WEDNESDAY 28 JUNE 2000
_________
Members present:
Mr Donald Anderson, in the Chair
Ms Diane Abbott
Sir Peter Emery
Dr Norman A Godman
Mr Eric Illsley
Mr Andrew Mackinlay
Sir David Madel
Mr Ted Rowlands
Sir John Stanley
Dr Phyllis Starkey
_________
MEMORANDA SUBMITTED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
RT HON ROBIN COOK, a Member of the House, (Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs), MR P HARE, Head of the Non-Proliferation
Department and MR P RICKETTS, Director of International Security, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, examined.
Chairman
159. May I welcome you and your two colleagues to our inquiry into
weapons of mass destruction? I welcome with you Mr Paul Hare who is Head of
the Non-Proliferation Department and Mr Peter Ricketts, whom we know well, who
is Director of International Security. May I say that the Committee has
visited Geneva, New York and Washington? We had an excellent service from our
embassy staffs there and indeed we heard many tributes to the way in which the
UK was contributing constructively to the debate. On those matters, NPT and
so on, we are one of many players. In the matter of the National Missile
Defence (NMD), which the US is now discussing, we shall have to take key
decisions on our own in respect of the US requests. What is your current
understanding of the position within the US?
(Mr Cook) To a degree it would be improper of me to speculate as to
what sovereign decision the United States may take in the future. At the
present time there is a degree of consensus among political quarters across
the United States that is interested in National Missile Defence. There is
a recognition in the administration of the importance of proceeding with this
in a way which is consistent with international arms control regimes,
particularly the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Final decisions also depend
on the conditions set out by President Clinton, of which, in terms of
timetable, the one which prevents decision now is the need for the technology
to be proven. There will be a further test in July and until then we would
not anticipate any movement to a decision. Quite possibly there will be no
decision under the current administration but that is for the Americans.
160. We have noticed that the State Department have latterly
dropped the use of the term "rogue state" in respect of North Korea and are
now using the term "state of concern". How do you read this rebranding? Does
it suggest to you that this is part of the administration's wish to push back
the decision until after the presidential election?
(Mr Cook) I think that would be over-interpreting the change of
language. I must plead guilty as a politician to also frequently changing
language in order to make it clear that we are talking about something which
is of interest, to convey the clear message. It does not necessarily imply
change of policy in this particular case.
161. But it was clearly done deliberately to change the terms.
(Mr Cook) It has not changed the United States' presumptions which had
led it to have the National Missile Defence both while North Korea was
described as a "rogue state" and whilst it is described as a "state of
concern"; it is still seen as the primary reason for the impetus behind the
National Missile Defence.
162. Do you see any perceived threat from missiles either to the
UK or to our forces overseas?
(Mr Cook) We have submitted a memorandum to you and you have also had
a very interesting secret briefing from DIS, which I have had the opportunity
to look at. You will be aware from that that we take very seriously threats
of proliferation to British interests though we are not currently anticipating
another state other than the existing nuclear weapons states having the
capacity to strike Britain by missile.
163. Do you see this sort of conflict arising that in the United
States there appears to be a consensus in favour of some form of National
Missile Defence? Our European partners are highly sceptical of the matter,
thinking it will destabilise arms discussions and so on. Do you feel that
there is a real danger that the UK will be forced to choose ultimately between
being seen as the tame ally of the US in terms of Menwith Hill and following
an EU lead?
(Mr Cook) You describe the two options available to us in terms which
are not attractive in whichever way we answer the question. I have been
present at meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Council on two occasions now
when we have had a full table round on this question. It is fair to say that
there is a lot of common ground on what are the areas of difficulty and what
would be an appropriate condition for this to proceed. It is not a question
of the United States versus Europe, nor of the United Kingdom being isolated
in its views either from the United States or from Europe.
164. Do any European countries share the concerns of the US? Do
any favour the US proposals for NMD?
(Mr Cook) It is fair to say that we all recognise that North Korea is,
to use the vogue term now, a "state of concern".
Dr Starkey
165. May I press you further on Britain's attitude to the NMD?
You will be well aware that there has been a whole series of written questions
to the Foreign Office and to the Ministry of Defence by a variety of members
attempting to find out what the British Government's attitude is. Essentially
the various answers have simply said that nobody has asked us to use British
facilities so we have not given any response.
(Mr Cook) It seems to me an eminently sane position for a government to
take.
166. That is a matter of opinion. It would seem to me, I humbly
suggest, that there is a debate going on about National Missile Defence, that
China and Russia, for example, have made very explicit their concerns about
National Missile Defence. A number of our European partners and indeed our
NATO partners including Canada, have made it very clear that they have severe
concerns about the possible effect of National Missile Defence on the
international arms control environment, yet the British Government appears to
have been saying nothing in public at all. It appears to be entirely neutral
on NMD. Would that be an accurate representation of the British Government's
public attitude?
(Mr Cook) I do not think you would be entitled to conclude anything on
the basis that we have not been asked for a decision. What view we took on
that decision would of course depend on the circumstances surrounding that
decision, for instance, the relationship to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
on which the United States is in discussion with Russia. Until we know both
the nature of the question and also the circumstances in which we are being
asked that question, it would be premature for us to debate what the response
might be, particularly since at the moment there is no commitment by the
United States to ask the question.
167. But you have also had a number of private discussions with
members of the American administration as have Defence Ministers. In those
private discussions have British Ministers been entirely neutral or have they
been drawing attention to some of the downsides of the American proposals?
(Mr Cook) Private discussions necessarily are private, as you will
appreciate, and I am conscious that we are not having this conversation in
entirely private circumstances. You could reasonably take it that we on both
sides of that discussion are open about reviewing what are the areas of most
concern in terms of the threat and the areas of concern in relation to the
solution to that threat. We have of course had a number of discussions about
the impact on the arms control regime and the case for making sure that it is
aligned with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
168. The Foreign Minister of Denmark has said that it would not be
Denmark's policy to use Thule radar station, which is the other one which
needs to be used along with Menwith Hill, in a violation of international
rules. Is that also the British Government's view about potential uses of
Menwith Hill, notwithstanding the fact that nobody has asked us yet?
(Mr Cook) We would find it extremely hard to agree to do anything which
was a violation of international rules. One should not infer from that, that
there is any settled view as to whether what we are asked is a violation of
international rules. I have also had discussions with Mr Pedersen and I think
it is fair to say that whilst he is absolutely right in taking the position
that they would not violate international rules, he is not necessarily
persuaded that what they were asked would violate it.
169. There is a feeling that National Missile Defence may also be
used by the US to proliferate theatre missile defence systems. The obvious
places in the world where they would be likely to do that would be in relation
to Israel, Taiwan and Japan. Would you view that proliferation as helpful to
world peace or destabilising?
(Mr Cook) If I had advice for the United States administration I would
tender it to the United States administration. First of all, theatre missile
defence is not constrained by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which applies
to the inter-continental not the theatre ones. Secondly, I am quite sure that
the United States itself will be very much alive to both the regional and the
wider global consequences of any such development.
Sir David Madel
170. President Putin said on 10 June that there is no actual
missile threat from the so-called "rogue states" of the Near and Middle East
or the Asian region which the USA refers to either now or in the foreseeable
future. Is President Putin right or wrong?
