Examination of Witnesses (Questions 260
- 279)
TUESDAY 21 NOVEMBER 2000
RT HON
ROBIN COOK
MP, MR EMYR
JONES PARRY
CMG AND MR
KIM DARROCH
260. I agree. Can I ask you about a political
point? It seems to me part of the motive for this is a matter
of prudence. Europe cannot always assume that the United States
through NATO will wish to intervene in our backyard. Indeed, there
have been some recent indications where there has been an incapacity
either through Congress or the administration to do that. As I
understand it, it seems to be a matter of prudence that we should
make arrangements for that day perhaps when government or Congress
or the people of the United States say, "We will sit this
one out." That is a prudent course but the anxiety we have
is also that by making these arrangements you give an amber light
for the people of Congress in the United States to come to that
view earlier than they might have done. Is there any way of taking
initiatives to try and keep on board and continue the involvement
and commitment of the United States in NATO and western Europe's
security? I am not talking about Madeline Albright but longer
term.
(Mr Cook) There is only so much Madeline can do in
the time available to her. Can I make a distinction? First of
all, collective defence rests with NATO. I do not for one minute
suppose that the United States will not for all future foreseeable
time play its full part as a leading player within NATO. In the
event of that collective defence being required, all of us are
committed. Without the same ability of national decisions to pick
and choose what you will have with the European security, we are
obligated to take part in the event of an external attack. I am
absolutely confident the United States remains very firmly committed
to that Atlantic alliance as one of the corner stones of its foreign
and defence policy and that that will continue. There is then
the range of operations which are outside the NATO requirement
of collective defence such as some of the peace keeping operations
that we have had to mount in the Balkans. There may be occasions
in the future—there have certainly been occasions in the
past—when the United States has not felt they ought to take
part on the ground. It does seem therefore sensible and, to use
your word, prudent for the European Union to be able to mount
an operation in those circumstances. On your point about the impact
on political opinion within the United States, I would stand that
argument on its head. The criticism one has heard more often in
the past from Congressmen and senators is that Europe does not
pull its weight and in particular does not pull its weight in
being willing to undertake peace keeping operations within its
own continent. I would have thought there was actually a greater
risk to the alliance if we are not seen to respond to that perception
that we do not pull our weight and a greater possibility that
we will maintain the health, strength and vibrancy of the Atlantic
alliance if the United States can see and is confident that its
partner is pulling its weight.
Mr Rowlands
261. On a question of clarification, what has
emerged from these exchanges is that outside of minor operations
the new rapid deployment force would be dependent quite quickly
on NATO assets and utilisation of NATO assets. Those assets require
unanimity by NATO countries. We focused on the United States but
what about a country like Turkey which is pretty peeved about
this project anyway? It would require Turkish consent to utilise
any NATO assets, would it not?
(Mr Cook) Of course. As a member of NATO, Turkey would
have a say in the use of common assets to which Turkey and the
rest of us have contributed. I would not want the Committee to
think that this has arisen with us as an afterthought. For well
over a year, we have been engaged in intensive dialogue both with
NATO as an institution and also with the other members of NATO
who are not members of the European Union. That has resulted in
two separate sets of agreement. One of those agreements is that
the European members of NATO who are not in the EU can participate
in any EU led operation. In other words, if we decide in the European
Union that we are going to mount such an operation, it will be
open to Norway or to the three candidate countries, the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland who are not yet in the European Union,
to take part; also Turkey. The other set of agreements relates
to our access to NATO assets and the decision making within NATO
on that. A lot of work has been done on that. Some of that will
be approved at Nice. It is perfectly true that Turkey will want
to be sure that its interests are fully safeguarded, but it is
not saying no in principle to this concept.
Ms Abbott
262. To return to the question raised by my
colleague, Mr Mackinlay, on the possible effect of the European
rapid reaction force on the US, everything you have said about
US sentiment applies to successive US secretaries of state in
what you might call the east coast foreign policy establishment.
Is it not the case that on the hill in Congress there has always
been a thread of isolationist thinking which may or may not find
a new arena if there is a change of president? Even though President
Bush seems to be in the hands of his father's advisers more or
less, nonetheless, there is a strong isolationist thread running
throughout the thinking on the hill. We know this because we meet
regularly with our colleagues. Is there not a danger that the
emergency European rapid reaction force may play to that longstanding,
isolationist thread in Congress and therefore not necessarily
be constructive?
(Mr Cook) At this particular moment in history, I
am not going to get drawn on any speculation as to who will be
the next president of the United States. It is the case that within
the United States, which is a lively democracy, you can hear different
views. The view of the current administration is united on this.
