WEDNESDAY 8 DECEMBER 1999
_________
Members present:
Mr Donald Anderson, in the Chair
Ms Diane Abbott
Mr David Chidgey
Sir Peter Emery
Dr Norman A Godman
Mr Eric Illsley
Mr Andrew Mackinlay
Sir David Madel
Mr Ted Rowlands
Sir John Stanley
Mr David Wilshire
_________
MEMORANDA SUBMITTED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
RT HON ROBIN COOK, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, MR EMYR JONES PARRY, CMG, Political
Director, and MS ANNE PRINGLE, Head, Eastern Department, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, examined.
Chairman
1. Foreign Secretary, may I welcome you and your two colleagues.
I think we are getting quite used to the whole team together and we welcome
you even more warmly as a result of that. You are accompanied by Mr Emyr
Jones Parry, the Political Director at the FCO, and Ms Anne Pringle, who is
head of the Eastern Department. Foreign Secretary, you know the terms of
reference adopted by our Committee "to inquire into the role and policies of
the FCO in relation to the Russian Federation", and you will recall in the
heady days after the fall of Communism great things were expected in Russia
of a movement to democracy, a multi-party system, and a market-based economy,
since when, alas, we have seen substantial corruption and political
turbulence. When we selected this subject, because of the importance of our
engaging with the new Russia, relations had already deteriorated because of
Kosovo and yet we anticipated that there would be a thaw in relations between
Russia and ourselves, the West and NATO generally. Now, alas, as a result of
Chechnya and the conflict there, there is a serious danger that relations will
worsen again in perhaps the worst period since the fall of Communism. Perhaps
I could give you notice that we obviously intend to spend a substantial part
of the evidence session today on the tragedy of Chechnya. Can you begin by
telling us whether in your judgment there is any sign that the Russian
Government is listening to the outrage which is coming from ourselves and
indeed other Western and Middle East governments?
(Mr Cook) Thank you very much, Chairman. Can I first report to the
Committee that about two hours ago I had a conversation by phone with the
Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov. We spoke for half an hour entirely on
the question of Chechnya. I expressed to him the concern that I recorded in
the House yesterday, our alarm and dismay at the turn for the worse in
Chechnya, and also, I hope, made clear to him the depth of strong feeling
among our people and among the people of Europe and of the United States. I
did say that we welcome the fact that they have made arrangements for Kurt
Vollebaek, the Chair in Office of the OSCE, to visit the region next week -I
understand that he will be going to Ingushetia and Takestan and that he hopes
to meet while there some of the Chechen leaders - and that we attached great
importance to him being able to explore the options for a political
settlement. Against that background we would look to Russia for a reduction,
not an escalation, in the military offensive that has been conducted in
Chechnya. I expressed to him the very considerable dismay that had been
caused by the threat last Monday. That brings me to your opening question,
chair, that is are the Russians listening? My impression is that the very
strong messages delivered by Britain, by our European partners and by the
United States yesterday have made their mark in Moscow in relation to the
threat that was issued against the residents of Grozny.
2. What is the evidence?
(Mr Cook) First of all, the Interior Minister has announced that the
safe corridor, although safety is questionable, will not be closed on Saturday
and will remain open. Secondly, the General in Chechnya has himself said that
it was not his intention to threaten an escalation of violence against the
civilians in Grozny. My impression is that our response to that threat has
struck home. I think they have perhaps been taken aback by the strength and
breadth of the response in the West to it. I would then add that as yet our
message on the wider front, namely that this military offensive is causing
civilian suffering on a very large scale and is not proportionate to the
problem and is not going to succeed in solving the problem of terrorism, has
not yet been absorbed in Moscow and we must continue to press that message
home. We will have a meeting with Igor Ivanov at the forthcoming G8 meeting
in Berlin and in my call to him today I did stress that it would be very
helpful and positive for them at that meeting in Berlin if there could be some
reduction of the military offensive, some prospect of a political settlement
there.
3. But the visit of Mr Vollebaek, Chair in Office of the OSCE to
Ingushetia and Dagesthan will be, in any event, after the date when the
carpet-bombing of Grozny has been threatened. On the face of it the message
you read out yesterday in the House to the inhabitants of Grozny, which is
now, we are told, a warning not an ultimatum, can hardly be of any comfort to
those who are cowering in the cellars of Grozny.
(Mr Cook) My very strong reading of the signals we have had from Moscow
in the last 24 hours is that they are not going to escalate on Saturday. I
think, therefore, the reference to government bombings is not something we
would expect to see on Saturday, though I cannot guarantee that. Of course,
that is only 10 per cent or 20 per cent of the problem, Grozny has been under
serious bombardment for some weeks now. Those who live in Grozny live in the
basements. The civilians there are already under threat and unless there is
a reduction in the bombardment and a sign of a limitation to the military
offences, just target it against the problem of terrorism rather than to
target every resident of Grozny and every community in Chechnya, unless that
happens, the prospects for a political process will be very hard.
4. Do you see any signs, given the fact that we are now in an
election season, that intense populism, nationalism has been aroused in
Russia, that there could be as a result of the Western approach continuing any
serious damage over a long period to relations with the West?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I take issue with the reference to as a result
of the reaction of the West. I think that when we are confronted with
something as chilling as the ultimatum that was issued on Monday, we have to
respond.
5. Of course.
(Mr Cook) It would be impossible for us not to do so. I think our
response, at least in respect to that ultimatum, has produced a result. As
to whether the Chechen military offensive and the public support for it will
have a permanent effect, I can only say that we have always stressed that we
want to see a democratic and stable Russia, a Russia with a modern progressive
market economy which has been reformed, the two prime objectives that we
identified in the Foreign Office memorandum to this Committee. We are willing
to help achieve that and to help achieve it through dialogue. All we require
of Russia though is that it demonstrates that it is taking part in a
meaningful dialogue by listening to what we are saying.
Mr Illsley
6. First of all, congratulations, Secretary of State, on the
continuing diplomatic efforts to try to reduce the situation in Chechnya.
This Committee visited Russia in October and I, and I am sure my colleagues,
was extremely dismayed by the attitude of the ordinary Russians who seemed
fully supportive of Russia's policy towards Chechnya. The politicians
regarded the issue as an internal matter and upbraided some of us attempting
to raise the issue in our discussions. My own view is that the Russians will
continue to attack Chechnya, they will continue to bombard Grozny and will
ignore the representations from the West. I would like to ask you whether you
can see any further initiatives that can be taken by this country or by others
to try to ease that situation, particularly in the light of the ultimatum?
(Mr Cook) I think the answer to that is yes, but first of all let us be
clear about the degree of initiatives that are under way. I welcome what you
say, Eric. First of all, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE goes there next
week, that is a direct result of the pressure we have put on Russia at the
Istanbul Summit and is in fulfilment of their conclusions at that Istanbul
Summit. I am in close contact with Kurt Vollebaek and I look forward very much
to hearing his report when he comes back. I think you then have to consider
what further measures it might be appropriate for the OSCE and for the rest
of the international community to take. Secondly, we still await the report
of Mr Jil Robles who went to the region at the end of last week and who is
reporting to the Council of Europe. There will, of course, be an Assembly
meeting of the Council of Europe in January and I would be very surprised if
this issue, and his report, was not a central point of that session. Thirdly,
there is the forthcoming meeting of the G8 which meets in Berlin at the end
of next week at which Igor Ivanov will be present which gives us an
opportunity, of the kind that we had in Istanbul, in a multi-lateral forum to
press the Russians to recognise both the width and breadth of concern within
the international community and the urgency of Russia addressing it because
what Russia is doing at present is not in its own interest. On the question
of the public opinion in Russia, we have always recognised, first of all, the
integrity of the Russian Federation. Nobody is suggesting that we would
support any change in the boundaries of the Russian Federation. Secondly, I
have repeatedly recognised and have said on this that there is a legitimate
serious problem for Russia in Chechnya of this terrorism and brutal violent
crime. Indeed, in Britain we have seen three of our own citizens brutally
murdered in Chechnya. All of us would understand if Russia was responding to
that problem. We cannot condone a response though which targets the whole of
the civilian population, nor can we understand how Russia imagines this will
isolate the terrorists and address the problem.
7. You mentioned yesterday that you welcomed the decision of the IMF
to delay the decision on loan funding. Our understanding is that the IMF had
already decided to delay that tranche of funding regardless of the situation
in Chechnya. The two issues are not necessarily linked.
(Mr Cook) The Charter of the IMF is quite explicit, that they can only
make decisions on the basis of economic conditions and economic calculations
and not on political considerations. Nevertheless, as we weigh those economic
conditions everybody is also conscious of the political dimension and context
of it. It was put rather well by Mr Camdessus, the Director of the IMF, only
a couple of weeks ago when he did point out that in making its general
decisions the IMF has to have regard to the public opinion of the country that
provides its funds because it is after all their funds. I do not think anybody
in the Kremlin is under any illusion that the timing of yesterday's
announcement was connected with the conduct of Russia's present relations in
Chechnya.
Sir David Madel
8. Foreign Secretary, food and clean water in Grozny, have the
Russians refused to let the International Red Cross in?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure whether the International Red Cross has
actually sought access to Chechnya itself. I can check, Sir David, and write
to you. The problem is that the Red Cross pulled out of Chechnya along with
every other humanitarian agency because the lives of their people were too
much at risk from the Chechen terrorists and from hostage taking and
kidnapping. There was no Red Cross presence at the start of the conflict. I
am not well cited whether the Red Cross have sought to establish their
presence in the present circumstances but I can write to you. The Red Cross
is certainly active across the board among the refugee columns and Britain has
contributed half a million pounds to the Red Cross programme within the
region.
9. Is there a role for the United Nations in this crisis?
(Mr Cook) There is certainly a role, as always, for the United Nations
where there is any threat to regional security or peace. Realistically we
have to face the fact that any attempt to raise this in the Security Council
is going to be blocked by Russia on the basis that they regard this solely as
an internal matter. Russia, as a permanent member, has a veto.
10. When we have had vetoes in the Security Council before,
stretching back on the 50 year history of the United Nations, often the
Secretary-General intervenes himself personally. Is there a case for the
Secretary-General to go to Moscow?
(Mr Cook) I think that Kofi Annan would certainly contemplate such a
visit if he felt that it would be productive. I think he would want to be
reasonably assured that such a visit would be received in Moscow and would
have a serious prospect resulting in progress. I would add though that when
we discuss the UN we should also remember the many UN agencies as well and the
UNHCR is already heavily involved in coping with the refugee stream in those
neighbouring areas.
11. Would we welcome a visit from Kofi Annan to Moscow?
(Mr Cook) The answer to that is I would welcome anything which held a
prospect of bringing an end to the military offensive in Chechnya and seeking
towards political solutions. If we were persuaded that an intervention by the
Secretary-General would tend towards that purpose, would have a chance and
prospect of success, we would support it, of course, although at this
particular moment in time I think we would attach priority to making a success
of the OSCE mission. After all, that is not only a mission which Russia has
accepted, it is a mission mandated by the Summit at which Russia participated.
