WEDNESDAY 28 JUNE 2000 _________ Members present: Mr Donald Anderson, in the Chair Ms Diane Abbott Sir Peter Emery Dr Norman A Godman Mr Eric Illsley Mr Andrew Mackinlay Sir David Madel Mr Ted Rowlands Sir John Stanley Dr Phyllis Starkey _________ MEMORANDA SUBMITTED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES RT HON ROBIN COOK, a Member of the House, (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), MR P HARE, Head of the Non-Proliferation Department and MR P RICKETTS, Director of International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, examined. Chairman 159. May I welcome you and your two colleagues to our inquiry into weapons of mass destruction? I welcome with you Mr Paul Hare who is Head of the Non-Proliferation Department and Mr Peter Ricketts, whom we know well, who is Director of International Security. May I say that the Committee has visited Geneva, New York and Washington? We had an excellent service from our embassy staffs there and indeed we heard many tributes to the way in which the UK was contributing constructively to the debate. On those matters, NPT and so on, we are one of many players. In the matter of the National Missile Defence (NMD), which the US is now discussing, we shall have to take key decisions on our own in respect of the US requests. What is your current understanding of the position within the US? (Mr Cook) To a degree it would be improper of me to speculate as to what sovereign decision the United States may take in the future. At the present time there is a degree of consensus among political quarters across the United States that is interested in National Missile Defence. There is a recognition in the administration of the importance of proceeding with this in a way which is consistent with international arms control regimes, particularly the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Final decisions also depend on the conditions set out by President Clinton, of which, in terms of timetable, the one which prevents decision now is the need for the technology to be proven. There will be a further test in July and until then we would not anticipate any movement to a decision. Quite possibly there will be no decision under the current administration but that is for the Americans. 160. We have noticed that the State Department have latterly dropped the use of the term "rogue state" in respect of North Korea and are now using the term "state of concern". How do you read this rebranding? Does it suggest to you that this is part of the administration's wish to push back the decision until after the presidential election? (Mr Cook) I think that would be over-interpreting the change of language. I must plead guilty as a politician to also frequently changing language in order to make it clear that we are talking about something which is of interest, to convey the clear message. It does not necessarily imply change of policy in this particular case. 161. But it was clearly done deliberately to change the terms. (Mr Cook) It has not changed the United States' presumptions which had led it to have the National Missile Defence both while North Korea was described as a "rogue state" and whilst it is described as a "state of concern"; it is still seen as the primary reason for the impetus behind the National Missile Defence. 162. Do you see any perceived threat from missiles either to the UK or to our forces overseas? (Mr Cook) We have submitted a memorandum to you and you have also had a very interesting secret briefing from DIS, which I have had the opportunity to look at. You will be aware from that that we take very seriously threats of proliferation to British interests though we are not currently anticipating another state other than the existing nuclear weapons states having the capacity to strike Britain by missile. 163. Do you see this sort of conflict arising that in the United States there appears to be a consensus in favour of some form of National Missile Defence? Our European partners are highly sceptical of the matter, thinking it will destabilise arms discussions and so on. Do you feel that there is a real danger that the UK will be forced to choose ultimately between being seen as the tame ally of the US in terms of Menwith Hill and following an EU lead? (Mr Cook) You describe the two options available to us in terms which are not attractive in whichever way we answer the question. I have been present at meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Council on two occasions now when we have had a full table round on this question. It is fair to say that there is a lot of common ground on what are the areas of difficulty and what would be an appropriate condition for this to proceed. It is not a question of the United States versus Europe, nor of the United Kingdom being isolated in its views either from the United States or from Europe. 164. Do any European countries share the concerns of the US? Do any favour the US proposals for NMD? (Mr Cook) It is fair to say that we all recognise that North Korea is, to use the vogue term now, a "state of concern". Dr Starkey 165. May I press you further on Britain's attitude to the NMD? You will be well aware that there has been a whole series of written questions to the Foreign Office and to the Ministry of Defence by a variety of members attempting to find out what the British Government's attitude is. Essentially the various answers have simply said that nobody has asked us to use British facilities so we have not given any response. (Mr Cook) It seems to me an eminently sane position for a government to take. 166. That is a matter of opinion. It would seem to me, I humbly suggest, that there is a debate going on about National Missile Defence, that China and Russia, for example, have made very explicit their concerns about National Missile Defence. A number of our European partners and indeed our NATO partners including Canada, have made it very clear that they have severe concerns about the possible effect of National Missile Defence on the international arms control environment, yet the British Government appears to have been saying nothing in public at all. It appears to be entirely neutral on NMD. Would that be an accurate representation of the British Government's public attitude? (Mr Cook) I do not think you would be entitled to conclude anything on the basis that we have not been asked for a decision. What view we took on that decision would of course depend on the circumstances surrounding that decision, for instance, the relationship to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on which the United States is in discussion with Russia. Until we know both the nature of the question and also the circumstances in which we are being asked that question, it would be premature for us to debate what the response might be, particularly since at the moment there is no commitment by the United States to ask the question. 