263. What about Congress?
(Mr Cook) I will come back to that in a moment, if
I may. We have a dialogue with some of those who are around both
the candidates for the presidency and I do not anticipate that
their view will be any different. 4I have spent some time over
the past year on the Hill and the views that tend to be expressed
to me by Senators and by Congressmen is not opposition to what
Europe is doing, but some disbelief as to whether we would actually
deliver on the commitment to the core of 60,000. I look forward
to the next time I return to the Hill because that disbelief is
plainly misplaced. I have read regularly in the papers over the
last two days thinking similar to the one you have expressed that
if Europe improves its capability it will encourage the United
States to loosen its ties with Europe. I think that is flatly
wrong. I think if those Congressmen and Senators did not see Europe
responding to what plainly is a need for a capacity to mount a
crisis management within Europe then they are more likely to be
against being supportive of Europe. If they see Europe playing
its part and making the kind of modernisation that we have done
they are more likely to recognise us as a viable partner with
whom they can work.
Chairman
264. Secretary of State, before coming on to
the leftovers via the Middle East, I would just like you to comment
on the two areas where perhaps the spirit of St Malo is not as
strong, and where there are possible divergences between our own
position and that of the French Government on the nature of European
defence: one, in terms of the military personnel in the Committees
of the European Union. I understand we are double-hated in that
our personnel assigned to NATO will also be those assigned to
the European Union, and that is the position of the majority of
countries; whereas the French will not in fact double hat—suggesting
that they have a rather different view of what the European Union
could be. Is that correct?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure whether it would be correct
to proceed from a different view of what the European Union can
do but, famously, they do have a different perception of NATO
and, of course, they are not part of the integrated central command
in NATO, which is why they may well feel that their representative
to the European Union initiative should be different from their
representative to NATO who fulfils a different role there—different
compared with our own representative. As a matter of fact, the
majority of the European Union nations have shared the same approach
that we have. From memory, France and Belgium are the two exceptions
but I do not think we should feel uncomfortable with the company
we are in.
265. The other area of possible divergence is
this: you said to the Committee a few moments ago there is no
room for the Commission in this. When you came before us last
time you said this was essentially intergovernmental. There remains
the question of parliamentary oversight. The French, I understand,
want that oversight to come through the European Parliament. We
have not heard the question of where we stand on it. Can you ensure
that we follow the Dutch initiative and ensure that there be discussion
at the Nice Summit of the nature of the necessary democratic parliamentary
oversight over this defence policy?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I am very happy to say that
we have always taken the position from the start that because
this was intergovernmental and because the military forces are
accountable to their national governments this was not a matter
in which the European Parliament had any locus. I have noticed
one or two papers in the last day or two have taken some scare
stories from resolution to the European Parliament. Those resolutions,
of course, have no status whatsoever in the context of the initiative
and will have no bearing in the future of the Force. The oversight
of the commitment of British Forces remains with the British Parliament
and, similarly, with the French—who I do not think actually
have said that they want the European Parliament to have a role
in this. I think they share our perspective on that. There is
an issue of how does one provide some form of pan European parliamentary
scrutiny. This is one of the issues that prompted the Prime Minister
to float the concept of a second chamber.
266. That is after another IGC after perhaps
five years. How do you fill the void prior to the five years of
another IGC?
(Mr Cook) We are going to create a new institution
but it is not going to happen overnight. In any case, this particular
institution, the European Security Initiative, will not be there
until 2003.
267. Will you ensure that this is on the agenda
at Nice?
(Mr Cook) We have already put it on the agenda by
Mr Blair's speech in Warsaw and part of the discussion at Nice
may well be to follow up to Nice.
268. Will you ensure that it is?
(Mr Cook) I think we will have to take a judgment
on where it comes in the long--term issues which we are negotiating.
Other partners are keener in pushing the post-Nice agenda than
we are.
Dr Starkey
269. Can I take up from the outcome of the Euro-Med
conference that was held in Marseilles last week, which I take
it will be discussed in Nice. Is it realistic for the European
Union to pretend that progress can be made on the Euro-Med process
when the conflict in the Middle East is continuously deepening.
I noted in the Foreign Office memorandum it says the Palestinians
and the Israelis expressed appreciation for the help and support
the EU has given. Could you say what practical and specific measures
the European Union is now proposing to actually take the peace
process forward to deal with the conflict? If the European Union
as a whole cannot come to any specific action might Britain and
the French between them actually to propose some specific action?
