THURSDAY 16 MARCH 2000
_________
Members present:
Mr Donald Anderson, in the Chair
Ms Diane Abbott
Mr David Chidgey
Dr Norman A Godman
Mr Eric Illsley
Mr Andrew Mackinlay
Sir David Madel
Mr Ted Rowlands
Mr David Wilshire
_________
MEMORANDA SUBMITTED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
THE RT HON ROBIN COOK, a Member of the House (Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), MR EMRY JONES PARRY, CMG,
Political Director, and MR BRIAN DONNELLY, Director, Regional Crisis
and former Ambassador in Belgrade, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
examined.
Chairman
377. Secretary of State, can I warmly welcome you to the
Committee. I know you want to make an opening statement and I will lead you
into that in a moment.
(Mr Cook) Thank you.
378. We are aware, also, that there is going to be a division in
the House at four o'clock and that you have agreed that the Committee can have
injury time.
(Mr Cook) I thought it was I who got injury time.
379. We will proceed to 5.15. My opening statement is this, as
you know, Secretary of State, the Committee has just returned from Montenegro
and from Kosovo. Our abiding impression is of the very high quality of the
British representation there, the enormous admiration for the British military
and the civilian administrators, those involved, and on behalf of the
Committee I would ask you to convey our gratitude to our diplomatic
representatives there who in a very hands on, shirt sleeve way - if that is
not a sexist way of describing it - are doing a magnificent job. Will you
convey our very warm, heart felt thanks to the diplomatic representatives and
others.
(Mr Cook) It will give me very great pleasure to do so. I shall make
sure that is conveyed to David Slynn and to the others who are working on
behalf of Britain and, also, on behalf of the international community in
Kosovo. I have read with interest the reports of your visit to Kosovo. I think
you will find what I am about to say in a very brief statement as chiming, to
a large degree, with what you discovered when you went there.
380. One little p.s. if I may, Dr Godman will correct me if I do
not say this, and Mr Wilshire, we met a number of representatives of the RUC
and everything I have said about the others is underlined by the work of the
RUC.
(Mr Cook) I think it is fair to say that the contribution which we have
made to the international policing effort is well recognised and the backbone,
of course, are officers from the RUC because they are the only part of our
civil police force trained in firearms. They are making a very good
contribution. I am very happy to carry those remarks back to them. I want,
Chairman, to make four very quick points in a brief first statement.
381. Please.
(Mr Cook) The first is that I am quite clear that the NATO intervention
last year was right at the time and remains right in retrospect. A year ago,
we had a choice, we could have intervened or we could have turned away. Not
to have intervened would have been to give Milosevic a clear signal that he
was free to pursue a campaign of ethnic cleansing, a campaign which was
already underway before NATO dropped a single bomb. Our aim through that
campaign was to make Kosovo safe for the return of the refugees and, in
retrospect, we can now see that we secured that far more quickly than we could
have hoped for in the time. The second point is the situation in Kosovo is
difficult and dangerous but as you have indicated yourself both UNMIK and KFOR
have achieved a great deal in the months in which they have been there.
800,000 refugees have returned. 1000 schools have reopened. Hospitals and
health centres are now functioning. 12,000 weapons have been handed in or
confiscated from elements of the KLA. A joint administration has now been
established in which the Kosovar Albanians are already participating and we
hope that they may soon be joined by elements of the Serb community within
Kosovo. We have started on a democratic process for municipal elections this
autumn, and registration commences next month. For ten years the Kosovar
Albanians were denied their basic rights. It is worth contrasting the present
situation with the decade of Serb rule when children were taught in cellars
or in garages. Now 86 per cent are attending school for an education in their
own langauge. Throughout this winter the vast majority of Kosovo's population
were warmly housed, thanks to the UN's Winterisation Programme which has
provided community shelters, prefabricated houses, firewood, coal and
thousands of stoves. There is a great deal yet to be done but what has been
done is a credit to those who have worked in Kosovo throughout the winter.
My third point echoes very much your opening statement. Britain can take pride
that it is taking a leading role in Kosovo. I wish the British public heard
more on the role that their country and people from this country are playing
in Kosovo. The contribution of our troops is outstanding. In the past two
weeks I have announced that Britain is doubling its police contingent in
Kosovo, that it is contributing lawyers to strengthen the judicial system, as
prosecutors and judges, and that we will be providing the core of a Criminal
Intelligence Unit to tackle organised crime. Today I can tell the Committee
that we have just agreed in Britain that we will provide œ90,000 to support
an independent radio station for the Serb population in Kosovo as an
alternative to the Milosevic controlled propaganda which, as you will be aware
from your visit, is all they hear currently.
382. That was a point made during the visit.
(Mr Cook) I am very conscious of it and I am glad we have been able to
respond to that serious problem. Finally, the task ahead, it should be said,
is not just a challenge to the international community, not just to UNMIK or
KFOR, the future is a challenge for the people of Kosovo themselves. They
must take responsibility, also, for creating a society in which ethnic
communities can live in peace with one another. Kosovo is on the right track.
We will not allow hardliners on either side to undermine the future of Kosovo.
I can advise the Committee perhaps, to demonstrate that point, yesterday KFOR
troops raided the suspected headquarters of Albanian extremists near the
Presevo border and seized a quantity of weapons and made a number of arrests.
The challenge we face is to stick with the task we have started. We have made
a good start. Finishing the job will take time but we have come a long way
and we are prepared to see it through.
383. Secretary of State, as a Committee we have returned teeming
with questions, mostly, of course, about the future but we want briefly to
look at one or two of the lessons from the past. Now one year on, with the
benefit of hindsight, what do you think might have been done better in the
lead up and in the military campaign?
(Mr Cook) One can always do things better with hindsight, Chairman. If
you were to ask me was there anything that we did at the time which was wrong
or anything that we could have done differently in the state of our knowledge
at the time, personally I would have difficulty identifying what that might
be.
384. Do you not feel a little uneasy that we manifestly failed to
gauge the scale of the Serbian response to the bombing which led to an
accelerated assault on the Kosovar population?
(Mr Cook) I would query the premise that it was a response or that it
led to the assaults on the Kosovar Albanian population. On the day we started
the bombing there were already 210,000 displaced persons inside Kosovo on the
mountains and in the forests, driven from their villages by the Serb
offensive. There were also already 70,000 refugees outside Kosovo who had
fled already from Kosovo. That displacement of the population both within and
outside of Kosovo had already commenced.
385. Yes but my word was "accelerated" with respect.
(Mr Cook) Can I respond to that then as well? There is no evidence
that what happened subsequently was not going to happen anyway. Nobody has
ever produced any compelling evidence that what was done by Milosevic would
not have been done by Milosevic in the absence ---
386. If it was going to happen in any event, should not greater
preparations have been made in terms of tents and clothing and all the other
infrastructure which has been needed to look after refugees?
(Mr Cook) I was dissenting from the description of it being a response
to the NATO bombing. I am not going to pretend that we anticipated the scale
of displacement. Particularly none of us predicted - and I know of no
intelligence to suggest that it would have happened - that there would be the
use of those shuttle trains running back from the Pristina to the Macedonia
border in scenes reminiscent of Stalin's or Hitler's depopulations. That was
not predicted and, therefore, could not be planned for. I think the other
point that is fair to make to the Committee is that in order to plan for it
we would have needed the co-operation of the neighbouring countries and those
neighbouring countries had difficulty contemplating the scale of the
population's displacement which came their way.
387. Even Albania?
(Mr Cook) Well, Macedonia in particular was very reluctant to plan for
more than 20,000 people becoming refugees.
Mr Rowlands
388. I would like to pursue this point and then make one other
retrospective point. Mr Jones Parry had a good go to try to persuade us that
it was not an unreasonable assumption that was made about the level of
refugees. I was not totally convinced the first time, so I am going to let
you have another crack at me.
(Mr Jones Parry) Thank you.
389. The notion that, in fact, the pattern of movements of
displacement was going to be roughly the same once you started bombing as had
preceded it I think beggars belief. Surely, did you not assume that when you
intensified the campaign that it would lead to an equal intensity of
displacement and therefore the statement by Mr Jones Parry that the systematic
moves of ethnic cleansing had exceeded any reasonable anticipation. Frankly,
I am not sure, is that naivety or something?
(Mr Cook) I really do not think that naivety is a fair charge.
Afterall, we had observed Milosevic in action in Croatia and in Bosnia. I had
followed very closely what had happened in Kosovo for the preceding year and
I think the last thing I would accept as a description - from my insights from
watching Milosevic to meeting him - is naivety. We knew what was going to
happen was going to be brutal.
390. Everybody underestimated him?
(Mr Cook) Nobody anticipated the use of the shuttle trains and that
actually was a new development in Milosevic's behaviour. That did not happen
in Croatia or Bosnia or previously in Kosovo, that was something new which we
had not anticipated nor, I think, could we be expected to anticipate it.
Anyway, even if we had anticipated it and even if by some extraordinary act
of predestination we had assumed that half a million people were coming the
way of Macedonia I am not clear how we could have gone about planning for
that. If we turned up to Skopje and said, "There is half a million people
coming your way", they would have refused to entertain plans based on that.
They were willing to consider only 20,000 refugees until the events took
place.
391. It was an assumption, maybe not a correct one, and I am quite
astonished that the intensity of the bombing would not lead to a huge
displacement of people within and from Kosovo. Do you hang on to the point
that you did not expect it or anticipate it?
(Mr Cook) Let us be careful, there was no causative relationship
between the bombing and the displacement. Those early weeks of the bombing did
not produce the displacement and were not on civilian sites.
392. I have re-read overnight our interim report, where we
published the four sessions with you from 1997 up to March 1999. Since then
there has been a spate of documentary programmes of one kind or another with
allegations of one sort of another, I would like to put one of them to you,
so you can have a chance to either correct the impression or indeed confirm
it. That is the curious role that was featured in one of the programmes last
Sunday night. Perhaps you do not watch television, we back benchers have an
opportunity to watch television.
(Mr Cook) I rely on you to inform me.
393. The evidence also reappeared in the Sunday Times.
(Mr Cook) It was probably false.
394. Do not look at it, I know it is not your favourite. "The CIA
officers were ceasefire monitors in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, developing ties
with the KLA and giving American military training manuals and field advice
on fighting the Yugoslav Army and Serbian police." This claim was made in the
programme in one form or another as well, "The American agenda consisted of
their diplomatic observers, aka the CIA, operating on completely different
terms to the rest of Europe and the OSCE, said a European envoy." This whole
question of the relationship and role of the CIAs/diplomatic observers and
their relationship with the KLA, is there any evidence suggesting that the
United States had a different agenda from the European members?
