evidence that
the Han in the region easily find employment while the Uyghurs
and others are marginalised.
8. These developments should be viewed in
the context of the changes in the relationship between China and
its Central Asian neighbours since the collapse of Soviet power
in 1991. The border between China and the USSR was effectively
sealed because of the Sino-Soviet dispute which began in 1960,
and in particular after the Kazakh exodus from China in 1962,
and this divided communities of Kazakhs and Uyghurs and contributed
to tensions on China's northwest frontier. Since 1991, China has
been assiduously cultivating relations with the newly emerging
states of Central Asia and the main issues on the agendas of meetings
between the governments have been the perceived threat from political
Islam in Central Asia and the connection between this and separatist
movements in Xinjiang. These meetings began as bilateral discussions
on unresolved issues of border demarcation but evolved into annual
meetings of what have become known as the Shanghai Five (after
the location of the first multilateral conference in 1995), China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—Uzbekistan
joined the five as an observer at the 2000 meeting.
9. Uyghur émigré groups and
nationalists inside Xinjiang view these meetings as a betrayal
by their Turkic and Muslim brothers in Central Asia and there
is a genuine fear that Uyghur language and culture is under threat
and could face extinction. However, in spite of harsh censorship
and repression, Uyghur literature and music continue to flourish,
often underground, and are particularly vibrant in the south of
Xinjiang.
10. In Xinjiang, as in Tibet, Inner Mongolia
and China proper, there is no political route available for the
peaceful expression of Uyghur aspirations to independence or autonomy.
Such expressions are seen by the Chinese authorities as a manifestation
of separatism and therefore as acts of treason.
11. Because nationalist and Islamist groups
in Xinjiang are clandestine and their supporters are subject to
the most severe penalties, including execution, if arrested, it
is difficult to get a clear picture of their political and social
programmes. Some émigré organisations have connections
with internal oppostion groups, while others are descendants of
exiles from the brief independent government which ruled from
Yining/Ghulja in the 1940s and have been cut off from development
in Xinjiang.
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