For the time being that is the issue on which we are focusing as a way of
trying to stimulate a political settlement, but for the future I would look
favourably certainly on anything that I could be persuaded would work.
Mr Chidgey
12. Good afternoon, Foreign Secretary.
(Mr Cook) Good afternoon.
13. I am sure you are aware that yesterday Joe Lockhart of the US
said that the United States was unlikely to cut off aid to Russia despite
President Clinton's statement that they would "pay a heavy price" for what was
happening in Chechnya. Obviously I am aware that at the same time we were
saying that we welcomed the delay in the IMF loan and we felt TACIS funding
should be held up or withdrawn. I am really looking here for some
confirmation from you that a co-ordinated response would be the best way of
trying to deal with this particular issue; we did not seem to have that
yesterday.
(Mr Cook) I am not sure I would agree with your last sentence. I did
speak at length with Madeleine Albright yesterday and we both shared the same
anxiety about the situation and the same dismay at the threat. We both agreed
that this would require us, if there was an escalation of violence, to
escalate our response and that we would maintain in close contact on this
question. I do not think there is a difference between us and the United
States in regard to the IMF and, indeed, the United States, if I recall
rightly, was hinting before yesterday that the economic conditions in Russia
had not been met for a further round of the loan and I think on that we are
absolutely eye-to-eye. On the question of financial support for various
projects that the United States provide for Russia, I must be frank with the
Committee. We are faced here with a serious dilemma. By definition, anything
that we are funding in Russia we are funding because it is in our mutual
interests to fund it. A large part, for instance, of the United States
programme goes towards the disposal of previous nuclear warheads caught by the
START 1 programme and is going towards nuclear safety, as indeed is some of
our own. It is not in our own interests to withhold that as some form of
sanction.
14. There are two questions I would like to ask you. First of all,
on this question of mutual interest projects, what advice is the Foreign
Office giving to British companies at the present time preparing bids for
alternative oil pipelines to duplicate or perhaps replace the pipeline which
passes close by Grozny?
(Mr Cook) You mean the pipeline which is going to go through Turkey
from Baku to the Mediterranean coastline?
15. Yes.
(Mr Cook) We do not have the temerity to offer advice to financial
companies or to oil companies on this question. This is a matter that we are
leaving entirely to their commercial judgment. I am bound to say that many
of them, looking at it with a commercial judgment, are continuing to look at
it.
16. Broadening the issue and the implications of Chechnya, if I may,
to relations between the West and Russia and between Russia and other
countries, when I was visiting Moscow with a delegation earlier in the year,
not with the Foreign Affairs Committee but quite separately, one of the points
the Russian Generals were impressing upon us was that they saw NATO support
of Kosovo as an indication that NATO felt powerful and legitimised enough to
intervene wherever they felt there was a need, which they felt meant that
Russia itself was a target of its designs, particularly Chechnya. That was
then, a few months ago. The issue that had arisen from the discussion we had
at that time was that Russian foreign policy was in fact moving further to the
east to develop an alternative power block to that exercised by America as the
major power, the mono-power I think is the expression, and that Russia was
hoping to build a multi-power structure in the next century bringing in
perhaps China and India. What contacts have you or the Foreign Office had
with China, India and the United States of America on this issue in terms of
our strategic interests in the next decade?
(Mr Cook) This sounds a little bit like a re-invention of the "Great
Game" from the 19th Century. We have a strong dialogue with China, as is
well-known, and in the course of that dialogue we do review strategic issues
around the world and from time to time we also compare our views of our
relations with Russia and the situation there. That will continue. I must
say I do not at the present time detect any appetite in China for a strategic
partnership with Russia. As to India, we have a very good friendly
relationship with India. It dates from our own shared history and our strong
community ties. India has always had since independence a strong relationship
with Moscow. I do not detect that relationship intensifying, if anything
rather the reverse.
Dr Godman
17. Just a couple of questions, Foreign Secretary, one on the IMF.
There are some suspicions that IMF funds have been used improperly in the past
in Russia. Are you confident that such monies are not used to subsidise the
military forces?
(Mr Cook) I am not aware of any evidence that IMF funds have been used
to support the military and one should also, of course, be clear that the
current loan arrangement is for the repayment of previous IMF funding.
Indeed, had the 400 million been released, as was about to be proposed to the
Board, the money would actually have left North America and it would not have
been transferred to the repayment of existing loans. One can argue, of
course, to a degree that that still relieves pressure on Russia which would
otherwise have had to find 400 million to pay the debt that was due and did
not have then have to do so because that facility would then have been there
and is now not there. I do not think anybody would argue that any recent IMF
agreement would have ended up providing direct financial contributions to the
military.
Dr Godman: Just one other question. There are obviously, you have said
this too, very serious fears about what will happen once Grozny falls, and
that is likely to happen because of the superior manpower and weaponry that
the Russians have. Do you believe that Moscow will press ahead with the
appointment of Mr Beslan Gantimirov as the administrator in Chechnya? He has
been brought out of a Moscow prison, has he not, to take up the job?
Chairman
18. This is the man at present in prison for embezzlement?
(Mr Cook) Previously I think he was the Mayor of Grozny and therefore
does have a bona fide connection. We would want to encourage Russia to have
dialogue with Chechen leaders with a view to trying to create conditions for
a political settlement. We therefore cannot complain if they seek to engage
in dialogue with people like the former Mayor of Grozny. I think we would
have our reservations as to whether dialogue with those Chechens who are in
Moscow is itself going to resolve a conflict which is taking place in
Chechnya. At least it needs to include representatives of the people on the
ground within Chechnya, and that is why we continue to press them to seek
political dialogue with a view towards a political settlement.
Dr Godman
19. If these developments take place what is to happen to the elected
President, Aslam Maskhadov? Has be been pushed into the margins or have you
sought assurances concerning his continuing role in the administration of
Chechnya?
(Mr Cook) We would certainly be of the view that if there is a
political settlement, it has to be a political settlement of which the elected
President of Chechnya is involved in the dialogue and the process. Maskhadov
was elected by the people of Chechnya, admittedly not by quite the same
detailed standards that we apply ourselves, but it was held to be a reasonably
free and fair election. The frustration that is expressed in Moscow is that
whilst they have been willing to deal with President Maskhadov, he in turn has
not been able to deliver either control over the terrorists or reduce the
degree of brutal violence within Chechnya. I would say by experience that we
have found it very difficult when we have been dealing with the two cases of
hostage-taking of British citizens to obtain from the Chechen authorities the
response that we would expect from authorities in any other situation.
20. That was a terrible affair obviously but it might be that the
elected President and his colleagues did not have the wherewithal to, if you
like, respond in an at all positive way.
(Mr Cook) That was self-evident to us and it was quite clear that he
could not, but I am not sure that the reason for that is necessarily one of
financial or personnel resources. I think it was also to do with the nature
of Chechen society and the distribution of power within it.
21. So you hope he stays a major player?
(Mr Cook) He is the elected President. It is hard to see how you can
have a political dialogue genuinely seeking political settlement if he is
ignored.
Ms Abbott
22. You will be aware that according to a report in the Financial
Times the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman says that China backs Russia's
military campaign in Chechnya. Do you think that is going to reinforce the
Russian resolution?
(Mr Cook) Possibly, but it would be no more of a surprise to Moscow
than it would be to ourselves that China does tend to adopt a very determined
position of non-intervention in what are regarded as internal affairs. That
is the view it is taking on Chechnya.
23. Well, he has gone further than that, he says the operation in the
North Caucasus is an effort to maintain national unity and territorial
integrity. He is not saying they do not agree with it, he is saying he
positively backs the operation.
(Mr Cook) I am not here to answer for the Chinese Government.
24. I am not asking you to. I am asking you does it not seem likely
to you that this explicit Chinese backing for their military operation is
going to make it less likely that the Russians are going to de-escalate?
(Mr Cook) I believe the Government of Russia will seek comfort wherever
it is expressed.
25. You will have seen, as we have seen, the press release put out
by the Russian Embassy on the 6th. They say quite clearly: "We think it
necessary to state once again and most resolutely that the Chechen problem is
Russia's internal matter ... We have no intention to conduct any talks with
terrorists, bandits and rapists." This does rather seem to put the lie to
your idea that you are encouraging the Russians to go into dialogue.
(Mr Cook) I am not sure that it puts the lie to anything that I have
said. That is a statement by the Russian Government, it is not a statement by
me. It is a matter of record that we are encouraging the Russian Government
to enter into dialogue. I am not suggesting for one minute that it is easy to
secure the results of that dialogue and, as yet, we do not see any sign of
serious political dialogue. That is why we are so anxious that Kurt Vollebaek
should visit the region next week to explore the prospects for a political
settlement. Please, I am not seeking to be facile about this and suggest this
is easy, it is not.
26. You seemed quite confident at the beginning of the session that
we are not going to see an escalation of the Chechnya campaign by the weekend.
You seemed quite confident that you were getting signals.
(Mr Cook) Certainly there are strong signals coming from Russia that
they are taken aback - and that is encouraging - by the degree of
international reaction to the ultimatum they issued on Monday. I am confident
but I cannot guarantee what Russia or the Russian generals will do next in
Chechnya. Going by the statements of the last 24 hours, the Russian
Government does not intend to close the escape route from Grozny and the
generals are saying that they do not intend to escalate the reactions. What
will happen on Saturday remains to be seen and I make no promises.
27. The Russian generals know in practice that those people in the
cellars of Grozny will not know that they are not closing off the escape
route. The statement, as far as people under bombardment, is meaningless. I
am trying to get from you, Foreign Secretary, what serious grounds have you
to believe that the Russians have swerved from the fairly obdurate position
in the last official statement that we got from the Russian Embassy?
(Mr Cook) Swerved is your word, it is not mine. What I said at the
beginning was that we are getting very clear messages from Moscow that they
are retreating from the ultimatum they made on Monday. With respect, I did
also make clear to the Committee that the main problem is the scale of the
military offensive in Chechnya and I saw no evidence that offensive was being
reduced.
28. You have talked about the meetings that might take place and the
reports that are being undertaken but can you actually enlighten the Committee
as to what Her Majesty's Government will actually do if the Russians go
forward with this ultimatum, what they will actually do as opposed to studying
reports and having meetings?
(Mr Cook) I said yesterday in the House that if the ultimatum was
carried out on Saturday the European Union will be meeting in Summit in
Helsinki and we will be asking the European Union to review the future of its
European aid to Russia. I made that statement yesterday and I stand by that
today.
29. The one weapon that the EU has would be the weapon of aid?
(Mr Cook) That is the weapon that the European Union has, it is its
connection with Russia, but yesterday I pointed out also that the IMF loan had
been put on hold and we would expect it to remain on hold. That is a quite a
substantial degree of leverage. There are other options we will consider when
we get to Saturday.