(Mr Cook) First of all, in the course of the very
interesting discussion we had in Marseilles there were a number
of specific proposals put forward, including I am happy to assure
you by myself and also by Javier Solana. It was a private discussion
and I do not think I am at liberty to discuss the particular points
that were discussed. The European Union is now more important
for the peace process than at any previous time. Javier Solana
was present at Sharm-el-Shaikh. His participation there has been
widely praised by the others present with whom I have discussed
it. He is also now appointed to the Mitchell fact finding commission
and will very shortly be visiting the regions in that capacity
as well as in his European Union hat. We are very willing to do
all that we can to take forward the peace process and we made
that plain at Marseilles, where I also had separate private meetings
with both the Israeli Foreign Minister and Nabul Sha'ath on behalf
of the Palestinian Authority. There are a number of issues that
I think can be taken forward. First of all, if we are looking
at it problematically, both sides should carry out the implementation
of the agreements they have already reached at Sharm-el-Shaikh.
Secondly, the fact finding commission should be put in place as
quickly as possible, Javier Solana is taking a very active interest
in the region. Thirdly, there is a strong feeling that it would
be helpful if we could get agreement on both sides on some form
of observers; and one possible way in which that could be secured
in the immediate future might be for the fact finding commission
itself to appoint people who can look at the facts on the ground
in the present as well as in the past. The Israeli government
has already agreed to the fact finding commission; it might be
easier for it to agree to observers that are attached to the fact
finding commission. We need some confidence building measures.
Possibly Europe itself can help to reduce the tension by addressing
the situation in the West Bank and in the Gaza. All of us attach
high importance and yesterday called upon an end to the blockades
of the towns and the villages within the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip; and Europe itself has already released some funds to cover
suspension by the Israeli Government of the payments of tax to
the Palestinian authority. There is a lot underway and we are
very keen to take it further.
Chairman
270. Foreign Secretary, we will resume on the
Middle East. We will aim to begin as soon as possible after five
past. I hope we can claim some injury time.
(Mr Cook) I do have a commitment at the office at
6.15 so I will need to leave at 6, but I will try to speak as
quickly as possible.
The Committee was suspended from 5.55pm
to 6.05pm
Chairman: Dr Starkey is going to continue with
the Middle East, then Sir David has one question and then we move
on to Mr Maples.
Dr Starkey
271. Before you were so rudely interrupted,
Foreign Secretary, you were talking about the EU urging the Israeli
Government to lift the blockades. Can I ask whether you have considered
using the human rights instruments within the trade agreement
with Israel? Can I remind you that when I asked this before in
May 1999 you said that it was not the moment to use the human
rights clauses at the start of the Barak Government. Can I point
out to you that we are now at the point where under Barak actually
more illegal settlements have been built in defiance of international
law than were built under the previous Netanjahu Government and,
of course, despite the UN Security Council Resolution, a wholesale
disregard of Israel's obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention
culminating in yet more collective punishment in response to armed
attacks from the Palestinian side. Can I ask whether the EU is
seriously considering using the human rights clauses within the
trade agreements to suspend the agreements, to encourage the Israelis
to comply with the Security Council and their obligations under
international law? If not, how bad do human rights abuses have
to get before those human rights clauses will be invoked?
(Mr Cook) I think, Phyllis, you have to be clear what
it is you are asking of the European Union. Your previous question
was what are we doing to help the peace process. Your second question
is, what are we doing to make life so difficult for the Israeli
Government that they may reconsider the conduct of their policies.
Either of those is a tenable strategy. What is not tenable is
doing both at the same time. If we chose to invoke the suspension
of the trade agreement on the grounds of the human rights clauses,
that would become the total focal point of our discussions and
negotiations with the Israeli Government, there would be no room
for anything else in the context of our relationship with the
Israeli Government. Indeed it would be a pretty tough and harsh
negotiation which, if we persisted, could result in the suspension
of a very large volume of trade which is of interest to Israel.
I cannot honestly see that as a useful back-drop to us trying
to play a facilitating role in the context of the peace process.
There is a general truth here and we had better face up to it
honestly. If we are going to play a role in the peace process,
if we are going to play the kind of role we did in Marseilles
when actually we brought the two foreign spokesmen together for
a lengthy and very useful and honest discussion in a way they
do not have in other forums, then we have from time to time to
bite our tongue and not say things and do things which one side
or the other is going to find makes us unacceptable as a body
which can play that mediating role.
272. But we are also high contracting parties
to the Fourth Geneva Convention. By not acting we are actually
abrogating our obligations, our obligations, under the Fourth
Geneva Convention. How long can we go on not using the powers
that we do have to try to protect people who are being killed?
(Mr Cook) We have many obligations and as Foreign
Secretary quite a large part of my time is spent reconciling the
differing obligations we have. At the moment in the context of
the Middle East, the most pressing obligation we have is to play
what part we can in ending that bloodshed and nothing less than
that will actually end the loss of life to which you refer. Suspending
the trade agreement most certainly will not.
Dr Starkey: I think that is a matter of opinion.
It does appear that the human rights clauses in this trade agreement
are a complete dead letter and there are no circumstances in which
the EU would actually invoke them, in which case I do think the
previous minister in the previous Government who assured Parliament
that those human rights clauses were important and could be used
as added pressure was talking through his hat.