167. But you have also had a number of private discussions with members of the American administration as have Defence Ministers. In those private discussions have British Ministers been entirely neutral or have they been drawing attention to some of the downsides of the American proposals? (Mr Cook) Private discussions necessarily are private, as you will appreciate, and I am conscious that we are not having this conversation in entirely private circumstances. You could reasonably take it that we on both sides of that discussion are open about reviewing what are the areas of most concern in terms of the threat and the areas of concern in relation to the solution to that threat. We have of course had a number of discussions about the impact on the arms control regime and the case for making sure that it is aligned with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 168. The Foreign Minister of Denmark has said that it would not be Denmark's policy to use Thule radar station, which is the other one which needs to be used along with Menwith Hill, in a violation of international rules. Is that also the British Government's view about potential uses of Menwith Hill, notwithstanding the fact that nobody has asked us yet? (Mr Cook) We would find it extremely hard to agree to do anything which was a violation of international rules. One should not infer from that, that there is any settled view as to whether what we are asked is a violation of international rules. I have also had discussions with Mr Pedersen and I think it is fair to say that whilst he is absolutely right in taking the position that they would not violate international rules, he is not necessarily persuaded that what they were asked would violate it. 169. There is a feeling that National Missile Defence may also be used by the US to proliferate theatre missile defence systems. The obvious places in the world where they would be likely to do that would be in relation to Israel, Taiwan and Japan. Would you view that proliferation as helpful to world peace or destabilising? (Mr Cook) If I had advice for the United States administration I would tender it to the United States administration. First of all, theatre missile defence is not constrained by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which applies to the inter-continental not the theatre ones. Secondly, I am quite sure that the United States itself will be very much alive to both the regional and the wider global consequences of any such development. Sir David Madel 170. President Putin said on 10 June that there is no actual missile threat from the so-called "rogue states" of the Near and Middle East or the Asian region which the USA refers to either now or in the foreseeable future. Is President Putin right or wrong? (Mr Cook) Let us address the issue of substance. There is no doubt that North Korea has developed a quite remarkable missile technology given the nature of North Korea's economy. It is also of wider concern in that it is an active proliferator of that missile technology and other countries have now had access to the technology developed by North Korea. It would be unwise for any of us to be complacent about the threat from North Korea or from those who benefited from its technology. 171. So President Putin is wrong to say that. (Mr Cook) I am seeking to avoid such an inflammatory way of responding to the question. I am trying to deal with the substance. (Mr Ricketts) In the joint communiqu‚ from the US/Russian summit on 4 June, both sides agreed the formulation. They agreed the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including missiles and missile technology. 172. So there is some degree of commonality between America and Russia. (Mr Cook) Yes, they both signed that communiqu‚. 173. President Putin also said that Russia would be pleased to see the representative of United Europe as the third party in this centre for missile launch control. How do you view that statement? (Mr Cook) I am not familiar with the statement and shall certainly have to study it with care. The immediate response to that is that Britain as a sovereign nation takes part in arms control agreements as a nation. Sometimes we confer on our position with our allies within NATO, for instance on conventional forces in Europe. In those cases which touch on our own nuclear posture, we would act independently. As far as I can recall we have never sought to collate an arms control position within the European Union, although in some cases where they touch on export controls, we would of course want to work with European partners to make sure we were applying the same effective export controls. Is that a fair summary? (Mr Hare) There are EU common positions on things like the BW protocol. (Mr Cook) But we do not propose to submit an EU representative to those conventions. 