(Mr Cook) Let us address the issue of substance. There is no doubt
that North Korea has developed a quite remarkable missile technology given the
nature of North Korea's economy. It is also of wider concern in that it is
an active proliferator of that missile technology and other countries have now
had access to the technology developed by North Korea. It would be unwise for
any of us to be complacent about the threat from North Korea or from those who
benefited from its technology.
171. So President Putin is wrong to say that.
(Mr Cook) I am seeking to avoid such an inflammatory way of responding
to the question. I am trying to deal with the substance.
(Mr Ricketts) In the joint communiqu‚ from the US/Russian summit on
4 June, both sides agreed the formulation. They agreed the international
community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction including missiles and missile technology.
172. So there is some degree of commonality between America and
Russia.
(Mr Cook) Yes, they both signed that communiqu‚.
173. President Putin also said that Russia would be pleased to see
the representative of United Europe as the third party in this centre for
missile launch control. How do you view that statement?
(Mr Cook) I am not familiar with the statement and shall certainly have
to study it with care. The immediate response to that is that Britain as a
sovereign nation takes part in arms control agreements as a nation. Sometimes
we confer on our position with our allies within NATO, for instance on
conventional forces in Europe. In those cases which touch on our own nuclear
posture, we would act independently. As far as I can recall we have never
sought to collate an arms control position within the European Union, although
in some cases where they touch on export controls, we would of course want to
work with European partners to make sure we were applying the same effective
export controls. Is that a fair summary?
(Mr Hare) There are EU common positions on things like the BW protocol.
(Mr Cook) But we do not propose to submit an EU representative to those
conventions.
174. Without being inflammatory, which I am not being, do you have
any anxieties that Russia might be trying to decouple Europe from the United
States as far as defence goes?
(Mr Cook) There have been attempts to achieve that at various intervals
along the past 50 years and, as you will know, it is very important for us
that we maintain the strength of our transatlantic alliance.
Ms Abbott
175. Just on the question of "rogue state", no-one on this
Committee is complacent about nuclear proliferation or developments in North
Korea, but it is very hard to see the ultimate logic of this "rogue state"
rhetoric. The day that North Korea launched a nuclear attack on the United
State North Korea itself would be dust. How far can you take this "rogue
state" characterisation inasmuch as there is any realistic threat of a nuclear
strike from North Korea on the United States?
(Mr Cook) I am not seeking to take it anywhere and to be fair to the
United States, as we just discussed, they have dropped the rhetoric of "rogue
state". One should not understate the missile technology capacity of North
Korea and whilst you may well be right in your assumption that the United
States would retaliate heavily in the event of an attack, that does not quite
meet the anxiety in the United States at the present time that there would be
the attack in the first place.
176. Do you think that is a realistic anxiety, that North Korea is
going to launch a nuclear strike on the United States any time soon?
(Mr Cook) I am merely trying to explain the current state of the
debate.
177. I understand that, I am asking you as Foreign Secretary
whether you think that it is realistic to fear a nuclear strike on the United
States from North Korea?
(Mr Cook) I am sorry. I am Foreign Secretary of Great Britain. I can
say with some confidence that we do not anticipate a nuclear strike from North
Korea on Britain, but I am not going to seek to second-guess the assessment
of the United States in relation to itself. I do think that it is a matter
of perplexity that North Korea developed such a technology in the first place.
Not unreasonably there are people in the United States who ask why?
178. You think that it is an open question as to whether North
Korean might be planning a nuclear strike on the United States.
(Mr Cook) The judgement on the national security of the United States
is one which the United States has to make itself.
179. I wanted to get back to the question of NMD and what its
effects might be on the arms race. As part of this inquiry we have taken
evidence from a number of academic experts, including Professor Robert O'Neill
of Balliol College, Oxford and Professor John Baylis of the University of
Wales. We put to them whether NMD might not actually lead to destabilisation
in relation to the arms race. Professor O'Neill says that it will completely
scupper any prospect of a long-term reduction in nuclear weapons between the
United States and Russia and that is going to implode the whole arms control
process. Do you think there is anything in that assessment at all?
(Mr Cook) Plainly the impact on the international arms control
environment is a crucial dimension to the debate on NMD and is one which we
have discussed with our opposite numbers in the United States. I would have
to say that in recent months the developments, particularly in relation to
Russia, have been encouraging. It is in the course of the past four months
that the Russian Duma has ratified START II, has ratified the comprehensive
test ban treaty and also the new administration in Russia has come up with
much more ambitious targets than even the already high level of objective for
START III negotiations. At the moment the momentum within Russia appears to
be entirely favourable towards cuts in nuclear missiles and that is consistent
with the comparative success of the Review Conference and the NPT. Of course,
if we are to maintain that momentum, it is important that NMD does not proceed
in a way which undermines the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
180. Is there a way in which the US could proceed with NMD which
would not undermine the treaty?
(Mr Cook) Yes.
181. What might that be?
(Mr Cook) The current discussions between the United States and Russia
about an amendment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which would enable
them to proceed in a way which would be consistent with an amended treaty.
Those discussions are proceeding.
182. We have just come back from China. Wherever we went we asked
our Chinese hosts what they thought of NMD. They were completely unequivocal
that in their view the move forward with NMD would be to destabilise the whole
process of disarmament. It is not just our European allies who are highly
sceptical, the Chinese are highly sceptical. It is only Britain who seems to
think it is an open question as to whether NMD would destabilise.
(Mr Cook) With respect, you are putting Britain in a different box from
our European allies with whom we discussed this closely and with whom we have
a lot of common ground. In the case of China, China has a long strategic
position of difference from the United States to that of Europe or the United
Kingdom. One can understand that in the case of China they may take a
different view of any arms development in the United States. I rather suspect
if you asked them about any strategic development funded by the Pentagon you
would find China flatly against it.
Sir John Stanley
183. Could you explain to us why it is the British Government's
policy to keep open the option of acquiring a National Missile Defence
capability ourselves in the future?
(Mr Cook) Could you repeat that question? Are you asking me why it is
we have a policy of keeping it open?
184. Can you explain why it is the British Government's policy is
to keep open the option?
(Mr Cook) Let us not overstate our commitment. We have not made any
commitment to acquiring a National Missile Defence for ourselves. The
technology at the present time is not available to us. Were we to proceed to
do so at our own cost it would be quite substantial. It is not a question of
keeping it open, but the question has not been addressed. I do not honestly
see that there would be any particular interest in closing it off, but at the
present time there is no active commitment to it.
185. I fully understand there is no active commitment but the
Government's stated position is to keep open the option of acquiring a
National Missile Defence capability ourselves in the future. The Government
has taken that position. Could you explain to us why the Government feels it
is necessary to keep that policy option open?
(Mr Cook) It is not a question of it being necessary, but for the life
of me I cannot think of a single reason of British interest which would point
in the direction of closing it down for all time at the present time. That
is not to say that we are actively considering it. Please tell me what is the
gain for Britain of saying we will never have one?
186. I put the question to you the other way. Will you tell us,
as the Government's stated position is to keep open the option of acquiring
an NMD capability, will you please tell the Committee what are the
circumstances in the future in which that option might be exercised?