30. What other leverage do we have?
(Mr Cook) I would not wish to be drawn at this stage on what we will do
in response on Saturday. We are reviewing a whole number of issues and steps
which might be taken, none of it is ruled out. I would ask the Committee to
reflect that we are here trying to achieve two very difficult objectives. One
is to make clear to Russia the dismay and the alarm of ourselves and our
partners about the behaviour of Russia and Chechnya. The other is to pursue
a strategic objective of helping to create a democratic and stable Russia with
a reformed market economy. We have to have regard to both those objectives as
we pursue a strategic policy in relation to Russia.
Sir Peter Emery
31. Foreign Secretary, just going back a moment to the background.
Is it not the case that our relations with Russia were under somewhat of a
strain before Chechnya, what with NATO enlargement, Kosovo and often the
misplaced view that the democracy should have been doing much more to
financially help Russia over this period?
(Mr Cook) Those are three separate steps. First of all, we took the
action in Kosovo because we believed it was right on humanitarian grounds and
it was right ---
32. I am sorry, I am not questioning that.
(Mr Cook) I do think we should be clear that the countries of NATO and
the European Union do have to pursue their own policy, not necessarily concede
a veto to Russia on this question. As to Russia's reaction, I would query the
word "strain". Undoubtedly in the case of Kosovo, in particular, there was a
very substantial public response, and the Committee has seen that for itself
in its visit to Russia, but what was interesting about the conflict in Kosovo
and the lead up to it was the degree of dialogue that we managed to maintain
with the Russian Government, specifically in my case with the Russian Foreign
Minister. Russia was fully engaged in all the events that led up to the
collapse of the Rambouillet peace process and the start of the conflict.
Russia was also fully engaged in the G8 discussions which secured that peace
process. Therefore, it is not simply a one dimensional problem. We have had
at the same time very substantial public reaction in Russia and, indeed,
unquestionably, Government opposition to what we did in Kosovo from Russia,
but at the same time a degree of involvement in the international diplomacy
and discussion of this problem with Russia which never happened during the
Cold War.
33. You are misunderstanding me, what I was trying to imply was that
because of those three instances our relationship with Russia was not as good
as it might have been or we would have liked it to be.
(Mr Cook) No reasonable person would disagree with that, Sir Peter.
34. Thank you. We are in agreement. If that is the case, is not the
role of the OSCE, of which Russia is a member and a participator, not of much
greater importance than it seems to have been given at the moment?
(Mr Cook) As a participator of the international community you mean?
35. Yes.
(Mr Cook) If we are taking this on a slightly longer timescale than the
present crisis, we have sought to bring Russia into international politics and
international organisations. To take two obvious cases, the Permanent Joint
Council was agreed with Russia as a parallel to the enlargement of NATO. It
did actually provide Russia with a much higher level structured forum in which
to raise issues of common concern and security than ever before with NATO and
the founding act sets out a very generous and rich agenda on issues that can
be addressed there. Secondly, the G7 has evolved over the recent years very
much into the G8. In all foreign affairs issues, Russia takes a full part.
In the Summits Russia plays a major part, although it is not present for some
of the financial discussion. So, on those regards, Russia has certainly more
of a role within the international community than before. I think there is
one third international body I would single out and that is the OSCE. The
OSCE, of course, was very much a favourite child of Russia. The creation of
OSCE owes a lot to Russia's own anxiety to create alternative security
assurances within Europe to NATO. The OSCE has taken on a much greater role
over the last year and has become a much bigger body. I pointed out at the
Summit we held recently that the number of missions and the number of
personnel in the field of the OSCE has dramatically increased since the last
Summit. In Kosovo we have the largest mission ever of the OSCE. Although
Russia's status remains the same within OSCE, the status of that organisation
is greatly enhanced.
36. What you have said reinforces what I was trying to suggest, that
OSCE was a body to which the Russians would be more likely to react favourably
to than necessarily the United States, Germany and ourselves and therefore we
ought to be putting a greater pressure on OSCE generally to take a more
positive role.
(Mr Cook) I would agree with your general premise that the OSCE, since
it is the favourite child of Russia, therefore should be able to play a
constructive role. We did, indeed, for that very reason press them hard at
the Istanbul Summit and obtained agreements from them which they may not have
intended to make before they came to the summit and, to be fair to Igor
Ivanov, which he is currently delivering with the visit of Kurt Vollebaek and
co next week. It remains to be seen of course whether that visit is a matter
of form or whether it can have real substance.
37. That is the point. Two questions and then I will finish. Would
it not appear to you that the media are whipping up a view that Britain should
somehow be doing much more? That seemed to be apparent in the BBC on The
Today programme this morning which you had to deal with.
(Mr Cook) I am not sure that it would be productive for me or the
Committee to express our views on the BBC's line of questioning!
38. It might be very productive, Foreign Secretary!
(Mr Cook) Let me make a general observation. First of all, we are very
heavily engaged. I have gone through a whole range of organisations through
which we are pressing this issue, the OSCE, G8, the Council of Europe, our own
direct bilateral exchanges. Secondly, we are looking at measures which can
convey the degree of concern. I announced two of them yesterday and we are
reviewing other options that may be available to us. There are at the other
end of the spectrum measures which everybody would regard as wholly
inappropriate and whenever I ask, "Are you really suggesting we go to war with
Chechnya?" they back off and say, "That would be daft." Nobody has come up
with a proposal that we are not reviewing or have not made which they
themselves are prepared to defend. If the Committee has any ideas I would be
very interested to hear them.
39. That leads nicely into my last question. You said to Ms Abbott
that you did not think it productive to mention the steps that you were
considering and that we might take. There is another side to that approach,
and that is as long as you are not committed to any of those steps, that all
the positive steps that could be taken should be outlined, so that the Russian
Government might realise some of the difficulties that are involved if the
Government should actually decide on any of them.
(Mr Cook) Sir Peter, first of all, we have made plain (and I also have
made plain today to Igor Ivanov) the degree of our concern and the degree of
difficulty we are now placed in by their behaviour in Chechnya in continuing
with our present relations and our present joint programmes. The only reason
why I cannot be drawn at the present time on what further steps might be taken
is because, by definition, they are almost all steps we would have taken with
partners and I am in close contact with colleagues on that. I can assure the
Committee that we are reviewing a wide range of options.
40. Do you not think that it is quite possible that it will become
much easier after the Duma elections are over on 23 December?
(Mr Cook) It is a possibility. We would certainly welcome it if things
were easier then but, as you yourself have indicated, there are further
elections next year.
Mr Rowlands
41. Following on from Sir Peter, you said you had a half an hour
discussion with the Foreign Minister. Do you think he is carrying any
meaningful influence on Chechnya policy, or is it not more the Prime Minister,
the President and the military and he is rather marginal to the whole
operation?
(Mr Cook) Prime Ministers always trump Foreign Ministers, I would not
in any way resile from that, that is the way things should be, but Igor Ivanov
is very central within Moscow. He has direct access to the President. That
is not necessarily the case for every Minister and that partly reflects the
particular interest the President takes in foreign and defence policy. He
also knows and relates to the international community and perhaps has a better
understanding than some of his colleagues about how the international
community thinks and reacts and therefore he is not only the proper but the
best channel of communication we have to get that message out.
42. I have read in commentaries and assessments that he does not pull
any weight on this issue in particular. It is very much being led by Yeltsin,
Putin and the military. He might be the acceptable face to keep an emollient
international community engaged in some kind of dialogue but he is not
carrying any weight within the administration.
(Mr Cook) It is natural among the trade union of Foreign Ministers that
we should defend the status of our rank!
43. I hope you have got more than he has got!
(Mr Cook) As Foreign Minister he is not in charge of what is in effect
a war, but he is the best avenue we have at a senior level within the Russian
Government to get that message heard. That said, I would not wish the
Committee to imagine that our messages have been directed only at the Foreign
Minister. The Prime Minister has now twice written to Prime Minister Putin
recording our concern about events in Chechnya.
44. Sir Peter asked you about the role of OSCE. Only two or three
weeks ago in Istanbul this summit declaration was signed and we have got
phrases like "we understand the need to respect OSCE norms", "we agree that
in the light of the humanitarian situation in the region, it is important to
alleviate the hardships to the civilian population", "clearly by creating the
corporate conditions for international organisations to provide humanitarian
aid", "we agree that a political solution is essential", "we will assist the
OSCE in achieving that goal", "we welcome the willingness of the Russian
Federation to facilitate steps creating conditions of stability, security and
economic prosperity." This was signed in all good faith by the Russian
Foreign Minister and then within two or three weeks the words are apparently
meaningless and worthless in the case of Chechnya.
(Mr Cook) I am very familiar with the words because they were
negotiated over five hours of intense negotiation between the Russian Foreign
Minister, myself, and the American, German, Italian and French Foreign
Ministers, and we pushed very hard to secure that language. We are now
pushing very hard to secure delivery on that language. In terms of the visit
by the Chair in Office of the OSCE, he has already been to Moscow and he is
now going to the region. I was concerned, myself, that the visit to the
region appeared to be being put off and that is why I rang Igor Ivanov at the
end of last week to press him for an early date and, to be fair, he has
secured a date next week.
45. What I am saying is not so much that this language was carefully
negotiated and we put the Russians under a lot of pressure to accept it and
so forth, but that that has not just not been implemented, but the very
opposite has occurred in the last two weeks in that they have intensified
their attacks on the civilian population, they have now threatened to close
the corridors and take over the capital. It is not that the language is not
being implemented; it is that the opposite is occurring.
(Mr Cook) I am not sure that the very opposite would be correct but it
is the case that when we met in Istanbul there was a very serious military
offensive which had already rendered hundreds of thousands of people homeless
and it has shown no sign of slacking. I am not pretending otherwise. Quite
the reverse, it is because of the events in Chechnya and because of the
escalation and threat that took place on Monday, that I made the statement I
did yesterday and I have a vigorous sense of dismay and concern, both at what
is happening and the failure of the Russian Government to respond to the very
strong messages we have sent in private and public.
46. Despite the horrors of what we see on our television screens of
what is happening in the region, does it not also say something rather
chilling about internal Russian politics, that the only unifying issue that
somehow brings Russians together is the persecution of a pretty helpless
people?
(Mr Cook) It is certainly the case that the offensive in Chechnya has
created a very strong degree of support for the government. To put that in
context, we should recollect that Russia sees this as related to the terrorist
bombs that killed 300 people before the start of the offensive, which they
attributed - although it has never actually been proved - to Chechen
terrorists. Both the wave of anger at the terrorist bombs and their
frustration at the lawlessness in Chechnya has created a very large degree of
public support for the action in Chechnya. Nor do we query the legitimate
right of Russia to respond to terrorism in Chechnya or the lack of lawfulness
in Chechnya. We cannot accept the manner in which it is being done with the
suffering it has created. Many of those hundreds of thousands of refugees are
just as innocent of the terrorist bombs in Moscow as were the people who were
the victims of the bombs. Nor can we understand how this is actually going
to produce a result. It is, of course, popular at the present time, wars
sometimes are popular in the first two or three months. If, however, it does
not produce a result in the next few months then it can turn into a liability,
not an asset.
