TUESDAY 21 NOVEMBER 2000
_________
Members present:
Mr Donald Anderson, in the Chair
Ms Diane Abbott
Mr David Chidgey
Sir Peter Emery
Mr Andrew Mackinlay
Sir David Madel
Mr John Maples
Mr Ted Rowlands
Sir John Stanley
Dr Phyllis Starkey
_________
RT HON MR ROBIN COOK, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, MR EMYR JONES PARRY, CMG,
Political Director and MR KIM DARROCH, Director, European Union,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, examined.
Chairman
1. First, Foreign Secretary, the good news is I hope you have
learnt that "Foreign Affairs" won the 1.05 at Wolverhampton, and I hope too
in the course of your busy day you were able to do the necessary.
(Mr Cook) Sadly, no, but I am sure it is an omen for the future.
2. Foreign Secretary, we welcome you, we welcome Mr Emyr Jones
Parry, who is the Political Director of course, and Mr Kim Darroch,
Director, European Union. You know, of course, that we have this meeting
before every European Council and one of the advantages of this is that our
meetings help to inform subsequent debates in the House of Commons. The
debate in the Chamber will be on Thursday. I understand that the
transcript of this meeting will be in the Vote Office tomorrow morning and
on the internet about noon tomorrow, so it will hopefully be of assistance
to parliamentary colleagues in terms of their preparation for that debate.
The position in terms of the Nice Council, Foreign Secretary, is this,
that, yes, it is the left-overs of Amsterdam, and it is the essential pre-
requisite to enlargement. We, both the Prime Minister and yourself on
behalf of the Government, have shown great enthusiasm for enlargement, not
least in the Prime Minister's Warsaw speech. In that speech he, without
naming names, was critical of those who indulge in grand declarations of
enlargement without following it through into the detail of policy
decisions. Is it your view that the enthusiasm of this Government is
shared by other Governments?
(Mr Cook) Yes, I think it would be fair to say that is true. I think
in practical terms we have perhaps been of value during the negotiations,
partly because we are the least protectionist of the states and therefore
tend to be willing to sign up to the most generous terms for the applicant
countries; partly also because we attach great significance to the security
of Central and Eastern Europe and we understand embracing the new
democracies there into the European Union will help to underpin that
security; partly because we ourselves have formed very good, strong
friendships and alliances with those countries. I do not think you will
find a single one among the applicants who do not recognise Britain as a
friend and an ally.
3. But there is a difference between acceptance in principle and
the readiness to make the necessary concessions in terms, for example, of
competition and agricultural policy, concern about an influx of workers in
competition. Is it your fear that there will be such hesitations and that
the timetable at Nice will be held up?
(Mr Cook) No. I would very much expect partners to come to Nice
seeking to reach an agreement on the Intergovernment Treaty amending the
existing Treaty in order to pave the way for a European Union which can
function with a larger membership. I do not think any partner would come
there in order to prevent that from happening. The two points you touch on
are two of the reasons why we are natural allies of the applicants. The
first is we are one of the strongest advocates of reform and modernisation
of the Common Agricultural Policy and we see enlargement as naturally
increasing the urgency with which that must be tackled. Secondly, on the
question of the free movement of people, we are possibly less immediately
exposed because we are further away than some of our partners from the new
members. At the same time, we have vigorously argued, and it is my own
strong belief, that if we actually want to tackle the issue of migration
which gives rise to some popular concern in some countries, the better way
to do it is to bring these countries into the European Union, enabling them
to share our prosperity and enabling them to have the prospect of a career
and a job and a future within their own country. That was the experience
with Portugal, and as a result of Portugal's membership there are now fewer
people from Portugal working elsewhere in the Union than there were before
Portugal became a member.
4. I would like to turn to the European Security and Defence
Initiative and call Sir John Stanley, but one final question on this
introduction. If all goes well at Nice, there is the Nice Treaty, that
Treaty will have to be ratified, at least some of the countries, like
Ireland and Denmark, may need a referendum, it will presumably be three
months before the Treaty is completed in proper legal form subsequent to
Nice. If that is the case, what can you say about the ratification process
in this country, that it may well be that the formal legal document will
not be available prior to perhaps a May election in this country? What is
your expectation about the likely ratification process in this country?
(Mr Cook) For the benefit of the press, I should perhaps say that no
May election has been announced and I am not going to answer the question
in a way that suggests there will necessarily be a May election. Our
position is that we will seek ratification as soon as is practical. First
of all, we have to have, as you precisely say, the legal text, and then
there will be a signing ceremony which will follow some time after Nice.
Thereafter, when that text is signed and ready to be put before the House,
we will put it before the House as soon as we can.
Chairman: I would like to turn to the ESDI.
Sir John Stanley
5. Foreign Secretary, in the last few days, as we know, the EU
Member States have announced their force commitments to the ESDI. As far
as the UK is concerned, of course, all our armed forces are already
committed to NATO. The question I would like to put to you first is this,
in the event of a commitment of part or all of the armed forces that we are
allocating to the ESDI to an operation elsewhere in the world, and that
commitment has taken place, if following that deployment NATO finds itself
with an imperative need to deploy its own forces, who will take the
decision as to whether the British forces remain committed to the ESDI
deployment or are recalled to take part in the NATO deployment?
(Mr Cook) The British Government.
6. Can you therefore give me an assurance, and the rest of the
Committee, that if such an eventuality arose, the right of the British
Government to recall these forces without notice, without any delay, to
take part in a NATO operation in preference to the ESDI operation, is
wholly untrammelled and unqualified and is absolute?
(Mr Cook) Yes.
Sir John Stanley: Thank you.
Mr Rowlands
7. Foreign Secretary, just to clarify what I think so far have
been the statements which have been made, these decisions would be by
unanimity, by consensus, to commit the forces?
(Mr Cook) To commit the forces, yes. Once the forces were committed,
the management of the operation would be taken in the hands of those who
are participating in the operation, not in the wider European Union. In
other words if a country, for whatever good reason, did not commit a force
it would then not participate in the management of the forces. Can I
confirm I have that precisely right?
(Mr Jones Parry) The decision to launch the operation is one that
the 15 would take by unanimity. The decision as to whether or not British
troops should in any way be involved in it, is absolutely for the British
Government and the British Government alone. Then what happens afterwards
is what the Foreign Secretary has said.
8. I think in an earlier session we had, when this issue was
first raised, one of us - perhaps I did - asked you whether frankly,
however substantial this rapid deployment force is going to be, without
American assent or support it was highly unlikely there would be any
effective ability to launch this force, and we asked about Kosovo and
Bosnia for example and if both those situations were re-run, would this new
European defence force be capable of acting on its own without American
logistic support or assent?
(Mr Cook) First of all, we have put immense effort into working with
NATO to make sure that we can get access to the common NATO assets which we
have all jointly created within NATO. Much effort has gone into that and
considerable progress has been secured with it, and you will have seen the
letter from George Robertson in the Telegraph this morning. Now we would
anticipate that if there was a major operation, then that major operation
would draw upon central NATO assets for planning to make sure we could
launch a successful operation. To be candid, I do not think a major
operation could be mounted without those NATO assets. At the present time,
we have no reason to suppose in those circumstances the United States, or
any other NATO ally, would withdraw its consent for the use of those common
assets. Do remember here that we have quite explicit statements in all the
key documents relating to the European Security Initiative that we will
only launch a European-led operation where NATO as a whole is not involved,
in other words the kind of operation that you are contemplating would only
happen if NATO itself had decided not to launch such an operation,
presumably because the US itself did not wish to be involved. In those
circumstances, we would expect there to be a presumption in the United
States, not wishing to take part itself, to facilitate the use of the
common NATO assets so that somebody could do it.
9. It would require US consent for any NATO assets to be
deployed?
(Mr Cook) Insofar as the United States is a member of NATO, yes, just
as it would require the consent of other NATO allies like Norway who are
not members of the European Union.
10. You slightly beg the question in the use of the word "major".
How do you define what is minor and major in those circumstances?
(Mr Cook) I would not attempt to define it by hard and fast rules,
but let me take three cases in the Balkans which might illustrate it.
First of all, I do not think anybody would be seriously contemplating the
EU-led operation replicating what happened in Kosovo, that was a conflict,
and indeed, as the Prime Minister said this morning, we are not
contemplating this EU force participating in a conflict, it is there for
humanitarian intervention and peace-keeping operations. Conversely, at the
other end of the scale, you will recall in the mid-90s there was a state of
anarchy in Albania in which the military forces and police forces broke
down. On that occasion it was impossible to find an institution willing to
mount an institutional response to that, and in the end there was a
coalition of the willing led by the Italians. This could well be an
example where had this EU possibility been present at the time of Albania,
the EU could have mounted that and we would have had a much more effective
and immediate and rapid response because we are dealing with an existing
structure. I think Bosnia comes in between those two. It is quite
possible that if we had available to us a core strength of 60,000 rapid
reaction forces we could have committed it in Bosnia during those years in
the early 90s when the United States were not willing to be present on the
ground, and possibly had we been able to do so massacres like Srebronica
might not have taken place.
Mr Rowlands: May I finally ask you about the very strong words used
by the Prime Minister in his Warsaw speech? I understand how we have
wanted a better co-operation with the European Union to exercise political
influence, but the words in his speech, if I could just read them to you,
sound very different from just that. "Whatever its origins, Europe today
is no longer just about peace, it is about projecting collective power."
Now any layman would suggest that means projecting military power and that
links to the reference to the super state.
Chairman: Super power.
Mr Rowlands
11. There is little wonder the media distort things and put those
two things together and say that this is all part and parcel of the
development of a military arm to the whole of the European Union.
