Examination of witnesses (Questions 60
- 79)
TUESDAY 30 NOVEMBER 1999
THE RT
HON ROBIN
COOK, MR
EMYR JONES
PARRY, CMG and MR
NIGEL SHEINWALD
60. But in the list you gave in answer to Mr
Rowlands, you did include a very significant item which was not
in the list that the Prime Minister gave to the House on 19 October
when he said, "We shall not agree to any lifting of the veto
in areas such as tax, defence, or our border controls." In
reply to Mr Rowlands, you included in your list that unanimity
and therefore the British right of veto would be retained over
treaty amendments and I would be grateful if you could confirm
that the British Government's position is that all treaty amendments
should continue to require unanimity?
(Mr Cook) Yes. As you rightly and fairly said, both
the Prime Minister and I were producing illustrations. These are
not intended to be exhaustive lists and I am not entirely sure
it would be sensible to declare where the bottom line might be.
Yes, on treaty amendments we would wish to see that dealt with
by unanimity, and on that, we are under no pressure, the great
majority of other Member States will wish to see it dealt with
by unanimity as well.
61. Following that, as you are aware, there
have been some suggestions that at this IGC or possibly later
there might be a division of the existing treaties into two parts
in which unanimity would be retained for one part and QMV would
go for the other. Given what you have just said to the Committee,
that the British Government's position is firmly to retain unanimity
on all treaty amendments, I hope we would be right therefore to
conclude that this Government would resist any such proposal to
divide the treaties into two halves in the way that has been suggested
in some quarters?
(Mr Cook) We are certainly of the view that it would
be unhelpful to the present IGC if that exercise were to be included
within it, because if you were to go through the whole of the
treaty to make a judgment on every existing article you are most
certainly not contemplating an IGC which can be completed within
a year. So we will be resisting that as any part of the agenda
for Helsinki.
62. Quite apart from the practical difficulties
which I would fully acknowledge and accept, I hope you would also
agree that that exercise would be in policy terms unacceptable
because it would amount to a surrender of our veto over those
areas of treaty amendment which fell into the QMV section of the
treaty for the future.
(Mr Cook) I must confess I do not think that the case
for it has been well made and I have difficulty being confident
that you could achieve the clear definition which would be necessary
between what parts of the treaty were institutional and fundamental
and what parts of the treaty were about policy, which is the distinction
you are proposing. Frankly, without any greater clarity as to
how you could distinguish which article of the treaty is not a
legal requirement but a policy requirement, I find it hard to
see how one could take forward this proposal.
63. The last point I would like to ask you is,
what is your present thinking on the timing of the IGC White Paper?
(Mr Cook) I do not have any date in mind. I do not
know if I should. Should I have a date in mind? (After a pause)
As early as is practical.
64. Are we talking about the year 2000?
(Mr Cook) Yes, definitely, because we want to see
the thing completed by the year 2000, so we would be hoping to
produce it early in the New Year.
Sir John Stanley: Early in the New Year. Thank
you.
Mr Chidgey
65. Foreign Secretary, do you foresee any further
changes in the institutional balance between the Council, the
Commission and the Parliament beyond the next IGC? You have already
mentioned some this afternoon. Do you see the current balance
we are moving towards now to be optimum?
(Mr Cook) Those are not necessarily the only alternatives.
As I said earlier, we would not want to embark on major structural
changes which would delay agreement. I do not myself wish to see
any particular shift in the balance between the Council and the
Commission. There will be potentially some incidental changes
in respect of the Parliament. For instance, one issue we may have
to address in the course of the IGC may be the size of the Parliament.
We cannot simply go on adding to the Parliament as 12 new countries
come in, but if we maintain an overall ceiling then that of course
has awkward questions about the distribution of seats among the
existing Member States. Secondly, if there is some modest increase
in QMV, that may in turn lead to a parallel increase in co-decision-making
with the Parliament because co-decision-making is normally applied
to areas where QMV applies.
66. Moving further on, do you feel the EU should
be given a legal responsibility beyond the area of trade in goods,
for instance?
(Mr Cook) You mean an external personality?
67. A legal personality.
(Mr Cook) The European Community, already negotiates
as a single entity and will be doing so with a common strategy,
for instance, in Seattle. When this was last discussed around
the Amsterdam Treaty, our position was that there was no requirement
for that external legal personality and I do not see us likely
to be asked the question again this time, but let me take advice
on that.