47. With a large number of bodies in the mean time.
(Mr Cook) Look, Ted, I am not suggesting that we want to set up those
months as an experiment in election popularity, we would like to see it ended
this week.
48. The Committee has been taking a lot of evidence. Looking back
over quite a lot of it before preparing for this meeting one thing that struck
me was that one common thing which emerges is that at all times since 1989 the
West has had a certain cautious optimism but always tried to be as upbeat as
possible about what is happening in Russia. I just wondered each time about
the benefit of the doubt that had been given that meant we had progress here,
whether it was on the financial side, whether it was on the economic side,
good governance on elections and the rest of it. But, in fact, if you tot it
all up, it is a pretty sorry story. We threw a lot behind a group of
reformers who turned out, many of them, to be crooks and ran out of money in
one form or another and created a system that has led to corruption and
created divisions. Now, on this side we have a military political situation
which in regional terms is destabilising. The Russians have gone into Georgia.
There has been meddling all around the neighbouring states. Do you think it
is time for a fundamental reappraisal of the assumptions we have been making
and the basis of some of the policies that we have adopted?
(Mr Cook) If I could first say that the Foreign Office memorandum to
the Committee spells out pretty bluntly the scale of the problem and the
difficulties in Russia. I reread it last night in anticipation of this
Committee and I thought it was a very good memorandum which very frankly, over
the first four pages, spells out the degree of difficulty both in the Russian
economy and Russian business.
49. Yes, but give the margin, the benefit of the doubt.
(Mr Cook) I am not sure that those first few pages did do that, Ted.
Obviously where we can make progress we welcome that. You mentioned Georgia,
one of the steps forward we secured in Istanbul was an agreement for the
withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia in terms that actually the Georgians
have strongly welcomed. There is a step forward, yes. I do not deny to you
that there are a lot of problems there and a long way to go in securing them.
I am not sure that I think the case is for reassessing strategic assumptions.
I think many errors have been made over the past ten years and the periods we
referred to are periods long before I had the opportunity to influence them
from a position of office. I am confident that the objectives of our policy
towards Russia, which are also set out in that memorandum, are the correct
objectives: firstly, to secure democratic and stable society in Russia and,
secondly, to secure a modern reformed market economy in Russia. We are still
a long way from the latter and have some way to go on the former but I am
quite confident those are the correct objectives.
Mr Wilshire
50. Foreign Secretary, do you accept that the situation in Kosovo,
and how the Government responds to it, is now a test of how we turn ethical
beliefs into action against those who abuse human rights?
(Mr Cook) Did you mean Kosovo?
51. No, sorry, I did not, I meant Chechnya. I beg your pardon.
(Mr Cook) The situation in Chechnya is a very serious challenge to
international humanitarian norms. We are not the Government of Russia and we
shall not be held responsible for what the Government of Russia does.
52. Nonetheless, this can be seen in terms of a Government quite
rightly with ethical beliefs that now has to act to uphold those?
(Mr Cook) We have made quite clear our commitment to international
humanitarian law and our commitment to human rights and we will seek to uphold
this in all areas. We will seek also to secure improvement in observance of
international humanitarian law wherever we can realistically and reasonably
take action to do so, and that is what we are pursuing in relation to Russia
and Chechnya.
53. I want to return to your interview this morning on the BBC. You
hopefully will be relieved to know that I agree with you when you say we
should not bomb Moscow in the way that we bombed Belgrade.
(Mr Cook) I am glad we have that point of consensus.
54. Yes. Can you not see any similarities between what happened in
Kosovo and what Milosevic was doing and what is now happening in Chechnya?
You were giving the impression this morning you did not see similarities of
any sort between those two episodes.
(Mr Cook) Well, first of all, in the case of Kosovo, we were confronted
with a massive ethnic cleansing which was plainly intended to take the
population of Kosovo out of Kosovo. We acted - and it has been one of the
great success stories in refugee returns that we have witnessed in post war
history - because it was across the borders and we had the capacity to act and
we did do so. Nobody in their right mind, and I understand we are in agreement
on this, is suggesting that we either can or should take such action in
relation to Chechnya.
55. Certainly the removal of a population from one place to another
is exactly what is happening in Chechnya at the moment. Can you not see some
similarities, even if the action that we can take is not the same and we do
not have a small person to pick on?
(Mr Cook) The premise behind your question is that somehow I am
defending what is happening in Chechnya; I am not. I deplore what is happening
in Chechnya as I said to the House yesterday. We are taking action to get
that message across to the Russian Government. As I said, we will take every
realistic and responsible measure both to get that message over to the
Government of Russia and to seek to change their conduct in Chechnya and to
seek a political solution. That does not mean to say that we follow to the
letter every way in which we pursued our action in Kosovo, as you yourself
have indicated that would be both dangerous and counter-productive.
56. Can you not see that one of the implications and one of the
consequences of what happened in Kosovo is that we have cleared the way for
the Russian leadership to use our action in Kosovo to justify ---
(Mr Cook) No, no, no.
57. --- and to sell to the Russian people what they are doing.
(Mr Cook) I would totally disagree with that. I hope this Committee
would not buy that argument. There is no parallelism between what the Russians
are doing as a military offensive in Chechnya, which is indeed to drive out
the civilian population, and what we did in Kosovo, where it was not we who
provoked the refugee exodus, it was the reaction of Milosevic and our action
was to reverse it and we succeeded in reversing it.
58. That is a disputable point.
(Mr Cook) No, we did succeed in reversing it.
59. Who caused the exodus in the first place is disputable. Again,
we are in agreement, you and I, on the question of having to do more if the
situation does not improve. You asked whether any of us have clear proposals
that you might be able to consider. Can I put this one to you: would you, like
me, support the suspension of Russia's membership of the Council of Europe,
which exists after all to protect human rights, and clearly the Russians, with
their action in Chechnya, are in breach of that? Would you support their
suspension immediately?
(Mr Cook) We have not taken a view on whether we would support their
suspension but if it is put for consideration, for instance, as a result of
the Jil Robles report, that is something we have to consider in terms of
whether Russia is meeting its obligations under the Council of Europe. Those
obligations are onerous, they are clear, they require respect for human
rights. Certainly that is respect which, if Mr Jil Robles recommends, we will
consider.
60. Just one other thing, Chairman, if I may. Again I agree with you
that it is absolutely right for us to be giving the Russian leadership a very
hard time over human rights abuses in Chechnya but, if that is correct, why
is it that the Chinese leadership was welcomed with open arms when the human
rights record in Tibet is as bad if not worse than what happened in Kosovo and
what is happening in Chechnya?
(Mr Cook) That is a large question and it is not viable, but I am very
happy to respond to it. We do have a strategic policy in relation to China
to seek to engage it in the outside world and to seek to it engage it in
dialogue. Part of that strategic policy is to engage it in dialogue on human
rights. We have made some progress on that. I am very conscious of Mr
Rowlands' perspective on this and I do not disagree with the Committee that
we have a long way to go with China. But, in the process of the past two years
we have got to the point of signing one of the International Covenants on
Human Rights and are on the verge of signing the other. We have also secured
the first visit to China by the UN Commissioner for Human Rights to China.
In the course of the visit to London I had the opportunity of a very full
discussion with the Chinese Foreign Minister, both on the arrest of dissidents
and also on the situation in Tibet and urged on them dialogue with the Dalai
Lama.
Chairman
61. I would like to get back to Russia.
(Mr Cook) I am very happy to talk about Russia, but asked about China
I have to respond.
Mr Wilshire
62. My final question really is how can it be ethical to cut off aid
to Russia but not to cut off aid to China? That is the only point I would
wish to address in terms of pursuing an ethical policy even-handedly across
the globe.
(Mr Cook) We will take whatever action is reasonable and realistic to
pursue our objectives. Such assistance that we do provide to China is
targeted on poverty reduction and support for human rights projects. We are,
for instance, assisting at the present time with the development of democracy
at the village level in China. I cannot for the life of me understand how it
helps human rights for us to cut that off.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, Sir John Stanley will now wind up for us
on Chechnya and we will then move to a range of subjects, and Sir John will
move on to weapons of mass destruction, arms control - areas of co-operation
that might be vitally affected by the Chechnya problem. Sir John?
Sir John Stanley
63. I certainly would not presume to wind up for the Committee, but
I had one very important question on which I seek your clarification in
relation to Chechnya. You have explained, and I entirely understand what you
said and accept what you said on the reasons why international humanitarian
agencies like the Red Cross have felt it impossible to operate inside
Chechnya, but what I find surprising and worrying, and still myself do not
fully understand, is why there has been such a very, very limited response by
the international humanitarian agencies outside Chechnya on the borders of
Chechnya to try to give humanitarian aid to the refugees flowing across the
border. I do not understand why the international agencies have been almost
invisible in these circumstances, making the most glaring contrast to what was
ultimately a very, very successful international humanitarian operation on the
borders of Kosovo, and why we are seeing on our television screens orphan
children left alone eking out some sort of existence in railway carriages, and
so many desperate families trying to start to get through a Russian winter in
tents, and why we are not seeing even the start of an international
humanitarian effort on the borders of Chechnya that we saw on the borders of
Kosovo. Is it because the Russian Government is obstructing these agencies?
Why has there been such a lack of international response?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I absolutely share your frustration at the low
level of humanitarian relief that gets to those who get out of Chechnya. I
share that concern. I think there are a number of reasons, none of which are
excuses, for the present situation. One of them is that we have not had
perhaps the proactive response that one might have hoped for from the Russian
authorities. That is not necessarily to say there is a political objection,
but things are difficult to move through Russia. Secondly, of course, we are
dealing with an area which is much more remote than Albania and Macedonia is
and much more difficult to get access to, but I do not dispute that there is
plainly a greater humanitarian need in the region than is getting through to
them and we have made œ0.5 million provision to the Red Cross which is active
in the area. We are engaged at the present time in looking at how we can
support UN operations through the High Commissioner for Refugees. We would
like to see them engaged and engaged in a more proactive way than at the
present time.
64. Can I, Foreign Secretary, turn to the wider international
security issues to which the Chairman referred. We went to Moscow
anticipating that we would get something of a post-Kosovo drubbing and we were
not disappointed in the welcome that we got. If I can just rehearse to you
the litany of serious misconceptions that were repeated to us really right
across the board amongst the people that we met in Moscow, across the
political spectrum by the representatives from the Duma, Communists to
Nationalists, from people in government, and from the military. We were told
that NATO was an organisation which now acted outside the international law.