(Mr Cook) Let us be quite clear, as the Chairman was pointing out,
that the Prime Minister did not say that he wanted Europe to be a super
state, he did talk about super power but not a super state.
12. Super power.
(Mr Cook) On the question of the military role here, if we look back
over the crises of the past decade, and we have tragically seen too many of
them in South East Europe over that decade, the military role was a very
important role in making sure that one could restore, establish and sustain
peace.
13. That was done by NATO.
(Mr Cook) By NATO in some cases. In Albania by a coalition of the
willing. In the case of Bosnia it was actually not done initially by NATO,
it was done by the UN mandating a force, UNPROFOR, in which many European
nations took part but the Americans did not. The central point is there in
that given a state of insecurity and instability the military had a very
powerful part to play in restoring stability and in maintaining that
security. This does not mean that we are going in any way to contemplate
an outright conflict but where there is insecurity, where there is
instability, if we want to have an EU capacity to restore the peace then we
have to have the capacity to project a military force.
14. So it is about projecting collective power that was
anticipated in this kind of development that we have seen?
(Mr Cook) Yes. The Prime Minister has been utterly explicit on many
occasions that we do not see the European Union as the instrument of
collective defence. We have always said and repeatedly said that that is a
job for NATO and nothing that has happened in European security is going to
undermine that central role of NATO and NATO is the sole provider of that
collective defence.
Sir Peter Emery
15. Foreign Secretary, you will know that the Parliamentary
Assembly of NATO was meeting in Berlin last weekend and yesterday. There
were a number of American Congressmen, both senators and members of the
House of Representatives, who were very neutral on ESDI. They, rather
surprisingly, were not giving much away either for or against. You
obviously will have had discussions with your opposite number in the
American Government. Can you tell the Committee what you judge is the
American Government's view about ESDI?
(Mr Cook) The American Government's view is well known and widely
available in public. Madeline Albright only yesterday did say that "the
European Rapid Reaction Force is a strongly positive development. We
wholly support it", which could not be more explicit. She went on to
recall that the United States is working closely with the European Union to
make the initiative a success and that it will strengthen European and
transatlantic security. There are similar statements from the Defence
Secretary who has said that they wholly and unequivocally support it and
there are similar statements of support from President Clinton. There is
no actor in the American Government who is immediately relevant to this
issue who has not gone in public on this with very strong statements of
support.
16. They do not consider that this is a weakening of NATO?
(Mr Cook) No, and indeed Madeline Albright's statement of yesterday
actually does say it will strengthen it. The reason for that is that the
United States has for long been concerned that Europe could do more to
share the burden. The stress that we have been successful as Britain
within the European Security Initiative for putting on capability has meant
that we have now had to face up to the need to make sure that we can have
available flexible, mobile, rapid forces that we can move in the event of a
crisis. Do remember of course that as we develop these forces they are not
available only to the European Union. Should NATO decide that it wishes to
lead the operation rather than the European Union then they are available
also to NATO, so it is an additional resource to NATO.
17. But of course it will as a force not have the lift capacity
which NATO has with the Americans of going very far even within Europe.
(Mr Cook) You are right to identify one of the weaknesses of the
European military forces, the absence of strategic air lift capacity, and
that has been identified by the military in the course of discussions
leading up to the Capabilities Conference. We are looking at ways in which
Europe can strengthen this, for instance through the acquisition of the
Airbus. But in the event that we had an agreement that the European Union
would lead an operation and NATO in which, as I say, effectively here the
United States was not going to take part, it is by no means impossible in
those circumstances that the United States, faced with an operation in
which they may not wish to take part but an operation which it wishes to
succeed, might assist with air lift.
Mr Chidgey
18. Foreign Secretary, as I understand it the force we are talking
about is 60,000, which is probably 120,000 allowing for flexibility and
operational roles. I understand also that the expected range of operations
for the force could be as much as 2,400 miles. I presume that is assuming
that the Airbuses come on board. In that scenario, and given the different
rates of funding that different members of the European Union have akin to
their armed forces, how confident are you that in fact this is going to
work and that the Member States will honour the promises they have made?
(Mr Cook) The headline goal is to put in the field a core strength of
a rapid reaction force of 60,000 personnel, to put it in the field within
60 days and to sustain it there for at least a year.
19. It means obviously far more than that available to maintain
it?
(Mr Cook) You would have to have a process of allocation or something
like that. At the present time the commitment has been made at the
Capabilities Conference to exceed what is required for that 60,000 figure.
We have commitments of 100,000 that have been made. Indeed, I would stress
that the Capabilities Conference in this sense has been a very considerable
success. Remember also that we are looking really at the top whack, for
instance, if one or two of the kind of scenario that we were discussing
earlier in Albania, you would not be committing anything remotely approach
the 60,000, maybe not even a tenth of that figure. Can I say something
about the geographic scope? There is no decision either on the
delimitation of that geographic scope, nor is there any decision on a
particular ceiling, so the figure of 2,000 miles which you have quoted has
no official provenance. The report from the Capabilities Conference is
quite careful in that it makes its commitments only specifically within
Europe and the European sphere of what is sometimes described as the
European back yard, which is the countries immediately adjacent to it. I
would not myself have thought that we are likely to be going outside the
European continent other than in circumstances where we are doing so in
response to a UN mandate.
20. Can I pick that point up because there are two things here.
You said earlier that it requires total unanimity from all the nation
states for the decision to be made to become involved, but could it be the
case that, having got that consent, it would not necessarily require all
the Member States to be involved in the action? Could this be an enhanced
operation scenario, particularly, for example, in West Africa where we have
interests in Sierra Leone and the French have interests in Guinea and, as
you know, the overall conflict is now spreading over the borders northwards
to Guinea?
(Mr Cook) First of all we would not see enhanced co-operation as an
appropriate model here and that raises a whole range of different issues,
one of which of course is that with enhanced co-operation the Commission
would have a role and we have been quite clear throughout this that despite
what the papers say there is no role for the Commission in this initiative.
To come back to the central point of your question, yes, if the European
Union took a decision to launch an operation it is then a matter for
decision for each of the members as to whether or not they take part. That
must be the case since we ourselves are clear that we are not going to be
mandated by the European Union on a basis on which we are compelled to take
part; we will take our own national decision and we can hardly object if
others do the same.
21. One final question. Given the overstretch we already have on
our armed forces, is your colleague, the Defence Secretary, totally happy
with this?
(Mr Cook) Totally, enthusiastic about it, played a very strong part
in it in the course of the conference today and yesterday, and the Chief of
Defence Staff also played a very full part in this. The point that it
illustrates I think is very relevant to the European Security initiative
because, as I have been saying, one of the gains from this is that there
will be perhaps a fair sharing of the burden of maintaining the peace and
within that overall envelope of the 100,000 commitment it is true that we
have committed 12,000. It is also the case that other partners have
committed 88,000 and making sure that they can deploy flexible, mobile,
rapid forces of the kind that many of them still have to work on is a very
important gain for Britain.
Sir David Madel
22. Before the ESDI operation began would we inform or consult the
United States?
(Mr Cook) In the event that we will be using NATO assets there would
be no question that we would have to consult fully with all the NATO
members. In the event that we were not using those NATO assets
theoretically the requirement for consultation would be less. In practice
however I think that there are no circumstances in which it is going to
happen without extensive consultation with partners. Do remember that
first of all NATO itself has to take a decision as to whether or not it is
going to be involved.
23. Before the ESDI operation begins there has to be unanimity
amongst the countries before they start an operation?
(Mr Cook) Before it can be a European-led operation there has to be
European Union unanimity.
24. Does there have to be unanimity to stop the operation?
(Mr Cook) As I recall it, the inclusion of an operation to formally
wind it up would be in the hands of all 15 but in practice if the
participants decided to end it then it would end.
25. So if some participants said, "We should stop now", it would
stop?
(Mr Cook) Not necessarily some. I would hope that there would be
unanimity among the participants to wind up the operation. Obviously if
some withdrew there would be a question for the others whether they could
realistically continue. Am I right in that?
(Mr Jones Parry) Absolutely right, Foreign Secretary. Can I stress
that all the structures, the decisions, have been put in place to ensure
that the decisions when taken are militarily sound, so there cannot be a
question of a capricious withdrawal. It would actually be sitting down
with contributors on the ground, none of us can take decisions which affect
contributors without them being involved. It is quite basic. If the view
of the contributors was clearly that they wanted out, then no-one else can
impose on them an obligation that they should actually continue. It is
just not conceivable. Could I also stress one thing? Continually the
phrase "a force" is being used in questions. There is no standing force.
There is no European army. There are capabilities which have been declared
to the Union but there they are also capabilities which are available for
the United Nations, for NATO, for Member States to use in whatever way they
wish. That is basic to this. When we talk about priorities, the
priorities are no different for the Secretary of State for Defence now than
they will be afterwards. There is always a difficulty in where do you put
your priority. The assumption somehow is that there is a problem out there
which the EU will take and therefore it will cause a problem for NATO. The
fact is that if there is a problem out there somebody will have to deal
with it. What this is doing is producing added capabilities so that some
of it can be used if needed.
(Mr Cook) If I could just summarise it, it is not going to be a Euro
army. There is no permanent standing army. There is no permanent central
integrated command as there is with NATO. We are under no obligation to
commit our forces in the event that there is such an operation and we will
only do so if we choose to do so.
26. A capricious decision to withdraw could be caused by changes
in the political situation in one of the countries. Would you accept that?
(Mr Jones Parry) Absolutely, but then you would require a sensible
rational discussion so that you did not take decision unilaterally just
like that which put others at risk. We would require that of other
contributors but it does not in any way say that you could not withdraw,
but the manner in which you did it would of course have to be done in the
most responsible way.
