Examination of Witnesses (Questions 240
- 259)
TUESDAY 21 NOVEMBER 2000
RT HON
ROBIN COOK
MP, MR EMYR
JONES PARRY
CMG AND MR
KIM DARROCH
Sir Peter Emery
240. Foreign Secretary, you will know that the
Parliamentary Assembly of NATO was meeting in Berlin last weekend
and yesterday. There were a number of American Congressmen, both
senators and members of the House of Representatives, who were
very neutral on ESDI. They, rather surprisingly, were not giving
much away either for or against. You obviously will have had discussions
with your opposite number in the American Government. Can you
tell the Committee what you judge is the American Government's
view about ESDI?
(Mr Cook) The American Government's view is well known
and widely available in public. Madeline Albright only yesterday
did say that "the European Rapid Reaction Force is a strongly
positive development. We wholly support it", which could
not be more explicit. She went on to recall that the United States
is working closely with the European Union to make the initiative
a success and that it will strengthen European and transatlantic
security. There are similar statements from the Defence Secretary
who has said that they wholly and unequivocally support it and
there are similar statements of support from President Clinton.
There is no actor in the American Government who is immediately
relevant to this issue who has not gone in public on this with
very strong statements of support.
241. They do not consider that this is a weakening
of NATO?
(Mr Cook) No, and indeed Madeline Albright's statement
of yesterday actually does say it will strengthen it. The reason
for that is that the United States has for long been concerned
that Europe could do more to share the burden. The stress that
we have been successful as Britain within the European Security
Initiative for putting on capability has meant that we have now
had to face up to the need to make sure that we can have available
flexible, mobile, rapid forces that we can move in the event of
a crisis. Do remember of course that as we develop these forces
they are not available only to the European Union. Should NATO
decide that it wishes to lead the operation rather than the European
Union then they are available also to NATO, so it is an additional
resource to NATO.
242. But of course it will as a force not have
the lift capacity which NATO has with the Americans of going very
far even within Europe.
(Mr Cook) You are right to identify one of the weaknesses
of the European military forces, the absence of strategic air
lift capacity, and that has been identified by the military in
the course of discussions leading up to the Capabilities Conference.
We are looking at ways in which Europe can strengthen this, for
instance through the acquisition of the Airbus. But in the event
that we had an agreement that the European Union would lead an
operation and NATO in which, as I say, effectively here the United
States was not going to take part, it is by no means impossible
in those circumstances that the United States, faced with an operation
in which they may not wish to take part but an operation which
it wishes to succeed, might assist with air lift.
Mr Chidgey
243. Foreign Secretary, as I understand it the
force we are talking about is 60,000, which is probably 120,000
allowing for flexibility and operational roles. I understand also
that the expected range of operations for the force could be as
much as 2,400 miles. I presume that is assuming that the Airbuses
come on board. In that scenario, and given the different rates
of funding that different members of the European Union have akin
to their armed forces, how confident are you that in fact this
is going to work and that the Member States will honour the promises
they have made?
(Mr Cook) The headline goal is to put in the field
a core strength of a rapid reaction force of 60,000 personnel,
to put it in the field within 60 days and to sustain it there
for at least a year.
244. It means obviously far more than that available
to maintain it?
(Mr Cook) You would have to have a process of allocation
or something like that. At the present time the commitment has
been made at the Capabilities Conference to exceed what is required
for that 60,000 figure. We have commitments of 100,000 that have
been made. Indeed, I would stress that the Capabilities Conference
in this sense has been a very considerable success. Remember also
that we are looking really at the top whack, for instance, if
one or two of the kind of scenario that we were discussing earlier
in Albania, you would not be committing anything remotely approach
the 60,000, maybe not even a tenth of that figure. Can I say something
about the geographic scope? There is no decision either on the
delimitation of that geographic scope, nor is there any decision
on a particular ceiling, so the figure of 2,000 miles which you
have quoted has no official provenance. The report from the Capabilities
Conference is quite careful in that it makes its commitments only
specifically within Europe and the European sphere of what is
sometimes described as the European back yard, which is the countries
immediately adjacent to it. I would not myself have thought that
we are likely to be going outside the European continent other
than in circumstances where we are doing so in response to a UN
mandate.