174. Without being inflammatory, which I am not being, do you have any anxieties that Russia might be trying to decouple Europe from the United States as far as defence goes? (Mr Cook) There have been attempts to achieve that at various intervals along the past 50 years and, as you will know, it is very important for us that we maintain the strength of our transatlantic alliance. Ms Abbott 175. Just on the question of "rogue state", no-one on this Committee is complacent about nuclear proliferation or developments in North Korea, but it is very hard to see the ultimate logic of this "rogue state" rhetoric. The day that North Korea launched a nuclear attack on the United State North Korea itself would be dust. How far can you take this "rogue state" characterisation inasmuch as there is any realistic threat of a nuclear strike from North Korea on the United States? (Mr Cook) I am not seeking to take it anywhere and to be fair to the United States, as we just discussed, they have dropped the rhetoric of "rogue state". One should not understate the missile technology capacity of North Korea and whilst you may well be right in your assumption that the United States would retaliate heavily in the event of an attack, that does not quite meet the anxiety in the United States at the present time that there would be the attack in the first place. 176. Do you think that is a realistic anxiety, that North Korea is going to launch a nuclear strike on the United States any time soon? (Mr Cook) I am merely trying to explain the current state of the debate. 177. I understand that, I am asking you as Foreign Secretary whether you think that it is realistic to fear a nuclear strike on the United States from North Korea? (Mr Cook) I am sorry. I am Foreign Secretary of Great Britain. I can say with some confidence that we do not anticipate a nuclear strike from North Korea on Britain, but I am not going to seek to second-guess the assessment of the United States in relation to itself. I do think that it is a matter of perplexity that North Korea developed such a technology in the first place. Not unreasonably there are people in the United States who ask why? 178. You think that it is an open question as to whether North Korean might be planning a nuclear strike on the United States. (Mr Cook) The judgement on the national security of the United States is one which the United States has to make itself. 179. I wanted to get back to the question of NMD and what its effects might be on the arms race. As part of this inquiry we have taken evidence from a number of academic experts, including Professor Robert O'Neill of Balliol College, Oxford and Professor John Baylis of the University of Wales. We put to them whether NMD might not actually lead to destabilisation in relation to the arms race. Professor O'Neill says that it will completely scupper any prospect of a long-term reduction in nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia and that is going to implode the whole arms control process. Do you think there is anything in that assessment at all? (Mr Cook) Plainly the impact on the international arms control environment is a crucial dimension to the debate on NMD and is one which we have discussed with our opposite numbers in the United States. I would have to say that in recent months the developments, particularly in relation to Russia, have been encouraging. It is in the course of the past four months that the Russian Duma has ratified START II, has ratified the comprehensive test ban treaty and also the new administration in Russia has come up with much more ambitious targets than even the already high level of objective for START III negotiations. At the moment the momentum within Russia appears to be entirely favourable towards cuts in nuclear missiles and that is consistent with the comparative success of the Review Conference and the NPT. Of course, if we are to maintain that momentum, it is important that NMD does not proceed in a way which undermines the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 180. Is there a way in which the US could proceed with NMD which would not undermine the treaty? (Mr Cook) Yes. 181. What might that be? (Mr Cook) The current discussions between the United States and Russia about an amendment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which would enable them to proceed in a way which would be consistent with an amended treaty. Those discussions are proceeding. 182. We have just come back from China. Wherever we went we asked our Chinese hosts what they thought of NMD. They were completely unequivocal that in their view the move forward with NMD would be to destabilise the whole process of disarmament. It is not just our European allies who are highly sceptical, the Chinese are highly sceptical. It is only Britain who seems to think it is an open question as to whether NMD would destabilise. (Mr Cook) With respect, you are putting Britain in a different box from our European allies with whom we discussed this closely and with whom we have a lot of common ground. In the case of China, China has a long strategic position of difference from the United States to that of Europe or the United Kingdom. One can understand that in the case of China they may take a different view of any arms development in the United States. I rather suspect if you asked them about any strategic development funded by the Pentagon you would find China flatly against it. Sir John Stanley 183. Could you explain to us why it is the British Government's policy to keep open the option of acquiring a National Missile Defence capability ourselves in the future? (Mr Cook) Could you repeat that question? Are you asking me why it is we have a policy of keeping it open? 184. Can you explain why it is the British Government's policy is to keep open the option? (Mr Cook) Let us not overstate our commitment. We have not made any commitment to acquiring a National Missile Defence for ourselves. The technology at the present time is not available to us. Were we to proceed to do so at our own cost it would be quite substantial. It is not a question of keeping it open, but the question has not been addressed. I do not honestly see that there would be any particular interest in closing it off, but at the present time there is no active commitment to it. 185. I fully understand there is no active commitment but the Government's