(Mr Cook) No, I cannot speculate on that because we have never drawn up
any commitment to it or the circumstance in which we would make that
commitment. All I am saying to you now is that I cannot see what we would
gain by closing the door now.
187. It is for you to defend your policy.
(Mr Cook) I am defending my policy. You are seeking to misrepresent
the policy.
188. No, I am not.
(Mr Cook) You have talked about keeping the decision open but that does
not imply that we have decided we will deploy it in any particular
circumstances, it merely states what is a matter of fact, which is that we
have not taken a decision actively to close it off.
189. I am not misrepresenting your policy one jot or tittle. If
you want it on the record, I will give it to you. The Defence Secretary in
his answer on 21 March in Hansard at column 491 said, "We will continue to
consult closely with the US and take account of the work they are doing, to
help us take an informed decision on whether to acquire such a capability
ourselves in the future". That is the Government's policy. I say to you
again, as the Government keep that option open, which is a very significant
policy option to keep open and you ask what the advantage is of closing it
down, that the advantage of closing it down would be very significant
reassurance to those who believe adherence to the existing ABM Treaty is very
important. That is the clear advantage of closing it down. I must ask you
the question, as the policy is to keep the option open: what are the
circumstances in which the exercising of that acquisition option could be
attractive to this Government?
(Mr Cook) Mr Hoon's answer speaks for itself. We are indeed in close
consultation on that aspect and a variety of other aspects of the National
Missile Defence. We have taken no decision and frankly I do not think it
would be helpful to the Government to discuss the conduct of the debate or for
me to speculate what the conditions might be in which we would make such a
decision.
Sir Peter Emery
190. Obviously the object of this Committee is to move towards the
limitation or the abolition of weapons of mass destruction.
(Mr Cook) Quite.
191. Can you explain to the Committee why, having had the
successful aspect of START I, START II having been ratified by the Americans
has not been entered into operation by the United States? Until it is
operating we cannot proceed on START III, which obviously is a move in the
direction that most of us would like to see on the limitation of warheads and
sizes, etcetera? Can you explain why the Americans have not moved in that
direction? Does not this incline one to believe that there is a move away
from the multinational approach to disarmament of this nature to a unilateral
approach whereby the Americans will decide what they will want to do for the
benefit of themselves? Does that not massively reflect on their approach to
NMD?
(Mr Cook) On the question of START II, in fairness to the United States
one should bear in mind that START II has only been ratified by the Russian
Duma this spring after a long period of delay. My understanding is that
whilst the Senate have ratified START II as a treaty they have not ratified
key protocols to it. Here there is a problem which we do run into in that
what may be the balance of political decision on the Hill is not necessarily
consistent with the arms control policy of the administration.
(Mr Hare) There is one particular protocol which they have not ratified
which extends the time limits for destruction under the treaty. It is a
slight modification of the original treaty but it is expected they will get
round to that shortly.
192. Do you think that this therefore is or is not a reflection of
the Americans moving much more to a unilateral approach on this level of
disarmament in a way that they did not when Helsinki came about and Russia was
the USSR and that things have massively changed since then?
(Mr Cook) I can only speak with confidence about the position of the
British Government. What I can assure the Committee is that we continue to
encourage not just the administration but also the Senate and Congress to
proceed with ratification of these key international agreements, including the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We have been quite vigorous in our comments
on the failure of the Senate to ratify it.
193. The British Government would not wish to see alterations to
the ABM Treaty.
(Mr Cook) I am not sure that would accurately reflect what we are
saying. What we are saying is that if the National Missile Defence is to be
perceived in a way which is consistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
that would require amendment to it. Not in itself, I have to say, such an
unprecedented step because the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been often
revised, but it does require revision by agreement between the parties to it
which does not include ourselves.
194. We are not willing to commit ourselves on that, perhaps quite
sensibly for national reasons, at this moment.
(Mr Cook) The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was negotiated between the
Soviet Union and the United States. At that time we had and still have no
intent to develop an anti-ballistic missile system. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union the parties to it now include many of the successor states to the
Soviet Union. We remain not a party to it and there is no particular
obligation for us to become a party to it.
Mr Rowlands
195. Is it a matter of absolute fact that in order for the NMD to
become effective Fylingdales has to be upgraded?
(Mr Cook) Yes, my understanding is that Fylingdales will require some
internal change to its software particularly for the initial phase of NMD.
196. To do that, the United States would have formally to obtain
our approval and authorisation.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
197. Under whatever arrangements Fylingdales is.
(Mr Cook) Yes, that is correct.
198. In other words, to come to a decision the United States has
to make assumptions at some time in the near future, or some time in the not
too distant future about whether Fylingdales will be upgraded.
(Mr Cook) I am not sure whether they would make an assumption but some
time, if they wished to proceed with NMD, they would have to approach us with
a formal request.
199. That would presumably be before they come to a decision
whether to go ahead with it because it is an integral part of the whole
composite scheme.
(Mr Cook) That is a matter for the United States administration to
resolve for itself, but I think it is unlikely that they would approach
another country with a formal request until they had formally committed
themselves.
200. Would it be unreasonable for them to expect an authorisation,
given that we are a close ally?
(Mr Cook) As you rightly say, we are a very close ally of the United
States. We have a lot of joint collaboration which works to our advantage as
much as to that of the United States. We will obviously consider with great
care any request from such a close ally.
201. So they would have a reasonable expectation that if they had
made this quite huge decision, probably in the next administration, probably
an election issue as well, they would get approval from an ally to do this?
(Mr Cook) I would repeat that we have not had the request. We have not
taken a decision on what our answer will be to the request and it is
impossible to anticipate what that answer will be unless we know the full
circumstances, for instance whether an appropriate amendment has taken place
to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
202. One of our major tests would be that it would put relations
under considerable strain if we had to say no in a certain situation; it
would only be one. I cannot think in my parliamentary lifetime of a
US/British decision of this kind. It would really put our relations under a
considerable strain, would it not?
(Mr Cook) Since we have not received the question and we have therefore
not formulated our answer, it would not be helpful to any of us for me to
speculate what would be the consequences of one particular form of answer as
opposed to another. I am quite sure our friends in the press are even now
honing down a headline in the event that I am tempted to reply to that
question.
203. I do not want to tempt you again but I think any objective
person would say it would be a very considerable decision to take because it
would be saying no to a major ally. I listened to your answers and one of the
tests we would make on whether to say yes or no would be whether in fact the
ABM Treaty was in any form of danger as a result of the US decision to go
ahead. That would be one of our litmus tests as to whether to approve or not.
(Mr Cook) Litmus test is perhaps creating a scientific certitude which
I am not suggesting. Certainly the background of the ABM Treaty would be a
very serious factor in our overall decision.
Ms Abbott
204. I am just wanting clarification. We had evidence that there
were two centres in Britain which were integral to NMD, one was Fylingdales
and the other was Menwith Hill in Harrogate. Is that correct?
(Mr Cook) The position with Menwith Hill is slightly different in that
Menwith Hill is currently a project upgraded in the context of Space Based
Infra Red Systems for early warning and indeed the authorisation for that was
given under the previous government and was a technology which was being
developed to upgrade early warning systems in advance of any debate on NMD
with the United States. In the event of NMD proceeding, that facility would
be of value, but it is continuing on its own logic and within its own terms.