(Mr Cook) All I can say is I was as frank and open with them as I can.
I know of no evidence to support those claims. In the terms of the
memberships of the KBM, do remember that most nations sending people to KBM
were sending either serving military or retired military personnel. Indeed
the backbone of our own contribution were military personnel and the whole
operation was led by a British General. It would not surprise me if the
American contingent contained military personnel. Secondly, undoubtedly the
KBM did have contacts with the KLA, they were, after all there to try and
observe and monitor breaches of ceasefire on both sides. The KLA was a source
of information to them and the KLA was also one of the actors on whom they
were frequently impressing the need to observe the ceasefire. That there were
military people with an American presence I would not find surprising, that
there was contact with the KLA I would not find that surprising. I have never
seen any evidence that they abused that opportunity to provide the military
training.
395. If one looks back on it, the interesting thing was that we
tried to put this force into place, we did not get in the elected numbers that
were expected. Mr Lloyd was giving evidence to us last year saying, what a
very useful role the observers were playing and yet the KLA were not properly
tied into this process. Indeed, there is some evidence that when Milosevic
realised this he then started to put his troops back in because he realised
it was an open season for the KLA to run around? Apparently there is some
evidence to go by, with a bit of tacit support from certain CIA quarters?
(Mr Cook) I would deny there was any tacit support of which we were
complicit or of which we were aware, I must say that. On the issue of the
events of 1998 it is certainly the case that periodically, not just that
autumn but also in the early summer, that what would happen is that the Serbs
would launch an offensive, the offensive would run its course, with the
international community, quite rightly and vigorously, protesting against what
was going on and towards the end of the offensive Milosevic would agree to
wind up the offensive, and in the case of the Holbrock Agreement to withdraw
part of his forces, so he did not at any point fully honour it. Subsequently
the KLA would tend to come out and occupy territory that it was safer for them
to return to. If you look back at 1998 you will find a number of statements
that I made, in which I am critical of the KLA also for their breaches of the
agreements and the terms of ceasefire, including the Holbrock Agreement. That
said, there was nothing to adequately justify the process in which Milosevic
embarked in January when he went into a succession of villages, including
Ratchat, and murdered the population. Ratchat were still demonstrably not
members of the KLA and the corpses that were found did not have any evidence
that they had been firing back at their attackers.
396. The reason why I pursue this line of questioning is because,
perhaps, it is the thing I inferred from some of the conversations we had last
week in Kosovo with KLA personnel. I got a sense that they now expect to
collect the spoils of war and victory and expect that they will be driving
force in the new crossover. A lot of the people we met had very strong
support and justification for the KLA to be leaders in Kosovo. I wonder
whether it goes back to this whole relationship that was created?
(Mr Cook) Britain does not have the kind of relation to which you are
suggesting. It is certainly the case that some of those in the Kosovo
Liberation Army have emerged as figures of political substance, Thaqi is
obviously one of those. He came to the Rambouillet peace process, he took over
de facto leadership of the Kosovar/Albanian delegation, although there was no
previous agreement that that is what he should do. He played a very
constructive and positive role in the peace negotiations. In any democratic
institution that is going to emerge from Kosovo I would be surprised if he and
a number like him did not play a part but they must do so through a democratic
process, not through attempting to maintain power on the back of an armed
organisation.
Chairman
397. One matter, you refute any suggestion that Mr Rowlands that
is inferring, or at least putting in other people's mouths, that the US were
supporting the KLA in a way that others were not. For example, during one
week there was allegations that there was regular contact between the KLA
delegation and key sources on the Hill in Washington.
(Mr Cook) Those are two separate points. Can I just round up what I
was saying in response to Mr Rowlands points, I have seen no evidence to
support those allegations. I am not in a position to bluntly say that I hear
his evidence that refutes what you are alleging but I have seen no evidence
to suggest it. Certainly I can assure the Committee that Britain and the
British contingent and, for that matter, General Drewienkiewicz who headed the
KVM force took no part. Frankly I would be surprised if KVM did provide any
significant cover to military training of the kind which is being alleged
here. On Rambouillet, yes the Kosovar Albanians, both at Rambouillet and from
Kosovo, had contacts on the Hill. That in itself is not improper, indeed they
had contacts in a number of European countries as well. That democratic
contact is something which, frankly, I do not think any of us would
necessarily have wished to discourage. The Rambouillet peace process was
chaired, of course, by myself and by Hubert Vedrine and we tried very hard to
make sure that pressure was applied to both sides to reach a common agreement
because that was what we sought.
398. Mr Michael Gove in this week's Times, amazing statement: "The
KLA presides over a drug smuggling operation responsible for 40 per cent of
the heroin sold in Europe and the US". Have you got any evidence of that?
Has he plucked that figure out of the air?
(Mr Cook) I am not familiar with that particular report. Which paper
did you say it was?
399. The Times? Mr Michael Gove.
(Mr Cook) I saw a similar report in The Guardian which was obligingly
frank that its sources were Belgrade sources so I do not know whether or not
there is a common source there. It was not something which started with the
conflict in Kosovo, it has been there way back beyond 1998. It is well known
that the Balkans is one of the principal transshipment routes by which heroin
enters Europe from Afghanistan and Turkey. I have no doubt whatsoever that
some element of that may be passing also through the criminal organisations
who may have contacts in and around Kosovo. One of the points I stressed when
I made my opening statement was that we are very keen to tackle organised
crime within Kosovo. Britain put forward an initiative on this with the
European Union last autumn and it is that initiative that is now coming to
fruition with the agreement for a Criminal Intelligence Unit in Pristina, to
which we are providing British detectives as the core of that unit. Certainly
I would entirely share with the Committee that we have deep concerns with the
level of organised crime, not just in Kosovo but in Kosovo and the surrounding
regions.
Ms Abbott
400. In March of last year you told the House "Last October, NATO
guaranteed the ceasefire that President Milosevic signed. He has
comprehensively shattered that ceasefire. What possible credibility would
NATO have next time that our security was challenged if we did not honour that
guarantee". Do you still believe that NATO's credibility was at stake?
(Mr Cook) It is what I said then and I see no reason to change my
views.
401. Is it not the case that actually NATO's credibility was a
more important reason for launching the air strikes. If it did turn on NATO's
credibility does that not actually undermine the legal justification for the
air strikes?
(Mr Cook) That is a synergism which I would not support at any of
those different stages. The prime reason for action was indeed the need to
avert humanitarian disaster. It was the case, also, that we did guarantee the
ceasefire and, yes, we would have had problems of credibility if we had not
then acted but that was not the prime reason.
402. NATO's credibility was not the prime reason?
(Mr Cook) No, I am sorry, Diane ---
403. I am asking you?
(Mr Cook) No, you are not, you are twisting my words. I said in October
our credibility was at stake. That was plainly the case because that was the
guarantee of the ceasefire. The fact the international humanitarian motives
coincided with what was plainly our own security interest was a matter which
may have been valuable for us in underlining how important our intervention
was but it does not undermine that humanitarian influence.
Mr Wilshire
404. Foreign Secretary, can I start with your statement, you said
in that that 12,000 KLA weapons had been handed in or confiscated.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
405. What is your best estimate of the number still in the KLA
hands?
(Mr Cook) Personally I do not have one, it is possible KFOR may have
one and we can try and obtain any estimate they may have and share it with the
Committee.
406. It would be helpful if you could. We were told it was a large
number and everybody else was struggling to put a figure. It would be helpful
if somebody could give us a figure.
(Mr Cook) I am not promising a figure. Putting a figure to it will be
very difficult. I can only say on this that KFOR was responsible for
overseeing the demilitarisation agreement of the KLA and they have reported
themselves that they regard the demilitarisation process as having been
effective.
407. That would be helpful. The other thing I noted from your
statement: "a joint administration has been established in which the Kosovo
Albanians are participating and we hope they will soon be joined by the Kosovo
Serbs." You added to that there is none at the moment. Why is there no Serb?
(Mr Cook) Because none of them has been willing to join. Bishop
Artemenje who, as your Committee will know from the visit, is a distinguished
leader of the Serb Orthodox Church within Kosovo, has indicated in Washington
that he is willing to join. Part of the problem of course is the divided
councils within the Serb community itself. I hope that Bishop Artemenje will
be able to provide the leadership of coming in to the joint administration and
provide confidence for others to do so.
408. Could I ask you then some questions about displaced people.
If I heard you correctly you said that at the time of NATO's attack on
Yugoslavia there were 210,000 displaced people inside?
(Mr Cook) Yes.
409. Did you have any reason to suppose that those 210,000 people
were making their way to leave at that stage?
(Mr Cook) No. I am not saying any particular number were heading
towards the border but I did say also 70,000 were already outside.
410. Yes, yes I was coming on to that.
(Mr Cook) Also, the Serb offensive proper began on 22 March, our
intervention commenced on 24 March. If you look at the history of the
subsequent weeks most of those who got to the border had been travelling to
the border for a number of days, usually around a week, that is different from
those who were put on the train and shuttled down. Therefore, none of us will
ever know to what extent those 210,000 may well have surfaced at the border
in the subsequent five days.
411. You did say that 70,000 were already outside Kosovo, how many
of those were forcibly driven out by the Serbs and how many of them actually
elected to go?
(Mr Cook) By definition a refugee does not elect to go.
412. Can you not see a distinction between being physically forced
over the border and choosing to go over?
(Mr Cook) Pretty neat to distinguish whether you are bundled at
gunpoint on to a train and driven over the border or whether you see a tank
smashing through your house and you flee to the forest before you are machine
gunned. I do not think either of those would be ones where you would say they
elected to leave.
413. Can you not see a distinction between fleeing to the forest
and fleeing out of Kosovo?
(Mr Cook) The forest may well be within running distance, the border
may be several days walk but many of those who went into the forest over the
subsequent three weeks did walk to the border, some of them, I have to say,
in the most appalling and excruciating conditions. I met one woman who had
actually been pregnant and near giving birth when her home was demolished.
Two days after on the road she gave birth. She then carried her baby for a
further three days to reach the border. Now you could say, and no doubt Mr
Wilshire might wish to argue, she was not forced to leave but somebody who was
prepared to go through that excruciating hardship to get over the border was
not somebody who was doing it voluntarily, they were fleeing in terror.
414. You said earlier on in reply, I think, to Mr Rowlands that
you had no evidence that this was not going to happen after the bombing took
place, by which you meant that there was going to be a seriously big
escalation in the numbers moving. What evidence did you have that it was going
to happen?
