APPENDIX 25
Memorandum submitted by Tibet Information
Network
Tibet Information Network (TIN) is an independent
news and research service that monitors and reports on the political,
social, economic, environmental and human rights situation in
Tibet today. TIN has no specific political agenda but it is committed
to ensuring that any decisions relating to Tibet, whether political
or developmental, are taken in full and public knowledge of the
facts and of the genuine concerns of the Tibetan people.
The enclosed submission will explore aspects
of the FCO's work relating mainly to political issues. It will
review current developments in Chinese politics as they affect
the United Kingdom and the UK's foreign policy relationship with
China, particularly in the field of promoting human rights. Other
aspects of the Select Committee's investigation are outside TIN's
remit.
THE FCO AND
CHINA: SUMMARY
The policy of the FCO towards China on human
rights issues has primarily been based on bilateral dialogue.
TIN's close monitoring over the past few years has indicated that
there have been no positive improvements in the human rights situation,
at least in the "national minority" areas of Tibet and
Xinjiang, since the dialogue was implemented and that the dialogue
has signally failed to prevent a worsening of the human rights
situation in these areas.
The nature of the UK dialogue with China allows
China to avoid discussion of certain key human rights issues while
strengthening its position in the international arena. China says
that it prefers dialogue to "confrontation". The China
Daily stated in October 1998: "It is not that China's stance
or policies on the issue of human rights have changed . . . rather
that the belated favourable turn in the international atmosphere
has created an opportunity for China to elaborate its perspectives."
China also acts as though it is under no obligation
to co-operate with international treaties. Even as it put its
signature to the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights, China announced that it would be "adapting"
the tenets of the Covenant to its own "national conditions".
At the same time, China has become increasingly
sophisticated at appearing to be responsive to international pressure
for reform, failing to take any concrete steps towards this reform.
It is developing a legal structure that, at least superficially,
is aimed at meeting international norms and appeasing political
and business leaders in developed nations who depend upon the
rule of law. There is little evidence however, that in the field
of human rights, any genuine legal reforms have been implemented,
at least in Tibet and Xinjiang.
Actions here in the UK such as the heavy-handed
policing of Tibetan and Chinese dissident demonstrations during
President Jiang Zemin's visit to London last year served only
to signal to China that it does not need to change from within
and that reform is not perceived as necessary. "Quiet diplomacy"
may well be conveying the same message; in October 1998 Prime
Minister Tony Blair privately raised the case of democracy activist
Xu Wenli, who was detained briefly while Mr Blair was in Beijing.
Within a matter of weeks, Xu Wenli was back in jail and had received
a sentence of 13 years.
China has in fact been demonstrating a consistent
lack of responsiveness to Western governments involved in the
dialogue process. Examples of this are evident in incidents of
severe reprisals for peaceful protests that have occurred during
two key visits to Tibet in the past three years. Three prisoners
who made peaceful protests during the October 1997 visit to the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Number One Prison (Drapchi) by the
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) were beaten and
had their sentences extended following the departure of the delegation,
despite official assurances to the group that there would be no
repercussions. Several reprisals were meted out to prisoners following
peaceful protests on 1 and 4 May 1998, the latter protest taking
place on the same day as the visit of the EU Troika ambassadors
to Drapchi (Number One) prison. At least nine Tibetan prisoners
died and others received sentence extensions following beatings
and torture by prison guards in the aftermath of the demonstrations.
It took the UK government, which held the Presidency of the EU
at the time of the visit to Drapchi, three months to raise the
issue of the deaths of the Tibetan prisoners with the Chinese
authorities. The UK government has still not succeeded in obtaining
any information about the Tibetans who died following the protests,
more than two years after the incidents occurred.
THE DIALOGUE
PROCESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
China seeks to legitimise its control of present-day
Tibet not just on historical grounds but on the strength of the
economic reforms it claims to have introduced in Tibet. Economic
liberalisation continues to evolve and has recently included privatisation
of tax offices and debate on the dismantling of state enterprises.
Away from the economic mainstream, however, the ideological campaigns
being imposed on Tibetans in the spheres of religion and culture,
the key elements of Tibetan national identity, are implemented
in language reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. The enclosed
document, Annex 1, is a summary of the current situation in Tibet,
including information on the intensification of religious and
cultural repression in Tibet in 1999.
The FCO stated in its 1999 Annual Report that
the dialogue with China has "provided a vehicle for detailed
discussion of many issues of concern directly with the Chinese
authorities. These have included torture, use of the death penalty,
religious freedom and Tibet, as well as individual cases".
Where Tibet is concerned, however, there is no evidence that the
UK government has succeeded in obtaining any useful information
from the Chinese government regarding either these issues or individual
cases. It has not, for instance, obtained any information about
the Tibetan monks and nuns who died following beatings and torture
at Drapchi prison following the political protests in May 1998
(see Annex 3 below). In some cases, the ongoing maltreatment of
individuals whose cases have been raised by the UK government
demonstrates the lack of seriousness with which the Chinese authorities
appear to treat the substance of the dialogue. The case of Ngawang
Sangdrol, a 22-year old nun currently serving a 21-year prison
sentence in Tibet for peaceful protest, has consistently been
raised by the UK government and the Chinese authorities continue
to assure the UK that she is in "normal health". However,
according to several reliable sources, Ngawang Sangdrol continues
to be subjected to harsh treatment in prison and there are currently
serious fears for her health and safety.