205. Would the use of that facility be essential to NMD?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure I am technically qualified to answer that.
(Mr Ricketts) The essential upgrading would be to Fylingdales.
Mr Illsley
206. Following on as to whether there would be any cooperation in
advance of a decision taken by the US on NMD, if there were a request from the
US administration for people to visit Fylingdales before a decision was taken
by the United States, what would be the reaction of our government to such a
request if the visit were specifically in terms of NMD?
(Mr Cook) We would not wish to stand in the way of representatives of
a close ally visiting a facility to which they already have very extensive
access. I am not even sure that we would necessarily be required to
condescend on whether or not they could visit. Do we know the legal position?
(Mr Ricketts) No. It is an RAF station but I believe that US personnel
have been there and there is US investment in the facility.
Sir David Madel
207. On the general position of disarmament, what consideration
has firstly the United Kingdom and secondly NATO given to the introduction of
a "no first use" policy?
(Mr Cook) The case for a "no first use" policy was argued for some time
during the Cold War and indeed at that time the Soviet Union was quite
interested in a "no first use" policy. With the changes in the relative
balance of forces, Russia has changed its position on that and is now itself
rather hostile to the context of a "no first use" policy. In those
circumstances, I am not sure it would be a productive avenue to explore in
terms of international negotiations. I personally would very much rest on the
priorities which are set out in the memorandum which we have given to the
Committee: to proceed with bringing into force the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty; to get under way with success the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty;
to complete the START II process and commence on START III. These are all
very important and well-established avenues for developing international arms
control. I am not sure I would advise at the present time us embarking on
what is at present not an actual line of inquiry which might be a diversion
rather than a strength. However, I would draw the Committee's attention to
what we did say in the context of the Review Conference and the NPT, which is
that at present none of the nuclear weapon states has weapons targeted on any
other state.
208. Is Russian opinion of NATO and the West changing in any way
now?
(Mr Cook) At some point there will be a generation change within
Russia, but at present the senior political figures and particularly the
senior military figures in Russia are people who have grown up in the days
when NATO was seen by Russia as a threat and it is still fair to say that NATO
is not regarded with affection or with relaxation in Moscow.
Mr Rowlands
209. In paragraph 16 of your joint memorandum with the Ministry of
Defence we are presented by the department with two likely scenarios. First
an agreement between the US and Russia on modifications to ABMT to allow NMD
to go through. We are told if that is the case Fylingdales would be
incorporated into such an agreement. The alternative scenario is that the US
and Russia had not reached agreement on modifications and the US formally gave
notice of its withdrawal from the treaty. If that were the prospect, would
we then say that is too big a price to pay and therefore we do not think we
can go along with upgrading Fylingdales?
(Mr Cook) As I said earlier, I do not think there is any profit for me
to speculate about the circumstances in which we would give the precise
answer. These things would obviously weigh heavily with us. Scenario (b)
outlines the situation in which the ABM Treaty effectively no longer exists
because it has been renounced. There are many people in the United States,
never mind Britain or Europe, who would regard that as a heavy price to pay.
The Committee suspended from 4.40 p.m. to 4.50 p.m. for a division in the
House.
Sir Peter Emery
210. A slightly different area, the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review. Given the reduction in Trident deployment already announced in the
SDR, what scope do you see for further unilateral reductions and has not
already the Government improved the transparency of its nuclear weapon
holdings as part of the SDR? What more promises are there that it can make
and how would these be achieved if they could be?
(Mr Cook) You are quite right and very helpful to draw attention to how
far we went in this direction in the course of the Strategic Defence Review.
If I take the final document of the Review Conference it identifies four
specific steps to be taken by the nuclear weapon states, all of which we took
in the course of the Strategic Defence Review. First of all, further efforts
to reduce nuclear arsenals. As you will be aware, we halved the number of
planned warheads on the Trident submarines and are now operating at reduced
level of warheads. Second, increase transparency. We are now the most
transparent and most open of any of the nuclear weapon states about the
declared number of nuclear warheads. Third, the further reduction of non-
strategic nuclear weapons. I think I am right in saying that we do not have
any non-strategic nuclear weapons now. Our only nuclear weapons are those on
Trident. We have eliminated all others. Finally, concrete measures to reduce
the operational stages. We have made it clear that we have reduced the state
of alert of our submarines and we are much more transparent about what that
state of alert is than anybody else. We are very much in conformity already
with what has been outlined in the Review Conference document. Further
progress must depend on progress by other nuclear weapon states. We remain
ready to consider further steps we can take but it is difficult to see, having
done as much as we have in the past three years, what more we can do
unilaterally. That said, I would also add that the focus of the pressure of
the non-nuclear weapon states at the Review Conference was not on Britain.
There was a broad recognition that we had done very well unilaterally. The
pressure was very much particularly on Russia and the United States to carry
forward the START process.
211. You did however make a suggestion that a subsidiary body
should be set up with a mandate to deal further with nuclear disarmament. How
far has that gone? I do not think it has, has it?
(Mr Cook) I would need advice on that.
(Mr Hare) As a result of the NPT Review Conference?
212. Yes.
(Mr Hare) There will be the continuation of the strength and review
process and there will be a PrepCom procedure for the next five years. Were
you talking about a body within the Conference on Disarmament, because there
is a possibility of that as well?
213. Yes, that is what I am talking about.
(Mr Hare) It is not yet agreed. As part of the balanced work programme
there is a proposal on the table which is being talked about in conjunction
with a cut-off treaty in other parts of a possible work programme.
(Mr Cook) But that would require to be agreed by the Conference on
Disarmament.
214. May I move for a moment to the verification aspects of NPT?
You will know of the work of the IAEA and the aspect of trying to strengthen
the 93+2 process. How confident are you that this would be sufficient to deal
with any unknown nuclear weapons programmes that might be developed by Iraq
or somebody like that? Do you really think that this would be sufficient,
that we would be able to understand that?
(Mr Cook) We are very keen and Britain is one of the most enthusiastic
supporters of strengthening the verification process. We will work hard to
achieve that. You ask whether it would be satisfactory and in the real world
it is very difficult to give a guarantee. On the whole the verification
system of the NPT is quite credible. The International Atomic Energy Agency
has a very high standing in expertise, has secured with parties to the NPT a
very wide degree of access. A development of a nuclear weapons programme
requires very large significant installations to produce the fissile material
which is one of the great bottlenecks and also to acquire extremely
sophisticated and unusual engineering facilities such as centrifuges to render
it capable of weapons use. It would be difficult; I am not saying impossible
but difficult for a country to develop a substantial nuclear weapons programme
clandestinely.
215. Lastly on a purely personal note, not a Committee question,
I have been visiting Vienna and the IAEA now for 12 to 14 years. We have been
awfully bad at keeping them up to date with funds. We do not increase even
by the percentages of normal growth to that body. Would you have a look at
that funding and see whether we ought not to play a greater role in trying to
make certain they are financially independent?
(Mr Cook) We have of course made a major contribution to the agency
both in terms of personnel and also technology as well as our financial
contributions.
216. Of course.
(Mr Cook) I do have to say to the Committee that this begs a much wider
question which is that it is the policy of this administration, as it was the
policy of the last administration, to allow for zero growth in international
organisations as a means of containing the costs to the British budget.