245. Can I pick that point up because there
are two things here. You said earlier that it requires total unanimity
from all the nation states for the decision to be made to become
involved, but could it be the case that, having got that consent,
it would not necessarily require all the Member States to be involved
in the action? Could this be an enhanced operation scenario, particularly,
for example, in West Africa where we have interests in Sierra
Leone and the French have interests in Guinea and, as you know,
the overall conflict is now spreading over the borders northwards
to Guinea?
(Mr Cook) First of all we would not see enhanced co-operation
as an appropriate model here and that raises a whole range of
different issues, one of which of course is that with enhanced
co-operation the Commission would have a role and we have been
quite clear throughout this that despite what the papers say there
is no role for the Commission in this initiative. To come back
to the central point of your question, yes, if the European Union
took a decision to launch an operation it is then a matter for
decision for each of the members as to whether or not they take
part. That must be the case since we ourselves are clear that
we are not going to be mandated by the European Union on a basis
on which we are compelled to take part; we will take our own national
decision and we can hardly object if others do the same.
246. One final question. Given the overstretch
we already have on our armed forces, is your colleague, the Defence
Secretary, totally happy with this?
(Mr Cook) Totally, enthusiastic about it, played a
very strong part in it in the course of the conference today and
yesterday, and the Chief of Defence Staff also played a very full
part in this. The point that it illustrates I think is very relevant
to the European Security initiative because, as I have been saying,
one of the gains from this is that there will be perhaps a fair
sharing of the burden of maintaining the peace and within that
overall envelope of the 100,000 commitment it is true that we
have committed 12,000. It is also the case that other partners
have committed 88,000 and making sure that they can deploy flexible,
mobile, rapid forces of the kind that many of them still have
to work on is a very important gain for Britain.
Sir David Madel
247. Before the ESDI operation began would we
inform or consult the United States?
(Mr Cook) In the event that we will be using NATO
assets there would be no question that we would have to consult
fully with all the NATO members. In the event that we were not
using those NATO assets theoretically the requirement for consultation
would be less. In practice however I think that there are no circumstances
in which it is going to happen without extensive consultation
with partners. Do remember that first of all NATO itself has to
take a decision as to whether or not it is going to be involved.
248. Before the ESDI operation begins there
has to be unanimity amongst the countries before they start an
operation?
(Mr Cook) Before it can be a European-led operation
there has to be European Union unanimity.
249. Does there have to be unanimity to stop
the operation?
(Mr Cook) As I recall it, the inclusion of an operation
to formally wind it up would be in the hands of all 15 but in
practice if the participants decided to end it then it would end.
250. So if some participants said, "We
should stop now", it would stop?
(Mr Cook) Not necessarily some. I would hope that
there would be unanimity among the participants to wind up the
operation. Obviously if some withdrew there would be a question
for the others whether they could realistically continue. Am I
right in that?
(Mr Jones Parry) Absolutely right, Foreign Secretary.
Can I stress that all the structures, the decisions, have been
put in place to ensure that the decisions when taken are militarily
sound, so there cannot be a question of a capricious withdrawal.
It would actually be sitting down with contributors on the ground,
none of us can take decisions which affect contributors without
them being involved. It is quite basic. If the view of the contributors
was clearly that they wanted out, then no-one else can impose
on them an obligation that they should actually continue. It is
just not conceivable. Could I also stress one thing? Continually
the phrase "a force" is being used in questions. There
is no standing force. There is no European army. There are capabilities
which have been declared to the Union but there they are also
capabilities which are available for the United Nations, for NATO,
for Member States to use in whatever way they wish. That is basic
to this. When we talk about priorities, the priorities are no
different for the Secretary of State for Defence now than they
will be afterwards. There is always a difficulty in where do you
put your priority. The assumption somehow is that there is a problem
out there which the EU will take and therefore it will cause a
problem for NATO. The fact is that if there is a problem out there
somebody will have to deal with it. What this is doing is producing
added capabilities so that some of it can be used if needed.