(i) "Limited Positive Steps": Delegation
visits to Tibet
There have been more than 50 visits by official
international delegations to Tibet since the early 1990s, including
the visit in October 1997 by the United Nations Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention. The invitation extended to this body has
been described by the FCO as one of the "limited positive
steps," in the dialogue process. However visits in themselves
do not necessarily indicate successful dialogue.
The proposed visit of the UN Special Rapporteur
on Torture to China, also described by the FCO as a "positive
step," has yet to be confirmed due to difficulties over a
lack of acceptance by China of the Rapporteur's terms of reference.
Confidential and unsupervised contact with witnesses
and other private persons is not possible for official delegations
visiting Tibet due to the sophisticated levels of control and
manipulation of official visits by the authorities. Enclosed (as
Annex 2) is a summary of the repercussions of prison visits by
international delegations.
(ii) Conflicting response by China to questions
of human rights
The beatings and torture of prisoners in the
TAR Number One Prison (Drapchi) in response to peaceful protests
by political and criminal inmates in May 1998 represented one
of the most severe acts of repression witnessed in Tibet since
the imposition of martial law in March 1989. The attached TIN
News Update dated 15 December 1999 (Annex 3) gives reliable eyewitness
information about the maltreatment of inmates in Drapchi Prison
and the sentence extensions imposed on six political prisoners
following the peaceful protests on 1 and 4 May 1998. The report
describes how People's Armed Police (PAP) personnel, equipped
with rifles and batons, were called into the prison after the
first demonstration on 1 May 1998, when political and criminal
prisoners were assembled in the prison courtyard for a flag raising
ceremony. A second protest on 4 May, the same day as the visit
of the European Union ambassadors' human rights fact-finding delegation
to the prison, was swiftly suppressed by prison guards and PAP
personnel who were stationed inside the prison compound.
Earlier this year, the Chinese authorities acknowledged
to the UK government that deaths of prisoners had taken place
following the Drapchi protests. However, Beijing gave a different
response to the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and
the Special Rapporteur on the issues of torture and freedom of
expression as follows: "In relation to alleged violent demonstrations
inside Drapchi prison in May 1998, the Government replied that
no such incidents had taken place. The [Chinese] government stated
that there had not been a demonstration by offenders since the
Tibet Autonomous Region prison [Drapchi] was founded." (Item
237 of the report of the Special Rapporteur Sir Nigel Rodley on
questions of civil and political rights including questions of
torture and detention, Ref E/CN.4/2000/9, 2 February 2000).
Chinese officials have given further conflicting
information to official delegations that have visited Tibet since
the May 1998 demonstrations. A Danish governmental delegation
that visited Tibet in August 1998 was told by the governor of
Drapchi prison that "nothing had happened" at the prison
on 1 and 4 May 1998, while the vice-governor of the prison told
them that "something had happened" during these two
days.
Politicians from a European Democratic Union
delegation to Tibet, which was led by the leader of the Parliamentary
Group of the Austrian People's Party Andreas Kohl, presented a
list of names of the prisoners who died following the Drapchi
protests to the Justice Bureau during their visit to Lhasa from
27-31 August 1998. Justice Bureau officials admitted that prisoners
began to shout slogans including "Free Tibet!" and "Long
live the Dalai Lama" during a flag raising ceremony on 1
May. According to the Justice Bureau, prison guards were so frightened
that they fired guns into the air to "attract the attention
of policemen outside the prison". The statement confirms
that guards were armed with guns but does not explain why they
were allegedly so intimidated by the slogan shouting. The officials
denied that any deaths had resulted from the incident.
(iii) Review of Legislative Changes in China
The FCO states that its participation in legal
seminars in 1998-99 is a sign of progress in the dialogue. The
following section and additional notes in Appendix 4 aim to provide
a context for this statement.
The establishment of the rule of law in China
is seen as vitally important by all those who wish to see successful
reform in China. However, this worthy objective has all too often
been used as an excuse for inactivity. Governments and international
bodies who shrink from direct criticism of China's record on human
rights continue to place emphasis on the development of the rule
of law and, indeed, changes to the Criminal Procedure Law and
the Criminal Law were introduced in January and October 1997 respectively,
but these amendments do not yet appear to have had any significant
impact on the legal or judicial procedures relating to political
"crime" and imprisonment in Tibet.
One of the statutory changes in the amended
Criminal Law that appeared to be of particular significance was
the elimination of "counter-revolution" as an offence.
In the amended law, in the section entitled "Crimes of Counter-Revolution",
all references to "counter-revolutionary crimes" have
been replaced by the offences of "endangering state security",
"subversion" or "attempts to overthrow the state".
However, the underlying content of the law has remained intact
and there is little evidence to suggest that the move is anything
more than an attempt to bring criminal definition into line with
international norms. (For further details on changes to legislation,
see Annex 4).