Mr Maples
27. Foreign Secretary, you said that one of the things the United
States wanted to see was greater European military capability in the
contribution to security in the region. One of the concerns some people
had was that with the European Union setting up its own military committee,
military headquarters, with no integrated control system but we are setting
up a military staff, talking about our own communications and intelligence
capabilities, duplicating those of NATO, is there not, at a time of falling
defence budgets across the European Union, particularly in Germany which
will be one of our main allies in this initiative, a danger that with these
additional expenditures which are being called on the actual money going
into military effort and military capability will be less and not more?
(Mr Cook) But the additional expenditure is very modest. First of
all, we are not going to have a permanent standing headquarters. There is
no equivalent of SHAPE, for instance. There is indeed going to be the
committee of military personnel from each nation in Brussels able to advise
on what might be a feasible operation and how it should be run. But, for
heaven's sake, that has to be a very sensible first base from which to make
any sensible and informed decisions. But the cost of that is pretty
minimal and probably the marginal cost of it is almost zero. As George
Robertson has stressed in his letter today, what we are seeking to do is to
complement not to compete with the assets of NATO. In the context of the
Germans and the Dutch in defence spending which you mentioned, I think that
this initiative has been extremely helpful in encouraging partners within
the overall envelopes that they are willing to make available for defence
to focus their efforts on making sure that their forces are flexible, are
mobile, can move rapidly. Germany was rather taken aback by how difficult
it was to get 5,000 of their service personnel to Kosovo in the course of
the conflict. That and the European security initiative has helped to
shape the debate in the direction of producing more flexible, more rapid,
more mobile forces, even within the overall declining envelope. It is very
much in our interests that that does happen across Europe; otherwise we and
France will be the only people capable of responding.
28. If we take the case of Germany, for example, which has one of
the lowest percentages of GDP on defence of any European Union country,
setting up our own intelligence communications with additional military
staff, that is not going to add to that capability of itself. Do you have
any assurance from the German Government that they will spend more money on
defence to make up at least for those duplications of assets and resources
which currently exist in NATO so that we can guarantee that they will be
providing a greater military effort as a result of this initiative?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I would strongly resist the idea that there
is any substantial expenditure on the duplication to which you refer.
Secondly, it would be impertinent of me to seek assurances from any other
sovereign state within the European Union for guarantees about their
spending. I think you would strongly resent it if Germany was to require
that of us.
(Mr Jones Parry) On the intelligence, what is clearly necessary is
that sources of intelligence should be available to the European Union.
There is no plan that the European Union should have an intelligence
gathering capability. At the moment, there is a WEU satellite centre which
does a certain amount of work. That will probably continue, but there is
no sense of extending beyond that. It may be that some Member States will
put in national intelligence assessments if an operation is being
contemplated but there is not going to be massive expenditure on
intelligence by the EU.
29. Are you saying that we as a nation will share all of our
military intelligence?
(Mr Cook) No, not all of it. Indeed, we do not with anybody but we
may well share intelligence which is relevant to an operation to the extent
that we can do so without compromising our own terms of operation. I read
in one paper this morning that the intelligence chiefs are very concerned
about this. I have to report, as the Minister to whom the Secret
Intelligence Service reports, that I have had no such concerns expressed to
me at all at any point of this.
Chairman
30. No concern about the leaky nature of Brussels? Interpreters
are refusing to have positive vetting.
(Mr Cook) There are bona fide issues of security within the European
Union which is now embarking upon a new exercise for it and that will
require both secure buildings and staff with a culture of respect for
secrecy. Javier Solana has been working hard at this. I cannot think of
anybody more likely to develop that culture of secrecy than the person who
has just spent five years as Secretary General of NATO.
Mr Maples
31. I understand the reason for the initiative, but I also
understood very clearly the previous policy which the Prime Minister set
out at Amsterdam, which is that defence was no business of the European
Union. That policy changed in the autumn of 1998, in the two or three
months in the run up to the Saint Malo Agreement. I have never really
understood what the rationale was for that policy change because it was a
very significant policy change. Sometimes the experience of Kosovo is
prayed in aid for the change but Saint Malo happened several months before
the Kosovo operation. I wonder if you can explain to us exactly why the
policy was so significantly changed?
(Mr Cook) I would make two observations. First of all, there has
been no change in our view that collective defence is not the job of the
European Union and nothing in this initiative in any way entrenches on
that. Collective defence remains the job of NATO. We have been very
successful in the course of all of this in making sure that that is
repeatedly stated. Secondly, whilst you are quite right that the Kosovo
conflict comes after Saint Malo, all of us could see the troubles in the
Balkans and the difficulty in Kosovo and our recent experience in places
like Bosnia. In those circumstances, I think it is entirely sensible that
we should look at how we can use the European Union to provide better,
effective decision making, to provide for the military capacity, in order
that it can play a better part in controlling such crises. One of the
great advantages of the European Union is that it has both the military
capacity of the Member States and the immense humanitarian and financial
assets of the European Union. Crisis management, unlike collective
defence, requires you to get the right balance between both of those. You
need both of those in any crisis and that is why the European Union is an
appropriate agency to manage crises. It is not an appropriate agency, in
our judgment, to manage collective defence.
Mr Mackinlay
32. Quite apart from legislation which might arise from any treaty
arising from Nice, will there not have to be self-standing legislation to
deal with the defence and security arrangements? For instance, I hear what
you say about security but manifestly there would need to be presumably
some pan-European or identical legislation, including the neutral states
and the Applicant states that might be participating, to see that there was
some minimum level of security and parity of treatment throughout the
arrangements?
(Mr Cook) On treaty change, it is our judgment that there is no
requirement for amendment of the treaty to provide the authority for what
we are doing. There are some countries that, whilst not necessarily
contesting that it is not required, think it might be desirable. There are
other countries who would find it very unhelpful if there was such a treaty
change in respect of defence at Nice. There has already been reference to
the possibility of Ireland having a referendum. As I understand it, it
does not propose to have a referendum on the Treaty of Nice, but it would
be obliged to if we incorporated issues such as defence. The probability
is that at Nice we will not make any treaty change in respect of this
initiative, but we do not see that as a problem. Indeed, throughout this
whole exercise, Britain has been trying to get the exercise focused on real
capability and real improvements, not on legal or rhetorical change.
33. Do you see that there might be a distribution of
responsibilities, either geographical or who has what assets, between
countries? For instance, would some have more maritime responsibilities
than others perhaps of cold weather climate? One of the concepts is to
maximise the scarce resources of the individual states collectively, is it
not?
(Mr Cook) It would make a lot of sense for nations to contribute
those parts of their military capabilities in which they have specialist
skills and specialist experience. From my visits to Bosnia, it would
require both cold climate and Mediterranean climate equipment.
34. I was thinking of some of the smaller countries. It would be
a pity if the smaller countries replicated everything rather than ----
(Mr Cook) We are not asking any country to necessarily start out and
develop from scratch a new capability to contribute. We are encouraging a
number of them -- some of them have been encouraged by the very exercise --
to look at how they can make their existing forces more flexible and more
mobile, but essentially what this is doing is making sure that the
contributions we already make in the military can be pooled effectively.
On the overall question of resources, collectively, the European countries
of NATO spend the equivalent of two thirds of the United States defence
budget. That is a very large sum of investment and I cannot say I am
convinced that they get out of it two thirds of the American output. A
more effective pooling of resources and perhaps a respect for specialised
skills might give us a more effective use of the money we do spend.
35. I agree. Can I ask you about a political point? It seems to
me part of the motive for this is a matter of prudence. Europe cannot
always assume that the United States through NATO will wish to intervene in
our backyard. Indeed, there have been some recent indications where there
has been an incapacity either through Congress or the administration to do
that. As I understand it, it seems to be a matter of prudence that we
should make arrangements for that day perhaps when government or Congress
or the people of the United States say, "We will sit this one out." That
is a prudent course but the anxiety we have is also that by making these
arrangements you give an amber light for the people of Congress in the
United States to come to that view earlier than they might have done. Is
there any way of taking initiatives to try and keep on board and continue
the involvement and commitment of the United States in NATO and western
Europe's security? I am not talking about Madeline Albright but longer
term.
(Mr Cook) There is only so much Madeline can do in the time available
to her. Can I make a distinction? First of all, collective defence rests
with NATO. I do not for one minute suppose that the United States will not
for all future foreseeable time play its full part as a leading player
within NATO. In the event of that collective defence being required, all
of us are committed. Without the same ability of national decisions to
pick and choose what you will have with the European security, we are
obligated to take part in the event of an external attack. I am absolutely
confident the United States remains very firmly committed to that Atlantic
alliance as one of the corner stones of its foreign and defence policy and
that that will continue. There is then the range of operations which are
outside the NATO requirement of collective defence such as some of the
peace keeping operations that we have had to mount in the Balkans. There
may be occasions in the future -- there have certainly been occasions in
the past -- when the United States has not felt they ought to take part on
the ground. It does seem therefore sensible and, to use your word, prudent
for the European Union to be able to mount an operation in those
circumstances. On your point about the impact on political opinion within
the United States, I would stand that argument on its head. The criticism
one has heard more often in the past from Congressmen and senators is that
Europe does not pull its weight and in particular does not pull its weight
in being willing to undertake peace keeping operations within its own
continent. I would have thought there was actually a greater risk to the
alliance if we are not seen to respond to that perception that we do not
pull our weight and a greater possibility that we will maintain the health,
strength and vibrancy of the Atlantic alliance if the United States can see
and is confident that its partner is pulling its weight.
Mr Rowlands
36. On a question of clarification, what has emerged from these
exchanges is that outside of minor operations the new rapid deployment
force would be dependent quite quickly on NATO assets and utilisation of
NATO assets. Those assets require unanimity by NATO countries. We focused
on the United States but what about a country like Turkey which is pretty
peeved about this project anyway? It would require Turkish consent to
utilise any NATO assets, would it not?