(Mr Cook) We had a very large volume of evidence before the conflict as
to the likely actions of the Serbs and the responses and the Committee will
be aware that I put in a classified note to them on the intelligence evidence
available to us. I really cannot be drawn in open session further than I have
gone on that classified note. As I think I made clear then, there were only
a few pieces of intelligence which referred to the possibility of the
displacement of people and none of them anticipated the scale of what
happened.
415. So there was in that case no evidence that this was going to
happen on this scale before the bombing started?
(Mr Cook) On this scale none.
416. You said you did not anticipate, what research did you do to
try and anticipate what the effect of the bombing would be?
(Mr Cook) We had myriads of intelligence coming out from the various
sources available to us. I agree it is not a place where you can turn up and
say "I have come here to do research" but we did fit together those pieces of
intelligence available to us from different sources.
417. Also, you said earlier on in this session that you knew it
was going to be brutal.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
418. What did you mean by "going to be brutal"? What did you
expect to happen?
(Mr Cook) What I said when I said it was going to be brutal, I was
responding to the earlier question of the Serb offensive. I was not talking
about what would happen in reaction to the NATO bombing. I was saying that the
Serb offensive which we could see coming and see starting was going to be
brutal and we knew it would be brutal both because of how they conducted
themselves in the previous year in Kosovo, in which 400,000 people had been
made homeless in the preceding year and because of the way in which they
conducted the war in Bosnia and Croatia. I do want to be clear about that.
I was not saying that we knew it was going to be brutal after the bombing
began, that was not what I said.
419. In that case, if that was what you meant, what did you expect
to happen when the bombing started?
(Mr Cook) We expected that the Serb offensive would continue and indeed
it did until such point when the bombing brought it to a halt.
420. How many people have been forced out of Kosovo since the
arrival of NATO troops in Kosovo?
(Mr Cook) In terms of the Serbs, I do not have the precise figures but
what does appear to have happened is that in the very early days about half
the population, half the Serb population of Kosovo left. Many of those left
before the KFOR troops arrived and left in anticipation of the KFOR troops
entering. The recent assessment from UNMIK is that over recent weeks the
number of Serbs returning has exceeded the Serbs leaving, but in the early
weeks there was a substantial exodus.
Mr Wilshire
421. Since you did not like the use of my phrase "choose to leave"
presumably you would accept that the Serbs who left did not choose to leave
either?
(Mr Cook) Those Serbs who left were not subject to the sustained, state
driven, coordinated plan for ethnic cleansing, let me be clear about that.
Many of them did leave before the KFOR troops had arrived and, indeed, left
as the VJ forces were leaving before they themselves were subject to any
potential form of intimidation. Others, undoubtedly, did leave as a result
of individual violence and intimidation, particularly in southern Kosovo. We
have deplored that violence and intimidation. There was no comparable form
of a state driven plan for coordinated displacement. We deplore what happened
on both sides but I would counsel the Committee against making the error of
building a moral equivalent between the two.
422. How many Albanians and Kosovans have yet to move back?
(Mr Cook) I think 850,000 left during the conflict and, as I understand
it, 800,000 have returned. Some of those whom I remember visiting in the
refugee camps in Macedonia did not come from Kosovo, they came from southern
Serbia, to which they were more reluctant to return.
423. How many Serbs have yet to move back?
(Mr Cook) There are probably over 100,000 left, a number have returned.
How many that might be, I frankly cannot tell. It may be that UNMIK will be
able to provide us with further figures.
Dr Godman
424. Along with my colleagues I am very anxious to ask you
questions on the present circumstances of Kosovo and its future prospects.
Just picking up the questions asked by Ted Rowlands and Diane Abbott, there
is a large army of tough minded critics of the role of the United States in
the NATO campaign. One of the fears of those critics on the other side of the
Atlantic is James Bisset, the former Canadian Ambassador in Yugoslavia. He
gave evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Commons in
Ottawa about three weeks ago and he said, amongst many other things, "The war
allegedly to stop ethnic cleansing has not done so. Serbs, Gypsies, Jews and
Muslims are being forced out of Kosovo under the urge of 45,000 troops.
Murder and anarchy reign supreme in Kosovo as the KLA and criminal elements
have taken charge. The United Nations admits failure to control the situation
and warns Serbs not to return. The war allegedly to restore stability to the
Balkans has done the opposite." Is he being over-fierce in his criticism?
(Mr Cook) For starters I do not know of anybody, it is certainly not
the official position, who is advising Serbs not to return to Kosovo. On the
contrary, the United Nations administration in Kosovo report that more Serbs
are returning than are leaving Kosovo at the present time. There are
problems, I was open about that at the start. There are very real problems
to be tackled. There are the economic and social problems in Kosovo.
Remember, we are dealing with the poorest province of what is now officially
one of the poorest countries within Europe. It is a country which has never
really undergone a transformation from the previous communist administration.
Throughout the ten years from 1989 when Milosevic was there it was an autonomy
starved of resources. Even if there had been no conflict going on there, it
would still have been a challenging task to put together a functioning
society, economy and public services. It also has the legacy of this conflict
and the appalling events that took place within Kosovo, both in terms of the
destruction of the physical infrastructure, including the farm housing and
many of the crops on the ground and the destruction of many of the human
assets themselves who were killed. That was always going to be an uphill task.
I think we have made considerable progress on it. I can recognise buried in
the high rhetoric of that statement some of the real problems we still have
to address. On the question of the intimidation of the Serb population that
has happened. The murder rate has come down very sharply. The murder rate
the first week after KFOR went in was about 40, at the end of January it was
only two. Indeed the murder rate in Kosovo is probably not that different
from many other parts of Europe. That does not mean that we have cracked the
problem. KFOR puts immense effort in to trying to safeguard the minority
communities. Fifty per cent of KFOR's time is spent protecting five per cent
of the population.
425. If you were a betting man would you bet on Kosovo becoming
under the United Nation's supervision a multi-ethnic society or a mono-ethnic
one?
(Mr Cook) It is the very clear commitment in the Security Council
Resolution, and also as part of the contact group and the main players in the
international community within Kosovo, that our commitment is to safeguard the
rights of the people in Kosovo irrespective of their ethnic identity. That
is why we have made it perfectly plain that refugee return applies both as a
right to the Albanians who were driven out and also to Serbs that may have
been driven out of southern Kosovo.
Mr Chidgey
426. I would like, if I may, to pick up on a few points to deal
with the military campaign and the peace keeping role of KFOR. May I just
say, it is easy to be self-congratulatory about how well our Forces do when
we talk to our diplomats on the scene. I am very proud of the fact that my
patch of the country is home to the Royal Green Jackets and it is something
that I take great pride in that wherever we went in Kosovo and whatever source
we spoke with they had nothing but the highest praise for the way that our
troops acted, not just our own people but everywhere we went. That is worth
placing on record.
(Mr Cook) I entirely agree with you.
427. I am very proud of that factor. Can I take you back, you may
be aware that General Mike Short, the NATO Air Commander, said, "That during
the military campaign I have been told, I cannot tell you how many times, you
are only going to be allowed to bomb two, maybe, three nights, that is all
Washington can stand." I would just like to ask you, what was the basis of
NATO's expectation that Milosevic would back down after three nights?
(Mr Cook) I do not have the least idea what he is talking about, that
was certainly not my expectation.
428. This is a quote from a programme on Channel Four.
(Mr Cook) It was not me doing the interviewing. I would like to ask
him what authority he had for that. It was certainly never my view and as you
will remember when we announced the conflict Mr Blair could not have been more
frank, he said, "This will be tough and we are prepared to see it out for as
long as it takes."
429. I accept it was not you doing the interviewing. In
retrospect, do you think it was wise for NATO to get itself into the situation
where its credibility depended on the behaviour of Milosevic rather than NATO
using the most effective means which, of course, was using ground assault.
By ruling out ground assault publicly were we not selling the past and putting
the decision making process into the hands of Milosevic rather than ourselves?
(Mr Cook) No. After all, at the end of the day Milosevic did, indeed,
crumble as a result of the air campaign.
Those who said that he could not withstand a sustained air campaign were
right. He bargained himself, of course, on the expectation that NATO's resolve
would not last and that we would fall out in dissent and would not see it
through. I do not know why I should be fair to him but to be fair to him I
think he was misled on that point by the people around him.
430. How close were you to bringing in ground troops?
(Mr Cook) I think if Milosevic had not moved by the time of the G8
summit then opinions might have coalesced.
431. Would we have been calling up reservists to meet our
obligations?
(Mr Cook) That is a matter for the military, that is not for me.
Certainly it would not be the Foreign Office who would send the call up
papers.
432. My final point, Chairman, because I know others want to come
in, wrapping this whole thing up, do you accept that there is now a danger
which is shared by some senior generals in KFOR that whilst we have won the
war we are in great danger of losing the peace?
(Mr Cook) No, I do not accept that and indeed my earlier statement set
out the enormous contribution that the international community has made to try
to establish peace within Kosovo and to try to get a functioning society and
economy within Kosovo. We are starting out from an absolute lower base of an
impoverished province which has been further ravished by the conflict. I
never expected it was going to be easy, frankly in some regards we have
actually done better than I could have hoped. For instance, on the issue of
the refugee return, it was the fastest refugee return we had seen in post war
Europe and it wildly exceeds anything we have yet achieved in Bosnia for four
or five years after Dayton.
433. Given the huge problems of the province as you have rightly
and eloquently explained, do you not find it frustrating, Foreign Secretary,
that we have spent a huge amount of money on the war and only a fraction of
that amount of money so far has been spent on pursuing peace?
(Mr Cook) I would actually disagree with the figures. I frequently
get frustrated at the way I see this reported but I am paid to get frustrated
at what I read. In terms of the actual contributions to what has happened
within Kosovo, we have spent far more since the end of the conflict than we
did during the conflict.
Chairman: We being the UK?
Mr Chidgey
434. This is the point.
(Mr Cook) I think you could take it across the international community
as a whole. KFOR, of course, has cost far more since June than the cost of
the conflict did before the end of June.
435. Do you have figures, Foreign Secretary?
(Mr Cook) I do not have the figures now among what is accessible here,
perhaps when I return after the division I can help. I can use the division
to do my home work.
Mr Illsley
436. Can I ask, to come back to Mr Chidgey's point, just very
quickly, you referred to some evidence that there was a perception around at
the time not in this place - I hasten to add - that NATO's bombing campaign
would have been very short and it would have been over in a few days. It would
have forced Milosevic to capitulate. Do you not think that perhaps is where
the idea of NATO's bombing precipitating the mass exodus of refugees comes
from, in that because the bombing went on longer than perhaps the perception
was, it allowed more time for the Yugoslav troops, the police forces in Kosovo
to carry on with the ethnic cleansing?