Plainly we are always willing to look at exceptions to that where a very
strong case is made. It is of course a difficult and judicious judgement
because every organisation advances a strong case.
217. But they have been kept short of money.
(Mr Cook) So has every international organisation in the past.
Sir Peter Emery: So have I.
Chairman
218. On the question of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, what
efforts are we making to get negotiations started? Given the volume of
existing stocks, do you believe that the proposed treaty should address both
existing stocks and future production?
(Mr Cook) On that latter question, definitely yes. Indeed it is our
policy to use the negotiations on it, not simply to achieve a freeze at
present level of fissile stocks but also to deal with the management and
reduction of existing fissile material stocks. That is broadly agreed as the
basis on which the negotiations should go. Taking them forward is a very
difficult and frustrating task as you indicate, not because countries are
necessarily saying that they are opposed in principle to this exercise; that
would be a fundamental argument but at least one which we could grope with.
A lot of the difficulties and delays have arisen over procedural points which
leave one wondering quite often if those are necessarily the real points at
issue. The fact of the matter is that a freeze on fissile material would be
a threat to the ambitions of some states either to expand their nuclear
arsenal or to develop a nuclear arsenal. Therefore there is an issue
objective here which is difficult to handle. Our best prospect is to make
sure that the peer pressure of the rest of the world's opinion prevents them
from delaying further progress.
Sir John Stanley
219. The aspect in relation to Russia to which I want to refer is
also directly related to the issue which we have just been discussing which
is fissile material reductions. When the Committee was in Washington in March
some of us were able to go to the Department of Energy there to be briefed by
the senior American official who deals with fissile material reduction. She
gave us figures which I certainly found quite staggering as to the size in
metric tonnes of the Russian stockpile of both plutonium and highly enriched
uranium. She also gave us the American assessment of the cost of the
destruction of their plutonium stockpile. She put the cost of converting
their plutonium stockpile into mixed oxide fuel at US$1.5 billion. She made
the point, which I think is a very reasonable one, that it is not just the
United States, it is really the whole of the world, not least we in western
Europe who have a huge security interest in getting this vast stockpile
eliminated, certainly from the point of view of being used as fissile material
in nuclear weapons. Against that background, do you not think there is a very
strong case for the European Union Member States and perhaps for Britain to
be taking the lead in trying to arrange a European financial contribution to
this huge cost in our security interests of reducing the Russian stockpile?
(Mr Cook) You are quite right to draw attention to the very substantial
backlog in reducing Russian weapons which are now overtaken by arms control
agreements and it is not just on the nuclear front, it applies very strongly
also in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In some cases the
problem is not simply one of finance; particularly in the case of the
Chemical Weapons Convention it is a question of the technological base. I
certainly have never ruled out the need for Russia to receive financial and
technical assistance in that. As the Committee will be aware, I have myself
been very active in trying to reach agreement with Russia for Britain to fund
programmes to eliminate nuclear hazards from Russia, particularly in the case
of the nuclear waste at Murmansk which was largely a product of the Russian
military programme. By and large what has happened between the division of
responsibility in Europe and the United States is that Europe has focused its
funding which is quite substantial on nuclear safety within Russia in terms
of the civil reactor programme and the costs there are very substantial
indeed. We are also of course examining that in relation to the Ukraine in
the context of Chernobyl. The tendency has been that the United States as
part of that basic sphere of influence take major responsibility for handling
the disposal of fuel from the nuclear weapons, in part of course because the
nuclear weapons being dismantled are a consequence of the START programme of
which the European Union is not a member. We have formidable challenges of
the nuclear environment from Russia, both of the waste, of the nuclear reactor
programme and of the nuclear weapons programme. It takes all of us to work
on that to try to help Russia to cope with that problem. I entirely agree
both the United States and Europe have a great interest in tackling both of
those issues. If you take the totality of effort to assist Russia with its
nuclear environment, Europe comes out rather well and what you were hearing
when you were in Washington was the repeated difficulty they had on the Hill
getting agreement to funding for Russia.
220. Have you received any request from the US administration for
a British, or more likely EU contribution to the funding of the conversion of
their plutonium into mixed oxide fuel and the destruction of their highly
enriched uranium stockpile?
(Mr Cook) I am not aware of that, but I should not like to say no
categorically.
(Mr Hare) The major concerted effort on this at the moment is going on
in the G8 group, G7 obviously. Although the EU is looking at a possible
contribution, we are more hopeful that the framework of an international
financial arrangement in which we would be involved would be agreed through
the G8 mechanism. It will be discussed in great detail at Okinawa next month.
Mr Rowlands
221. Let me take you to a couple of key countries, China being the
first. Is there any evidence to suggest that China is helping other countries
to build nuclear warheads or delivery systems?
(Mr Cook) I am not aware of that. On the whole China does not tend to
raise concerns of proliferation.
(Mr Hare) Proliferation concerning ...?
222. Either nuclear warheads or delivery systems to third parties.
(Mr Hare) We have had concerns in the past, obviously particularly in
relation to the Pakistan programme where there has been cooperation. We hope
that they are now introducing better export controls. There are signs of them
doing that. In the last couple of years they introduced dual use controls and
we are looking for further evidence that yes, indeed they have stopped the
flow to Pakistan.
223. When you say they are strengthening and toughening their
arrangements does that imply they did not know what was being done, that the
Chinese forces did not know or that they wanted to sell? The sense of your
reply seemed to be that they were toughening up their licensing arrangements.
(Mr Hare) In fact China only entered the NPT in the early 1990s. They
are not members of the nuclear supply group yet. They have recently joined
the Zangger Committee, which imposes an obligation to put export controls on
nuclear materials. They would regard their cooperation programme with
Pakistan as legal. They are now in a between stages process of gradually
coming into these regimes and imposing better controls, but I do not think the
situation is perfectly clear at the moment one way or the other.
224. What about Iran? Any indication that they may or may not be?
(Mr Hare) That the Chinese would be supplying Iran?
225. Yes.
(Mr Hare) There have been indications in the past but the concern is
not as clear currently.
Chairman
226. Links with North Korea?
(Mr Hare) Yes, as well, but of course the North Korean nuclear issue is
being dealt with under the Kido framework and there is a freeze on their
nuclear programme. The Chinese involvement there is more historical than
current.
Sir John Stanley
227. In Beijing last week we did have the opportunity of a fairly
extended conversation with the senior Chinese official responsible for their
arms control negotiations. We discussed at some length the issue of whether
China might be willing, one would hope at a fairly early date, to join the
missile technology control regime. I have to say we got a very dusty reply.
We were told that this was a rich man's club. We were told that this was
discriminatory against developing countries and so on. I do not know whether
you can give us any assurance that HMG will be doing its best to try to bring
about a change of view in Beijing because this is one of the few real arms
control breaks on this crucial area of missile technology which spreads round
the world the implications not just merely for nuclear but chemical and
biological as well; obviously very serious, as we all understand. It is
vitally important that all countries understand that the widest possible
participation in that regime is in everybody's interests.