Evidence, in the Russian view: Kosovo. We were told that NATO had ceased
being a defensive organisation and was now an aggressive organisation.
Evidence, in the Russian view: Kosovo. We were told that NATO had now become
an expansionist organisation in military terms. Evidence, in the Russian
view: the enlargement of NATO. We were told NATO's main military power, the
United States, could no longer be considered serious about strategic nuclear
disarmament. Evidence, in the Russian view: the refusal of the Senate to
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And we were told also that the
United States was engaged in a long-term objective of weakening, possibly
invalidating, the Russian deterrent by the proposals it was making to amend
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. I am sure you would agree, Foreign
Secretary, that these are immensely damaging and dangerous misconceptions
which could set back the process of arms control for years if they were
allowed to linger and gain root. Could I ask you to tell the Committee what
steps the British Government is taking alongside our allies to try to
eradicate these very, very dangerous misconceptions which certainly could do
grievous harm to the process of arms control in the long-term if they are
allowed to stay in Russian minds.
(Mr Cook) First of all, I do not agree with any of those misconceptions
and I am sure the Committee did not either. Secondly, you do highlight what
is a serious issue for us which is within the political class in Russia there
are a number of issues coming together which are leading them to regard the
West as the problem in their foreign policy concerns. That is exactly why at
the last G8 Summit Britain took the lead in trying to make a number of
constructive proposals for ways in which we could demonstrate that the West
is a solution to the domestic problems of the people of Russia, for instance
our proposed programme to try and halt the spread of TB, and if we can find
ways in which we can relate in a meaningful way to the lives of the people
what the West is doing to help create a more progressive Russia, we may be
able to try and tackle at the root that growing sense of alienation to the
West and the outside world. In every possible dialogue we do try to get
across a more balanced picture. We will be discussing later the programmes
that are carried out by both the World Service and the British Council which
do provide alternative information to the Russian people. There is a vigorous
programme of parliamentary exchanges and indeed, if I recall rightly, fourteen
parliamentary delegations from Russia to Britain in the past year. We would
welcome more parliamentary visits from Britain to Russia to try and have
dialogue with the Russian Duma and to try and spread perhaps a more pluralist
interpretation of international affairs. We did fund one such visit during
the Kosovo crisis to get across the concerns and alternative perspective of
the West and that was quite successful in making some impact at the time on
Duma opinion.
65. I can merely pass on, Foreign Secretary, that whatever the
efforts so far, judging by those we spoke to in Moscow, we have got a huge
amount of ground to make up and a huge amount of fence-repairing, putting it
at its mildest, to do. I think all the members of the Committee left Moscow
really very, very disturbed about the serious misreading of Western and NATO
defence policy which seems to be taken almost as read without question right
across the political spectrum in Russia at the moment.
(Mr Cook) I think the Committee is quite right in feeling that anxiety
and I would share that anxiety. We are not responsible for the misreading of
the policy and you concede yourself this is a misreading. I cannot be held to
account for the state of Russian public opinion. I do think there are two
fundamental issues here. One is I do think there is an unhealthy competition
and nationalism within the Russian political classes. I think they have to
find alternative ways of democratic competition rather than in the nationalism
competition. Secondly, perhaps rather than starting out by saying how do we
change public opinion, we need to take one step back and be more fundamental
and say how do we actually draw Russia out of its shell and regard the rest
of the world not as a threat but as an partner and to understand that for them
prosperity and security in the future depends on the terms of the engagement
and the success of that engagement with the outside community rather than
retreating into a fortress Russia. There are a whole range of ways in which
we can seek to try and engage all levels of Russian society but at the
diplomatic and political level we have worked hard over the past few years
always to try and keep that door open and with the diplomats some success.
66. Can I finally, simply put on the record, Foreign Secretary, that
we have received a number of very, very warm tributes from those that we met
in the British community and in the European community to the work which our
British Ambassador has done.
(Mr Cook) Good.
Sir John Stanley: During the Kosovo crisis when it must have been one
of the most uncomfortable and difficult positions to have to actually hold.
Chairman: On radio and television.
Sir John Stanley
67. He was spoken of in glowing terms for the reasonableness and
tenacity with which he tried to explain the NATO position.
(Mr Cook) I very much appreciate those generous comments and I will
make sure they are fed back to Moscow.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, we move from the arms control on to
nuclear safety.
Sir Peter Emery
68. Before that, Foreign Secretary, I was delighted to hear you say
that you would welcome many more visits of British Members of Parliament to
Russia. I am sure that is a help. We can look to the Foreign Office to help
finance these visits, can we?
(Mr Cook) No, you cannot. First of all, I have no power to do so and
certainly I do not have the money to do it. We would support, where persuaded
there is a case for it, an individual visit for a specific purpose but it is
not the function of our budget to underwrite the generality of routine
Parliamentary exchanges. That is a matter for Parliament.
Mr Mackinlay
69. British-American Parliamentary Group, there is a discrimination
there.
(Mr Cook) I was going to say, there is also another parallel that we do
have funds for visits to the Commonwealth membership but not to the CIS.
70. No.
(Mr Cook) I do think there is an issue for Parliamentarians to pursue
there and the Committee perhaps could be helpful in that.
Sir Peter Emery
71. Maybe we could discuss this at length on other occasions. Can I
turn then to nuclear safety. You will know there has been considerable concern
expressed in the North Atlantic Assembly and many other places about the
number of unsafe nuclear generating plants that exist on the eastern side of
the European continent. I think there are 15 that are in doubt. What action
is the Foreign Office taking with these and to try and enlarge the work that
IAEA in Vienna is actually doing to ensure their safety?
(Mr Cook) There are two major dimensions to the Russian nuclear safety
question. I welcome very much you drawing attention to it because it is a
personal concern of mine and it is a major concern for Russia and its friends.
The first of those is the nuclear reactor safety. Quite a lot of work has
been done on that and quite a lot of funding provided through the EBRD. I
think something like œ20 million has now been provided through the EBRD for
nuclear safety within nuclear reactors. There is a lot of work still to be
done but the TACIS programme, the EBRD do provide quite a lot of European
support which we contribute to. The second dimension is one actually which
frankly has not had the same attention but in many ways could be just as
dangerous and that is the handling of nuclear waste.
72. From the north.
(Mr Cook) From the nuclear reactors and from the nuclear weapons
programme. There are two main concentrations of that. One is east of the
Urals, the supposed nuclear waste treatment plant, though our impression is
it is not even keeping pace with the accumulation of nuclear waste at the
present time. The second, as you rightly say, is the Kola Peninsula up in the
north, where so much of the Russian nuclear fleet previously was. Most of the
problem with nuclear waste is not from the weapons but from the reactors in
the nuclear fleet. I visited Murmansk last spring and there I pledged us to
a sum of money, of which we have been able to find œ5 million in total. It was
very warmly received by the Murmansk authorities because to them, they are
sitting on the problem and they recognise this is a very real, very serious
problem. It is not their problem alone, it is also that of the rest of us in
the northern hemisphere and we all have a role and we all have an incentive
to make sure this problem is tackled.
73. Foreign Secretary, the point surely is that money is nothing
compared with the vast damage that we could all suffer if their nuclear
reactors go wrong or the nuclear waste situation should thoroughly deteriorate
into explosion or something of that nature. Ought we not to be taking a
greater role in trying to bring international views together to get more money
because one so frequently hears the argument "Well it must be for these
countries to clear up their own problems", well, of course we understand that
but the problems if they are not cleared up and they go wrong are problems
which hit our generations and the generations of Europe very, very heavily.
(Mr Cook) I have a lot of sympathy with the views you expressed. For
myself I have repeatedly sought to raise this issue and to try and mobilise
the international response to it. With the nuclear reactor safety, we have
made some serious inroads into the problem and some serious funding. We are
still some way away from achieving the same progress on the nuclear waste
safety. There are of course very serious problems about securing progress. It
would be much more helpful if Russia itself was coming forward and saying "We
have this terrible headache and this terrible problem, can you help with it?".
On the contrary, the Russian authority's response tends to be the nuclear
waste treatment and the nuclear waste in their nuclear fleet is getting very
close to the most sensitive, secure part of their strategic posture. It is
actually very difficult to give them help. It was March that I offered the œ5
million, it is now December, we still have not got agreement on the
arrangement for the contingent liability for any work we do. We have not got
exemption from VAT and Customs' levy if we actually send over the material we
need to purchase with it. It can be very frustrating helping in these
circumstances.
74. The mayor of St Petersburg, who of course would be much affected
by what would happen in Murmansk, was massively in favour of any money coming
from anywhere.
(Mr Cook) Exactly.
Dr Godman
75. On this question of your visit to these nuclear powered vessels,
I take it that they are literally tied up to the quay.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
76. Forever and ever.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
77. There is no question of any of these vessels being scuppered in
the northern deeps?
(Mr Cook) I cannot give such an assurance.
78. Were you given assurances?
(Mr Cook) Not in those terms. I am not aware of any current proposal to
do that. Norman, you are right that there are a large number of submarines,
in particular, which are laid up in the Kola Peninsula. There are also a
number of former freighter ships which are beyond their use as freighter ships
which are also tied up to the quay containing large volumes of nuclear waste
on board them. The œ5 million that I contributed will - and I record the terms
of it - provide safe stowage casks for the nuclear waste on those freighters
most at risk of sinking.
79. This will not cover the protection of these vessels, the
contribution of œ5 million. How big a part of the overall cost is the œ5
million. I think it is a very fine gesture but if we look at the permanent
docking of our obsolescent nuclear submarines, œ5 million would not cover the
protection of one nuclear powered vessel, would it?
(Mr Cook) œ5 million does go further in Murmansk than it necessarily
would in our economy. Can I be quite clear what we are proposing. What we are
proposing to do is to provide safe stowage casks for the waste that is
currently out of those submarines and currently being stored on vessels tied
up in the docks at Murmansk. That is one of the reasons why it is so very
welcome in Murmansk. I want to be absolutely candid, I am not saying that
this is going to make a major transformation of the situation but it does
avert the most pressing crisis which is actually some of these freighters are
about to sink and the stowage casks that they are in at present are no longer
reliable. This will buy us a significant amount of years in order to try and
work out a more fundamental, more far reaching solution. Ultimately Russia is
going to need greater and more reliable capacity to recycle nuclear waste.
80. Putting it crudely and simplistically, the authorities would
literally need to concrete over the whole of those harbours where those
vessels are tied up, as you said yourself, not tied up, laid up.
(Mr Cook) I would not want to express a view on what the technical
solution might be. One of the things that Britain can contribute here is not
just the question of finance we actually do have an enormous amount of
expertise in this area. BNFL has already played a very helpful role in
examining the problem and is there to provide advice. As I said, if we are
going to crack this problem we do need a proactive response from the Russian
side as well.