(Mr Cook) No, I do not think that is right, Eric, because the expulsion
of the local population had begun even before we began bombing and continued
without cessation from the moment we commenced upon it. The shuttle trains and
the Macedonian waves of refugees came very quickly after the start of the
bombing, there was an early response. There may have been an element of
calculation on Milosevic's part, which was that if he intensified his
brutality he would play to those voices in the West who wanted to back off.
I think that if he had succeeded in that objective it would have been a
disaster for Kosovo and a disaster for the Balkans.
Sir David Madel
437. If I could start by saying that the Royal Air Force and what
they are doing, working with the Russians at Pristina Airport, is challenging
for them. Do the Russians now have a changed attitude to what we are now
doing with Kosovo? Originally they were hostile.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
438. Now do you think they have changed course?
(Mr Cook) First of all, can I welcome what you say about the air force.
I think it is very important for us all to remember that the operation on the
ground by KFOR is only possible with the immense logistic support and all
those in that chain of supply deserve their credit for the success. On the
Russian position, Russia was very co-operative and supportive within the
Contact Group and the run up to Rambouillet. It took part in the decision to
summon Belgrade to the Rambouillet peace talks. It was very helpful at
Rambouillet in trying to secure a peace settlement. It disagreed with the
military action which NATO took but since the end of that has shown a
willingness to take part in KFOR and indeed is present in force in KFOR. It
is one of the largest contributors to KFOR on the ground. It is working as
a practical partner in the KFOR operation. At the present time in terms of how
we proceed within Kosovo, there is no friction between us, they are supportive
of the 1244 at the Security Council and they have since then acted within the
terms of the 1244 in a way which has been supportive.
439. Are the Americans pressing us very hard to speed up the
decision making process in NATO in case we have to do this sort of thing
again?
(Mr Cook) I am not familiar myself with what may be happening on the
military side of NATO but, on the whole, I think we should look back on what
happened last year with some degree of cautious satisfaction, there is no room
for complacency but cautious satisfaction that NATO came through what is
actually the first test in 50 years of conducting a military operation and did
so with resolution and did so with unity.
Chairman
440. One final one on this. Foreign Secretary, do you think that
the eventual capitulation of Milosevic was due in part to a presumption, an
assumption that the Russians would have a partition as part of Kosovo?
(Mr Cook) No. No, I do not think that. I think it may have partly been
prompted by the fact that Russian did not provide him with the support that
he had perpetually led people to believe would be coming from Russia.
Remember his brother is the Serbian Ambassador to Moscow and they had always
held out to the people of Serbia the prospect that Russia would arrive as the
seventh cavalry. It became increasing apparent to him that they were not
going to do so either in terms of the presence of military support or indeed
of substantial economic and supply support. Other factors I think that weighed
with them, first of all, it became plain to him that our resolve was much
greater than he had anticipated.
441. Sticking together.
(Mr Cook) He always knew that we had the greater military force but he
was bargaining on the idea that he would have the greater ruthlessness and
determination. I think the third element was his indictment by the War Crimes
Tribunal which was deeply demoralising to him and to those around him.
Chairman: We want to spend the bulk of the session on the peace, Mr
Mackinlay.
Mr Mackinlay
442. Can I just say that I do think, speaking for myself, it was
probably one of the most important visits we made as a Foreign Affairs Select
Committee and my abiding memory, and I suspect of my colleagues, is of two
occasions. One was when we stood by the graves where bodies had been
reinterred and saw the half filled graves where there were polythene bags
placed with clothes in in order that people could subsequently identify what
loved ones were in those graves. Secondly, by chance, the fact that we were
delayed at Pristina and the RAF - so it was unrehearsed - flew us to Skopje
and we saw village after village and house after house which had been gutted.
Certainly I think that is what many of us will remember for a long, long time.
Foreign Secretary, I want to really ask you four questions and the one on
which certainly I know my colleagues want to come in on I will leave to the
end, so that is the question of policing, the whole question of justice and
law order. There are a couple of other points I want to ask you about. The
possibility of a constituent assembly and also the question of missing persons
and people who are incarcerated in Belgrade. If I can just pick up on a rather
isolated point. In a memorandum which the Select Committee have been given by
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, headed EU and UN policy implications,
paragraph six refers to the fact that we are ---
(Mr Cook) Could you hold on until I get there.
443. I do apologise. This is KOS 23d.
(Mr Cook) What paragraph?
444. Paragraph six. Bearing in mind our inquiry really is looking
to the future of the Balkans region. You rightly say that "The UK is also
actively pursuing WTO membership ..." amongst many other things as a way of
bringing the countries of this region into the Euro Atlantic fraternity.
Recently you met the new Prime Minister of Croatia.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
445. He would have raised with you, would he not, the frustration
his country is feeling having been caught in a sandwich between France, I
think in particular, and the United States which will not let his country join
the WTO, for no other reason other than the fact that there is a trade war on
certain matters between those two countries and, I suppose implicitly, the EU.
What can you do to break this absurd deadlock, bearing in mind the unlocking
function that Croatia could bring to this entire region if it was encouraged
and coaxed into EU, etc, and WTO?
(Mr Cook) I absolutely agree with you, the very powerful size of the
forces that Croatia can unleash across the region by the force of example.
We now have in Croatia a Government which in one election has taken the
country from the 19th century to the 21st century. It is in part an economic
reform and is honouring its international obligations on refugees and war
criminals. I found Monday's visit very exciting and inspiring. The WTO is
one of the issues that we did discuss, and our policy position is that we
strongly support WTO membership for Croatia provided we can get the issues
right. The one issue that has caused problems with negotiations is of the
terms of Croatia's acceptance of the proper requirements of audio visual
training. Frankly, I think Croatia's offer is a perfectly fair and a sensible
offer, it also matches the terms on which the Baltic States were admitted to
the WTO. We see no reason why Croatia should be required to go further. You
are correct, the United States is currently blocking it because it wants it
to go further. This matter we have discussed with our United States partners
and I will continue to press them to recognise that it is a fair and a
reasonable and in any case for strategic reasons we should be encouraging
Croatia to get into the WTO.
Mr Mackinlay
446. Missing persons. We met people in Kosovo who said they
believed there were up to 12,000 people in Serb prisons, approximately 2,000
people had undergone some form of trial, there was another 2,000 or 3,000 who
the Serbs had admitted they had incarcerated, so that was not an issue, there
was also a big gap between the Serb admission and what was the understanding
of the people in Kosovo. It would be interesting to know or if you can supply
the breakdown of figures of what our assessment is of these people. The
second point is, when we had the armistice, which is the best way of referring
to it, why did we not press for an immediate return of these people? Many of
these have gone under trial, which were wholly botched-up political trials,
in very distressing circumstances for people, including doctors, who helped
KLA and so on. Why did we not make that a condition of the armistice and what
hope can you afford to people who have loved ones who are trapped politically
in prison in Belgrade and/or lost?
(Mr Cook) On your point about the conditions of the ceasefire, to be
candid, if they were left out of the conditions, the fact is none of us had
any real idea of the scale of the problem until we got on the ground there.
In fairness, most of our observation was aerial and we were not aware of those
who were removed and, indeed, a number were removed in the last few days of
the VJ presence, after the ceasefire was agreed. The numbers reported are
higher than the numbers I recognise. None of us really know. We believe 500
have been returned from Serbia but at least another 1,600 remain. I really
cannot put my hand on my heart and say these are figures to which I can attach
any great accuracy. We will, of course, continue to press for those who have
been removed from Kosovo to be returned or, if there are bona fide criminal
charges against them, for those charges to the brought forward. Can I just
echo one of the issues we should bear in mind when we think about the grief,
pain and bitterness is that there are literally hundreds of families across
Kosovo who will never know what happened to their loved ones?
Mr Mackinlay: Constituent Assembly. You have local government elections
and roles are being prepared. Everyone recognises that the roles will not be
the most sophisticated in the world but we can have elections for local
authorities, is there not a powerful case to bring people into, albeit a very
embryonic, Parliamentarism, to have a constituent assembly with special
arrangements for Serb and other minorities, rather like we have done in the
past in respect of Northern Ireland, literally to get people with some status
of turning, even if they might boycott it initially, and so on, just to get
people within the frame? Is there not a case for a representative assembly
which we would return to?
Chairman
447. Perhaps I can give you time to think of a good answer to
that.
(Mr Cook) I can quickly respond to that point, then we can continue
when we return. First of all, we are keen to get on with a democratic
process. We want that to start at a local level, we think that is the right
level, and also that will enable local communities to take control of their
local public services, health and education and economic stimulus. That will
be quite creative in terms of the politics of Kosovo by giving the them
accountability and responsibility for the real quality of life of their
people. In the fullness of time what you raise is something that should be
addressed and, of course, the Rambouillet peace process did envisage such an
assembly with remarkable over-generous representation for the Serb population,
and had the Serb side accepted Rambouillet they would be in a much better
position now.
The Committee suspended from 4.01 p.m. to 4.13 p.m. for a division in the
House.
Chairman: Dr Godman is following up the question from Mr Mackinlay.
Dr Godman
448. Very, very quickly. My question is prompted by the comments
Andrew made about people incarcerated in Serb prisons. Can he confirm now,
or, if he cannot, if he will, that the International Red Cross and its
representatives have unhindered access to prisoners in Serbia in order to
determine what is happening to these people?
(Mr Cook) I suspect the answer is no but I am open to advice from
either of my colleagues.
(Mr Donnelly) The ICRC are visiting those prisoners they know about.
That may be a different thing from whether they are being able to visit all
of the people being held in Serbia. That is only half an answer to your
question. They are getting access but whether it is free, unhindered and as
open as they would like, I would not be sure.
449. Can you check this out for me?
(Mr Donnelly) I certainly will.
Chairman
450. Will you write to the Committee in respect of the number of
people and the access?
(Mr Cook) I will happily write to the Committee.
451. What information you have available.
(Mr Cook) I will absolutely share with you all we know but, I have to
be frank, we may not get near the numbers.
452. That is all we can ask for.
(Mr Cook) Can I go over the numbers of the financial costs which I was
asked about earlier?
453. Yes.
(Mr Cook) I can only share with you the costs to the UK because,
frankly, we cannot speak authoritatively of the cost to other countries. In
the course of expenditure during the crisis from March until June the total
spending additional cost to the UK was œ90 million, of which almost exactly
half were defence related MoD costs, the great bulk of the balance was the
DfID aid for the refugees and our contribution to the European Union aid for
the refugees and humanitarian crisis. The cost to June 1999 was œ90 million,
half defence, half humanitarian. In the year since June 1999 the total costs
to the UK of peacekeeping and our contribution to reconstruction is œ475
million. Of that, œ370 million is the cost of our contribution to KFOR but
the balance is our contribution to UNMIK and the reconstruction effort. That
balance is twice as large as we spent on defence related expenditure.
