C. CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
bans the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use
of chemical weapons; requires the destruction of all existing
chemical weapons and establishes an extensive system of declarations
and inspections to verify this. It entered into force on 29 April
1997, and is the first multilaterally negotiated disarmament agreement
which aims to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction
in a verifiable manner.
To date, there are 129 States Parties to the
Convention, including all EU Member States (see Annex B for list
as of January 2000). Other States which have ratified the Convention
include the United States, Russia, India, Pakistan, China, Iran
and—important in the Middle East context—Jordan. The
UK aims to achieve a Treaty with universal adherence, implemented
on a world-wide scale in an effective manner. In order to reach
this goal, as many countries as possible must ratify (or accede
to) the Treaty. Adherence by States with significant national
chemical industries or in regions of tension is of particular
importance.
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW)
Implementation of the CWC is overseen by the
OPCW, located in the Hague. The OPCW has made an active start
to implementing a rigorous verification and inspection regime
under its Brazilian Director-General (Ambassador Bustani). All
States parties to the Convention are required to submit declarations
of past chemical weapons activities and regular declarations about
the production, processing and consumption of certain dual-use
chemicals which have possible chemical weapons applications. These
declarations are verified by means of routine inspections of which
over 600 have already taken place world-wide. The Convention also
makes provision for clarifying concerns about compliance with
the Convention including both bilaterally and through the OPCW.
If necessary a State Party can request the Organisation to conduct
an on-site Challenge Inspection when there are strong grounds
for suspecting non-compliance. To date no challenge inspections
have been proposed or carried out.
UK National Authority
The National Authority for the UK is the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) which is responsible for provision
of the UK share of the funding of the OPCW. The DTI also provides
the national representative on the Executive Council of the OPCW
and oversees all OPCW inspections in the UK. There have so far
been over 30 Inspections in the UK at both defence and industrial
sites. All have passed off successfully. The UK has a permanent
seat on the Council of the OPCW by virtue of the size of its chemical
industry.
United States
The United States has so far provided only a
military declaration covering its CW stockpile and former CW production
facilities. Destruction operations, under OPCW supervision, are
well ahead of the timescale required by the CWC. Legislation facilitating
the provision of US industrial declarations was however only adopted
in late 1998. As a result, these declarations have been delayed
and are now expected in April 2000. Industrial inspections in
the US will therefore begin in the latter half of 2000. Aspects
of US legislation have also given rise to concern, eg the possible
Presidential veto on challenge inspections, and the restrictions
on the removal from the US of samples for analysis (Condition
18). In both areas, the UK has sought to pursue pragmatic solutions
which meet the essential requirements of the CWC with the US directly
and in discussion with EU partners.
Russia
Russia ratified the CWC on 5 November 1997,
despite concerns over the costs (estimated at more than $6 billion)
and environmental effects of destroying her large chemical weapons
stocks. Russia has declared 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons,
of which some 30,000 tonnes is in munitions form, stored at seven
sites on its territory. Russia is now obliged to destroy all stocks
within 10 years, with the possibility of a five year extension.
Progress has however been slow and in late 1999 Russia had to
request an extension to the first deadline—destruction of
1 per cent of weapon stocks by April 2000. The UK, together with
a number of States Parties, expressed concern at the setback for
CWC implementation but indicated a willingness to consider the
request constructively, given appropriate transparency of the
Russian destruction programme.
CW Destruction assistance
The CWC makes clear that the "possessor
pays" for chemical weapons destruction. On entry into force
in 1997, and without prejudice to that principle, the EU pledged
up to 15 million Euros (£8.84 million) to be spent in Russia
over three years on CW destruction-related projects. This has
recently been supplemented by a decision to spend 6 million Euros
(£3.79 million) at one CW destruction plant. The UK has been
examining what additional bilateral assistance might be made available.
(The US, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Italy and Sweden have
offered assistance in areas related to CW destruction).
