D. VERIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CONVENTIONS
NPT: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and Safeguards
The IAEA implements the safeguards required
by the NPT—essentially under Article III.1 and Article III.2.
DTI has lead responsibility in the UK for the IAEA and pays the
UK's annual subscription. The UK has a permanent seat on the IAEA
Board by virtue of the size of its nuclear industry.
The extent to which IAEA safeguards are applied
in any particular State now depends on its status in relation
to the NPT:
— NNWS parties to the NPT are each
obliged by the Treaty to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear
material;
— NWS parties to the NPT are not obliged
by the treaty to accept IAEA safeguards on any of their nuclear
material, but all of them have now voluntarily agreed to make
some of their nuclear material liable to IAEA safeguards;
— non-parties to the NPT are of course
under no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear
material under the Treaty. All of them have nevertheless accepted
IAEA safeguards on some of their material or facilities.
Strengthened Safeguards
After the 1990-91 Gulf War it became apparent
that the standard safeguards agreements with NNWS (known as INFCIRC
153) were inadequate. The IAEA had not detected Iraq's massive
clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The fundamental reason
for this was that the system had developed in such a way that
the IAEA's focus was more on checking the correctness of the information
declared to it by an NNWS than on checking that such information
was comprehensive.
In 1993 The IAEA therefore launched a two-year
study into ways of strengthening INFCIRC 153 safeguards in order
to remedy this deficiency. This "93+2" programme led
to various additional measures being proposed. These were subsequently
divided into "Part 1" measures, which could be implemented
under the authority of the existing INFCIRC 153 agreements, and
"Part 2" measures, which could only be implemented if
an Additional Protocol was concluded between the IAEA and each
NNWS. In June 1995 the IAEA's Board of Governors approved the
"Part 1" measures, and they are now being implemented.
In May 1997 the Board approved the model of an Additional Protocol
(known as INFCIRC 540), and the negotiation, entry into force,
and implementation of such agreements between individual NNWS
and the IAEA is now in progress.
In order to allay NNWS concerns about discriminatory
treatment, the NWS agreed to negotiate their own Additional Protocols
with a view to applying those 540 measures which they identify
as contributing to the Protocol's objectives. The UK signed its
Additional Protocol in September 1998. A bill to enable us to
fulfill our obligations under the Additional Protocol is currently
before Parliament.
Neptunium and Americium
As a result of a separate initiative, in September
1999 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a set of measures designed
to provide the international community with assurance that in
the NNWS amounts of neptunium or americium in separated form do
not raise proliferation concerns (neptunium and americium are
fissionable materials produced during the operation of a nuclear
reactor). If these materials had been left outside international
oversight, there could have been a small risk of a State attempting
to misuse them in seeking to acquire a nuclear explosive capability.
The relatively small amounts of neptunium and americium in separated
form in the UK are carefully monitored and protected, and reports
on exports of the materials from the UK to NNWS are provided to
the IAEA.
Despite the experience with Iraq, the UK believes
the IAEA has done and will continue to do an effective job concluding
and implementing safeguards agreements in accordance with the
requirements of the relevant articles of the NPT. The Additional
Protocol will enhance the IAEA's ability to detect and deter clandestine
activities in the NNWS. More information will have to be provided
to the Agency and it will have wider inspection powers.
CTBT Verification System
To verify compliance with the CTBT an International
Monitoring System (IMS) is being established. The IMS will comprise
321 monitoring stations located in 90 countries and includes seismic,
hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide sensor networks. The
date from these networks are transmitted to an International Data
Centre (IDC) located in Vienna. This will produce analysis of
detected disturbances to allow States Parties to verify compliance
with the Treaty.
The IMS is designed to provide data to enable
States Parties to detect, locate and identify nuclear explosions
of at least 1 kt. The level of 1 kt is not a threshold but a level
set to achieve the aims of the CTBT in a cost-effective way. We
believe the IMS network ensures with a high degree of confidence
detection, location and identification of explosions of at least
1 kt. It is assumed that the uncertainty of avoiding detection
at a significantly lower yields will assure compliance well below
the level of 1 kt. On-site inspections will also assist in verification
of the nature of the source.
Verification of Chemical Weapons Convention: covered
under the OPCW in Section C
Enforcement Procedures
As regards enforcement, the IAEA's safeguards
agreements with NPT Parties, the CWC, and the CTBT all contain
provisions enabling the IAEA, the OPCW, and the CTBTO respectively
to take certain measures if a State Party fails to take measures
to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance.
In addition, in certain circumstances, they require or enable
these organisations to bring an issue of non-compliance to the
attention of the United Nations Security Council. The BTWC, which,
as yet, has no verification organisation, nevertheless provides
each State Party with a right to lodge a complaint with the United
Nations Security Council if it finds any other State Party to
be acting in breach of its obligations. In addition, any State
Party seeking to exercise its right of withdrawal from the NPT,
BTWC, CWC, or CTBT must give advance notice of such withdrawal
to the United Nations Security Council.
Once a matter had been referred to it, it would
then be for the United Nations Security Council to decide on the
appropriate course of action, in accordance with the United Nations
Charter. On 31 January 1992 the President of the United Nations
Security Council Summit (the British Prime Minister) made a Presidential
Statement on behalf of the Summit which noted that "the proliferation
of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international
peace and security". The United Nations Security Council
subsequently took an active interest when North Korea gave advance
notice in March 1993 of its withdrawal from the NPT and when the
IAEA's Board of Governors reported on North Korea's non-compliance
with its safeguards agreement.
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