454. If there are comparative costs with the US on both sides,
that would be helpful.
(Mr Cook) I think we might have difficulty in finding published
figures for the US.
Chairman: If they are available.
Mr Illsley
455. Just to press the point that Mr Mackinlay made on the
constituent assembly. As you know, many of the former personalities within
the KLA are now seeking political positions, together with the existing
politicians, some of whom we met during our visit and most of whom, nearly
all, called for an independent Kosovo. Bearing in mind that this is not the
wish of the British Government at the moment, but bearing in mind there is
this call amongst the present candidates, if you like, for independence and
given that a constituent assembly will focus that call even further, do you
have any view on that or do you think that a constituent assembly will
increase that call for independence at a time when really it is not feasible?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I hope I indicated in replying to Andrew's
point that we are not committed to a constituent assembly. The commitment at
the present time is for elections to local and municipal authorities. Frankly
I think that is going to be a difficult enough task to organise and to get
under way and to hold on a free and fair basis before we start thinking about
anything wider of a province wide character. What you highlight is a serious
issue for the future and that is at the present time, as the Committee has
discovered, nearly everybody inside Kosovo wants independence and absolutely
everybody outside Kosovo does not want independence for Kosovo. That does not
simply include remote countries who happen to be influential in the Security
Council, such as Britain or Russia, it includes all the contiguous neighbours.
Macedonia is deeply alarmed at the prospect of an independent Kosovo and sees
it as very undermining to its own status. In Bosnia it would be a very
serious reverse of the Dayton process if there was an independent Kosovo.
There are very serious problems to be addressed as we go towards the future.
For myself, I do think that there are creative and imaginative ways of
resolving this and in the modern world lots of different models have been
found by which sovereignty has been maintained whilst de facto self-government
has been created. I do not actually think that we will be able to get that
kind of creative and imaginative thinking in Kosovo while Milosevic is still
in Belgrade. Frankly, I think this is an issue that will be easier to resolve
if there is a democratic transition in Serbia of the kind that I have just
witnessed in Croatia.
456. Do you think UNMIK's role is clearly enough defined in Kosovo
at the moment? That was one of the things that was related to us, that one
or two people thought that UNMIK did not have a clear view as to the future
strategy. Along the same lines as calling for independence there was this
fear that perhaps UNMIK did not really have a clear enough rule further into
the future.
(Mr Cook) It is very difficult to see how the international community
broadly can take a view one way or the other on this question because it is
something that will have to be resolved through a political process. That is
clearly set out in Resolution 1244, which is the mandate for UNMIK, it is very
clear as a mandate, but on the long-term status of Kosovo does charge UNMIK
with starting a political process to resolve it. It is very hard to see how
UNMIK or anybody else can start such a political process which would
necessarily have some dialogue and involvement with Belgrade whilst Belgrade
is led by an indicted war criminal.
Chairman: Thank you very much. There is now a Kosovo Transitional
Council composed of 40-odd people with rather limited terms of reference.
Given that independence is out for the foreseeable future, and that is the
wish of all the Kosovar Albanian parties, do you have any views on the lines
that at the same time as the local elections in September or whatever, there
should also be elections for this Transitional Council which, since it has
limited terms of reference, would not be deemed so dependent and would ----
Mr Mackinlay: A lightning rod.
Chairman
457. At least move towards the removal of part of the democratic
deficit.
(Mr Cook) I am not sure that I would wish to stand next to the
lightning rod though. First of all, I think the task should be to make sure
that we do create some form of responsibility within the Kosovar Albanian
community. The place to start is with municipal local authorities who can be
seen to be clearly accountable to local people for local services and the
quality of local life.
458. You would not rule out elections to the Transitional Council?
(Mr Cook) I am not ruling anything out. The Transitional Council is
essentially consultative. I am not sure that I would be enthusiastic in the
immediate future of elections to a body which did not itself have
responsibility because that seems to me to run the risk that you end up with
a body that because it is not responsible for what is happening in Kosovo does
not itself have to be realistic in what it demands.
Mr Rowlands
459. May I say that I think I share your view rather than my
colleague's view on this. What struck me most forcefully when we went to
Glamoc was the utter bitterness and unbelievable feeling almost of vengeance
that ran through the community. When you heard their experiences it was most
understandable. We are not talking about months, we are talking about a very
considerable period of time before those memories are going to dim to say the
least. You mentioned the role possibly of the Archbishop and I kept on
putting the Archbishop's name to the many Albanian contacts we made and all
of them shook their heads in equal disbelief. They do not believe that the
Serb Orthodox church in Kosovo is a moderating force at all, in fact one or
two allegations were made that they called on Milosevic but Milosevic would
not go far enough. What evidence have you got to suggest that there is, in
fact, a moderate Serb opinion that Kosovar Albanians will see as being more
assertive in any foreseeable timescale that we are talking about?
(Mr Cook) Let me come back to Bishop Artemenje and the Kosovar Albanian
perception. I am very glad that the Committee had the opportunity to visit
Kosovo and those who go there do find it has a powerful impact on them. Like
members of the Committee I went to one of the war crime sites which had been
at that time investigated by British police. I saw the 30 corpses gunned down
in two very small rooms. I met some of the local residents. I met a woman
weeping and saying, "What will happen to their orphans?" It is impossible to
say to the people, "It is all over now, tomorrow you wake up, forget it and
get on with a life of tolerance and good neighbourliness." It is going to
take a long time before at the human level any form of reconciliation can
actually be effected. Therefore, I must say, I do get impatient with those
writing from a distant perspective who are unrealistic and glib about how easy
it is to rebuild that spirit of ethnic tolerance. In terms of the Serb
community there are perfectly fair criticisms of what members of the Serb
community may have done or may have failed to do during the atrocities. I
understand that that very largely colours the attitude of the Kosovar
Albanians. At the same time there is a discernable difference of view among
the Serbs within Kosovo primarily between those who are what one might
describe "indigenous" Kosovar Serbs who have been there for a long period of
time, which tend to include figures who are senior in the Church, and those
who came in 1989 or thereabouts as part of the colonial administration of
Belgrade and were among the first to leave as the PDJ were withdrawing. Many
of those Serbs who are themselves natives of Kosovo do feel that Belgrade has
let them down in that they were used as pawns by Milosevic for his own
struggle for national opinion back in Serbia and that the conduct of
Milosevic's policy towards Kosovo was most certainly not geared to the
interests of the Serbs who actually lived in Kosovo.
460. There is not a shred of evidence that those Serbs made any
attempt to moderate the behaviour and treatment of the local population. In
fact in Glamoc we had an example where one of the possible leading war
criminals was actually a local.
(Mr Cook) At the end I am not here making the case on behalf of the
Serbs during the conflict, indeed I was on the other side, but I think we have
got to have an amnesty against those who failed by sins of omission. We
certainly must pursue those who were war criminals and those who carried out
the atrocities, but unless we are prepared to allow a fresh start for those
who did nothing we are never ever going to have any form of reconciliation in
Kosovo.
461. One thought on the notion that when Milosevic goes suddenly
Kosovar Albanians will feel they can stay within a loose federation, again,
I did not any find anyone who believed that their relationships with Serbia
were totally determined by the physical presence of Milosevic; it was now much
more fundamental than that.
(Mr Cook) I very much welcome the realism that you are showing. I wish
I read that kind of realism more often in our national press. On the question
about Milosevic, I think the starting point is there is no hope of that while
he is there. How much hope of it when he goes depends what replaces him. To
be honest, things are now happening in Croatia which a year ago were
unthinkable and there are some 16,000 Serb refugees invited to return to
Croatia which astonished them.
Chairman
462. To Kosovo?
(Mr Cook) To Croatia and it would have astonished them six months ago
if we had said you are shortly going to get an invitation from Zagreb to
return to Eastern Slovenia, and it will take some time for such a development
to change opinions, but if we did get a genuinely democratic outward looking
government of Serbia, not just a shadow of Milosevic, then it is possible to
think of more creative solutions.
Chairman: Let us turn now to policing, law and order and the new
judiciary Mr Mackinlay?
Mr Mackinlay
463. One of the things I want to put to you, Foreign Secretary, is
first of all the superb contribution the United Kingdom is making in all of
these areas. I think whatever differences might exist, with some justifiable
pride the lead role of the United Kingdom in so many areas should be
recognised, and policing is one such area. But there is in massive
deficiency. There are just over 2,000 of a mixed bag of police officers - and
I do not mean that disparagingly about them - whereas in any comparable
situation the professional estimate of need is twice that amount. I think
that is agreed ground. You said that our contribution of RUC officers are
trained in carrying weapons and I know the Ministry of Defence Police are
sending out some who are similarly trained. The point I wanted to convey to
you, and perhaps you might reflect upon this, is that both one of our most
senior military officers there and (and I think I can say this) the actual
chief of police himself, when I probed them on the subject of what about other
police officers drawn from English and Welsh and Scots' constabularies, said
they would be delighted to have them. Then we probed the question of being
trained to use sidearms and they said, I am paraphrasing, "This is not a
problem because first of all there are police officers in all these
constabularies who are retiring every month who do have such qualifications
and those who have not, we could train up." If I could just go on for 30
seconds more. The other thing they pointed out was they recognised that the
chief constables in England, Wales and Scotland cannot be denuded of scarce
resources but every month there are hundreds of people retiring who they would
give their right hand to have in the United Nations police force from English,
Welsh and Scots' constabularies many of whom would have had experience of
sidearms, or those who could be trained up very shortly. The discipline and
the rules of engagement and the tradition of community policing is what they
are crying out for. It did occur to some of us that perhaps that had not been
fully understood here. I am not talking about yourself. This would be 300
per cent better than the void you have got and also some of the policing which
has been contributed to there has been found to be somewhat deficient. I
wonder if the United Kingdom Government could reflect on this narrow issue of
people with sidearms experience.
(Mr Cook) The point you make about retired police officers is a very
interesting one. I will reflect on that and see if there is any way in which
we could tap that resource. I would have to say, though, that I personally
would be pretty robust that any policeman we send to serve with a police force
which operates on an armed basis must be somebody who has been trained in the
use of arms. I really would very much hesitate to lobby my colleagues in the
Home Office to send out people who would be expected to use weapons there who
had not been trained on the streets here. That is why our contingent is drawn
from the RUC and from the MoD. We have doubled the numbers. We are putting
in 120. The United States and Germany have put in the largest numbers but
outside of them, despite the fact we are the only ones who normally have
unarmed police, we are compared quite favourably. We have also looked at how
we can be supportive in roles where weapons are not required. That is why we
have increased the contribution of police we make to the training school for
the local police force and we now have 40 working there in the police school.