BIOLOGICAL AND
TOXIN WEAPONS
CONVENTION
Biological Weapons (BW) have been banned since
1975 when the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) entered
into force. A list of parties is shown at Annex C. However the
Treaty has no effective provisions to verify compliance. The revelations
by the UN Special Commission about Iraq's BW programme and former
President Yeltsin's admission in 1992 that the Soviet Union has
illegally conducted a BW programme, have underlined the pressing
need for the Convention to be reinforced with measures to strengthen
confidence in compliance and deter potential proliferators.
The BTWC Ad Hoc Group/UK Role
Since 1995 an Ad Hoc Group of States
Parties has been meeting in Geneva, under the chairmanship of
Ambassador Toth of Hungary, to consider measures to strengthen
the Convention. The Group has made good progress and is now negotiating
on the basis of a draft text of a Protocol to the Convention.
The last two years have seen a significant increase in the tempo
of the work. This intensification has been sustained in 2000,
where a possible 14 weeks of negotiation are available.
The mandate given to the Ad Hoc Group
requires that the work on a Protocol be completed as soon as possible
before the Fifth Review Conference, scheduled for the latter half
of next year. The United Kingdom is responsible for chairing meetings
in the key area of compliance measures—the core of the proposed
Protocol—and has played a leading role in the negotiations
in our capacity as a Depositary Government for the BTWC. The UK
is committed to seeing the early and successful completion of
a Protocol and has offered London as the venue for the eventual
signing ceremony.
BTWC Protocol
The draft Protocol includes all the key elements
which the UK considers essential to make it effective. On a number
of important issues, there remain substantial differences between
the negotiating parties which have yet to be resolved.
The Protocol envisages a package of complementary
measures. These include a mandatory requirement to declare sites
and activities which could be misused for producing biological
weapons; provisions for on-site visits; and, in the case of serious
doubts, investigations (ie inspections) of suspect facilities
and incidents. A small international organisation would be created
to implement these measures.
Declarations
The mandatory requirement for national declarations
would identify facilities which could most easily be used for
activities prohibited by the Convention, ie where expertise, equipment
and materials exist, and activities conducted which could be misused
by a State to develop and make biological weapons. Each relevant
facility would complete a detailed questionnaire.
Visits
There are two basic justifications for the provision
of on-site visits as an integral part of the Protocol. First,
to provide greater insight into and transparency of activities
at declared facilities; greater openness over time will help reduce
grounds for suspicion that relevant facilities might be misused.
Second, to help ensure accuracy; eg a visit to clear up ambiguity
in a declaration or find out whether an undeclared facility should
in fact have been declared.
Investigations
Short notice investigations will help to deter
violations and deal with any alleged breaches of the Convention.
These provisions need to include the right to go anywhere at anytime
to see whether illegal activities are, or have been, taking place.
Investigations would be carried out at facilities, test ranges,
sites of alleged BW use and where there are unusual outbreaks
of disease thought to be connected to illegal BW activities. Investigators
would have extensive powers to interview, observe, check documents,
and take and analyse samples.
Role of new International Organisation
A small international body would have the task
of implementing the Protocol. Its personnel would examine declarations;
follow-up any problems; visit declared facilities and check as
necessary whether other facilities which appear to meet the criteria
for declaration should in fact have been declared. The organisation
would also be responsible for conducting any investigations into
alleged violations.
Other Issues
It is widely recognised that the Protocol will
also cover technical assistance and co-operation. The UK believes
that the provisions in this area should be limited and not cut
across aid activities which are conducted more effectively by
other international organisations. Measures should focus rather
on diagnosis, surveillance and prevention of infectious diseases.
Some limited measures on transfer between states of BW agents
or equipment could be included. They must not, however, interfere
with national export control policies.
Non-Proliferation gains
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
has at present no effective verification procedures. The proposed
Protocol will have legally binding measures to increase openness
in key biological activities, help deter proliferation and offer
tools for dealing with any alleged violations of the Convention.
In a wider context, the Protocol will fill the last major gap
in arms control provisions covering weapons of non-proliferation
regime.
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