(Mr Cook) Of course. As a member of NATO, Turkey would have a say in
the use of common assets to which Turkey and the rest of us have
contributed. I would not want the Committee to think that this has arisen
with us as an afterthought. For well over a year, we have been engaged in
intensive dialogue both with NATO as an institution and also with the other
members of NATO who are not members of the European Union. That has
resulted in two separate sets of agreement. One of those agreements is
that the European members of NATO who are not in the EU can participate in
any EU led operation. In other words, if we decide in the European Union
that we are going to mount such an operation, it will be open to Norway or
to the three candidate countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
who are not yet in the European Union, to take part; also Turkey. The
other set of agreements relates to our access to NATO assets and the
decision making within NATO on that. A lot of work has been done on that.
Some of that will be approved at Nice. It is perfectly true that Turkey
will want to be sure that its interests are fully safeguarded, but it is
not saying no in principle to this concept.
Ms Abbott
37. To return to the question raised by my colleague, Mr
Mackinlay, on the possible effect of the European rapid reaction force on
the US, everything you have said about US sentiment applies to successive
US secretaries of state in what you might call the east coast foreign
policy establishment. Is it not the case that on the hill in Congress
there has always been a thread of isolationist thinking which may or may
not find a new arena if there is a change of president? Even though
President Bush seems to be in the hands of his father's advisers more or
less, nonetheless, there is a strong isolationist thread running throughout
the thinking on the hill. We know this because we meet regularly with our
colleagues. Is there not a danger that the emergency European rapid
reaction force may play to that longstanding, isolationist thread in
Congress and therefore not necessarily be constructive?
(Mr Cook) At this particular moment in history, I am not going to get
drawn on any speculation as to who will be the next president of the United
States. It is the case that within the United States, which is a lively
democracy, you can hear different views. The view of the current
administration is united on this.
38. What about Congress?
(Mr Cook) I will come back to that in a moment, if I may. We have a
dialogue with some of those who are around both the candidates for the
presidency and I do not anticipate that their view will be any different.
4I have spent some time over the past year on the Hill and the views that
tend to be expressed to me by Senators and by Congressmen is not opposition
to what Europe is doing, but some disbelief as to whether we would actually
deliver on the commitment to the core of 60,000. I look forward to the
next time I return to the Hill because that disbelief is plainly misplaced.
I have read regularly in the papers over the last two days thinking similar
to the one you have expressed that if Europe improves its capability it
will encourage the United States to loosen its ties with Europe. I think
that is flatly wrong. I think if those Congressmen and Senators did not
see Europe responding to what plainly is a need for a capacity to mount a
crisis management within Europe then they are more likely to be against
being supportive of Europe. If they see Europe playing its part and making
the kind of modernisation that we have done they are more likely to
recognise us as a viable partner with whom they can work.
Chairman
39. Secretary of State, before coming on to the leftovers via the
Middle East, I would just like you to comment on the two areas where
perhaps the spirit of St Malo is not as strong, and where there are
possible divergences between our own position and that of the French
Government on the nature of European defence: one, in terms of the
military personnel in the Committees of the European Union. I understand
we are double-hated in that our personnel assigned to NATO will also be
those assigned to the European Union, and that is the position of the
majority of countries; whereas the French will not in fact double hat -
suggesting that they have a rather different view of what the European
Union could be. Is that correct?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure whether it would be correct to proceed from a
different view of what the European Union can do but, famously, they do
have a different perception of NATO and, of course, they are not part of
the integrated central command in NATO, which is why they may well feel
that their representative to the European Union initiative should be
different from their representative to NATO who fulfils a different role
there - different compared with our own representative. As a matter of
fact, the majority of the European Union nations have shared the same
approach that we have. From memory, France and Belgium are the two
exceptions but I do not think we should feel uncomfortable with the
company we are in.
40. The other area of possible divergence is this: you said to
the Committee a few moments ago there is no room for the Commission in
this. When you came before us last time you said this was essentially
intergovernmental. There remains the question of parliamentary oversight.
The French, I understand, want that oversight to come through the European
Parliament. We have not heard the question of where we stand on it. Can
you ensure that we follow the Dutch initiative and ensure that there be
discussion at the Nice Summit of the nature of the necessary democratic
parliamentary oversight over this defence policy?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I am very happy to say that we have always
taken the position from the start that because this was intergovernmental
and because the military forces are accountable to their national
governments this was not a matter in which the European Parliament had any
locus. I have noticed one or two papers in the last day or two have taken
some scare stories from resolution to the European Parliament. Those
resolutions, of course, have no status whatsoever in the context of the
initiative and will have no bearing in the future of the Force. The
oversight of the commitment of British Forces remains with the British
Parliament and, similarly, with the French - who I do not think actually
have said that they want the European Parliament to have a role in this.
I think they share our perspective on that. There is an issue of how does
one provide some form of pan European parliamentary scrutiny. This is one
of the issues that prompted the Prime Minister to float the concept of a
second chamber.
41. That is after another IGC after perhaps five years. How do
you fill the void prior to the five years of another IGC?
(Mr Cook) We are going to create a new institution but it is not
going to happen overnight. In any case, this particular institution, the
European Security Initiative, will not be there until 2003.
42. Will you ensure that this is on the agenda at Nice?
(Mr Cook) We have already put it on the agenda by Mr Blair's speech
in Warsaw and part of the discussion at Nice may well be to follow up to
Nice.
43. Will you ensure that it is?
(Mr Cook) I think we will have to take a judgment on where it comes
in the long-term issues which we are negotiating. Other partners are
keener in pushing the post-Nice agenda than we are.
Dr Starkey
44. Can I take up from the outcome of the Euro-Med conference that
was held in Marseilles last week, which I take it will be discussed in
Nice. Is it realistic for the European Union to pretend that progress can
be made on the Euro-Med process when the conflict in the Middle East is
continuously deepening. I noted in the Foreign Office memorandum it says
the Palestinians and the Israelis expressed appreciation for the help and
support the EU has given. Could you say what practical and specific
measures the European Union is now proposing to actually take the peace
process forward to deal with the conflict? If the European Union as a
whole cannot come to any specific action might Britain and the French
between them actually to propose some specific action?
(Mr Cook) First of all, in the course of the very interesting
discussion we had in Marseilles there were a number of specific proposals
put forward, including I am happy to assure you by myself and also by
Javier Solano. It was a private discussion and I do not think I am at
liberty to discuss the particular points that were discussed. The European
Union is now more important for the peace process than at any previous
time. Javier Solano was present at Sharm-Al-Sheikh. His participation
there has been widely praised by the others present with whom I have
discussed it. He is also now appointed to the Mitchell fact finding
commission and will very shortly be visiting the regions in that capacity
as well as in his European Union hat. We are very willing to do all that
we can to take forward the peace process and we made that plain at
Marseilles, where I also had separate private meetings with both the
Israeli Foreign Minister and Nabil Sha'ath on behalf of the Palestinian
authority. There are a number of issues that I think can be taken forward.
First of all, if we are looking at it problematically, both sides should
carry out the implementation of the agreements they have already reached at
Sharm-Al-Sheik. Secondly, the fact finding commission should be put in
place as quickly as possible, Javier Solano is taking a very active
interest in the region. Thirdly, there is a strong feeling that it would
be helpful if we could get agreement on both sides in some form of
observers; and one possible way in which that could be secured in the
immediate future might be for the fact finding commission itself to appoint
people who can look at the facts on the ground in the present as well as in
the past. The Israeli government has already agreed to the fact finding
commission; it might be easier for it to agree to observers that are
attached to the fact finding commission. We need some confidence building
measures. Possibly Europe itself can help to reduce the tension by
addressing the situation in the West Bank and in the Gaza. All of us
attach high importance and yesterday called upon an end to the blockades of
the towns and the villages within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and
Europe itself has already released some funds to cover suspension by the
Israeli Government of the payments of tax to the Palestinian authority.
There is a lot underway and we are very keen to take it further.
Chairman
45. Foreign Secretary, we will resume on the Middle East. We will
aim to begin as soon as possible after five past. I hope we can claim some
injury time.
(Mr Cook) I do have a commitment at the office at 6.15 so I will need
to leave at 6, but I will try to speak as quickly as possible.
The Committee was suspended from 5.55pm to 6.05pm
Chairman: Dr Starkey is going to continue with the Middle East, then
Sir David has one question and then we move on to Mr Maples.
Dr Starkey
46. Before you were so rudely interrupted, Foreign Secretary, you
were talking about the EU urging the Israeli Government to lift the
blockades. Can I ask whether you have considered using the human rights
instruments within the trade agreement with Israel? Can I remind you that
when I asked this before in May 1999 you said that it was not the moment to
use the human rights clauses at the start of the Barak Government. Can I
point out to you that we are now at the point where under Barak actually
more illegal settlements have been built in defiance of international law
than were built under the previous Netanjahu Government and, of course,
despite the UN Security Council Resolution, a wholesale disregard of
Israel's obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention culminating in yet
more collective punishment in response to armed attacks from the
Palestinian side. Can I ask whether the EU is seriously considering using
the human rights clauses within the trade agreements to suspend the
agreements, to encourage the Israelis to comply with the Security Council
and their obligations under international law? If not, how bad do human
rights abuses have to get before those human rights clauses will be
invoked?
(Mr Cook) I think, Phyllis, you have to be clear what it is you are
asking of the European Union. Your previous question was what are we doing
to help the peace process. Your second question is, what are we doing to
make life so difficult for the Israeli Government that they may reconsider
the conduct of their policies. Either of those is a tenable strategy.