(Mr Cook) If I could just summarise it, it is not
going to be a Euro army. There is no permanent standing army.
There is no permanent central integrated command as there is with
NATO. We are under no obligation to commit our forces in the event
that there is such an operation and we will only do so if we choose
to do so.
251. A capricious decision to withdraw could
be caused by changes in the political situation in one of the
countries. Would you accept that?
(Mr Jones Parry) Absolutely, but then you would require
a sensible rational discussion so that you did not take decision
unilaterally just like that which put others at risk. We would
require that of other contributors but it does not in any way
say that you could not withdraw, but the manner in which you did
it would of course have to be done in the most responsible way.
Mr Maples
252. Foreign Secretary, you said that one of
the things the United States wanted to see was greater European
military capability in the contribution to security in the region.
One of the concerns some people had was that with the European
Union setting up its own military committee, military headquarters,
with no integrated control system but we are setting up a military
staff, talking about our own communications and intelligence capabilities,
duplicating those of NATO, is there not, at a time of falling
defence budgets across the European Union, particularly in Germany
which will be one of our main allies in this initiative, a danger
that with these additional expenditures which are being called
on the actual money going into military effort and military capability
will be less and not more?
(Mr Cook) But the additional expenditure is very modest.
First of all, we are not going to have a permanent standing headquarters.
There is no equivalent of SHAPE, for instance. There is indeed
going to be the committee of military personnel from each nation
in Brussels able to advise on what might be a feasible operation
and how it should be run. But, for heaven's sake, that has to
be a very sensible first base from which to make any sensible
and informed decisions. But the cost of that is pretty minimal
and probably the marginal cost of it is almost zero. As George
Robertson has stressed in his letter today, what we are seeking
to do is to complement not to compete with the assets of NATO.
In the context of the Germans and the Dutch in defence spending
which you mentioned, I think that this initiative has been extremely
helpful in encouraging partners within the overall envelopes that
they are willing to make available for defence to focus their
efforts on making sure that their forces are flexible, are mobile,
can move rapidly. Germany was rather taken aback by how difficult
it was to get 5,000 of their service personnel to Kosovo in the
course of the conflict. That and the European security initiative
has helped to shape the debate in the direction of producing more
flexible, more rapid, more mobile forces, even within the overall
declining envelope. It is very much in our interests that that
does happen across Europe; otherwise we and France will be the
only people capable of responding.
253. If we take the case of Germany, for example,
which has one of the lowest percentages of GDP on defence of any
European Union country, setting up our own intelligence communications
with additional military staff, that is not going to add to that
capability of itself. Do you have any assurance from the German
Government that they will spend more money on defence to make
up at least for those duplications of assets and resources which
currently exist in NATO so that we can guarantee that they will
be providing a greater military effort as a result of this initiative?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I would strongly resist the
idea that there is any substantial expenditure on the duplication
to which you refer. Secondly, it would be impertinent of me to
seek assurances from any other sovereign state within the European
Union for guarantees about their spending. I think you would strongly
resent it if Germany was to require that of us.
(Mr Jones Parry) On the intelligence, what is clearly
necessary is that sources of intelligence should be available
to the European Union. There is no plan that the European Union
should have an intelligence gathering capability. At the moment,
there is a WEU satellite centre which does a certain amount of
work. That will probably continue, but there is no sense of extending
beyond that. It may be that some Member States will put in national
intelligence assessments if an operation is being contemplated
but there is not going to be massive expenditure on intelligence
by the EU.
254. Are you saying that we as a nation will
share all of our military intelligence?
(Mr Cook) No, not all of it. Indeed, we do not with
anybody but we may well share intelligence which is relevant to
an operation to the extent that we can do so without compromising
our own terms of operation. I read in one paper this morning that
the intelligence chiefs are very concerned about this. I have
to report, as the Minister to whom the Secret Intelligence Service
reports, that I have had no such concerns expressed to me at all
at any point of this.
Chairman
255. No concern about the leaky nature of Brussels?
Interpreters are refusing to have positive vetting.