(iv) Torture in Tibetan prisons and the UN
Convention against Torture
Article 10 and 11 (29) of the Convention against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(ratified by China in 1988) state that "it is strictly forbidden
to use torture in a prison. No one is ever permitted to torture
prisoners under any circumstances or for whatever reason. Prison
guards are trained to observe correct and civil behaviour".
Reliable information obtained by TIN shows that there is no decrease
in levels of torture and abuse in Tibet's prisons and that incidents
of repression appear to have worsened in the past two years. Further
information is available on this issue from TIN if required.
A CONSTRUCTIVE FOREIGN
POLICY RELATIONSHIP
The nature of the UK dialogue with China permits
China to avoid discussion of certain key human rights issues while
strengthening its position in the international arena.
Neither party in the dialogue process appears
to place much value on accurate and specific information. While
the FCO clearly leads and sets the agenda for the bilateral debate
on human rights in China, this low prioritisation of correct information
about the current situation is reflected in other departments.
During a debate last December in the House of Commons, for instance,
the Minister for International Development stated that DFID supported
a World Bank project which planned to move 60,000 mainly Chinese
farmers into a region of China which has Tibetan autonomous status,
thus diluting the population of Tibetans in the area. There was
evidence of opposition from local Tibetans. During the debate,
it was clear that the Minister for International Development had
made the decision to support the project without being aware of
the geographical and political sensitivities of the project, sensitivities
that had led the US government and others to condemn the project
as inappropriate and in contravention of the World Bank's own
operational guidelines. The Inspection Panel of the World Bank
has now completed a review of the project, and their report, as
yet unpublished, is understood to be highly critical of virtually
every aspect of the proposed development. The World Bank may well
now decide not to fund the project.
The paucity of new and credible information
about political prisoners, conditions in prisons, and other human
rights issues being provided by the Chinese side as a result of
the dialogue appears to indicate a lack of commitment to genuine
information exchange. When a Chinese official confirmed that deaths
had resulted from the Drapchi protests in May 1998, for instance,
there appears to have been no attempt by the British side to follow
up this statement with a request for specific details of prisoners
who died, or of the conditions of those who were tortured following
these protests. During official visits to China by Western government
delegations, impressions of places and people appear to take precedence
over the gathering of concrete information from Chinese officials
about human rights abuses. The officials of course do their best
to be as general and non-specific as possible during the dialogue
process. They may also attempt to create an uncomfortable atmosphere
during the dialogue process, but persistent, tenacious and informed
questioning, using terminology and language that is meaningful
to these individuals, would undoubtedly yield more satisfactory
results than those we have seen so far.
There are other areas that could be explored
as part of the effort to develop a more meaningful relationship
with China. For example, the FCO is in favour of supporting change
within the legal mechanisms of the country and in this context
it would be interesting to tackle the Chinese authorities on issues
raised by a study of the Chinese constitution. China is particularly
vulnerable to discussion of these fundamental tenets by international
bodies.
An example of this concerning Tibet is the reaction
from China against any proposal for genuine "autonomy";
which is perfectly feasible within the constitution. An impact
might be made upon overall thinking on China if experts began
to study the constitution in order to gain an insight into the
dualistic nature of this document, particularly in its firm emphasis
that the state's prerogative to protect its own self-defined "security,
honour and interests" supersedes everything else in the constitution.
The constitution itself is structured around several articles
that successfully remove all legitimacy from the other provisions.
China may, for instance, assert that basic human rights, including
freedom of religion and expression, are protected by China's constitution.
However there are other provisions in this same constitution which
suggest that fundamental freedoms can be withdrawn when this is
considered necessary by the authorities. Article 51 says that
the exercise of individual freedoms and rights "may not infringe
upon the interests of the state". Article 54 asserts that
citizens "must not commit acts detrimental to the security,
honour and interests of the motherland".
An understanding of the constitution is inseparable
from the notion of the "rule of law" which technical
co-operation schemes are intended to support. In fact, rule of
law is subservient to the constitution, which is itself subject
to the rulings of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress (headed by Li Peng). The Chinese constitution places
the courts and procuracy under the control of People's Congresses
at every level of government, including the national government,
which allows the NPC's Standing Committee to supervise the Supreme
People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate.
The Chinese news agency Xinhua stated in January
that the Chinese leadership may amend the law on regional autonomy
for minorities. Li Dezhu, minister in charge of the State Ethnic
Affairs Commission, said "More and better laws will help
enhance an equal, united and mutually beneficial relationship
among all of China's 56 nationalities." (Xinhua, 7 January
2000). The nature of the forthcoming changes was not specified
in the article.
Note on constitutional issues:
Please see Annex 5 for a summary of the legal
and constitutional status of minorities and minority areas in
the People's Republic of China. For a further insight into China's
policies towards minorities and a discussion of how the economic
advantages of autonomous status have been swallowed up in the
economic reform process, see the article by Dr Tan Leshan in Chinabrief,
Vol II No 4, December 1999-March 2000, "Autonomy is not what
it was". http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com
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