What is not tenable is doing both at the same time. If we chose to invoke
the suspension of the trade agreement on the grounds of the human rights
clauses, that would become the total focal point of our discussions and
negotiations with the Israeli Government, there would be no room for
anything else in the context of our relationship with the Israeli
Government. Indeed it would be a pretty tough and harsh negotiation which,
if we persisted, could result in the suspension of a very large volume of
trade which is of interest to Israel. I cannot honestly see that as a
useful back-drop to us trying to play a facilitating role in the context of
the peace process. There is a general truth here and we had better face up
to it honestly. If we are going to play a role in the peace process, if we
are going to play the kind of role we did in Marseilles when actually we
brought the two foreign spokesmen together for a lengthy and very useful
and honest discussion in a way they do not have in other forums, then we
have from time to time to bite our tongue and not say things and do things
which one side or the other is going to find makes us unacceptable as a
body which can play that mediating role.
47. But we are also high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva
Convention. By not acting we are actually abrogating our obligations, our
obligations, under the Fourth Geneva Convention. How long can we go on not
using the powers that we do have to try to protect people who are being
killed?
(Mr Cook) We have many obligations and as Foreign Secretary quite a
large part of my time is spent reconciling the differing obligations we
have. At the moment in the context of the Middle East, the most pressing
obligation we have is to play what part we can in ending that bloodshed and
nothing less than that will actually end the loss of life to which you
refer. Suspending the trade agreement most certainly will not.
Dr Starkey: I think that is a matter of opinion. It does appear
that the human rights clauses in this trade agreement are a complete dead
letter and there are no circumstances in which the EU would actually invoke
them, in which case I do think the previous minister in the previous
Government who assured Parliament that those human rights clauses were
important and could be used as added pressure was talking through his hat.
Mr Mackinlay: Who was that?
Dr Starkey
48. Mr Hanley. Finally, I want to bring up another more technical
point in relation to the trade agreement, which is that I note in the
conclusions of the Presidency Report that there is mention that there is
going to be a move towards bringing in the diagonal accumulation in the
trade agreement to encourage inter-regional trade. Could I at least have
an assurance that there will be no discussions on diagonal accumulations
involving Israel until the current dispute between the European Union and
Israel, over the way in which the Israeli Government is misapplying the
rules of origin so as to designate goods produced within illegal Israeli
settlements as "made in Israel", is sorted out and resolved to the
satisfaction of the European Union? That there will be no discussions
about diagonal accumulations involving Israel?
(Mr Cook) I think that is pretty certain but I also have to say that
fears about diagonal accumulation involving Israel are possibly at the
outer margin of the areas of immediate concern in Israel, because the
reality is that there is not any other country in the region which is going
to get into diagonal accumulation in the present circumstances.
Sir David Madel
49. For clarification, Foreign Secretary, am I right that both
Israel and the Palestinian authority have agreed to the stationing of
observers?
(Mr Cook) No. The Palestinian authority is very keen on it and
lobbies internationally for it, but there is no agreement on the Israeli
side.
Chairman: I would like to move on now to the main areas of the Nice
Council, QMV. Mr Maples?
Mr Maples
50. Foreign Secretary, there is a rather long list - rather longer
than many of us expected - of 50 items in the draft which the French
Presidency has produced, suggesting a move from unanimity to QMV. I am
sure everybody is happy to know it is not my intention to go through the
lot, and I am sure you would say that some of them are very minor, but
there are two or three of them we can deal with quite quickly and then on
social security and tax perhaps you would like to take a little more time
to elaborate which proposals fall within the category which the Government
will not agree to. The first thing I want to ask you is that the
appointment of the special representative to the CFSP is now going to be
done by qualified majority voting. Does the Government have any difficulty
with that?
(Mr Cook) No. In fact we pressed for it.
51. You do not think that falls within the definition of the area
that you said you would not allow?
(Mr Cook) It is not an issue of a defence commitment or indeed a
foreign policy itself, but we have taken the broad approach throughout this
IGC that actually we would welcome majority voting on appointments,
otherwise you end up with a situation in which one country can use an
appointment as a pressure point in relation to something which is nothing
to do with the appointment. Javier Solano, it should be remembered, was
appointed by unanimous consensus without any real competition to him
because he was such an outstanding and first class candidate. He is
technically the Secretary of the Council of the General Affairs Council and
it would be inconsistent for us to press for appointments elsewhere to be
settled by majority voting whilst exempting ourselves at the General
Affairs Council.
52. It is proposed that Article 13 of the Treaty establishing the
Community is amended to allow in areas of combating discrimination based on
sex, racial or ethnic origin, et cetera, that "where the Council adopts
Community incentive measures to support action by the Member States ...",
et cetera, it can do so by QMV. Is this not opening up a whole new area to
the competence of the Commission? Does that concern the Government or are
you happy with this?
(Mr Cook) Can I perhaps say for preface that this of course is a very
long shopping list produced by the Presidency. Out of the 50 I think there
are only a couple in the entire 50 which have nobody opposing them. All
the others do have at least one, and mostly more than one, country opposing
them. As to the UK, the majority of these we would not regard as
acceptable and you are referring to one of those. The mere fact the
Presidency publishes this shopping list does not mean that we intend to go
into the shop and buy the goods.
53. I understand that but if I assumed you were going to subscribe
to these, there would be no point in putting the questions. The third
point which I hope you can deal with shortly is that it is proposed that
Article 191 of the Treaty should be amended to allow the Council by QMV to
lay down regulations governing political parties and rules regarding their
funding. This does seem to be an area which touches on both of us, though
not in quite the same way.
(Mr Cook) Could you repeat which number it was?
54. Article 191. It is proposed it deals with political parties,
which it says are a good thing, and it goes on that the amendment is that
the Council acting by QMV should lay down regulations governing political
parties in Europe and in particular rules regarding their funding.
(Mr Cook) You will be intrigued to hear that it is missing from the
Foreign Office list, by which I take it that we are not wildly enthusiastic
about it. Can I say a word on this though because there will be statutory
parties in the IGC and we are supporting it because we think it would be
more helpful and more transparent if the European-wide parties - the EPP
for the Conservative Party and the PS for the Labour Party - were
separately funded in their own right rather than, as at present funded, as
a by-blow of the parties in Parliament. So there will be such a statute
agreed at Nice. I personally am not aware of having given a view whether
or not it should be QMV.
55. Can I take it then that you would support pan-European parties
operating in relation to the European parliamentary elections and it would
not relate to your party or mine operating in European elections within the
United Kingdom?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure I would narrow the definition down solely to
participation in European parliamentary elections, but it is the case that
I think all three parties represented around this table have sister parties
and umbrella groups for their sister parties throughout the European Union,
and in this the Conservative Party is no different from us. The EPPE has
always supported exactly the same requests for a party statute that we
have, indeed the letter to the Commission was signed jointly by the leaders
of all the different parties. But this is not the creation of a European
party to which individual citizens would subscribe, what this is is the
umbrella group for the different national parties.
56. Could I ask you to deal with the two areas which perhaps do
fall within the area you said the Government would not allow QMV on, one is
social security and the other is tax? There are different drafts of the
tax proposal around but one of them does talk about measures to co-ordinate
the provisions of Member States to prevent discrimination and double
taxation; measures to prevent fraud and tax evasion; the exchange of
information. These go really quite a long way and it does bring within the
unanimity provision of Article 93 provisions relating to direct taxation.
I know that is unanimity and not QMV but it is the first time, as far as I
know, that direct taxation has been sought to be brought within Community
competence, and is that not the thin edge of the wedge? I wonder if you
could deal with both of those issues, direct taxation and QMV for indirect
taxation?
(Mr Cook) First of all, as a general principle, we are taking the
position in this IGC that we are not in favour of the extension of
Commission competence and therefore, although I have not discussed that
specific point recently with my Treasury colleagues, I would be very
surprised if we did not take a position against direct taxation becoming
part of the competence. I can write to the Committee to clarify that. On
the issue of the procedure of decision-making, we will be very robust in
insisting on unanimity on all tax matters, embracing also the matter of tax
fraud which, as you rightly say, are rather widely drawn, and we would not
wish to create a situation in which with ingenuity it could be used to
affect the tax position of any national country.
57. The final question I want to ask is about social security
where it is proposed to extend qualified majority voting to Article 42, to
the co-ordination of national laws in the field of social security. It
goes on in other areas in the current draft, as it did previously, to say
that although in Article 251 it should be by unanimity - it is not
proposing as I understand it this be done by QMV - it should extend to the
co-ordination of national laws. Does this fall within the Government's
policy of not acceding to QMV in areas of social security?
(Mr Cook) I am happy to say, yes. It is one of the five areas we
identified at the beginning of the proceedings where we would not believe
that the application of majority voting would be appropriate. Lest I be
thought to be too negative, perhaps I can end by saying, for balance, that
actually the number of areas where we have strong views in those 50 are not
actually much out of line with those of other countries, indeed France has
a broadly similar number of objections, which complicates their role in the
presidency.
Mr Chidgey
58. Foreign Secretary, I would like to ask you a couple of
questions about the mechanics of this process, the re-weighting. Then I
have a question about the transparency of the operations of the Council of
Ministers in this regard. It has been reported that although a final
decision on weighting will be left to EU leaders in Nice, most delegations
have agreed in principle that future decisions taken by QMV should reflect
the support of at least half the EU's population and half its Member
States, and that officials will now work to prepare options along these
lines. I am sure you are aware that on the decisions where QMV currently
applies a threshold of 71 per cent is required to reach agreement, and over
time as the European Union has expanded the percentage of population needed
to reach that threshold has dropped from around 70 per cent when it was
founded to around 58 per cent today and we are now looking at a scenario
that with 28 Member States that could fall to below 50 per cent, so
consequently it would appear that officials are working along the lines of
preserving a 50 per cent minimum. Is the Government happy with that or
does the Government seek to get closer to the original concept of a simple
majority?