(Mr Cook) There are bona fide issues of security within
the European Union which is now embarking upon a new exercise
for it and that will require both secure buildings and staff with
a culture of respect for secrecy. Javier Solana has been working
hard at this. I cannot think of anybody more likely to develop
that culture of secrecy than the person who has just spent five
years as Secretary General of NATO.
Mr Maples
256. I understand the reason for the initiative,
but I also understood very clearly the previous policy which the
Prime Minister set out at Amsterdam, which is that defence was
no business of the European Union. That policy changed in the
autumn of 1998, in the two or three months in the run up to the
Saint Malo Agreement. I have never really understood what the
rationale was for that policy change because it was a very significant
policy change. Sometimes the experience of Kosovo is prayed in
aid for the change but Saint Malo happened several months before
the Kosovo operation. I wonder if you can explain to us exactly
why the policy was so significantly changed?
(Mr Cook) I would make two observations. First of
all, there has been no change in our view that collective defence
is not the job of the European Union and nothing in this initiative
in any way entrenches on that. Collective defence remains the
job of NATO. We have been very successful in the course of all
of this in making sure that that is repeatedly stated. Secondly,
whilst you are quite right that the Kosovo conflict comes after
Saint Malo, all of us could see the troubles in the Balkans and
the difficulty in Kosovo and our recent experience in places like
Bosnia. In those circumstances, I think it is entirely sensible
that we should look at how we can use the European Union to provide
better, effective decision making, to provide for the military
capacity, in order that it can play a better part in controlling
such crises. One of the great advantages of the European Union
is that it has both the military capacity of the Member States
and the immense humanitarian and financial assets of the European
Union. Crisis management, unlike collective defence, requires
you to get the right balance between both of those. You need both
of those in any crisis and that is why the European Union is an
appropriate agency to manage crises. It is not an appropriate
agency, in our judgment, to manage collective defence.
Mr Mackinlay
257. Quite apart from legislation which might
arise from any treaty arising from Nice, will there not have to
be self-standing legislation to deal with the defence and security
arrangements? For instance, I hear what you say about security
but manifestly there would need to be presumably some pan-European
or identical legislation, including the neutral states and the
Applicant states that might be participating, to see that there
was some minimum level of security and parity of treatment throughout
the arrangements?
(Mr Cook) On treaty change, it is our judgment that
there is no requirement for amendment of the treaty to provide
the authority for what we are doing. There are some countries
that, whilst not necessarily contesting that it is not required,
think it might be desirable. There are other countries who would
find it very unhelpful if there was such a treaty change in respect
of defence at Nice. There has already been reference to the possibility
of Ireland having a referendum. As I understand it, it does not
propose to have a referendum on the Treaty of Nice, but it would
be obliged to if we incorporated issues such as defence. The probability
is that at Nice we will not make any treaty change in respect
of this initiative, but we do not see that as a problem. Indeed,
throughout this whole exercise, Britain has been trying to get
the exercise focused on real capability and real improvements,
not on legal or rhetorical change.
258. Do you see that there might be a distribution
of responsibilities, either geographical or who has what assets,
between countries? For instance, would some have more maritime
responsibilities than others perhaps of cold weather climate?
One of the concepts is to maximise the scarce resources of the
individual states collectively, is it not?
(Mr Cook) It would make a lot of sense for nations
to contribute those parts of their military capabilities in which
they have specialist skills and specialist experience. From my
visits to Bosnia, it would require both cold climate and Mediterranean
climate equipment.
259. I was thinking of some of the smaller countries.
It would be a pity if the smaller countries replicated everything
rather than—
(Mr Cook) We are not asking any country to necessarily
start out and develop from scratch a new capability to contribute.
We are encouraging a number of them—some of them have been
encouraged by the very exercise—to look at how they can
make their existing forces more flexible and more mobile, but
essentially what this is doing is making sure that the contributions
we already make in the military can be pooled effectively. On
the overall question of resources, collectively, the European
countries of NATO spend the equivalent of two thirds of the United
States defence budget. That is a very large sum of investment
and I cannot say I am convinced that they get out of it two thirds
of the American output. A more effective pooling of resources
and perhaps a respect for specialised skills might give us a more
effective use of the money we do spend.
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