stated position is to keep open the option of acquiring a National Missile Defence capability ourselves in the future. The Government has taken that position. Could you explain to us why the Government feels it is necessary to keep that policy option open? (Mr Cook) It is not a question of it being necessary, but for the life of me I cannot think of a single reason of British interest which would point in the direction of closing it down for all time at the present time. That is not to say that we are actively considering it. Please tell me what is the gain for Britain of saying we will never have one? 186. I put the question to you the other way. Will you tell us, as the Government's stated position is to keep open the option of acquiring an NMD capability, will you please tell the Committee what are the circumstances in the future in which that option might be exercised? (Mr Cook) No, I cannot speculate on that because we have never drawn up any commitment to it or the circumstance in which we would make that commitment. All I am saying to you now is that I cannot see what we would gain by closing the door now. 187. It is for you to defend your policy. (Mr Cook) I am defending my policy. You are seeking to misrepresent the policy. 188. No, I am not. (Mr Cook) You have talked about keeping the decision open but that does not imply that we have decided we will deploy it in any particular circumstances, it merely states what is a matter of fact, which is that we have not taken a decision actively to close it off. 189. I am not misrepresenting your policy one jot or tittle. If you want it on the record, I will give it to you. The Defence Secretary in his answer on 21 March in Hansard at column 491 said, "We will continue to consult closely with the US and take account of the work they are doing, to help us take an informed decision on whether to acquire such a capability ourselves in the future". That is the Government's policy. I say to you again, as the Government keep that option open, which is a very significant policy option to keep open and you ask what the advantage is of closing it down, that the advantage of closing it down would be very significant reassurance to those who believe adherence to the existing ABM Treaty is very important. That is the clear advantage of closing it down. I must ask you the question, as the policy is to keep the option open: what are the circumstances in which the exercising of that acquisition option could be attractive to this Government? (Mr Cook) Mr Hoon's answer speaks for itself. We are indeed in close consultation on that aspect and a variety of other aspects of the National Missile Defence. We have taken no decision and frankly I do not think it would be helpful to the Government to discuss the conduct of the debate or for me to speculate what the conditions might be in which we would make such a decision. Sir Peter Emery 190. Obviously the object of this Committee is to move towards the limitation or the abolition of weapons of mass destruction. (Mr Cook) Quite. 191. Can you explain to the Committee why, having had the successful aspect of START I, START II having been ratified by the Americans has not been entered into operation by the United States? Until it is operating we cannot proceed on START III, which obviously is a move in the direction that most of us would like to see on the limitation of warheads and sizes, etcetera? Can you explain why the Americans have not moved in that direction? Does not this incline one to believe that there is a move away from the multinational approach to disarmament of this nature to a unilateral approach whereby the Americans will decide what they will want to do for the benefit of themselves? Does that not massively reflect on their approach to NMD? (Mr Cook) On the question of START II, in fairness to the United States one should bear in mind that START II has only been ratified by the Russian Duma this spring after a long period of delay. My understanding is that whilst the Senate have ratified START II as a treaty they have not ratified key protocols to it. Here there is a problem which we do run into in that what may be the balance of political decision on the Hill is not necessarily consistent with the arms control policy of the administration. (Mr Hare) There is one particular protocol which they have not ratified which extends the time limits for destruction under the treaty. It is a slight modification of the original treaty but it is expected they will get round to that shortly. 192. Do you think that this therefore is or is not a reflection of the Americans moving much more to a unilateral approach on this level of disarmament in a way that they did not when Helsinki came about and Russia was the USSR and that things have massively changed since then? (Mr Cook) I can only speak with confidence about the position of the British Government. What I can assure the Committee is that we continue to encourage not just the administration but also the Senate and Congress to proceed with ratification of these key international agreements, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We have been quite vigorous in our comments on the failure of the Senate to ratify it. 193. The British Government would not wish to see alterations to the ABM Treaty. (Mr Cook) I am not sure that would accurately reflect what we are saying. What we are saying is that if the National Missile Defence is to be perceived in a way which is consistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that would require amendment to it. Not in itself, I have to say, such an unprecedented step because the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been often revised, but it does require revision by agreement between the parties to it which does not include ourselves. 194. We are not willing to commit ourselves on that, perhaps quite sensibly for national reasons, at this moment. (Mr Cook) The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was negotiated between the Soviet Union and the United States. At that time we had and still have no intent to develop an anti-ballistic missile system. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the parties to it now include many of the successor states to the Soviet Union. We remain not a party to it and there is no particular obligation for us to become a party to it. Mr Rowlands 195. Is it a matter of absolute fact that in order for the NMD to become effective Fylingdales has to be upgraded? (Mr Cook) Yes, my understanding is that Fylingdales will require some internal change to its software particularly for the initial phase of NMD. 196. To do that, the United States would have formally to obtain our approval and authorisation. (Mr Cook) Yes. 197. Under whatever arrangements Fylingdales is. (Mr Cook) Yes, that is correct. 198. In other words, to come to a decision the United States has to make assumptions at some time in the near future, or some time in the not too distant future about whether Fylingdales will be upgraded. (Mr Cook) I am not sure whether they would make an assumption but some time, if they wished to proceed with NMD, they would have to approach us with a formal request. 199. That would presumably be before they come to a decision whether to go ahead with it because it is an integral part of the whole composite scheme. (Mr Cook) That is a matter for the United States administration to resolve for itself, but I think it is unlikely that they would approach another country with a formal request until they had formally committed themselves. 200. Would it be unreasonable for them to expect an authorisation, given that we are a close ally? (Mr Cook) As you rightly say, we are a very close ally of the United States. We have a lot of joint collaboration which works to our advantage as much as to that of the United States. We will obviously consider with great care any request from such a close ally. 201. So they would have a reasonable expectation that if they had made this quite huge decision, probably in the next administration, probably an election issue as well, they would get approval from an ally to do this? (Mr Cook) I would repeat that we have not had the request. We have not taken a decision on what our answer will be to the request and it is impossible to anticipate what that answer will be unless we know the full circumstances, for instance whether an appropriate amendment has taken place to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 202. One of our major tests would be that it would put relations under considerable strain if we had to say no in a certain situation; it would only be one. I cannot think in my parliamentary lifetime of a US/British decision of this kind. It would really put our relations under a considerable strain, would it not? (Mr Cook) Since we have not received the question and we have therefore not formulated our answer, it would not be helpful to any of us for me to speculate what would be the consequences of one particular form of answer as opposed to another. I am quite sure our friends in the press are even now honing down a headline in the event that I am tempted to reply to that question. 203. I do not want to tempt you again but I think any objective person would say it would be a very considerable decision to take because it would be saying no to a major ally. I listened to your answers and one of the tests we would make on whether to say yes or no would be whether in fact the ABM Treaty was in any form of danger as a result of the US decision to go ahead. That would be one of our litmus tests as to whether to approve or not. (Mr Cook) Litmus test is perhaps creating a scientific certitude which I am not suggesting. Certainly the background of the ABM Treaty would be a very serious factor in our overall decision. Ms Abbott 204. I am just wanting clarification. We had evidence that there were two centres in Britain which were integral to NMD, one was Fylingdales and the other was Menwith Hill in Harrogate. Is that correct? (Mr Cook) The position with Menwith Hill is slightly different in that Menwith Hill is currently a project upgraded in the context of Space Based Infra Red Systems for early warning and indeed the authorisation for that was given under the previous government and was a technology which was being developed to upgrade early warning systems in advance of any debate on NMD with the United States. In the event of NMD proceeding, that facility would be of value, but it is continuing on its own logic and within its own terms. 205. Would the use of that facility be essential to NMD? (Mr Cook) I am not sure I am technically qualified to answer that. (Mr Ricketts) The essential upgrading would be to Fylingdales. Mr Illsley 206. Following on as to whether there would be any cooperation in advance of a decision taken by the US on NMD, if there were a request from the US administration for people to visit Fylingdales before a decision was taken by the United States, what would be the reaction of our government to such a request if the visit were specifically in terms of NMD? (Mr Cook) We would not wish to stand in the way of representatives of a close ally visiting a facility to which they already have very extensive access. I am not even sure that we would necessarily be required to condescend on whether or not they could visit. Do we know the legal position? (Mr Ricketts) No. It is an RAF station but I believe that US personnel have been there and there is US investment in the facility. Sir David Madel 207. On the general position of disarmament, what consideration has firstly the United Kingdom and secondly NATO given to the introduction of a "no first use" policy? (Mr Cook) The case for a "no first use" policy was argued for some time during the Cold War and indeed at that time the Soviet Union was quite interested in a "no first use" policy. With the changes in the relative balance of forces, Russia has changed its position on that and is now itself rather hostile to the context of a "no first use" policy. In those circumstances, I am not sure it would be a productive avenue to explore in terms of international negotiations. I personally would very much rest on the priorities which are set out in the memorandum which we have given to the Committee: to proceed with bringing into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; to get under way with success the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; to complete the START II process and commence on START III. These are all very important and well-established avenues for developing international arms control. I am not sure I would advise at the present time us embarking on what is at present not an actual line of inquiry which might be a diversion rather than a strength. However, I would draw the Committee's attention to what we did say in the context of the Review Conference and the NPT, which is that at present none of the nuclear weapon states has weapons targeted on any other state. 