Mr Mackinlay
81. Can I pursue that. It does occur to me following Dr Godman's
question that in a sense in the West, and I use very general terms, really we
have not grasped the gravity of the threat to us all in Northern Europe.
Because of constraints of public expenditure and so on and so forth, it seems
almost like a mega accident waiting to happen. Then public opinion will
chastise the present generation of politicians across Western Europe and North
America. I have almost a plea for you to perhaps go back to the highest
levels to say "This is a matter which parliamentarians...", I suspect our
colleagues in other legislatures, "...consider to be of even greater priority
than it is being given at the present time." Money has to poured at it, large
sums of money.
(Mr Cook) I have expressed my concern in a number of international
forums.
82. Yes.
(Mr Cook) I welcome the thrust of the question because it drives me to
do it again.
83. Yes.
(Mr Cook) I would share with the Committee I regard this as a very
grave problem. I do not want to be alarmist and certainly I do not wish to
read any sort of sensationalist stories tomorrow. There is not an immediate
and pressing risk but there is a grumbling and a very serious problem that
requires to be addressed. I think the difficulty in mobilising the
international community is partly that Russia is not jumping up and down and
demanding help, there would be resistance. It is partly also that although
when sitting around the table everybody agrees it is grave, there is not a
sense of urgency.
84. We are on record now for expressing that urgency. On the
question of NATO-Russia relationships, the Permanent Joint Council was seen
as a great vehicle, as it were, as trying to bridge the gap but demonstrably
that has failed. Indeed, I think I am correct in saying that the Russians now
see the PJC agreement as having been abrogated as a result of Kosovo. What
have you got in mind - I know it is difficult at the present time with
Chechnya and so on - to either build on the PJC or to create a new
relationship between NATO and Russia?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure that abrogated is quite the right way of
expressing it, I think the Russian view is it is put in suspension. Would
that be a fair expression?
(Ms Pringle) Yes.
(Mr Cook) It is the case that it has not functioned since the start of
the Kosovo conflict. I think personally that is a matter of regret and is
actually not helping Russia's interests. We did set out quite a generous
agenda for the PJC. We did have a meeting at ministerial level in New York at
the General Assembly in 1998, if I recall rightly. That was actually quite a
moving occasion, to have around the room the Ministers of NATO and the Foreign
Minister of Russia discussing jointly with them how we take forward
peacekeeping, conflict prevention and co-operate together and that was
valuable. I am sorry that we have not been able to exploit the PJC to its full
amount, partly because of the deep freeze in taking things forward that has
descended since Kosovo. The door is still open. We understand Russia is now
beginning to be willing to enter into dialogue and issues that are not related
to Kosovo. In a sense their problem on this is the reverse of our problem in
relation to Chechnya, by not taking part they are damaging their own national
interests.
85. Enlargement of NATO, speaking for myself I always thought it was
right to enlarge the extent we did and there was a window of applicable
opportunity which was seized. Clearly that deeply hurt Russian feeling and
aggravated their feeling of, I suppose you could say, encirclement but it was
tolerable. Then came Kosovo and now it has been put to us, and I put to you,
that further enlargement really for the foreseeable future would be far too
provocative and perhaps inappropriate and unnecessary. I am thinking in
relation particularly to the Baltic States and/or Georgia. Just to complete
this, presumably the Baltic State solution is admission to the EU which
provides implied security. Could we have your views on that, the enlargement
of NATO?
(Mr Cook) First of all, let us be clear what drove the expansion of
NATO was the wish of the countries of central Europe to become members of
NATO.
86. Sure.
(Mr Cook) One cannot say to Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic,
we cannot accept your application because Russia will be unhappy. That would
be wrong for them and it would also be wrong for NATO to take that view. For
the same reasons we have to respect the ambitions of the other applicant
countries to be members of NATO. That is why at the Washington Summit we made
it clear that the door must remain open and we cannot allow a veto for Russia
or any other third country as to whom we consider for membership. There is
at the present time, no immediate plan for an immediate further expansion, nor
could it happen in any event until the next NATO summit. As a result of the
Washington Summit we are working with those who are applicant countries to
develop their military partnership with us through a stability pact. We are
looking at ways in which we can have a meaningful increase in security of
those countries in the Balkan region and south east Europe as applicants. As
you rightly say, with many of these countries they are also in the enlargement
process of the European Union where for the time being their political
priority rests. Now I think that is another added reason why it is so
important that we make a success, and a success as soon as possible, of the
European Union enlargement because so long as that momentum is proceeding, to
some extent it eases the anxiety of being left out of NATO.
87. My last question, Foreign Secretary, is Belarus and Russian
relations. I remember the time when the President of Belarus's official
constitutional term expired I put down some Parliamentary questions as to the
view of the British Government, the reaction to the fact that he was going to
kindly carry on in office. The reply I got said "He is de facto president",
I think that was the gist of it. What occurred to me at that time and remains
with me is that we are not showing sufficient disapproval of the
unconstitutional regime of Belarus. We seem to be rather sanguine about the
attempts by that President to reach a new federation with the Russian
Federation. Thirdly, it struck me that in terms of a conflict avoidance we
ought to be addressing ourselves to this great extent we are because it could
be another trouble spot some months or a year or two down the road in terms
of conflict within a state bordering NATO and probably bordering an EU state.
I suppose I did say finally, the human rights aspect of that, there is deep
concern amongst us about really there does not seem to be any higher profile
either by the Foreign Office here or the West generally about what is
happening in Belarus.
(Mr Cook) We have grave concerns about the quality of governance and
human rights in Belarus, indeed it is hard to know exactly where to start.
We recognise that Lukashenko is indeed the de facto president of Belarus. He
is therefore the authority with whom we deal but we are deeply critical of the
way in which he suspended the constitution effectively in 1994 and the way in
which he has ridden roughshod over all democratic norms ever since. We have
also had our own financial problems with him in that he is the only head of
state in my time in office who has tried to throw us out of our embassy and
break the Geneva Conventions on diplomatic access, a problem which we
eventually resolved with a large number of partners who were in the same boat.
On the question of the union with Russia, Russia and Belarus are two sovereign
states. It would not be for us to oppose any free decision by both of them or
the union any more than elsewhere. It does have to be a free decision by both
of them and of course what concerns us about Lukashenko's proposal is that it
is vigorously opposed by those opposition figures we can hear who of course
do not have any real democratic rights within Belarus. If such a union were
to proceed it is for Russia and the people of Belarus to decide for themselves
but we would want some evidence that the people of Belarus supported it.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, we turn to drugs and terrorism, Mr
Chidgey?
Mr Chidgey
88. I am sure, Foreign Secretary, you will be aware of a rather
startling programme on the BBC earlier this week I think on the Russian mafia
which I think has highlighted many of the concerns the Committee has felt
anyway. However inaccurate or gilding of the lily, it does nevertheless bring
to the forefront some very serious concerns that many people have about what
is happening in terms of criminality in Russia. I have a series of questions
I would like to put to you. Particularly, for example, how great a threat do
you see Russian terrorism, drugs and crime to the EU in general and to
ourselves in particular with regard to the development of organised crime,
particularly the development of drug smuggling activities? Now for example
in the document prepared by the FCO it states that "... the growing problem
of drug addiction in Russia is of concern to the UK, although it is not at the
moment a great threat". I wondered what the basis for that statement was?
Linked to that particular point is a question for you as to whether or not
there is a justification for additional drug liaison officers outside Moscow
itself?
(Mr Cook) On the last point, a drug liaison officer usually operates
from our posts and usually from our sovereign posts and by definition is
mainly there to promote liaison with the host government. I would be a little
bit cautious about movement to a drug liaison officer operating outside the
sovereign post and certainly deeply sceptical that he could operate outside
a post. To come back to the first of your questions, there is a serious
problem of drug addiction and drug running and the organised crime that goes
with it in Russia. We are deeply concerned about that. I would not want you
to interpret anything we have said in that paper as indicating in any way
complacency. Indeed that is why we have sought and have now secured a
Memorandum of Understanding with the Russian interior ministry on how we can
work together to combat organised crime, sharing information, sharing methods
and sharing insights. Indeed, on one of my visits to Moscow I did present
them with a kit which would be helpful to them in tracking organised crime.
The statement that it is not a great threat, I believe - if I am in error on
this I will put in a note to the Committee - reflects our assessment of the
drug routes to Britain, of which Russia is not a high place. I am told I am
right, I think they mean it.
89. That is helpful. I know other colleagues want to question you.
In that regard, the issue of organised crime, laundering money in the Western
financial centres, again an issue which is quite clear and a considerable
concern. It has been recognised in the United States and in the latest
information that has come out in the popular media, there is an accusation a
major bank in this country has been involved, perhaps unwittingly. I am asking
you really what evidence is there that the City of London is used by Russian
organised crime to launder money?
(Mr Cook) I think it would be unwise of me to get drawn on any one
individual accusation but on the question of money laundering, we are very
alive to the problem of money laundering at an international level. We have
taken a lead in many forms to try and combat it. Part of that work which we
are seeking to promote with the Russian authorities is to tackle the question
of money laundering but it is a very difficult one and the Committee, having
had some insight to the state of the Russian banking sector, will understand
how problematic that is.
90. Some of the evidence we have received on this Committee has been
from an academic expert on the Russian crime scene. The comment was made that
they believe that the FCO assumes that Russian organised crime was in fact a
law enforcement issue, therefore not specifically in the mainstream interests
of the FCO, and the FCO's view was that "... is not its business, except in
certain very limited and specific contexts ..." to be involved in these
issues. I wonder, perhaps you could throw a little light on that?
(Mr Cook) Fine. I do not think anybody in the Foreign Office has ever
dared expressed such a view within my hearing and I can assure you that it is
not my reading of their activities. For instance, obviously this is primarily
an issue for the Home Office but the Foreign Office would be very active in
all things that relate to the international convention. For instance, the
Foreign Office has taken a lead in trying to persuade Russia to adopt money
laundering legislation. We brokered the Memorandum of Understanding between
the interior ministry and the Home Office on this issue. If I am correct, I
think your remarks are from Mr Galeotti.
91. Absolutely. Spot on.
(Mr Cook) Mr Galeotti, as I understand it, has not been in the Foreign
Office for three years and we are rather puzzled by his comments, particularly
by his criticism of the Consular-General in Ekaterinburg which was not opened
when he was in the FCO, if I remember rightly, it was not opened until 18
months ago.
Mr Wilshire
92. Chairman, that reference to the Consular-General, if we get an
opportunity later I would like to come back to that and visit it. I will stick
to the drug issue. Mr Illsley and I had a chance to meet with some of the
drug enforcement people in Moscow while we were there and because of having
part of Heathrow in my constituency I get much involved in the day to day
issues. I understand your point about drug liaison officers and the fact that
you face them on your own territory. Is there not a case for considering
Ekaterinburg for example, as a Consular-General on the drugs route, the old
silk route to the West? Using the argument, although it is not a great source
of drugs in this country, as I understand it from Customs and Excise, it is
better to stop it becoming one than to wait until it has become one. Is there
any scope for further DLOs in your judgment?