That is also why we have looked at how we can make a contribution in the back
room work against organised crime and will provide the core of their criminal
intelligence unit. If you add together all these different commitments we
will have 180 police working in Kosovo within the next month or two. That is
quite a substantial contribution out of the total.
Dr Godman: Just very quickly following up on what Andrew said. I take
your point. I think that police officers need to be well-trained in the use
of pistols, but it seems to me what could help to make things easier for those
police officers who have that kind of skill is if the period of engagement was
reduced from 12 months to six months. I think that that would make it, dare
I say, more attractive for younger officers to sign up. The RUC officers, who
I think are doing a superbly efficient job, and I have written to Ronnie
Flannegan, the Chief Constable, to that effect, are there for 12 months and
I think if officers could be offered a six months' long engagement that would
bring about an increase in recruits because, as Andrew said, they are
desperately needed. By the way, in terms of the training I met a Fijian
officer, a delightful fellow, very humorous, who said that he had never
handled a pistol before he had signed up for this secondment. He was given
two days training and felt he was proficient. He seemed to have on his hip
an ancient Smith and Wesson .38 pistol. I would want more training than that
for our officers but I think if they were for six months as a period of
engagement ---
Mr Mackinlay
464. The oldest police officer is 70. They are desperate for them
so they will be pleased to have the best British copper.
(Mr Cook) I would be sceptical, like yourself, whether two days is
sufficient.
Dr Godman
465. It is not.
(Mr Cook) It is not just a question of training, it is also a question
of experience, the confidence of having spent some time walking the streets
with your weapon and knowing when and how to use your weapon. On this point
I would take an awful lot of shifting about sending police into this
environment who had not had experience of weapons use. Having said that, we
can look again at the question of the period of engagement. Finally, recruits
have not been a problem, we have been able to fill our complement but our
complement necessarily is limited by the pool from which we can draw. The one
problem of reducing the period of service is that we are giving eight weeks
training, not on weapons use but on the nature of the situation in Kosovo and
on the type of policing work you are expected to do, and that reflects our own
strong commitment as a nation that we have better police that are better
trained at what they are trying to do. Providing an eight week training
period for a posting of only six months might be a little bit out of balance.
I would not have a close mind on it. Certainly we have to understand that
when we ask people to go to Kosovo for 12 months, we are asking a lot of their
families as well as of them.
Mr Wilshire
466. Very briefly on this question of policing, it is clearly
absolutely right that we should do more to help with intelligence because the
message that you will have got, and we got, is there is a vacuum there of
knowing what is going on. Those people involved who I listened to said "we
are foreigners, we do find it difficult to get into the community". Whilst
it is absolutely right also to do more for training, is there any prospect at
all of doing yet more so that the intelligence can be gathered by local people
who have been trained? It is not a criticism, it is a plea for even more.
(Mr Cook) I only made the announcement yesterday so perhaps I could be
allowed to bed down this initiative before I am asked for even more. I do not
disagree with you on the general principle. We do have a serious organised
crime problem, not just within Kosovo but with links outside Kosovo. Where
we may be better able to meet your request for local intelligence and access
is through the police training academy that is operated under OSCE. That has
actually produced its first two streams of graduates totalling 350 in all.
They are drawn from all the communities in Kosovo, including the Serbs,
including the Roma. We are now in a position to rapidly produce further
numbers at the rate of 170 per stream. As that feeds through I think that
will make a significant contribution to our ability to tap local knowledge,
local news and get on top of the criminal problem.
Mr Illsley
467. One of the points I want to make is just to reinforce the
issue about the judicial void that you covered in your opening statement.
There was a frustration on the part of police officers we met because they
were rounding up people who they felt were responsible for crimes who were
simply released the same day. One example we were given was of RUC and
Seattle police officers. They actually arrested a suspect who was released
from Pristina and got back to Glamoc before the police officer did. There is
that frustration, that there seems to be no judicial function. The other
thing is the 350 you have just mentioned of the KPC, which is what I presume
you were referring
to ----
(Mr Cook) Not the KPC. This is of the local police force which has
been trained and raised by OSCE. The KPC is a separate and serious question.
468. I might have got it wrong, I could be referring to the local
police force being trained up and trained to go into the local community. One
of the men I met, the first thing he asked for was a gun: "give us arms
otherwise we cannot police it". Is there any likelihood of that?
(Mr Cook) I am unsighted on that but I am slightly surprised that we
are expecting the local police to operate unarmed. We will do a note to you,
Chairman.
Ms Abbott
469. Without exception the Albanian politicians we met, from
whatever party spectrum, were intent on independence for Kosovo and when we
read out to them written evidence that we have from the Foreign Office which
makes it clear that Her Majesty's Government is not thinking about moving to
independence in the near future, they were taken aback. When we spoke to
Bishop Artemenje's people about the question of independence they were equally
emphatic that even the discussion of independence would mean the Serbian
population would flee and not return. On the ground in the minds of the
Albanian politicians there seems to be a degree of ambiguity as to what the
West's position really is. For the avoidance of doubt, would you like to
restate it?
(Mr Cook) I did only ten minutes ago in response to Mr Mackinlay's
question but I am happy to go over the ground again. Resolution 1244 is quite
explicit that Kosovo, for the time being, is part of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, that its future final term status will be on the political
process. It is very hard to see how we can have that political process which
will necessarily involve dialogue with Belgrade whilst Belgrade is led by an
indicted war criminal. In the longer term I would hope that we would find a
creative and imaginative solution to this problem, a kind that is not uncommon
around the world at the present time, but I see no prospect of securing that
while Milosevic is in Belgrade.
Mr Chidgey: Can I return to policing with a very small question,
reiterating and re-emphasising the point Mr Illsley made about the huge vacuum
in the judicial process. I recognise from your statement that we are
committed to sending lawyers there but I would like to re-emphasise just how
serious this problem is. The frustrations building amongst the expatriate
police that are seen helping out in Kosovo is enormous because they are
arresting people for anything from speeding to murder and there is no judge,
there is no court for them to be tried in.
Chairman: No prisons.
Mr Chidgey
470. No prisons. To their credit the police force are finding
ways of actually exercising community judgments on people they arrest. For
example, if you are caught speeding in certain parts of Kosovo they will
impound your car. That is a very practical and sensible response but it only
goes to illustrate how important it is that we do something about this because
the concept of law and judicial process has become a laughing stock.
(Mr Cook) You are absolutely right to point to all the different points
along the chain which we need to get right. As I said earlier, we took over
a province which frankly was a desert in terms of any form of public service.
There had been no functioning Albanian court system since 1989, there were no
effective prisons, there was no effective police force either because all the
police had been Serbs. Therefore, we had to put all of that together from
scratch. We have put œ1 million of our money in precisely to try to provide
emergency places of detention and the last time I looked I think there were
600 people who were detained. The trouble is when you have got a limited
number of detentions it is the very serious ones who are detained and,
therefore, people who in any other society would be detained are not being
detained at the present time. We also need a court system that works and that
will hand down sentences as well as a prison in which those sentences can be
served.
Chairman
471. And sentenced in a non-partisan way, which is one of the
problems at Rambouillet.
(Mr Cook) Yes. The starting problem there, of course, is whether both
sides will recognise the same legal base. The problem at Rambouillet was the
Serbs refused to accept the pre-1989 legal base and to recognise Albanian law,
Albanian courts and Albanian judges and wanted the right to appeal to Serbia
to be dealt with in Serbia by Serbian courts, Serbian law and Serbian judges.
In the medium term that is plainly something that we could not tolerate
because it breaks down the whole concept of ----
Mr Chidgey
472. There is a question of partiality, where if it is a
particular group trying a case the guy gets off, if it is the other group the
guy is sentenced. Even though there are no prisons he is still sentenced.
(Mr Cook) I understand that. I share your concern on this point. I
have got to say that at the end of the day I come back to the fourth part of
my opening statement which is that the Kosovar Albanians themselves have to
accept some responsibility for what kind of society they want to create. If
they themselves will frustrate every attempt to achieve a judicial process to
punish the criminals they are not going to have a successful society whatever
we do.
Chairman
473. There is that danger of a dependency culture building up, of
a scruffiness where people are unwilling to remove all the rubbish and yet are
unprepared to help in the community. Would a Community Service Order on the
same basis as in the UK be an appropriate instrument of punishment in certain
cases?
(Mr Cook) I think we have got to have a little bit of timidity in
starting to draft the Kosovar Albanian penal code. Ultimately this is
something which they have to get right for themselves. The only immediate
problem I can see in what you propose is community service orders are quite
intensive in terms of oversight and we do not have those resources.
Mr Mackinlay: It has to be crude and simple.
Mr Rowlands
474. Can I make one suggestion on one piece of activity on crime
that ought to be carried out by an external force and that is the arresting
of local war criminals. I think it would help a great deal. When people in
the villages we went to know who the person is, know where they are, see no
action being taken because understandably there is The Hague at one level but
at the local level there is no equivalent going on, would not that be a useful
extension of UNMIK to have a local war criminal unit to try to pick up and
prosecute some of the local war criminals?
(Mr Cook) I would absolutely agree that that is a priority for any fair
judicial process. Whether it is entirely properly the task of UNMIK is
something on which I would want to reflect. The lead in this is the
International Tribunal but of course it is the case that the International
Tribunal has a very clear policy of focusing on those responsible for the
oversight, masterminding and initiation of war crimes. They do encourage the
countries of the region to call to account those who have committed acts in
the course of war crimes without themselves being leaders in the role and
therefore as and when we have a functioning judicial system in Kosovo that is
a perfectly fair responsibility for Kosovo itself to accept. I would agree
with you that if we are trying to achieve a reconciliation between the ethnic
community justice for acts of the past is essential in clearing the way for
people to co-operate in the future.
Sir David Madel
475. Can I follow up what Diane Abbot said. Are we really saying
that if there is no change in Belgrade our policy is we are recognising one
country with two systems, which is what we do over China? If Kosovo moves to
democracy we still recognise it as part of Serbia but it is a different
system, so we are bringing into Europe the policy of recognising one country
with two systems?
(Mr Cook) As I said earlier, there are a number of creative and
imaginative solutions to this issue of sovereignty that exist around the world
and that is one of them. I do not want to be too explicit on this because I
certainly do not want anybody producing tomorrow "Cook holds out Hong Kong
model for Kosovo" because I am not proposing any one model. I think one of
our frustrations in dealing with the Balkans is that there is a very 19th
Century concept of sovereignty in their minds which reflects the extent to
which they have been cut off from all the modern trends of Europe for the
period they were in Communist deep freeze. If we can try and get a more
outward looking modernist approach within the region then it may be possible
to look more sympathetically and positively at those constructive ideas but,
frankly, if I were a Kosovar Albanian I would not begin to start contemplating
them myself so long as Milosevic is in power in Belgrade.