(Mr Sheinwald) I think it is one of the issues mentioned
in the Dehaene Report to which you have alluded already, and it
is also in the Commission's own report, but we would not see it
necessary to discuss it next year at the IGC.
(Mr Cook) It was not an issue on which there was any
great pressure at the last IGC. Many countries share our own concern
that external legal personality should be for Member States.
68. Do you see that there is any scope for introducing
a Union-wide criminal offence to counter the abuse of EU funds?
(Mr Cook) If by that you mean the corpus juris
proposal which was for a Europe-wide prosecutor, then the answer
is no and indeed we saw that off at Tampere. We certainly are
in favour of greater co-operation within the prosecuting authorities
of the Member States, but that is a different matter from a prosecutor
with a cross-boundary remit. We are vigorous in our commitment
to tackling fraud within the European Union and of course it has
to be faced that most of that fraud occurs at Member State level
rather than at Commission level, but those are matters best addressed
through co-ordination of the national legal systems than the creation
of a special prosecutor who, like the US marshal, can appear in
any state.
Mr Illsley
69. Foreign Secretary, I have three questions
and the first follows on from Mr Chidgey's corpus juris
point. A lot of the press reports at the time printed scare stories
about the removal of habeas corpus, the Napoleonic legal
system replacing our own legal system in this country and all
the rest, but at the bottom of all that corpus juris was
intended to combat fraud. Is there any role for corpus juris
in the future or did Tampere, as you say, kill the whole of the
document stone dead?
(Mr Cook) No, it certainly saw, I hope, the end to
a proposal that there should be a prosecutor with a pan-European
remit as opposed to a national remit, but I would not want the
Committee to understate the degree of progress that we achieved
at Tampere. Tampere was a very successful summit which achieved
three major strategic objectives. First of all, it increased co-operation
between national police forces both in preventing crime and in
tackling cross-border organised crime. Secondly, it achieved progress
towards common standards on asylum and common programmes to tackle
the pressure of migration in the countries of origin. Thirdly,
there were some quite strong steps forward on mutual recognition
of court decisions and co-operation between legal systems. That
last point does provide openings which can lead to strengthen
the work against fraud on the European budget, and I would myself
see the way forward as taking advantage of those new openings
for greater co-operation and co-ordination between prosecutors
before we entertain the concept of a pan-European prosecutor.
70. Coming back to the question of enlargement
which as you have pointed out is perhaps a justification for launching
the IGC anyway, are there going to be any arrangements to seek
the views of candidates for enlargement, or is there any likelihood
that they might send representatives, particularly in view of
the conference which you decided to boycott?
(Mr Cook) It is a very fair and important question.
The candidate countries cannot be a formal part of the IGC, they
have no legal status to do so and in any case Member States would
be jealous of their right to affect the decisions for the European
Union of which they are currently the members. At the same time,
the decisions we take will have a bearing on future member countries—for
instance on the weighting of votes, the size of Parliament—all
these are of relevance to them. That is why it is important that
in parallel to the IGC, measures are taken by the presidency and
by Member States to keep the applicant countries informed and,
where appropriate, consult them, but they will not have a formal
status in the process.
71. The third question relates partly to a conclusion
from Amsterdam that there should be introduced more rapid and
effective decision-making procedures for solving problems within
the EU. Bearing in mind the problem we had with the beef crisis,
where there was basically a resort to the European Court or the
threat of legal action against countries despite the fact negotiations
were continuing, is there any likelihood the IGC will look to
improve those decision-making procedures? Also, I did notice in
your submission to the Committee, the idea of a European Food
Safety Agency which, in view of the problem with the beef crisis,
would perhaps solve other problems. What are the prospects for
a Food Safety Agency in Europe?
(Mr Cook) It is a proposal that will need to be handled
with care because Member States are not going to accept an agency
which would result in any reduction of standards and therefore
I think this particular proposal will require very careful exploration.
But on your other point, I am whole-heartedly with you. I said
earlier that one of the issues where we could see a case for majority
voting would be in reform of the procedures of the European Court
of Justice. Reform of its procedures ought to be part of this
IGC and we would hope that we can achieve reforms and changes
which will cut down the very long time it currently takes to take
a full case through the European Court of Justice.
Chairman
72. Just to wind up on this section on the IGC
before we go on to defence, Sir Peter and Mr Chidgey, can we take
it that in part because of the linkage with enlargement, you confidently
expect the IGC to be concluded before the end of next year?