(Mr Cook) I would not wish to have a closed mind on the matter. I would
be very happy to take this away and consider the question and of course it is
a matter we would have to discuss closely with Customs who are primarily the
people who second them. The supply of such people is limited, which is not
primarily a resource issue but these are highly skilled and knowledgeable,
experienced people. I must say whenever I have met with them on my visits
around posts I have been extremely impressed by their commitment and their
skills. Given there is a limit to them, we have necessarily to make priority
decisions about where they are deployed and therefore, although I do not
dissent from your ambition that we should be prevented from growing what is
still a small problem and while we are still trying to cope with the larger
problems, it is perhaps difficult to find the spare resources for this but I
will take it away and consider it.
93. Following on from that, one of the realities of a drugs liaison
officer is that he is an enforcement officer.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
94. Seconded, as you rightly say. There are other countries, the
Americans particularly, who have changed the status of what we know as a drugs
liaison officer into say a legal attache which gives them a bigger involvement
on what would be Foreign Office work. Is it something you have explored as a
possibility for the way in which we handle drug enforcement?
(Mr Cook) My impression of American society is they believe that
lawyers are the best people to do anything. I would be very hesitant to
criticise or suggest we could improve on the work being done by the drugs
liaison officers. I think the fact they are law enforcement officers is
actually an immense asset in many of the circumstances in which they work.
They come to it with all the instincts of a law enforcement officer and with
experience.
95. Just one more thing on this, Chairman, and it is not because I
agree with him but I go back to Dr Galeotti's evidence. I think it is
sufficiently important to ask you about it. I quote from what he says. He says
"Furthermore, my feeling is that the Diplomatic Staff in Moscow, reflecting
the FCO's general distaste of law enforcement affairs, tend to regard the
DLO's presence as an excuse not to get involved themselves". Now I stress I
am not saying that because I agree with it, but I see somebody say that and
I do think it is something that between us as a Committee, and you as the
Foreign Secretary, we should consider and reassure ourselves this is nonsense.
(Mr Cook) The DLO in Moscow is attached to the Chancery, so he is very
heavily plugged into the structure of the Embassy. They are seconded Customs
officials, they have their own ethos and culture and way of working. They are
focused on one specific and particular task. Indeed, like law enforcement
officers everywhere it is important that they do have that instinct and
culture. But, I have never in my exchanges with them at any stage heard any
complaint about a lack of commitment, support or priority among the diplomats
with whom they work.
96. Would you take away that comment and consider it and write back
to us?
(Mr Cook) I am very happy to put in a note.
Mr Wilshire: I would find it very helpful to have that refuted because
if it was to be true it would be worrying.
Chairman: Mr Illsley will start, Foreign Secretary, on diplomatic
representation.
Mr Illsley
97. Foreign Secretary, we received evidence from a number of
witnesses here, and during our time in Moscow, critical of our visa issuing
regime in Moscow. You are probably well aware of the stories. One of our
witnesses actually gave evidence to the Committee and said "It is widely
perceived that the British Embassy is the worst one in Moscow for obtaining
a visa". As David Wilshire has pointed out, he and I visited the visa section
in the Moscow Embassy and saw nothing to confirm that view. We were assured
by staff locally that our regime was not as bad as it had been painted. There
is still this perception, which was again repeated to us during our stay, that
there are difficulties for particularly young females and young men in
obtaining visas to visit this country. Do you think there is an argument for
relaxing our visa regime or looking again at this issue?
(Mr Cook) Where I would unquestionably accept that our standards are
unsatisfactory is in terms of the accommodation of the visa section in Moscow.
It is dire, dire for both the applicants and also frankly for those who work
in it. We have repeatedly over the years tried to get the Moscow authorities
to agree to a planning permission and extension on site, we have failed to
secure that. The position is about to be transformed with the opening of the
new embassy, from which visas will start operating by January, mid January,
at which point we will be able to bring in applicants who are waiting, they
will have a proper waiting environment. We will have proper and decent
accommodation and working environment for the staff. So that side of what I
think is an unsatisfactory position will be resolved very shortly. I think
that will obviously greatly help with the public presentation and
acceptability of our visa system. Thereafter, I would be reluctant to accept
some of the criticisms that I have heard expressed. First of all, in terms of
refusals, refusals in Russia are at three per cent a day, so there is no
evidence that we are being particularly harsh, or compared with other parts
of the world, unreasonably vigilant in rejecting applications. Secondly, I
think I am right in saying 90 per cent of all interviews are completed within
ten minutes so they cannot be particularly extensive, intrusive or
distressing. Of course, I appreciate that if one is seeking to establish the
bona fides of a person who is seeking a visa, particularly if that person does
not have adequate documentation, which is often the case in Moscow, they have
to be asked questions which they may find rather personal. To a degree I am
not my own master on this, in this we co-operate closely with the Home Office
but Parliament and public would hold us responsible for making sure that we
are giving visas only where the applicant is bona fide and meets the grounds
for the visa.
98. Is there any possibility of building new consulates in Russia?
For example, I believe there is a joint consulate and a British Council
building in Ekaterinburg? Is there any proposal to do further work like that?
(Mr Cook) Ekaterinburg does issue visas. I must say to you we have
been rather puzzled by how few applications there have been to Ekaterinburg.
We opened it precisely because we wanted to have a place beyond the Urals and
a visa issuing office beyond the Urals, but I think I am right in saying we
have only had 2,000 applications this year which rather puzzles us.
(Ms Pringle) Yes.
(Mr Cook) It is a sign that possibly the extent to which
representations were made to us about the geographic problem were overstated.
Of course I would not rule out additional consulate-generals in Russia, if I
had the resources I would want to open many more consulate-generals across the
board. At the present time I cannot hold out the prospect that we have that
as a priority.
99. Turning to electronic issues, the British community in Moscow are
critical of the Foreign Office web site. I just wonder whether there are any
proposals to improve the web site that you have, whether there are any
proposals for electronic media to be used within the visa regime?
(Mr Cook) I am disappointed if our web site has attracted criticism. I
suppose for balance, yesterday in the House it was praised. If there are ways
in which we can usefully improve the information on the web site, I would be
very happy to look at that and do that. We regard our information through e-
communications actually as very advanced and very positive. What we cannot do
though is accept visa applications through e-communications or e-mail or
internet and the primary reason for that is, of course, the charge needs to
be paid up front. Therefore, until the fee is paid we cannot process the
application.
100. Finally, the Committee Members who visited St Petersburg were
presented with a document by the staff in the consulate-general. I wonder has
any action been taken?
(Mr Cook) I am not quite sure, Eric, that I got the question. What is
the question?
101. It was a document which was presented to Committee Members by
staff members whilst we visited St Petersburg.
(Mr Cook) I see.
102. We just wondered whether that had been presented to you?
(Mr Cook) We welcome and encourage proposals from staff for improvement
in the operation and, indeed, currently we have just such a team operating
within the Foreign Office. It may be the document you have seen was a
submission to that, and it is being looked at internally. I hope very shortly
to receive the result.
Chairman: Ms Abbott with questions on the visa and then Mr Wilshire.
Ms Abbott
103. I just want to press you on the visa regime because for
ordinary Russians their first practical experience of Britain may be applying
for a visa and we did receive a number of statements from a whole variety of
people, Professor Margot Light of the LSE, John Thornhill of the FT ---
(Mr Cook) I am afraid, Diane, I cannot hear what you are saying.
104. Sorry. What I am saying is that a visa regime, although for
the Foreign Office seems terribly mundane and not a matter of high foreign
policy, for ordinary Russians it is very much their picture of Britain. We
have received so many statements from such a wide variety of people about the
way the visa regime operates I want to press you on it. There are two sides
to it. One is the speed at which visas are processed, and the figures you
have given us seem to suggest you have to speed up. We did have one witness
in front of us here who said that more recently you were processing them more
quickly. The other issue is the way that people are treated. You seem rather
dismissive about the way they are treated. I just want to press you on this.
Are you telling the Committee you are satisfied that there is nothing further
that can be done by training and supervision of ECOs to make sure that people
are treated as courteously as this whole Committee would like them to be
treated?
(Mr Cook) I am seeking advice for your question, Diane.
(Ms Pringle) Straight forward applications that the Embassy receive are
dealt with within 24 hours ---
105. Obviously I am speaking unnaturally softly this afternoon. I
am not talking about the speed of the processing, I am talking about the way
people are treated. I know from my own constituency experience that can cause
a lot of unnecessary offence. What I am asking the Foreign Secretary is is he
telling the Committee he is satisfied there is nothing further that can be
done in terms of training and supervision of ECOs to ensure people are treated
courteously?
(Mr Cook) Diane, there is always room for constant improvement. There
must always be a commitment to constant training and retraining. I am not
going to suggest at all that there is no room for improvement or that there
will be no scope for further training and further approaches in the future.
I am all in favour of that. I would strongly disagree with the idea that the
Foreign Office regards this as in any way an unimportant side of our business.
Visa processing is a very important part of all our major posts. I fully
understand also that it is a very important part of public diplomacy for
precisely the point you make. This is the point of contact between the public
and our service. What I would dissent from though is that there is a systemic
problem of attitude on the part of those carrying out the interviews. As I
said, 90 per cent of all interviews in Russia are completed within ten
minutes, I think it is. It is difficult to see on the basis of that statistic
that there are unusually intrusive, extensive investigations. But, if there
is a real specific problem, what I need is dates, times and names to pursue
it. If I can have that I will certainly pursue it.
Mr Wilshire
106. On the consulate-general at Ekaterinburg, the Chairman and I
did get a chance to visit there, I will take a chance on saying I suspect I
speak for him as well as myself when I say I am saddened to hear criticism of
something that we visited. If you could convey to them that at least we were
well looked after, impressed and content, irrespective of what people say to
us.
(Mr Cook) I will certainly do that.
107. What I found from that visit, which was enormously helpful,
was it just showed me how little I really understood. I am regularly told that
Moscow and St Petersburg are not Russian. I arrived in an oblast which it was
explained to me had interesting powers and had very interesting officials,
including the Foreign Minister, whether he was in your trade union, I am not
sure. The message that we got there was "please deal with us about trade,
please deal with us not through Moscow". It is that I would like to explore
with you. To what extent where there is a somewhat devolved arrangement in a
huge geographical country are you able to use the consulate-general to go
direct rather than having to go through the Embassy?