(Mr Cook) That is not our starting point. Our starting point is that
there has to be a substantial simple re-weighting of the votes of the
larger countries and that there has to be a clearer approximation between
the votes in the Council and the populations of the countries. Nobody is
asking that it should be pro rata. That would be not to pay sufficient
attention to the status of the Member States as Member States. We need to
get the balance right.
59. Are you in favour of double majority?
(Mr Cook) No. We have never ruled out double majority but that is
also not our starting point because if you go for the double majority then
that will have the effect on most models presented of reducing the level of
increasing simple re-weighting. In other words, we are not willing to
trade off the increase in Britain's vote in exchange for a dual voting
system which will also count populations. Of course, if we could get a
satisfactory outcome on the simple re-weighting of our vote then we would
not have any national reason for opposing dual majority, but we are not
going to lobby for that in circumstances where it might blunt our number
one priority which is to get an increase in our vote.
60. My second question is in the context of core beliefs and
objectives of institutional reform. You probably recall, Foreign
Secretary, that earlier this year a joint paper was issued in which the
Government agreed that "we" (as the Government) "also believe that to be
properly accountable the Council of Ministers must be open and transparent.
We therefore favour publication of all votes when the Council of Ministers
is acting in a legislative capacity". My question to you is, when can we
expect to see signs of the Government following that agreement?
(Mr Cook) If you mean honouring it, pressing for it, we continue to
do so. If by honouring it you mean achieving agreement to it, I have to
say we are not yet there and there are quite a number of other countries
who do not necessarily share our commitment.
61. Would you agree, if you could get the agreement with the other
countries, that when the Council is acting as legislature, when those
meetings are held they should be held in public and there should be full
reports on the proceedings of those meetings and that votes should be
published and that within a fixed deadline ministers should actually be
obliged to explain how they intend to implement domestically the
legislation that has been agreed in the Council?
(Mr Cook) I totally agree with the last point and that of course is a
matter for national parliaments. Secondly, if we could secure our
objective, which is a more transparent recording of votes and the
publication of those votes, that then would go some way to meeting your
concern. Opening up the meetings to being held in public would make it
often, I am afraid, more difficult to secure the agreement. In the course
of the end game there is inevitably a requirement to compromise which might
be more difficult if it were taking place under the public gaze as it is
actually done. Here there is a very difficult task to be made in getting
the right balance between transparency and the need to get the decisions
taken. At the moment we do not think we have made sufficient progress on
transparency to press for it.
Sir John Stanley
62. Foreign Secretary, in one of your replies to Mr Maples I
thought you gave the Committee the impression that the Government's
commitment to preserving unanimity was in five areas when, as I understand
the Government's position, it is in fact in six. In the Government's
response to the Committee's report, Developments at the Intergovernmental
Conference 2000, you say, "The Government has made it clear that it will
not agree to QMV for tax, social security, treaty change, own resources,
border controls and defence".
(Mr Cook) You are quite right. I had forgotten about the own
resources. Those are the ones we listed both in the White Paper and in my
statement to the House, and I am happy to correct that one.
63. Thank you. Could you therefore confirm to the Committee that
in each of those six areas the British Government will if necessary use its
right of veto at Nice to ensure that unanimity is preserved in those six
areas?
(Mr Cook) We are not going to agree to majority voting in those
areas. Can I just say a word about language? In the context of what will
be a very protracted discussion in negotiation in Nice, in which France has
set aside two whole days for this and suggested that we should be ready for
three whole days if necessary to get to the end of it, it will not actually
be the case that at any point the President will press a buzzer and ask who
is going to cast a veto. It does not operate like that. We will be making
it plain that we cannot agree and the discussion will continue until we can
move on.
64. In relation to the remaining items of the 50 or so that have
been referred to you previously said to the Committee, and it is again
reflected in your response to the Committee's report, that "but in all
other areas" - that is, in all the other areas over and above the six we
have referred to - "we support the case by case approach adopted by the
Portuguese Presidency". Am I right therefore in thinking that the case by
case approach will be adopted in relation to all the remaining areas and
that the British Government holds itself in principle ready to concede QMV
in any of the remaining areas apart from the six to which we have referred?
(Mr Cook) No, that would be false. The six that we identified then
are those where we established bottom lines on which we did not think that
any majority voting would be appropriate since they are so central to the
prerogatives and decisions of national governments and their parliaments.
But that does not mean that you can adopt what would be a false corollary,
that anything outside those areas we are willing to sign up to. As I said
earlier, we have our reservations about the majority of those listed there
and many of them go well into very different fields from the ones that we
quite properly listed as our six bottom lines.
65. That being the case, Foreign Secretary, could I ask you - and
I certainly wholly understand the importance of any government going into
an international negotiation quite properly wishing to hold its full
negotiating position to itself - whether the British Government intend,
prior to Nice to indicate which of the other areas outside the six but
within the 50 or so which are possibly up for QMV it has already decided it
is not prepared to see move from unanimity to QMV, for example, in the
forthcoming debate this week?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure that in my speech as I developed my speech in
the House I went through each of the 50 different articles, but we
regularly exchange with our partners our views on each of those. We have a
number of discussions still coming up in which we will repeat our position
on those. You did, quite generously and correctly, Sir John, touch on the
difficulty in going too public and too precise in public on this. This is
a negotiation and it is not, if I can just make this point of correction, a
case that on those where we are going to agree to qualified majority voting
we are ready to concede majority voting. In some of them we ourselves are
pressing for majority voting, for instance, on the question of freedom of
movement of professionals, recognition of professional qualifications. A
number of British employee organisations are pressing us to secure this
because they see it as a way of freeing up access to European employment
for their members. In the end again there will be some trading off in
which we will actually want countries to accede to those which are in our
interests and for which we are lobbying on our behalf and in which we will
have to consider what flexibility may be necessary on our side, but we are
not going to cross that road, nor are we going to agree to the majority of
these 50.
Mr Rowlands
66. Just to reinforce Mr Maples's point about revised Article 42
on social security, interestingly, in the way it is headed, "Measures
required in the field of social security to provide freedom of movement",
so their attempt is actually to introduce these almost as part and parcel
of making the single market work. May I just draw attention not only to
the article but to the huge protocols attached to it which list almost
every single benefit that would as it were fall within some kind of new
revised Article 42. I assume because you have already said that you are
opposed to this proposition fundamentally. Do you have substantial support
amongst other Member States for opposing this measure?
(Mr Cook) We have understanding. We have not necessarily got the
same degree of support on, say, social security as we have on taxation in
which there are quite a number of countries who share our apprehensions for
unanimity on taxation. Our concern about social security is that if that
became subject to majority voting there is the danger that it could
potentially trigger significant additional sums on spending. Since that is
potentially the case it is appropriate that it should be done by unanimity
and not by majority voting.
67. What these revised articles and the protocols are after is, I
think, a whole new area of harmonisation on benefits. How do you feel
about that because that is what this is really behind all this?
(Mr Cook) In fairness to the Commission, and this in no way detracts
from what I have just said, that we are not going to agree to majority
voting, what we are dealing with here, which is not a new article; this is
an existing article of the Treaty, in the exercise with this 50 is not the
creation of new competencies and new articles but identifying some articles
within the Treaty which are currently done on unanimity and could
potentially move to majority voting. We do not think that this is one that
is appropriate to do that, but, to be fair to the Commission and the
Presidency, they are not proposing a new article that is not already there.
68. I think the logical consequence of what has been drafted
before us is a very considerable extension of attempts to harmonise
benefits right across Europe in the name of the single market.
(Mr Cook) I do not dispute your point about majority voting and
unanimity. We believe that that should be retained on a unanimity basis.
It is perhaps worth putting on record that actually the great majority of
decisions that are taken within the Council of Ministers are taken on the
basis of majority voting. Our analysis of the past three years shows that
80 per cent of all decisions taken by Council ministers were taken by
majority voting, not by unanimity. It is different if you look at the
articles and the Treaty in which you will find that there is a much higher
proportion than 20 per cent of the articles that are based on unanimity but
they are mainly articles that are rarely used, for instance, own resources
only comes round every six or seven years. It is already the case that
effectively for decision making within the Council of Ministers the rule is
majority voting. Indeed, as I pointed out to the House in the last debate,
Britain actually does rather well out of that. We are defeated on majority
voting less often than France or Germany or the Netherlands or Spain.
69. But at least you can say that it is not going to happen?
(Mr Cook) No.
Ms Abbott
70. Foreign Secretary, I want to ask you two questions about the
size of the Commission and then move on to something which I do not think
will come up in Nice but is a Commission proposal. It is nothing about
arms initiatives but is a trade proposal. On the size of the Commission,
according to press reports discussions on the size of the Commission are
focusing on a system where there will be first one commissioner for Member
States and then shift to a cap on the size of the Commission with a system
of rotation to the Member States. Can you confirm for me whether you would
support a system under which the United Kingdom will not at all times be
able to appoint a commissioner?
(Mr Cook) It is very difficult to be precise about what may come out
of Nice. My own view is that if the five larger countries give up their
second commissioner we have enough room to accommodate any probable or
likely first wave of enlargement without any significant increase in the
Commission. The first wave is unlikely to be more than about half a dozen.
Therefore, the likely outcome of Nice in terms of Treaty amendment would be
for every country to have one commissioner. Britain though will only agree
to that if we get the other part of that package which is a substantial
increase in the simple re-weighting of our vote in the Council to
compensate for the agreement to give up our first commissioner. In the
longer term, if all 12 countries of the applicant countries become members
of the European Union, we will have to look very seriously and very
imaginatively at how we try and accommodate those additional members with
the current requirement that every country has one Commissioner or, at
present, two Commissioners. Plainly, it will be very difficult to make the
Commission work coherently if it ends up with 26 or 27 Commissioners, but I
doubt that that is an issue that will be resolved at Nice. It needs to be
but some way down the track.