(Mr Cook) You are absolutely right to draw attention to the fact that
the proliferation of delivery system technology is every bit as much a matter
of concern as the weapons of mass destruction themselves. I absolutely share
your concern to make sure that we have the maximum effective measures to
prevent missile technology proliferation. Plainly I shall continue to do all
I can to encourage China to adhere to it although I am not aware at the
present time of concern we have about them sharing missile technology. I am
not sure there is much I can do to meet the essential argument because in a
sense it is an unavoidable consequence of an export control regime that its
whole purpose is to deny it to others. One cannot quite get round that.
Mr Rowlands
228. I also recall that conversation. It began with a reference
to General MacArthur and we took it from there. One thing we could do is
remind the Chinese that MacArthur was actually sacked by the US administration
for it. India and Pakistan are by far the most serious possible regional
nuclear arms race. What sort of diplomatic initiatives, not necessarily
unilateral ones by the United Kingdom but by the collective or any other
combination possible, are we able to mount to try to persuade India and
Pakistan to slow down and start to proceed to disarm?
(Mr Cook) You will recall that when the nuclear test took place in
South Asia, Britain gave a vigorous response and was very active in trying to
put together an international coalition to try to maintain pressure on both
India and Pakistan to renounce the nuclear option. Indeed Britain took the
initiative in proposing that we should set up the task force in order to bring
together a number of like-minded countries to both maintain dialogue with
India and Pakistan on this question but also look at ways in which we might
be able to help technically, for instance on confidence building between them
and also in mapping out the way in which they could renounce the nuclear
option. What I did when I drew together that task force, because at the time
Britain was in the presidency of the G8, was deliberately to invite the
countries who had renounced the nuclear option to play their part in that task
force. One point I would stress is that actually if you look across the
totality of the 1990s what is encouraging is the number of countries which
actually turned their back on the nuclear option: Brazil and Argentina
through their treaty which has provided a nuclear weapon free Latin America;
Ukraine; to a lesser extent Kazakhstan who came out of the former Soviet
Union and renounced the nuclear weapons, of which there were many on their
soil; South Africa, which since the end of apartheid is the first country to
have actually wound down and dismantled a nuclear weapons programme. We
invited those countries to join us in the G8 to work together in a task force
to encourage India and Pakistan to join them and renounce the nuclear option
and to provide technical advice on how to go about it. The task force still
meets. It is not particularly popular in South Asia but it is a means of
crystallising international concern in a way that it is difficult to rebuff
because here are countries who have deliberately chosen not to exercise the
nuclear option. We also regularly discuss nuclear weapons matters with India
and other countries of South Asia.
Chairman
229. With any result?
(Mr Cook) There is a dialogue. I shall come onto the root problem in
a moment, but we did agree in the course of my visit to India the other month
that we would have a bilateral dialogue between India and Britain on nuclear
weapons issues. The basic problem with the Indian sub-continent of course is
not essentially one of arms control, it is essentially one of tension between
the two countries and ultimately we shall continue to have difficulties making
progress on arms control unless and until we make progress on what we
delicately term the roots of tension between them.
(Mr Ricketts) The non-proliferation dialogue which the Foreign Secretary
launched when he was in India will be taken forward next week when there is
a delegation of Indian officials coming to London for two days of full
discussions on these issues. The task force is still very much alive with
active participation from the non-nuclear weapons states and also Russia and
China who both see very clearly that a nuclear arms race in the sub-continent
is not in their interests and that the benchmarks we set out in that UN
Security Council Resolution 1172 are still very much applicable. The pressure
is still there.
(Mr Cook) In terms of what progress has been made, it is worth
recording that there have been no further nuclear weapon tests in South Asia.
Both countries appear to have accepted a moratorium on tests. We are
encouraging both countries to adhere to the comprehensive test ban treaty.
If they were to do so that would be quite a significant barrier to any further
development of a nuclear arms race between them.
Mr Rowlands
230. Frankly would not the most simple example to set be for us to
continue rapidly to nuclear disarm on the grounds of what is our function at
the moment as a nuclear power, what role do we play in the post Cold War era?
If that happened in European Community nuclear powers, outside United States
and Russia, would that not really set a good example to and encourage Pakistan
and India to follow?
(Mr Cook) I would not wish to overstate the extent to which India and
Pakistan have developed their nuclear weapons programme in response to British
or French nuclear weapons programme. I suspect any decision we take
unilaterally would have no bearing on their own calculations. I would stress
to the Committee that we have already taken quite remarkable unilateral steps
in terms of our nuclear posture and I listed them in response to Sir Peter.
Those steps are widely appreciated outside Britain. I find they do not
necessarily get the attention that they merit inside Britain but in the
nuclear arms control debate around the globe, what Britain has done in the
last three years is widely appreciated, recognised and understood. Our
commitment of course is to take further steps in the context of moves towards
the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Personally there is a case to be
made for us pressing the other countries to follow the example we have already
made in our transparency, our reduced alert, our reduction of nuclear arsenals
and to continue to use a voice among the nuclear weapons states for further
progress.
Chairman
231. We have had evidence from Sir Michael Quinlan, former
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, of no great nuclear
disarmament. He said that the case for an independent nuclear capacity of the
UK is markedly less cogent than it was during the Cold War. Do you agree with
that?
(Mr Cook) The tension and the threat is demonstrably much less than it
was at the height of the Cold War. It does not mean that all threats have
disappeared and indeed we spent the first half of this session reviewing new
threats.
232. What is the best intellectual argument that you can advance
for the continued possession of nuclear weapons?
(Mr Cook) From the point of view of the Foreign Office and our concern
about further progress on arms control, I should be extremely reluctant to see
us take a step which was not reciprocated by others. The most useful way in
which we can take forward that objective is within the nuclear weapons states.
233. So the best case is as a bargaining counter.
(Mr Cook) I do not say best case, I am merely answering as the Foreign
Secretary, not as the Defence Secretary. I am answering as Foreign Secretary
in relation to the arms control requirement.
Dr Starkey
234. The Middle East is obviously another region where it is not
exactly all sweetness and light. Can I ask how hard Israel is being pressed
by Britain and others to become a party to the NPT as a non nuclear weapons
state? Do you view recent reports of their testing of cruise missiles as
reassuring or otherwise?
(Mr Cook) Do you mean the Israeli denial? I have no reason to
disbelieve the Israeli denial of the cruise missiles and I have no evidence
to suggest that the reports were accurate or that the denials are wrong. In
terms of our view on this matter, we should very much wish to see Israel come
into the NPT. We should very much wish to see Israel adhere to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because, if I remember rightly, it is one of the
countries which has to adhere for it to come into force. At the Review
Conference we signed up enthusiastically to a commitment that all countries
of the region should abandon weapons of mass destruction and enter into the
international regimes. An Israeli of course would respond by saying that
whilst they might be willing to do that, other countries, notably Iraq, have
to do so as well.
235. I should simply remark that Israel has a history of denying
things which subsequently turn out to be true. It has consistently denied
that it had any nuclear facilities. Of course the defection of
Mordecai Vanunu blew that one away.
(Mr Cook) Yes, but it is difficult to launch a cruise missile without
somebody noticing, particularly in such an intensive electronic environment
as the Mediterranean.
236. People may have noticed and it not have been in their
interests to say. Turning to other states within the region, what prospects
do you think there are of drawing all the Arab states into the Chemical
Weapons and Biological Weapons Convention in the absence of Israel's
membership of the NPT, particularly given the current asymmetry between the
weapons potential of Israel and other states within the Middle East. What
incentive is there for them to be the ones who move first?