(Mr Cook) I think I might be wise to let Ms Pringle respond to that
one, but I would stress that we do not simply confine ourselves in Moscow to
speaking to the Russian Government. Our Embassy in Moscow has a wide range of
contacts around the province and the oblast and, indeed, on my visits there
they have frequently and often introduced me to people from those regions and
oblasts who frequently do come to Moscow. It is an interesting feature of the
Russian economy that some of its most vibrant and most modernised parts are
in the regions rather than in the central heartland. There you can find
younger governors who take a more modern approach and where real reform is
coming from. Do you want to add to that, Anne?
(Ms Pringle) Yes. As far as trade relations go we can deal directly
with the regions and we are trying specifically to target those regions now,
both in terms of British Council programmes, Know-how Fund programmes, etc..
It is a really important plank of our operations generally in Russia.
108. The message that I was getting, Chairman, I would be grateful
to see if you get the same message back here in London, was that by having a
consulate-general it gives us a trade advantage over those who only use their
emphasis in Moscow. If that is so, is this not a good economic case for
contemplating spending less at the centre and perhaps using any saving to open
a new consulate-general elsewhere?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I would agree very much with the first part of
your point. I do think that it is very valuable to have a consulate-general
with experienced commercial staff on the ground in the region and that can
give you an interesting and helpful edge. Our Ekaterinburg post is one that
I know is very warmly welcomed by the authorities in Ekaterinburg. Secondly,
personally I do not dissent from the point you make about the cost benefit
product of opening up consulate-generals in areas of commercial opportunity.
I very much welcomed what the Committee said on my resources and I think they
share my perspective. Without more resources it is difficult for me to take
that forward and I would hesitate to run down our Embassy in Moscow which is
hard pressed and does do a very important job.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, I hope we have a little injury time. Mr
Rowlands wants to open another area of debate.
Mr Rowlands
109. As part of my homework I re-read the Common Strategy on the
European Union. Do you think in the light of events it needs re-writing or
revisiting, Foreign Secretary?
(Mr Cook) I suspect there will be a consensus that we need to review
it. It was never intended to be something that should be carved in granite and
then never mended. It is always going to be a continuous building process and
I think, not now but as we see the shake up in the next few weeks, it will
need to be revisited.
110. One of the themes is the idea of EU liberalising trading
relationships with Russia. Yet we have 12 anti-dumping measures, stringent
anti-dumping measures, on Russia from within the European Union. Surely it
would be almost impossible in the present climate to reconsider these types
of issues otherwise we would be sending totally the wrong messages?
(Mr Cook) I am sure you are right that nobody is going to press for
anti-dumping measures to be lifted in the present circumstances and, indeed,
by and large in any case the internal pressure in the European Union is to
keep rather than to reduce anti-dumping measures. Looking to the future,
certainly we will be wanting to pursue that agenda of opening up trade between
ourselves and Russia. It is in our interests to do so. For the present time
we would want certainly to make sure the agreements we reach are rigorously
monitored and enforced.
111. One question, picking up where I started off earlier. I find
there is quite a big gulf, frankly, between the documents and the words,
whether it is the Istanbul one or whether it is this document and actually
what is going on in the ground and, therefore, what is really going to shape
the immediate and medium term future. Somebody mentioned earlier on China, I
can remember Tiananmen Square and then we had all indignation and then a
talking period of X months, possibly a year or so, and then gradually
everybody returned to business as usual. Do you think that will be the same
post-Chechnya, that this will be quickly forgotten and because of the bigger
strategic things we will decide it was not very important after all, the
bigger objectives in these common strategy programmes are more important?
(Mr Cook) It is very important, fundamental to those caught up in it.
It is extremely important in terms of concern to the international community.
It is not going to be forgotten. I do not think that there is the
contradiction that you suggest between a strategy of constructing a democratic
and stable Russia with a modern reformed economy and a response to Chechnya.
If we can achieve a democratic and stable Russia which is engaged with the
outside world, which is not a fortress Russia fearing the outside world, a
Russia which respects human rights and also respects minority rights, a Russia
which is able to provide some prosperity to its people through a modern
economy and involvement in the global economy, frankly I would have thought
that is the most secure long term way of making sure that Chechnya does not
occur again.
112. Does the Office and you yourself think Russia has a serious
alternative of any kind, other than in the end to become a part of Western
capitalist free market society? Do you think it has a serious meaningful
alternative to that, turning East or, in fact, somehow just building a
regional power based system?
(Mr Cook) Whether or not it sought a regional power basin, I will come
back to that in a moment, it will still need to have an efficient economy and
effective modern industries. It is hard to see how it can achieve that if it
were in a posture of isolation both diplomatically and economically. It is not
there at the present time, that is not what the leadership wants. It would be
unwise to try to embrace that. All the evidence of recent history is that
those countries, either by choice or by compulsion, which are isolated from
the international trade and international investment and are countries which
pay a very heavy price for falling behind in terms of standards of their
industry, the quality of life of their people, work hard to try to get back
into that international community. Nobody in the Russian Government is
suggesting that form of isolation and I think they are right to try to avoid
it.
Sir David Madel
113. Foreign Secretary, it is very important that the European
Union speaks with a united voice in relation to relations with the Russian
Federation. Are any EU Member States opposed to liberalising trade with Russia
or are we all united on this front?
(Mr Cook) Everybody is signed up to it as an objective, and indeed it
is in the common strategy. I would not disguise to the Committee that there
are times when an individual country may find an individual industry
threatened by competition from Russia and sometimes that can result in a bona
fide claim for an anti-dumping measure. On the broad principle, everybody is
sensitive.
114. Are we and the United States in agreement on the policy of
IMF lending to Russia?
(Mr Cook) I believe that we are absolutely eye to eye that Russia is in
default of a number of its economic conditions. In the present circumstances
there is not a case for overriding that.
115. I would like to endorse what Sir John Stanley said about the
programme that the embassy organised both in Moscow and St Petersburg. I
found that the Russian fear of Germany I think has vanished now but there is
still this ticking fear of the West, not so much the European Union. There is
just this fear. You have been Foreign Secretary for two and a half years, can
you share with the Committee your thoughts as to how we dissipate that Russian
fear?
(Mr Cook) I think it is probably fair to say that the Russians with
whom I relate, the Foreign Minister and others, ambassadors, are people who
have a fairly sophisticated and cosmopolitan experience of what the outside
world is like and, therefore, they tend not to have that fear. I suppose to
an extent, Sir David, I am meeting the wrong people to authoritatively answer
your question. You have to understand though that we are dealing with a
country which has its own historic development and its present psychological
culture relates to that historic development. It is only ten years ago since
it emerged from a position of absolutely being frozen from outside contact.
We are currently getting normally 80,000 applications for visas in Moscow, I
think until 1989 it was more of the order of 3,000. That under-rates the
enormous degree to which they did not have contact with the outside world.
When historians write about the period from 1989 onwards they may take a
critical view of some of the things that were done in the West but I think
possibly also there was an exaggerated expectation on the part of the Russians
themselves that merely by throwing off Communism you would somehow achieve the
prosperity and the freedom of the West. In fact, the West achieved that
prosperity on the basis of a certainly difficult process of development and
there was no shortcut to that. Possibly we were unhelpful in not being frank
and upfront about that in 1989 and 1990. Therefore, at the present we have
two things, we have our tradition rooted in that period of isolation of the
Cold War still reflected in the fact that the Communist Party is the largest
single supporter of the electoral system, not that it proposes a reversion to
the Soviet system, and we also have a frustration of defeated expectations of
the hopes of 1989, primarily because those hopes were unrealistic. Those two
things taken together do create a psychological, cultural perspective which
we have to understand. I do think over a period of time if we can come up with
programmes that address the problems, such as I mentioned earlier tackling the
health problems - male life expectancy in Russia is now lower than in India
-there is an enormous scope there for a country like us with a long experience
of public health and the National Health system to try to assist in some of
the health dimensions there. If we can do that and show the Russian people
that we want to help them to have a better quality of life, a longer life,
then we might break down some of that fear of the outside world which applies
to us and the rest of the world.
Mr Rowlands
116. Foreign Secretary, some of the commentators compared Russia
to the Weimar Republic, a weak currency, a divided state, large growing
unemployment internally. Do you think there will be a yearning for a strong
man or a strong person to emerge and to yet again govern Russia in the good
old traditional fashion with czars and Stalin?
(Mr Cook) I think one should note that one of the healthy features of
the Russian polity is that they do have a very deep seated and healthy
distrust of fascism and fascists. Zhirinovsky has not achieved the rocketing
rise that was predicted for him some ten years ago. I do not think that they
will necessarily be attracted to anybody who is proposing an ideology for
strong authoritarian rule but undoubtedly they want a leader who functions and
who can provide the leadership that they need. We would like to see a Russian
Government that is in command of the situation and which has taken control of
the very serious problems of law and order and organised crime which affects
the lives of so many of their people.
Mr Chidgey
117. Foreign Secretary, I believe I am right in saying that the
BBC World Service Russian programme is the most widely listened to programme
in Russia from a foreign broadcaster in that country. Would you say,
therefore, that both the World Service and the British Council have sufficient
finances to meet the challenges that they are facing?
(Mr Cook) I would never say that anybody has sufficient funds but the
British Council is getting an uplift in its budget exactly the same as the
Foreign Office, two per cent in real terms. It does have nine posts in Russia
and is opening another one. The World Service is getting an uplift in its
budget which is double the one to the Foreign Office.
118. For Russia?
(Mr Cook) No, this is across the board.
119. Generally.
(Mr Cook) It is for the World Service itself primarily to decide what
it does with its resources. I have a limited capacity to influence them. I
mainly just sign the cheque.
Chairman
120. Finally, on the problems facing Britain's business and
finance. We have had some very worrying decisions recently. Barclays, for
example, have cut down very substantially their interest in Russia, closed
their Moscow office. BP Amoco are considering pulling out of their oil
interest because they have lost œ200 million on the Sidanko affair. The
problems of the financial and legal base in Russia are so extensive. What can
we do to help our companies in these circumstances and how do we get the
message across to Russia that by their failures in terms of structures and so
on they are harming the prospects of further Western investment?
(Mr Cook) I think there are two separate dimensions to this problem.
The first is that the Russian economy since the 1998 rouble crash has gone
through a period of very serious retrenchment and undoubtedly that has
compelled a number of businesses to reflect upon the prospect, but there is
secondly the other aspect which you focus on which is concern as to whether
the rule of law properly and fully applies to commercial transactions.
121. Yes.
(Mr Cook) We have vigorously, both at ambassador level and of course at
my left, made representations in some of these famous cases, particularly the
BP Amoco and Sidanko issue which I personally raised with Ivanov. I regret the
way that has panned out. I am not sure that senior politicians in Moscow fully
understand the extent to which that type of development, not only lowers the
confidence on the part of BP but deters other companies who know BP, who
respect its international standing and are concerned when they see BP
complaining that the law is not properly applied.
122. Can I thank you, Foreign Secretary, again, you and your team,
for the way you have responded to our questions. We will keep in touch.
(Mr Cook) Thank you. I look forward very much to your report.