71. Something that has foreign policy implications is the EBA,
Everything But Arms, initiative which has been put forward by Commissioner
Lammy, the EU Trade Commissioner, and is now a formal Commission proposal.
That would give the 48 least developed countries tariff and quota free
access to European markets. What it would do is completely capsize the
economies of the ACP countries that currently have protected access for
sugar, bananas, rum and rice. The Caribbean countries are very concerned
about this. They are concerned that in respect of the least developed
countries you will have a shattering effect on the economies of countries
which are only slightly more prosperous and longstanding than this country.
It appears the Commission wants to force this through by December and the
Caricom countries are in uproar about this.
(Mr Cook) That is not a matter for the General Affairs Council.
72. I am aware of that.
(Mr Darroch) I think you have described the proposal of Commissioner
Lammy accurately. There is indeed a proposal to offer wide trade
concessions to the least developed countries. In general, as you suggest,
this is something that, as a country that believes in a liberal trade
agenda, we support. It does have implications for those countries just
outside the least developed which have to be worked through. It has only
just come out as a proposal. It needs to be discussed in the working group
at technical level and then it will come up to the Council. We shall try
to preserve the best features of the proposal while protecting the
interests of the Caribbean countries who are just outside that group, but
we have not worked through the detail of this yet.
73. What is the timescale for implementation? The Caribbean
countries think it is going to start in December.
(Mr Darroch) The Commission has an ambitious timescale in mind but
it needs to get agreement from the Council on it and whether that can be
achieved by December must be open to question.
74. I am sure it seems a relatively small matter to you but for
the people of the Caribbean ----
(Mr Cook) It is not small at all. The interests of the ATP countries
are very important, particularly important to Britain and France as the two
previous countries with most contact with them. It is a very major issue.
It is not one coming before the GAC or before Nice and I am unsighted on
this but I can undertake to write to the Committee more fully about it.
75. What the Caricom countries are saying is obviously this has
been discussed with them and it is the long term thrust of EU policy
opening up to the markets but they were promised that there would be full
impact studies of the effect on commodities like bananas and sugar. It
seems for political reasons all this has been short circuited and there is
an attempt to ram it through by December. This is a DTI thing really but I
am flagging up the foreign policy implications and the concern of the
Caribbean countries.
(Mr Cook) The Commission is perfectly entitled to set whatever
ambitious agenda and timetable it wishes. That does not necessarily
require the Council to give a positive or a negative answer in that
timetable. Personally, from what I have heard, intuitively I would be
surprised if they got agreement from any Council by December, but I can
write and clarify that.
(Mr Darroch) We are aware of the Caribbean countries' concern. They
have talked to our missions and we will take their views into account.
Chairman
76. The last major chunk is enlargement and the dates of
enlargement. You argued in the past that to set dates might reduce the
pressure on certain countries to do well in terms of incorporation of the
acquis. Now it is said that the Swedish presidency might seek over the
first six months of next year to set dates presumably because of progress
in terms of the chapters. What is the current HMG view on setting dates?
(Mr Cook) I set this out for the first time in July when I spoke in
Budapest and made a major speech on our approach to enlargement. In that
speech, I did call for target dates and said we believed the time was right
when we should consider target dates for the candidates. It is not a view
shared by the current presidency, the French government, and therefore we
have never thought it a realistic prospect for Nice, but I think it is
quite possible that it will be set at the Gothenberg Summit which will come
at the end of the Swedish presidency. Because of its traditional and
geographic connection with the Baltic states, Sweden is very forward on the
enlargement issue. I would hope that we can get consensus by then for
target dates for the applicant countries. One of the reasons why we can be
hopeful on that front is that the recent report by the Commission on the
enlargement is very positive and does show that, in the majority of cases,
good progress is being made by the applicant countries. Therefore, by the
middle of next year, it should be possible for a number of them to set a
target date by when we could complete negotiations. Of course, the
completion of the negotiations is only then the start of the ratification
process, but the Committee may be aware that the Prime Minister, in his
Warsaw speech, did say that we wanted the new first members to join us in
time for the next European Parliament elections which would be in 2004.
For completion of the negotiations and completion of ratification, that is
the basis for deliverable targets.
Mr Mackinlay
77. You have clarified something I was going to ask you. Where
the Prime Minister said that he hoped the principal applicant countries
would be in by the European elections 2004, I had interpreted that as
almost like them having the parliamentary elections and being able to sit
in the Parliament in advance of membership. That was his target date, was
it, for membership?
(Mr Cook) They could become members in advance of polling day for the
European Parliament but if, say, we get half a dozen members joining ad hoc
addition to the European Parliament will be tricky because there will have
to be a redistribution of seats between the nations.
78. I am sorry to labour this. It is probably not the most
important thing in the world but the way I interpreted it was that he was
saying that accession might be 2005 but they will be able to participate in
the elections and take seats.
(Mr Cook) I am not sure that that would be legally possible. For
them to legally take part in the elections, they would have to be members
of the Union by then. Indeed, they would wish to be and it would be our
objective too. We would not, certainly at this early stage, countenance
setting a later date.
Chairman
79. If the ratification process were far advanced, you would not
be against not holding up countries having shadow elections prior to formal
accession?
(Mr Cook) Speaking for the United Kingdom, we would be certainly open
to such a creative solution but whether that is legally possible I would
not like to say offhand.
(Mr Jones Parry) In the case of Spain and Portugal, both had members
of the European Parliament under special arrangements for the general
election which then followed their accession.
(Mr Cook) Am I not right in saying that that did not require a
redistribution of seats? A bolt on is one thing, but ----
Mr Mackinlay
80. What is clear this afternoon is that it is not clear exactly
what the Prime Minister had in mind on this narrow point.
(Mr Cook) I think it is quite clear what the Prime Minister had in
mind which is that they should be full members of the European Union in
time to take full part in the European Parliament elections in 2004. I
would not want to get into speculating about that timetable not being met,
because it lessens the pressure on our partners, but we can investigate the
legal position.
Chairman
81. Could you give us a note on that, please?
(Mr Cook) Of course.
Sir John Stanley
82. Foreign Secretary, you said this afternoon that you think both
entry and ratification for the six applicants in the first wave are a
realistic target for 2004. Would you agree that almost all the attention
in relation to the next wave of enlargement, with particular reference to
the six countries that are coming in, not least Poland and Hungary, has
been very much focused on the institutional changes which are necessary to
accommodate them, but there has been grossly insufficient attention paid to
the financial, particularly CAP, reform changes which are required? Would
you agree that it is now going to be imperative that France and Germany in
particular seriously address the need to deal with the financial
implications and the CAP reform implications of entry, particularly of
Poland and Hungary, if there is going to be any sort of prospect of
achieving the 2004 date which you said this afternoon you think is
realistic?
(Mr Cook) First of all, can I make an entry in the margin? It is
true I used the phrase "half a dozen" which is slightly elastic, but I
would not want to be pinned down to that being precisely those who started
the process of accession in the first wave because we have always been
clear that this is not a block process. In other words, those six do not
necessarily come in as a block. Equally, those who are behind them have
the opportunity of catching up. This is quite relevant since Malta, which
started last, has made the best progress in view of its previous work and
has pretty well caught up on the first six. It is not necessarily those
who are in the first wave for accession who may be in the first wave for
membership. The answer to your substantive question is no. That was the
whole point of Berlin. Berlin set a financial perspective for seven years
and set a financial perspective in the expectation that new members would
be coming into the European Union in the course of those seven years. It
created sufficient room within the financial perspective to accommodate new
members towards the end. That financial perspective comes in in 2006 and
there will be renegotiation of that financial perspective starting
effectively in 2004. That enlargement will coincide with the debate about
the next financial perspective in the course of which we would certainly
hope to see further reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and would
ourselves expect the WTO to be applying pressure for that objective.
83. This afternoon you are saying something which has come as
quite a surprise to me because we have taken this very precise issue
previously in the Committee in believing that the first wave of applicants
was being treated as a block and would come in all together. You are now
saying to us that possibly the more difficult countries in financial terms
-- I suppose Poland would particularly stick out -- might find that their
applications are going to be deferred because of the difficulties that
France and Germany in particular have with accommodating their agricultural
economy against the existing subsidy system for the CAP.
(Mr Cook) I do not honestly see how you can draw the last inference
from what I said, because what I said was at Berlin all the countries of
the European Union, including France and including Germany which was in the
chair of the Berlin Summit, agreed to a financial perspective spanning for
the next six years which was carved out specifically in order to provide
room for enlargement and on the assumption that enlargement would take
place in the course of that financial perspective. That is not a fair
inference from what I said. I am surprised if it comes as news to the
Committee that we are not approaching this as a block process. We have
said that right from the start in 1998 when accession was launched under
the British presidency. The principle of differentiation is very important
to the applicant countries because they want to know that they will get in
on the merits of their case, on the work that they have done to prepare for
membership and are not necessarily kept waiting whilst others catch up.
Sir David Madel
84. A recent Commission report referred to the slow progress of
Polish agricultural reform. Am I right in thinking that we are not
prepared to overlook that in our desire to get Poland in and, if
agricultural reform in Poland proceeds at a slow pace, there will be
inevitable delay?
