B. THE EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
(See Annex A for membership as of January 2000
of Export Control Regimes).
Nuclear Suppliers Group
The Nuclear Suppliers Group was created in 1974
in response to the first nuclear explosion by India. In 2000 the
NSG consists of 35 nuclear supplier countries which seek through
export controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The controls and the list of goods under control are contained
in the NSG Guidelines Parts 1 and 2. Part 1 goods are items that
have an exclusive nuclear use. Part 2 goods are dual-use items,
that is goods that could be used for nuclear uses but which also
have legitimate industrial applications. The Group meets several
times a year including an Annual Plenary meeting. The Chair rotates;
France succeeds Italy in mid-2000. The UK chaired in 1998-99.
The effectiveness of the NSG depends on members
applying the various export control regulations contained in the
Guidelines. A key provision is that full scope IAEA safeguards
are a condition of supply to non-nuclear weapon states. The NSG
is a consensus organisation but not legally binding. We believe
that members comply with their NSG obligations.
The NSG has a well established Denial Notice
system the cornerstones of which are the no-undercut and commercial
confidentiality principles, ie that information exchanged about
denials will not be used for commercial purposes against firms
in the country supplying the information. Information on Denials
is regularly exchanged between members.
Challenges to the NSG in the 1990s have included
the development of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme by
Iraq and India and Pakistan nuclear tests in 1998. The NSG is
responding to the changing circumstances whilst continuing its
collective efforts against proliferators. Recent initiatives have
included:
— two major transparency seminars held
in Vienna in 1997 and New York in 1999, in which non-members,
NGOs and other interested parties were invited to a series of
talks on the work of the NSG. The purpose was to counter criticism
that the NSG is a cartel that hinders legitimate trade;
— a major restructuring of the Part
2 Guidelines to make them compatible with the EC Dual Use Regulations;
— a willingness to consider applications
from countries wishing to join the Group who can fulfil the necessary
membership criteria. Turkey, Belarus and Slovenia are all on the
threshold of membership;
— the setting up of a working group
(Chaired by the UK) to review the institutional working arrangements
of the NSG.
Zangger Committee
The Zangger Committee is an informal group of
34 nuclear supplier countries who are states parties to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was formed in 1971 with the
purpose of agreeing on the detailed implementation of Article
III.2 of the NPT. As a result, the Committee publishes and keeps
updated a "Trigger List" of items that require certain
safeguards and assurances as a condition of supply.
To a large extent the work of the group is dependent
on technological progress in the nuclear industry. The "Trigger
List" is now well established and only needs adjusting as
new technologies come into the fore or old technology becomes
obsolete. Unlike the NSG, it does not maintain a dual-use list.
The Austrian Chairman of the Committee works to maintain the impetus
of the group (the UK acts as Secretary). Meetings are held twice
yearly in Vienna. Technical issues that warrant further study
are usually handled within a technology holders working group.
The Committee continues to be an effective instrument
in non-proliferation. This is due to the importance members attach
to its relationship to the NPT. China joined the Zangger Committee
in 1998, the first of the international export control groups
to which it has adhered.
Australia Group
In April 1984, as a result of the findings of
a UN investigatory mission that chemical weapons had been used
in the Iran/Iraq war, some governments placed licensing controls
on the export of various chemicals which could be used in the
manufacture of chemical weapons.
The measures imposed by the governments concerned,
however, were not uniform either in scope or application. This
led in 1985 to the formation of the Australia Group (AG) to harmonise
the measures taken individually by governments and enhance co-operation.
In 1990, the AG agreed to take steps to address the problem of
the spread of biological weapons.
The AG is an informal arrangement in which 30
countries and the EU Commission participate. It is chaired by
Australia and meets in Paris. Participants do not undertake any
legally binding obligations: the effectiveness of the co-operation
between participants depends on their national measures and their
commitment to non-proliferation goals.
All members are States Parties to the Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Annual
meetings explore the scope for making more effective the measures
already taken by individual countries, including through exchange
of information, harmonisation, and consideration of the introduction
of additional national measures where necessary.
Each AG country has introduced licensing measures
on the export of certain dual-use chemicals, biological agents,
and chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment
with a view to ensuring that exports of these items do not contribute
to the spread of chemical and biological weapons.
Denials of exports are notified to other AG
participants through the AG chair. The UK consults the lists of
other countries' denial notices when considering export licence
applications. A "no-undercut" policy is operated ie
if a country receives an export licence application for an AG-controlled
item to the same end-user which has previously been denied by
another member, the export cannot go ahead without consultations
between the two countries. There is no obligation not to undercut
but members recognise that to do so would undermine the effectiveness
of the AG.
The AG has come under increasing criticism by
some NAM countries (Iran, China, India, Pakistan) who view its
existence as contrary to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Biological Weapons Convention. These countries argue that exports
should not be denied to States Parties to the Conventions. The
UK believes that neither the conventions nor the AG would be wholly
effective on their own but that a joint approach to stopping proliferation
is the most effective. AG members are actively engaged in outreach
activities to non-member countries to keep them updated on the
workings of the group and to reassure them that the AG denies
exports in practice in few cases and only when there are good
grounds to suspect that the goods are to be used in a WMD programme.
They also support the O'Sullivan statement of 1992 which accepts
that the workings of the Australia Group will have to be reviewed
once there is a fully operational Chemical Weapons Convention
and an effectively verified Biological Weapons Convention.
Missile Technology Control Regime
Founded in 1987 the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) is an informal non-treaty suppliers regime. It currently
has 32 members and the chair for 2000 is the Netherlands. The
UK chaired in 1996-97.
The members seek to prevent the proliferation
of missile systems, their components and related technology by
agreeing guidelines and a list of sensitive items which are implemented
through national export controls. It is the only multilateral
forum dealing with missile proliferation. It is not a universal
forum, nor is it universally accepted, nor does its mandate extend
beyond export controls.
MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment and Technology
Annex form the basis for controlling transfers of all delivery
systems, other than manned aircraft, capable of delivering weapons
of mass destruction. This is achieved by controlling the transfer
of complete missile systems or unmanned air vehicles capable of
carrying any payload over a range of at least 300km, and by controlling
transfers of components and related technology that could contribute
to such missile systems or to the ability to develop and produce
such systems. Many items with legitimate non-missile related uses,
which are known as dual use items, fall into these categories.
Restraint is exercised in the consideration of transfers of such
items, which are evaluated on case by case basis.
A system of denial notifications exists for
export licences that are refused. This notification contains information
about the goods, destination and end-user and is relayed to all
partners of the MTCR. Partners have agreed not to undercut, ie
approve an export which is essentially identical to one already
denied, and notified, by another partner without first consulting
the issuing partner.
The main effect of the MTCR has been to prevent
or constrain ballistic missile programmes heavily dependent on
imported Western technology. Its success to date stems from the
common purpose and shared objectives of its partners. However,
indigenous missile progammes are of increasing concern. Such programmes
are active in, inter alia, India, Pakistan, Iran and DPRK.
Wider international measures to prevent missile proliferation
may need to be considered and these are being discussed in MTCR
and other non-proliferation fora.
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