Mr Mackinlay: Who was that?
Dr Starkey
273. Mr Hanley. Finally, I want to bring up
another more technical point in relation to the trade agreement,
which is that I note in the conclusions of the Presidency Report
that there is mention that there is going to be a move towards
bringing in the diagonal accumulation in the trade agreement to
encourage inter-regional trade. Could I at least have an assurance
that there will be no discussions on diagonal accumulations involving
Israel until the current dispute between the European Union and
Israel, over the way in which the Israeli Government is misapplying
the rules of origin so as to designate goods produced within illegal
Israeli settlements as "made in Israel", is sorted out
and resolved to the satisfaction of the European Union? That there
will be no discussions about diagonal accumulations involving
Israel?
(Mr Cook) I think that is pretty certain but I also
have to say that fears about diagonal cumulation involving Israel
are possibly at the outer margin of the areas of immediate concern
in Israel, because the reality is that there is not any other
country in the region which is going to get into diagonal cumulation
in the present circumstances.
Sir David Madel
274. For clarification, Foreign Secretary, am
I right that both Israel and the Palestinian authority have agreed
to the stationing of observers?
(Mr Cook) No. The Palestinian authority is very keen
on it and lobbies internationally for it, but there is no agreement
on the Israeli side.
Chairman: I would like to move on now to the
main areas of the Nice Council, QMV. Mr Maples?
Mr Maples
275. Foreign Secretary, there is a rather long
list—rather longer than many of us expected—of 50
items in the draft which the French Presidency has produced, suggesting
a move from unanimity to QMV. I am sure everybody is happy to
know it is not my intention to go through the lot, and I am sure
you would say that some of them are very minor, but there are
two or three of them we can deal with quite quickly and then on
social security and tax perhaps you would like to take a little
more time to elaborate which proposals fall within the category
which the Government will not agree to. The first thing I want
to ask you is that the appointment of the special representative
to the CFSP is now going to be done by qualified majority voting.
Does the Government have any difficulty with that?
(Mr Cook) No. In fact we pressed for it.
276. You do not think that falls within the
definition of the area that you said you would not allow?
(Mr Cook) It is not an issue of a defence commitment
or indeed a foreign policy itself, but we have taken the broad
approach throughout this IGC that actually we would welcome majority
voting on appointments, otherwise you end up with a situation
in which one country can use an appointment as a pressure point
in relation to something which is nothing to do with the appointment.
Javier Solana, it should be remembered, was appointed by unanimous
consensus without any real competition to him because he was such
an outstanding and first class candidate. He is technically the
Secretary of the Council of the General Affairs Council and it
would be inconsistent for us to press for appointments elsewhere
to be settled by majority voting whilst exempting ourselves at
the General Affairs Council.
277. It is proposed that Article 13 of the Treaty
establishing the Community is amended to allow in areas of combating
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, et cetera,
that "where the Council adopts Community incentive measures
to support action by the Member States ...", et cetera, it
can do so by QMV. Is this not opening up a whole new area to the
competence of the Commission? Does that concern the Government
or are you happy with this?
(Mr Cook) Can I perhaps say for preface that this
of course is a very long shopping list produced by the Presidency.
Out of the 50 I think there are only a couple in the entire 50
which have nobody opposing them. All the others do have at least
one, and mostly more than one, country opposing them. As to the
UK, the majority of these we would not regard as acceptable and
you are referring to one of those. The mere fact the Presidency
publishes this shopping list does not mean that we intend to go
into the shop and buy the goods.
278. I understand that but if I assumed you
were going to subscribe to these, there would be no point in putting
the questions. The third point which I hope you can deal with
shortly is that it is proposed that Article 191 of the Treaty
should be amended to allow the Council by QMV to lay down regulations
governing political parties and rules regarding their funding.
This does seem to be an area which touches on both of us, though
not in quite the same way.
(Mr Cook) Could you repeat which number it was?
279. Article 191. It is proposed it deals with
political parties, which it says are a good thing, and it goes
on that the amendment is that the Council acting by QMV should
lay down regulations governing political parties in Europe and
in particular rules regarding their funding.
(Mr Cook) You will be intrigued to hear that it is
missing from the Foreign Office list, by which I take it that
we are not wildly enthusiastic about it. Can I say a word on this
though because there will be statutory parties in the IGC and
we are supporting it because we think it would be more helpful
and more transparent if the European-wide parties—the EPP
for the Conservative Party and the PS for the Labour Party—were
separately funded in their own right rather than, as at present
funded, as a by-blow of the parties in Parliament. So there will
be such a statute agreed at Nice. I personally am not aware of
having given a view whether or not it should be QMV.
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