(Mr Cook) There is no guarantee that any one country will get in in
the first place, and all of them will have to meet the criteria for
membership - the labour criteria, and the adoption of the acquis in which
agriculture is part. That said, we should bear in mind that one of the
difficult issues yet to be resolved in negotiation with the applicant
countries is the question of direct payment to farmers. The Berlin
financial perspective assumes that there will be no direct payment to
farmers in the applicant countries as they became members. In some ways
that would be a helpful outcome because what we would not wish to create is
a new constituency of support for direct payment within the European Union
which would be inconsistent with our own wish for reform. This is not
something which for obvious reasons is attractive to the applicant
countries that will be the centre of much negotiation over the next year.
Chairman
85. Nor would it be consistent with broad Community principles of
fairness and treating all Members equally?
(Mr Cook) It is indeed a point that is vigorously put out by the
applicant countries but, at the same time, it does climb with the need to
achieve reform and reduce spending.
Sir David Madel
86. Of existing members of the EU probably the country keenest for
Poland to join is Germany, for understandable reasons. Do you get the
impression that Germany is not prepared to overlook the slow pace of the
Polish agricultural reform?
(Mr Cook) No. Indeed, as I said earlier, Britain is one of the less
protectionist members, and in some ways we are more supportive than those
countries which are nearer.
Mr Mackinlay
87. If I can say to you, Foreign Secretary, my recollection of the
British Government's position is somewhere between yours and John Stanley's
- it is a nuance.
(Mr Cook) A very interesting correlation.
88. If it is just left like this, this afternoon, I think it could
negate all the very positive vibes which came from the Prime Minister's
Warsaw speech, if I might say so. Apart from clarity here, I think I
should invite you - surely the position of the British Government is
saying, of course, ultimately there is no guarantee that countries coming
to Visigrad, Estonia and Slovenia, come in en bloc; but as a matter of
policy and as a matter of objective and target that is the intention that
we should reach that - because to bring other countries in (particularly
Hungary and the Czech Republic) and for Poland not to be admitted would
have profound other consequences either within the 40 million people of
Poland, which is bigger than all the other countries put together, and be
an enormous loss not just to them but to the rest of the European Union.
It seems to me that what you personally have uttered in this Committee is
the objective that they should come in together. It is fair but it is not
an absolute guarantee, but if you are departing from that this afternoon
then that is a departure which should be noted?
(Mr Cook) No, it is no departure. I think it is very important we
are quite clear about this. It is not only one country that may be
listening to what we are saying here but also the others, and they all want
to be treated on their merits and not as members of a bloc. Malta wishes
the opportunity to catch up.
89. Malta is about the size of Wandsworth. Let us put things into
perspective.
(Mr Cook) I am not sure I would find it helpful to endorse that
observation. Malta is a sovereign independent state which is entitled ---
Chairman
90. Under clear democracy.
(Mr Cook) ----- to have its application judged on its merits. I do
not think we should diminish Malta's case. If I can go back to where I was
- Malta would wish the right to catch up. We have always promised that
there was a fast lane, as we said, in which those who were further behind
could catch up. We would want to make sure, for instance, that the other
Baltic States if they made the progress could catch up with Estonia, but
that is down to them. Let me stress, Chairman, I have said nothing in the
course of this hearing to suggest that we do not want Poland to be a member
and we do not want Poland to be a member in the first wave. All I have
said, and this has been our policy right from the start, is that each
country will be judged on its merits and on the progress it has made.
Mr Mackinlay: It is a different nuance.
Chairman: We have several blocs I would at least like to touch on -
enhanced co-operation first with Mr Rowlands and Mr Maples.
Mr Rowlands
91. Foreign Secretary, when you last came before us on these
issues you and the Department's position was why do we have to build a new
provision for enhanced co-operation. The provision had been made and had
not been used at all previously. Has there been an example of enhanced co-
operation under the existing arrangements?
(Mr Cook) No.
92. We nevertheless are faced with the quite considerable pressure
to have new provisions for enhanced co-operation which include, among other
things, no veto or emergency brake on enhanced co-operation for the first
pillar. Do we support that? How are we going to handle that issue?
(Mr Cook) The present situation is satisfactory at this point. It
does provide that if a Member State objects to enhanced co-operation then
it should be referred to the European Council before a decision is taken
for enhanced co-operation to proceed, and we are not uncomfortable with
that as an outcome.
93. On the first pillar we would accept possibly qualified
majority voting to proceed?
(Mr Cook) No, that is separate. What it does provide for is that if
a member country objects it has to go to the full summit meeting before it
would proceed. Also that has to be read in conjunction with the conditions
for enhanced co-operation. For instance, we are very keen and are making
good progress in securing strong language that makes clear that enhanced
co-operation cannot disrupt the Single Market. To be perfectly honest with
the Committee, I do not think that leaves much scope for enhanced co-
operation within the first pillar.
94. Secondly, the concept of a veto has been retained for the
second and third pillars, although our Government White Paper envisaged
that there could be some kind of enhanced co-operation without a veto on
the issue of security and defence. Is that right?
(Mr Cook) No, our position is that any decision to adopt a policy on
the Common Foreign and Security Policy has to be unanimous. However, we
have always recognised that, having adopted policy, the issue of
implementation is one where a group of countries may wish to proceed and
others may not want to take part. After all, if we are realistic the
capacity of the Member States to project foreign influence in different
parts of the world varies depending on their history, depending on their
scale and depending on their current trading pattern. It does make sense
to have the possibility of a number of countries going ahead without
everybody having to take part; but we would retain unanimity for that
initial decision in adopting policy.
95. Can you give us an illustration of what would be the subject
of enhanced co-operation if these provisions went through under pillar one?
(Mr Cook) I would be reluctant to attempt that, Chairman. We are
content to listen to our partners concerns about this. If, for instance,
in the case of implementation of Common Foreign and Security Policy there
was to be a smaller group going ahead, it may well be us that go ahead.
I personally would hesitate to put forward an example.
96. Because it is very difficult to find one, as we have not had
one already?
(Mr Cook) You are perfectly correct to point out that we have not had
one - indeed, I have made this observation myself. Also, once you deduct
issues like the Single Market there is limited room for this to apply.
I do think it should be born in mind that those who are arguing for this -
for instance, particularly the Benelux countries - are not thinking of the
present European Union (and remember this has all been done in the context
of enlargement); they foresee an outcome in which there may be a European
Union of 26 Member States. To take one area which they themselves do refer
to, the issue of the environment in, say, the Netherlands and Denmark,
there is extremely high public pressure for high standards of environmental
protection. It may not necessarily be the case that the applicant
countries, coming as they do from a much lower GDP base, would necessarily
be capable or wish to adopt such high standards in environment and,
therefore, they argue there may be a occasions in the future when a number
of countries may wish to proceed with enhanced co-operation on
environmental issues which not everybody might take part in. That then
brings you to a debate of whether a group of countries can do so without it
distorting the Single Market, for instance, and could not apply
environmental regulations on trade. I understand the point they are making
- it is a valid one.
97. If I could summarise the position we are going to take - these
revised draft proposals we would go along with them or would we dig our
heels in?
(Mr Cook) We do not see any reason to object to what is done and on
the table which appears to fully protect our interests and, indeed, to take
the example of the environment if it was to proceed, we may wish to be part
of that inner group.
Mr Maples
98. There have been some other changes though - it talks about one
of the purposes of enhanced co-operation being to reinforce the process of
integration, and what used to be a majority of members who had to want to
participate and it is now eight, which is the current majority but it might
not be in the future. There is a provision in the Amsterdam Treaty that
any Member who was not part of the initial group could join later. That
has now changed as well. It seems to me this is a very different proposal,
substantially different, and particularly if countries that do not want to
join have given up their veto.
(Mr Cook) First of all, we would not accept an exclusive form of
enhanced co-operation. We would wish to insist on the right of any member
having the right to take part in any subsequent state. On that point, I
can assure you we would still insist very much on what was part of the
architecture of the original proposal. On the threshold of enhanced co-
operation, I personally do not have a difficulty with eight. Eight is a
very substantial number, whether or not it is the majority of a European
Union of 20 or whether it is only a majority of a European Union of 15, and
I would not necessarily wish to stand in the way of eight members going
ahead, provided what they are going ahead with does not damage our
interests. It may well be in the case of the environment we might
ourselves want to be part of that eight.
99. Finally on the CFSP, I understood you to say that we would not
be prepared to allow any enhanced co-operation in this area to go ahead
unless there was a veto from those who do not want to participate in
stopping it. That is not the way the current draft works because it refers
to the use of Article 23(2) of the Treaty of the European Union and refers
to bits of that which do not actually include the right of a veto. Are you
saying quite categorically we do not allow enhanced co-operation in the
Common Foreign and Security Policy area without a veto on behalf of those
countries that do not want to join, if they stated they were of a crucial
national interest?
(Mr Cook) What I was stating was that we do not see the case for
majority voting on the adoption of a policy. We have been willing to look
at the case of majority voting on enhanced co-operation on the
implementation of policy. It may well be right that the current draft does
not fully reflect our negotiating position but then that is not an agreed
text.
Sir David Madel
100. Foreign Secretary, do we want Nice to fix the date of the
next IGC? If we do, do we want that date to be 2004?
(Mr Cook) Our position is that we believe that the first new members
should be present from the start of the next IGC and take part in the IGC.
We have already had an extensive debate as to whether or not 2004 is a
realistic target date for the first new members. I think it is difficult
to be precise about when a future IGC may actually get underway. At this
present point we have not taken a view on that. The issue of principle I
think is very important, and those who pressed for an IGC to commence in
2004 we would want to see make a commitment that they will themselves work
for enlargement to take place before 2004. These are two interlocking
issues, both of which are subject to wide margins of judgment as to whether
or not 2004 is the right year, and at this point I do not want to commit
myself.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, a relaxing three days at Nice it will
not be. I would like to thank you and your colleagues.