476. Foreign Secretary, on a BBC Panorama special last April you
said in relation to Mr Milosevic: "I will deal with anybody who enables us to
return refugees to Kosovo under international protection. If that involves
dealing with those who have effective power to Belgrade then we owe it to the
refugees to do that. When we have the refugees back, the next task is to
restore normalcy, stability and security." If that means making arrangements
with Mr Milosevic but still leaving the indictment there, is that something
we would do?
(Mr Cook) I find it difficult to answer that in its hypothetical
context because I think there is only a limited number of ways in which
anything done by Milosevic would be welcome or trusted within Kosovo. There
are some things which Milosevic knows perfectly well we want from him. We
touched on one of those earlier which is the release of the missing persons.
I would have no hesitation about the international community making any number
of approaches which might produce a result on that kind of issue. But the
bottom line here is that Milosevic is an indicted war criminal. It is our
view that he should not be holding office. One of the things that condemns
Serbia not to be included in the process of modernisation that is going on
throughout the region is precisely that it is led by a man wanted for war
crimes and therefore there is a very sharp limit on the extent to which we are
prepared to deal with him in the way that recognises that he is the President
of Serbia whilst at the same time being an indicted war criminal.
477. But we might be prepared to deal with him on very limited
fronts?
(Mr Cook) None of us have any problems about dealing with him in
interfaces with Kosovo of the kind I have said. If, for instance, he were to
break any agreements with us we are not going to fail to ring him up and send
people to protest to him because we do not want to deal with him.
Dr Godman
478. Literally within 24 hours of flying home from Kosovo I went
across to Northern Ireland and along with other members of this Committee I
have experienced sectarian hatred over there, but I have to echo what Ted
Roland said, I have never experienced the kind of bitterness, the embittered
hatred that I came up against in Pristina. Talking to five women journalists,
all of whom spoke superb English, there was no question in their minds of
seeing within the next few years the development of a multi ethnic harmonious
society. They talked in terms of an assembly if one were to be set up under
the rules of autonomy which would be divided along ethnic lines. Could I ask
a question relating to this ethnic hatred. Mitrovica is the flash point at
the moment, is it not? Is the problem there exacerbated by the lack of
experience that that particular French infantry regiment had in comparison
with our soldiers who have had that long experience of serving in Northern
Ireland? How do we calm things down in this region?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I share absolutely your perception of the
bitterness there and we should never forget that that is a product and also
a testimony to the appalling atrocities that took place there over the
previous 18 months particularly during the last Serb offensive of the spring
of 1999, and the strength of feeling demonstrates just how appalling it was
during that period for them. We cannot be glib about how easy it is going to
be to put that together again. On Mitrovica, first of all, I do not think it
would help the operation of KFOR or the international effort in Kosovo if we
got into the argument of national buck passing or putting the blame on others.
I would say in defence of the French forces that during the Bosnian conflict
they were extremely robust and took many more casualties than any other
national contingent in Bosnia and yet they saw the thing through. I hope we
will be able to make progress in Mitrovica and indeed only yesterday the
French forces were in action trying to reclaim control of the bridge that
should unit but divides the two parts of the town. The policy of UNMIK is to
make sure that there is a common circulation area in the centre of Mitrovica
so the bridge cannot be used as a barrier between the two communities. There
is a new UNMIK civil supervisor for Mitrovica, a former American General,
General Nash, and I believe that we are now taking a more robust more
assertive role in Mitrovica, which is going to be extremely difficult to see
through to conclusion for all the reasons we have discussed, but it is
essential.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, I would like to move on to Montenegro
shortly but I know Mr Chidgey has a question on the economy.
Mr Chidgey
479. Foreign Secretary, in your statement you mentioned rightly
that for ten years the Kosovar Albanians had basically been excluded from the
running of the country, the normal way of life and the economic way of life
of the country. You mentioned also that thanks to our western efforts
children are now being educated rather than by expatriate education and
education from outside the country. You talk glowingly about the housing but
I think it is important to say though that as far as housing is concerned
there are still many tens if not hundreds of thousands of rural populations
which have moved into the cities where the housing still is and theirs have
not been rebuilt yet. I am confident they can do it, they are very expert at
doing this. The real issue I want to raise with you is that over that ten
years the Kosovar Albanians were literally taken out of the real economy, in
fact there was no taxation structure in the country, nobody paid taxation
because they were excluded from the jobs which were taxable. There is a huge
deficit in building up a robust economy which the people of Kosovo contribute
to and benefit from. I am very anxious that we do not just gloss over this.
We are talking about a people who have been outside an organised economy, an
organised society, for years. I would like to know what is our long-term
commitment to provide the sort of institutional strengthening that is going
to be needed to create the base that they require to build a new Kosovo? What
precedent do we have for this? Do we really understand the depth of the
problem?
(Mr Cook) I think the answer to that is yes. Indeed, one of the
reasons I throw up my hands when I read many of the articles in the press is
that they are plainly written by people who have no grasp or concept of how
big the problem was when we took over and the idea that you can create a
European social democracy in Kosovo within ten months is plain and absolute
fantasy. You raised a lot of very real problems and you expressed them very
accurately. One of the many consequences of the 1989 suspension of autonomy
by Belgrade was that for the subsequent ten years the Kosovar Albanian
population existed in a sort of underground existence. Belgrade cleaned them
out of all the public services. The Serbs took over from them in the
hospitals, the Serbs took over from them in the power stations, the Serbs took
over from them in many of the key economic centres. Indeed, that has been
part of our problem since June because the moment the VJ withdrew all of these
people went too. We literally found the power station unstaffed when we
arrived at Pristina. You have Albanians without that kind of expertise or
status or experience over the past ten years. Secondly, because they were
prevented from being taught in Albanian at the Serb schools they set up their
own parallel system of education.
480. Funded from outside.
(Mr Cook) They funded it and because they were funding it a system grew
up in which they did not pay taxes to the official authorities, they made
their contributions to their own community ethnic organisations. There is not
a system or a culture of paying taxes to the official authorities. To be fair
to the UNMIK operation, and in this case it is the EU pillar that is
responsible for it, very considerable effort has gone into trying to create
the basis for a future economy and tax raising system there. Dixon, who has
headed up that EU section, has put particular priority into trying to tackle
the basis for a functioning economy, sometimes to the point of criticism that
he is not looking enough at the physical infrastructure, such as the housing.
The reality is that not everything can be a priority. Now we have arrived at
a situation in which there are customs collections and sales taxes which are
operating at the main crossing points of the border.
481. One of the results of that is the biggest traffic jams I have
ever seen in my life. There were some 700 lorries at the border when we
travelled across.
(Mr Cook) I can believe that. The exit and entry points are very few.
We cannot have it both ways. We cannot demand a tax system and then back off
from the fact that this really does mean a customs system at the border plus,
of course, one has to be frank, control over organised crime, because the
point of intervention is at the crossing point. We are committed to providing
resources for the reconstruction and Europe is providing 360 million euro in
the current year, which is just over half the total amount coming from the
world, very large sums of money. That kind of input is not going to end this
year. As Kosovo progresses it is not unreasonable to expect a gradual
transition to what was envisaged in 1244 which is that UNMIK will meet many
of its costs for services in Kosovo from developing a tax system within
Kosovo.
Chairman
482. We visited Montenegro, we were received very warmly, and we
were encouraged by the democratic spirit when parties opposed to each other
politically were prepared to appear before us and give evidence. How do you
answer the charge of a Montenegrin that "here you are, the international
community, urging us strongly not to go for independence and at the same time
denying us resources because we can only have access to the international
financial institutions if we are indeed independent"?
(Mr Cook) To be fair to ourselves, quite a lot of resources have gone
into Montenegro since June of last year. I am conscious of the dilemma that
you have identified. Frankly, there is nothing we can do about the rules of
the IMF because it would require a change in the charter effectively.
483. But we can do something about the EBRD.
(Mr Cook) Can I come to it next one step down. In terms of the World
Bank there is now a proposal for a trust fund to be set up in Montenegro which
would be a useful way of enabling the World Bank to be active but without
infringing its charter. That will depend on donors coming forward and paying
into the trust fund but I think that is quite an imaginative way around the
problem. In terms of the European Union, there are two issues of concern to
Montenegrins. One is those projects put forward to the Stability Pact where
we have now looked again to see if there are ways in which we can include some
form of project in Montenegro. It is going to be very difficult but we are
trying to crack that one. The more urgent and more difficult one is that
ECOFIN, the finance ministry of the European Union, have looked at this
question on a couple of occasions and feel that they cannot offer financial
assistance to Montenegro because they can only do so where the IMF would be
engaged. To be candid, I would not necessarily find it unhelpful if the
Committee was to press the European Union to find creative ways around the
problem.
484. Do you feel frustrated by the fact that whilst Europe
dallies, whilst bureaucrats find excellent ways to say no, that democracy
building and democracy potential in Montenegro is put at risk?
(Mr Cook) You should not underrate the extent to which assistance has
been provided by the European Union. Indeed, per capita we have probably put
more reserves into Montenegro than just about any other spot within the
region. But, having said that, I am not disagreeing with you, Chairman. We
cannot say to Montenegro "you should not demand independence" and then at the
same time penalise them on their right to support and assistance from outside.
That is why on that one I think we need to work hard to find an imaginative
way through this thicket.
Mr Illsley
485. I was very interested in your point about the amount of money
the European Union have put into Kosovo bearing in mind Kouchner's comments
at the UN Security Council while we were actually there when I think he
referred to the EU as "a deadbeat donor". Coming back to Montenegro, and we
left Montenegro as Chris Patten came in, there is a fear in Montenegro, a
suggestion around Montenegro, that within the next 12-18 months Milosevic
could look for a way of extending his mandate and his current position and the
only way he could do that would be by forcing an issue to enable him to
rewrite the constitution of Serbia Montenegro. To do that he would be quite
prepared to relinquish Montenegro, to destabilise it before doing so, causing
all manner of problems in that country. Is that a scenario which is
subscribed to by the Government, or are you aware of that?