(Mr Cook) "Confidently expect" is a hostage
to fortune and I am conscious that I may be before this Committee
a year from now, so I think I would be inclined to say that it
would be our intent and that is what we would work towards. It
is also the intent of the two countries that are taking up the
Presidency next year, but none of us can guarantee that.
73. Apart from the United Kingdom, Portugal
and France, is that, in your judgment, a consensus, that it should
be concluded by the end of next year?
(Mr Cook) I would certainly say that a comfortable
majority of members would be in agreement with that. To be candid,
not every country is as enthusiastic as the United Kingdom about
enlargement and it is always possible that there will be a country
which has reservations about enlargement which may express them
by making sure that the IGC gives a considered, lengthy and exhaustive
discussion to issues.
74. Finally, on what you do not like to be called
the Three Wise Men report, the Dehaene-Weizsaecker-Simon report,
are there parts of that comprehensive report to which you take
exception, to which you would object?
(Mr Cook) I think I have made it plain to the Committee
already that we do not accept that as the agenda for the IGC.
I do not think there will be any merit in going through ticking
and crossing here and there because that is not our starting-point
of reference.
Sir Peter Emery
75. Foreign Secretary, I have no doubt you know
the line of questioning that I might take on defence as I put
two of the questions during the foreign affairs debate on the
Loyal Address and did not get any answers. Firstly, though, may
I ask you about the St Malo conference. Does this indicate that
the United Kingdom is quite happy to go along with France, not
only on the rapid reaction force but also in the taking over by
the European Union of WEU?
(Mr Cook) If we secure the changes that we are proposing
to the European Union, it may then at that point become logical
to fold the WEU into the European Union, but that is some fences
down the track. First of all, we have to make sure that we have
the structures within the European Union for sensible decision-making
on security and crisis management. Secondly, we must make sure
that we have satisfactory mechanisms for the transmission of those
decisions to the military assets that we have committed to NATO,
and thirdly, which is a point Britain keeps stressing, we must
also make sure that we do have the effective military capability
to carry out those security decisions. Therefore, if we achieve
all that, then it would be appropriate to look at the WEU becoming
part of the European Union and, indeed, to be fair, that has been
a consensus position in the European Union since the Cologne summit
this summer.
76. Would you not accept, however, that the
restrengthening of WEU over the last eight years has been very
much France's agenda, to have WEU play a greater part within European
defence at the expense of NATO?
(Mr Cook) I would hesitate to speak for the French
government. I can only speak for the British government and I
can say what our objectives are.
77. But you have ideas?
(Mr Cook) I have lots of ideas which sometimes are
wiser to keep to myself, but I appear before the Committee as
the British not the French Foreign Minister.
78. We are asking to draw them out from you.
(Mr Cook) May I be clear about this, though, and I
think this really perhaps goes to the heart of the matter. We
do not see the security initiative in Europe as in any way competing
with or diminishing NATO. First of all, it is not going to be
about territorial defence. In our judgment that is a job only
for NATO. Secondly, it does not mean that NATO would not be involved
in crisis management in the future. When we had the Anglo-French
summit last week the wording of the agreed communique between
both of us was that the European security mechanisms would only
apply—I think I quote accurately—where the Alliance
as a whole is not engaged; in other words, if through NATO, the
United States, chooses to be engaged, then that is the way in
which the crisis management will be carried out. Thirdly, we are
not proposing any standing European military army or military
organisation. What we are proposing are mechanisms by which the
European Union in crisis management can call upon assets which
each of the Member States has committed to NATO.
79. But then the two questions that I did not
get an answer to were: how do you stop neutral nations of the
European Union having an input into the EU's decision-making on
WEU, which may well slow military decision-making of those nations
who are members of WEU?
(Mr Cook) To be fair, those countries, if I am right,
are already associate members of the WEU[1]
and so are very much involved in the WEU structures, but in the
real world, frankly, if we have a crisis equivalent to Kosovo
of this year or Albania four years ago, we will want all the help
we can get and Finland and Sweden have a very good record in peacekeeping
operations and we would like to see they are part of it and our
understanding from their support of our initiative is that they
also share that objective.
1 Note by Witness: In the WEU, EU non-NATO countries
are properly termed Observers. The Associate Members are the non-EU
European members of NATO. Back
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