(Mr Cook) If both sides to any particular standoff like that sit and
wait on the other to move first, we have a recipe for stalemate which is sadly
something only too familiar in diplomacy. In the case of the Middle East my
own expectation of progress would be more pinned on making progress in the
Middle East process. When I visited the Middle East in autumn of last year,
when there was some optimism about progress, I was very encouraged that then
there were several countries enthusiastically contemplating a very different
security environment which would arise in the wake of the Middle East peace
process settlement. Looking at regional parallels for instance to OFCE in
Europe which has provided a basis for confidence building and security
arrangements and inspections within Europe, some equivalent to that in the
Middle East would be revolutionary. I personally would be sceptical whether
we are going to make that much progress on the question you raised without
first resolving the current position in the Middle East peace process. I
should be hopeful that if that were achieved we could then make more rapid
progress both between the Arab nations and with Israel. One exception to this
of course, and it is a very large exception, is Iraq which is likely to pursue
its ambitions for weapons of mass destruction irrespective of the Middle East
peace process because that is about securing regional domination, not about
concerns about Israel.
237. Indeed and indeed it is as much of a threat to Iran for
example as it might be to Israel. May I just press you on this notion that
the Middle East peace process should take primacy and then after that there
might be discussions about weapons of mass destruction? Western nations have
a significant leverage within the Middle East peace process in that they are
going to have to pay for it. Might it not be sensible to couple discussions
about weapons of mass destruction and the Middle East peace process slightly
more nearly together, particularly given the fact that western nations will
be expected to put a huge amount of money into the region after the conclusion
of a peace agreement and that we might expect some quid pro quo in greater
helpfulness in overall regional peace from the nations involved in return?
(Mr Cook) First of all may I just make clear that I am not asserting a
primacy of the peace process over arms control agreements as a matter of
policy, I am merely making a statement of reality, that in reality if the
peace process is successfully resolved we can expect better progress on some
of these other questions. I am not saying that is the way it should be. I
am certainly not saying that in any way reduces our calls on Israel and other
states in the region to adhere to the relevant international agreements. On
the question of the financial contribution we are making to the peace process,
you are quite right to point out that the peace process will require very
substantial international support, particularly for example on the settlement
and compensation of refugees. That will primarily be funding for the
Palestinian entity and for other countries in the region such as Lebanon. I
am not sure that there will be that much financial leverage in relation to
Israel.
238. Except that successful financing of the agreement adds to the
stability of the agreement and that certainly is to the advantage of Israel.
(Mr Cook) I would agree with that but I really do not think you would
thank me if Yassar Arafat reached agreement with the Prime Minister of Israel
and I refused to fund it because I was waiting on another agreement with the
Prime Minister of Israel.
(Mr Hare) In relation to Israel we do call on them immediately to
ratify the CTBT. We also see the cut-off treaty as a very realistic immediate
measure to which they could come in as a negotiator alongside the other non-
NPT parties, India and Pakistan. Just as with India and Pakistan, where we
have a non-proliferation dialogue, we also have one with Israel. We are
making those points and in our view there are immediate things they can do
which would be short of adhering to the NPT but nevertheless very worthwhile.
Sir David Madel
239. Would Israel's attitude change if all its surrounding
neighbours would recognise it as a state?
(Mr Cook) That is essentially a question for Israel. It is certainly
true that its development of its programme of nuclear weapons was a reflection
of a perception of itself as threatened.
240. We shall continue to press. Some of its immediate neighbours
do recognise Israel but we shall continue to press those who do not - I am
thinking particularly of Syria - to recognise Israel as a state.
(Mr Cook) Yes, but that of course is part of the peace process. We
have always said we want to see a comprehensive peace process on all its
tracks; not just the Palestinian track but also the Lebanese and the Syrian
track. I hope that we shall secure that. We are working hard to do so.
241. Israel has said that it would never be the first to use
nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
(Mr Cook) Since it is the only country in the Middle East which
possesses nuclear weapons that is not particularly advancing the argument.
242. You say that, but how close is Iraq to using nuclear weapons?
(Mr Cook) Iraq is now some distance away from nuclear weapons. The
threat from Iraq and the area which remains of very serious and live concern
for us in relation to Iraq is its near capacity for chemical and biological
weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which was the invigilating
body, the inspection body under the UN resolutions, has confirmed that Iraq
is some way away now from a nuclear weapon capacity.
243. Would you agree that it is the Middle East peace process, the
recognition of Israel, which needs to come first before Israel will start?
(Mr Cook) No. As a matter of policy I would not say that: as a matter
of reality I recognise that that is the most likely way forward.
Sir Peter Emery
244. In what way does UNMOVIC differ from UNSCOM? When is UNMOVIC
likely to commence work in Iraq?
(Mr Cook) I take one step back and say that the difference between the
two resolutions which set up these agencies lies in other parts than the
inspection regime, particularly the fact that the new resolution removes any
ceiling on the oil exports of Iraq. I do not think that fact has yet been
adequately recognised. I still keep reading articles in the press which talk
about oil sanctions on Iraq. There is no ceiling on Iraq's oil exports and
they are currently at an historic all time record high, which leaves us
puzzling why so many people in Iraq are starving and short of medicine.
245. Do you think that the work of UNMOVIC is unnecessary then?
(Mr Cook) No; no, no. I was making the point that the distinction in
the resolutions lies in other parts than the inspection regime. It is our
view that one cannot be confident that one is containing Saddam Hussein's
well-known ambition for weapons of mass destruction unless there are
inspections on the ground. There were four dossiers which were set out in the
original Security Council resolution: nuclear weapons, missile technology,
biological, chemical weapons. None of those has been formally closed and the
latter two remain issues of very live concern. It is very difficult from
aerial and external intelligence to get on top of the chemical and biological
capacity.
Chairman
246. I am turning now to chemical and biological weapons and the
danger of proliferation. Clearly the two conventions in this field are in
themselves insufficient. What other measures, what other instruments or other
means, is the UK pursuing to try to prevent the passage of these weapons to
other states?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure I would accept your contention that the
Chemical Weapons Convention is itself strategically flawed. The Chemical
Weapons Convention provides a very clear international regime for elimination.
It does have a system of verification. There is a provision for challenge
inspections where it is suspected there are chemical weapons facilities and
there is a target date for 2012, by which they have to be eliminated. I am
not going to pretend it is easy to implement it because by definition we are
dealing with a weapons programme which can be easily mistaken for a chemical
process and a manufacturing process. It would not be very easy to identify
many areas where in legal drafting we could strengthen that. The Biological
Weapons Convention does give us grounds for real concern because it does not
have the process of verification written into it, which is why Britain is
attaching high priority and putting a lot of effort into trying to get
agreement on a protocol for inspection.