(Mr Cook) Before I respond to you on Montenegro can I just respond to
the point on which you quoted Bernard Kouchner. I think there is a
misconception around the extent to which the European Union is putting in the
bulk of the resources for much of the activity within Kosovo. If you take the
budget of UNMIK, of OSCE and of the reconstruction pillar, the total budget
for this year is œ529 million. œ354 million of that is coming from the
European Union and, of that, œ57 million is coming from Britain on top of our
own bilateral expenditure within Kosovo. So the œ354 million is actually spot
on two-thirds of the total expenditure across those pillars. I really think
that the European Union and ourselves, as a European nation, have come in for
some unfair criticism about the extent to which we are playing our part in
Kosovo. On Montenegro the position is very tense and we follow it with both
very great interest and very real concern. We have gone out of our way
repeatedly to show solidarity with Montenegro. I and other European Ministers
have repeatedly met with President Djukanovic to show that solidarity. I
think it was absolutely right and courageous of Chris Patten to go to
Montenegro and show in a very visible way the European Union's commitment and
support for Montenegro, and we will continue to do everything we can to get
across that message of our commitment to Montenegro as a democratic and
autonomous area. Whether Milosevic would put it out of the Federal Republic,
nobody knows for certain what he would do. I think it is very important to
keep him guessing as to what we would do if he was to take a precipitate or
violent action. At the same time it is hard to see how he himself could gain
constitutionally from expelling Montenegro because at the moment he is
technically the President of the Federal Republic, not Serbia. Had he been
President of Serbia for the two terms provided for in the constitution and if
there was no longer a Federal Republic, technically he would have nothing to
be President of.
486. That is the point I am getting at. Taking out Montenegro he
could ---
(Mr Cook) --- rewrite the FRY constitution? It is true that it is the
Montenegro representatives in the federal chamber who have prevented him from
rewriting the Federal constitution so far but he must find it difficult to
figure out what would be the incalculable consequence of any move he made and
it is our task to make it more difficult for him.
Mr Rowlands
487. Last July you came before us, Secretary of State, and told us
of specific conversations between yourself and President Djukanovic and
mentioned the military technical agreement which ensured that any withdrawal
of Serb troops from Kosovo did not go into Montenegro. That might have been
observed by the letter but the President told us when we met him that he had
seen a significant increase and build-up of Federal troops inside Montenegro
since and indeed although they went into Serbia they now have been moved down
to Montenegro. A) can you confirm that has happened or provide any
information. Secondly, he told us he had approached NATO and raised this with
Brussels. I wondered whether this matter had been followed up. Thirdly, part
of the same question, you rightly said to us before that there would be grave
consequences and we have made this very clear to Milosevic, but we made very
clear to Milosevic a whole series of messages over the last decade and in the
end he chose either not to listen to them or did not believe them. How are
we going to make sure that Montenegro is not the next Kosovo?
(Mr Cook) I cannot give the Committee any guarantee of what Milosevic
will do. It would be dishonest of me to attempt to do so. All I can assure
the Committee is that we are taking every possible step to show our commitment
and solidarity with Montenegro and keep Milosevic in a state of uncertainty
and indecision as to what would be the consequences of any action he may take.
On the issue of the troops in Montenegro, subject to guidance, I do not think
there has been a significant increase in number but what we have certainly
witnessed - and I have discussed this with President Djukanovic - a successive
replacement of the officers with tougher, hardliners. A year ago Milosevic
replaced his officers with hardliners. Now he has replaced those hardliners
with even more hardliners. This is particularly worrying in the case of
Montenegro. Brian, you are more familiar with this than I. You have been to
Montenegro.
(Mr Donnelly) You are absolutely right, Secretary of State, we are not
aware of any formal units that have come from Belgrade to reinforce the Second
Army in Podgorica (?). Certainly there have been some interchanges of
personnel with the intention of perhaps toughening up the middle-ranking
officer corp and there has been a formation of what has been called the 7th
Military Police Battalion attached to the Federal army in Montenegro which in
fact is not really an army contingent at all but simply has been recruited
from supporters of Milosevic. They are essentially political appointments but
have been badged and presented as military officers.
488. Is this not the pattern? Are these not the tell tale signs
of someone putting in place the mechanisms for destabilisation?
(Mr Cook) Yes, you are right to worry. As I said earlier, we view
events with grave concern.
Sir David Madel
489. On economic aid and financial assistance, the problem of
where you have a country that cannot have aid because Serbia is a pariah, can
we have a situation where a region of that country, which in a sense you would
say Montenegro is, providing that region satisfies the Copenhagen criterion
on democracy, could have economic aid? If we made that change in Europe then
IMF economic aid could go in.
(Mr Cook) The European Union, as I said, is already giving substantial
quantities of aid to Montenegro and will continue to do so, but the issue
really of concern to President Djukanovic is not the assistance for
development and humanitarian aid purposes but the budgetary assistance for
macro-financial stability which it cannot get from the IMF. As I understand
it, and I am not myself a Finance Minister, the European rules prevent ECOFIN
responding and the IMF cannot take part. It might be helpful if I put in to
the Committee a note on what assistance there has been and where the various
legal barriers lie. But, as I said earlier, I personally think that we have
got to find imaginative ways round the barriers.
Chairman
490. And suggestions as to how those legal barriers might be
overcome.
(Mr Cook) I do not think I can myself suggest to you things that I was
told pushing privately within the European Union, but any additional pressure
from you would be of assistance and would be quite welcome.
(Mr Jones Parry) Could I just add a comment. The problem with
macro-economic financial assistance is that it is predicated throughout on an
IMF programme. An IMF programme for Montenegro is not possible. We only do
IMF programmes under the Charter for an entire country. It not possible to
give that assistance. What we are concentrating on is budgetary and programme
assistance with the EU and possibly the European Investment Bank giving
project assistance. We are working on both of those.
Dr Godman
491. Mr Donnelly, I think it was you who said that hardline
officers had been moved in down to junior or middle ranking officers, but is
it not the case that the soldiers that they command are largely conscripts
from Montenegro itself or are they moving in hardline junior ranks as well?
We passed the barracks every day and there is a massive presence there. But
is it not the case that most of the other rankings are made up of conscripts?
(Mr Donnelly) A high proportion of the other ranks are made up of
conscripts who come from Montenegro and as such one would except them to
reflect the divisions within Montenegro so some have allegiance for Djukanovic
and some not. I could not tell you precisely what proportion they are and
there are inevitable questions about the loyalty of those forces in the event
they were called into action. I think the difficulty is that we cannot assume
that they would not respond to Djukanovic. It may be that in the event some
would.
(Mr Cook) One should not lose sight of the fact that part of the
delicacy and complexity of Montenegro is that about a third of the population
are more aligned with Milosevic than Djukanovic.
Sir David Madel
492. Foreign Secretary, two final things which are currently side
issues but have the capacity for becoming very central; Macedonia and the
Presevo Valley. It seems to me valuable always to try and put oneself in the
position of the other side and it would seem to me that an obvious tactic from
Milosevic would be to undermine and/or discredit KFOR and NATO if he could.
Both of those two places represent opportunities. Can I ask you about
Macedonia first and then the Presevo Valley. The argument goes with Macedonia
that it is the supply route for absolutely everything overland into Kosovo.
If trouble could be fermented in Macedonia that supply route could be put into
jeopardy. Would the United Kingdom Government, would NATO, would anybody
intervene in Macedonia if things were to get difficult there on that basis?
(Mr Cook) I have to show great care and caution in answering that
question because it is capable of causing great alarm in Macedonia if I get
it wrong among our allies and our friends. Macedonia is very jealous of its
independence, and rightly so. It is quite explicit that the activities of
KFOR and NATO on its soil are activities sanctioned by the Government and
therefore not an intrusion upon its sovereignty. I think I would be very
unwise, given the importance of our relations with Macedonia, to go beyond
that.
493. Could I put the argument into the record that was put to us.
It goes as follows: Presevo Valley in Serbia has Albanians who are KLA, some
of whom you say have been arrested, and either the KLA themselves fomenting
trouble or Milosevic causing trouble results in those Albanians going into
Kosovo which results in the Kosovar Albanians taking revenge on the Serbs in
Kosovo because of yet more trouble which results in an exodus and, therefore,
more trouble again which KFOR cannot handle. If that is the train of events
predicted that might happen, what political steps would be taken in the event
of a deliberate attempt to ethnically cleanse the Presevo Valley?
(Mr Cook) We very much share your concern about the Presevo Valley and
you are right to identify it as a potential source of instability. I have to
say that the immediate and pressing prospect of that instability is from the
activity of Albanian hardliners infiltrating over the border in order to act
as a source of instability there. We have no evidence that they are
themselves directly stimulated by the KLA, although elements of them
undoubtedly have had former links with the KLA. I think the most valuable and
immediately important priority for us is to effectively try to seal the border
in particular circumstances. We will have to do our best to achieve that,
which is why the action was taken yesterday to raid one of the headquarters
on the Kosovo side of the border. We are not aware of very large numbers who
are active going over the border to act as terrorist formations within the
Presevo Valley, but it is very important that we do everything we can to
minimise that and to deny them supplies.
494. If the result of this were to be very serious reprisals
within Kosovo, does the international community have both the will and the
capacity to take whatever forceful steps are necessary to put down that sort
of unrest in Kosovo?
(Mr Cook) My answer to that is going to be dictated by my previous
answer which is the immediate problem in the Presevo Valley is Kosovar
Albanian extremists going across the border to create trouble in the hope that
it will provoke Milosevic to be repressive in the expectation that will
provoke floods of refugees coming to Kosovo, in the expectation that in turn
will suck NATO into a wider conflict with Southern Serbia. Ergo, if I were
to respond to what you are saying by saying that of course we will take
action, I would be giving them exactly the incentive, the encouragement, that
they want. We are saying to them very firmly "if you create trouble over the
other side of the border, do not expect us necessarily to come riding to the
rescue."
Chairman
495. UNMIK's mandate is renewable, would you expect any problems
from China or Russia?
(Mr Cook) Certainly not from Russia, which is presently in KFOR. I
would not anticipate difficulty with China.
496. The Funding Conference for the Stability Pact, would you like
to make any comment on our expectations?
(Mr Cook) I very much hope that we will be able to come up with funding
for the many worthy projects that have been identified and we will certainly
be going in a positive spirit with a positive announcement.
497. As always you have been extremely frank and helpful. May I
also thank Mr Donnelly and Mr Jones Parry who has had a rather easy ride
today. Thank you very much indeed.
(Mr Cook) Just to ensure that I have an easier ride in future can I
just check if there is anything I have said since we came back from the
division that I need to correct? No.
498. You have been given a clean bill of health.
(Mr Cook) There is one point I need to put the record right on.
Earlier I referred to General Drewienkiewicz as the Head of KVM, I am reminded
that although that may be the way it appears to me he was actually the Deputy
Head of the KVM.
Chairman: Thank you very much indeed.