(Mr Hare) The Chemical Weapons Convention is very much a landmark
convention, the first universal convention applied to eliminate a class of
weapons, destroying a class of past production of weapons, 135 countries
adhering, new ratifications coming through. It is an impressive achievement
in three years. There is still a lot of work to do to ensure it is
implemented satisfactorily, that all the provisions are properly used. We
know we are contributing very directly to that. Just this week we are staging
another practice challenge inspection in a military base in the UK with
several foreign observers present. This is designed to show that we mean
business, we mean to implement fully the Chemical Weapons Convention in all
circumstances on an objective but tough basis. What the Foreign Secretary
says about the Biological Weapons Convention is absolutely right. The major
arms control negotiations in WMD at the moment are the biological weapons
protocol negotiations. There is another major session in July where we hope
further progress will be made. There is already a very substantial document
there in draft form. We, the UK, have an important role as friend of the
chair in the compliance portfolio which is one of the major issues to be
resolved. As to your initial question, you asked what other measures we
applied to supplement the work of the conventions. A big area currently is
export control, both our national controls and our harmonisation and
consultation with like-minded countries in groups like the Australia Group,
where we maintain common control lists, we discuss intelligence questions and
we look at patterns of proliferation. All those issues are dealt with in that
context and we do not just put all our reliance on effective implementation
of the conventions.
Sir John Stanley
247. Turning to the Biological Weapons Convention and the need for
a verification protocol, may I say how very much I welcomed your decision to
place in the public domain, I believe for the first time, early in the life
of this administration some information about the horrendous nature of the
release of biological weapons in a densely populated area. For example the
unclassified Foreign Office paper which you placed in the House of Commons
Library on 4 February 1998 contains this chilling sentence, "One hundred
kilograms of anthrax released from the top of a tall building in a densely
populated area could kill up to three million people". I believe the
Government has been right to highlight the immense dangers of these appalling
weapons. Against that background, do you hold out any prospect of being able
to achieve a common position amongst the P5 countries, in particular in the
verification protocol for the BW treaty? Do you think you will be able to
avoid the less than satisfactory position which was created in the Chemical
Weapons Convention whereby the United States as the price of their
ratification of it effectively have a form of presidential opt-out from a
particular challenge inspection?
(Mr Cook) As a matter of principle I should of course be opposed to
countries entering an opt-out from challenge inspections. Of course in that
particular case, though the administration itself has no difficulty with
support, the administration in fact assisted in negotiating, that particular
reservation was entered at the insistence of the Hill not of the US
administration. I am not immediately up to speed on what is the position of
all of us in the P5. As a broad principle I should hope that over a period
of time we can secure progress on the protocol on two grounds. First of all,
it is extremely difficult for any country to say that it is reserving the
option to develop biological weapons, so there is a large international
consensus that this is a valid negotiating objective. Secondly, a very large
number of countries has already signed up to the Biological Weapons
Convention. They have done so partly to have the reassurance that other
countries are not developing these biological weapons and they cannot have
that reassurance without some system of inspection and challenge
investigations. The difficulty here of course, and there is a bona fide issue
here, I am not saying we should be defeated by it or that we should accept it
as a reason for giving up but there is a bona fide issue, in that the
challenge inspections on chemical and biological weapons are often carrying
out inspections or could be carrying out inspections of bona fide chemical or
other biological factories and installations and there is a proliferation at
the present time of biological technology and biological industrial
production. Some countries - this was reflected in the debate in the Senate -
have a legitimate concern that this would compromise their own industrial
confidentiality and security. We have to find a way forward in which one can
respect that industrial commercial confidentiality, but at the same time
respect the very powerful strategic need to give us confidence that those who
adhered to the convention are actually standing by its terms. What is the
position within the P5?
(Mr Hare) All the P5 are fully engaged and on the whole very
constructively engaged in the BW Protocol negotiations. It is right to say
that there are still some differences, but they are not the only differences
which do exist. There are important countries in the NAM which are taking
particular positions but we are working hard to resolve them. The important
thing is that all the P5 and the major NAM countries are fully engaged and are
addressing the key issues. The experience of the Chemical Weapons Convention
will be extremely important. There have been over 500 inspections worldwide
in that; a good proportion of those will have been done in the P5. The
Chinese may have mentioned to you the extraordinary thoroughness with which
they set up their own national authority for chemical weapons, in fact the
burdens it has imposed on them in terms of the number of inspections they have
received. We shall expect that to happen in the Biological Weapons Protocol
as well. The answer is that of course you cannot have a realistic protocol
in biological weapons without the P5 being engaged, but the signs are good
that eventually they will come round. The Americans have of course only just
produced their full industrial declaration in the Chemical Weapons Convention
and as I understand it inspections are starting there now in industrial
facilities. That will boost the numbers of inspections considerably that the
US themselves are receiving.
Chairman
248. Are you concerned that the US presidential veto on challenge
inspections could become a precedent for other countries to adopt that and to
obstruct the implementation of the convention?
(Mr Hare) As I understand it, it was imposed on the administration.
249. But it is there.
(Mr Hare) It is seen as very much a last resort in perhaps very unusual
circumstances. Obviously we hope it is not a precedent. We do not see the
CWC as having that sort of precedent integrated in it.
250. Do you have any evidence that others are proposing to use it
as a precedent?
(Mr Hare) None that we have seen.
251. Back on the Chemical Weapons Convention again, we understand
that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in its
verification capacity has failed to investigate a number of allegations in
relation to breaches of the convention. These include for example breaches
in relation to India, Russia, Sudan and Turkey, allegations that they have
employed chemical weapons since ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Have we responded to these allegations in respect of those countries?
(Mr Cook) I am advised that few of the allegations which have been made
have been backed up by fact, indeed the occasions which are authenticated of
the use of chemical weapons are very few, the most obvious ones being the use
by Iraq during its war with Iran and also against its own population in the
Kurdish area. I am not aware of an allegation in which there was evidential
corroboration which has been ignored by the OPCW. You may want to take
evidence on that yourselves.
252. We have seen references to these allegations. Obviously we
do not know the quality of the evidence which is available. Can I take it
that HMG is not convinced of the quality of the available evidence?
(Mr Cook) I should have to rely on advice on that?
Mr Mackinlay: Could you clarify what evidence you are referring to?
Chairman
253. These are the four cases in our footnote. One was during the
Kargil war last year in relation to Jammu and Kashmir. Another was in
relation to the Russians and Chechnya. Another was in southern Sudan during
July and August of last year. Finally, against various Kurdish fighters.
There are clear allegations but your view is that the evidential basis is
insufficient.
(Mr Cook) In the case of the southern Sudan, soil samples were taken
which provided no evidence of chemical weapons having been used. In the case
of the use in the Kurdish area of Iraq, it is well known and well
authenticated that Saddam Hussein did use them.
254. The Turkish army.
(Mr Cook) I am sorry. I am not aware of any such allegation, nor am I
aware of any evidence to support it. I do not think any investigation has
been carried out either in the Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir or in
Chechnya, but I have not myself seen any evidence to support the claim that
chemical weapons were used.
(Mr Hare) What we are confident of is that the mechanism exists in the
OPCW to carry out the necessary investigation. It has been shown in the Sudan
case most recently that that can be done.
Mr Rowlands
255. I notice from our notes here that all our references are from
The CBW Conventions Bulletin. Is that a respected source?
(Mr Cook) I would have to defer to either of my officials who read it.
(Mr Hare) Yes, it is.
256. It is a respected source.
(Mr Hare) It is.
(Mr Cook) I cannot say that it has figured on my reading list. It has
never been put in my Red Box.
Chairman: On that basis of respectability it is appropriate to thank
you and your colleagues very much.