208. Is Russian opinion of NATO and the West changing in any way now? (Mr Cook) At some point there will be a generation change within Russia, but at present the senior political figures and particularly the senior military figures in Russia are people who have grown up in the days when NATO was seen by Russia as a threat and it is still fair to say that NATO is not regarded with affection or with relaxation in Moscow. Mr Rowlands 209. In paragraph 16 of your joint memorandum with the Ministry of Defence we are presented by the department with two likely scenarios. First an agreement between the US and Russia on modifications to ABMT to allow NMD to go through. We are told if that is the case Fylingdales would be incorporated into such an agreement. The alternative scenario is that the US and Russia had not reached agreement on modifications and the US formally gave notice of its withdrawal from the treaty. If that were the prospect, would we then say that is too big a price to pay and therefore we do not think we can go along with upgrading Fylingdales? (Mr Cook) As I said earlier, I do not think there is any profit for me to speculate about the circumstances in which we would give the precise answer. These things would obviously weigh heavily with us. Scenario (b) outlines the situation in which the ABM Treaty effectively no longer exists because it has been renounced. There are many people in the United States, never mind Britain or Europe, who would regard that as a heavy price to pay. The Committee suspended from 4.40 p.m. to 4.50 p.m. for a division in the House. Sir Peter Emery 210. A slightly different area, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review. Given the reduction in Trident deployment already announced in the SDR, what scope do you see for further unilateral reductions and has not already the Government improved the transparency of its nuclear weapon holdings as part of the SDR? What more promises are there that it can make and how would these be achieved if they could be? (Mr Cook) You are quite right and very helpful to draw attention to how far we went in this direction in the course of the Strategic Defence Review. If I take the final document of the Review Conference it identifies four specific steps to be taken by the nuclear weapon states, all of which we took in the course of the Strategic Defence Review. First of all, further efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals. As you will be aware, we halved the number of planned warheads on the Trident submarines and are now operating at reduced level of warheads. Second, increase transparency. We are now the most transparent and most open of any of the nuclear weapon states about the declared number of nuclear warheads. Third, the further reduction of non- strategic nuclear weapons. I think I am right in saying that we do not have any non-strategic nuclear weapons now. Our only nuclear weapons are those on Trident. We have eliminated all others. Finally, concrete measures to reduce the operational stages. We have made it clear that we have reduced the state of alert of our submarines and we are much more transparent about what that state of alert is than anybody else. We are very much in conformity already with what has been outlined in the Review Conference document. Further progress must depend on progress by other nuclear weapon states. We remain ready to consider further steps we can take but it is difficult to see, having done as much as we have in the past three years, what more we can do unilaterally. That said, I would also add that the focus of the pressure of the non-nuclear weapon states at the Review Conference was not on Britain. There was a broad recognition that we had done very well unilaterally. The pressure was very much particularly on Russia and the United States to carry forward the START process. 211. You did however make a suggestion that a subsidiary body should be set up with a mandate to deal further with nuclear disarmament. How far has that gone? I do not think it has, has it? (Mr Cook) I would need advice on that. (Mr Hare) As a result of the NPT Review Conference? 212. Yes. (Mr Hare) There will be the continuation of the strength and review process and there will be a PrepCom procedure for the next five years. Were you talking about a body within the Conference on Disarmament, because there is a possibility of that as well? 213. Yes, that is what I am talking about. (Mr Hare) It is not yet agreed. As part of the balanced work programme there is a proposal on the table which is being talked about in conjunction with a cut-off treaty in other parts of a possible work programme. (Mr Cook) But that would require to be agreed by the Conference on Disarmament. 214. May I move for a moment to the verification aspects of NPT? You will know of the work of the IAEA and the aspect of trying to strengthen the 93+2 process. How confident are you that this would be sufficient to deal with any unknown nuclear weapons programmes that might be developed by Iraq or somebody like that? Do you really think that this would be sufficient, that we would be able to understand that? (Mr Cook) We are very keen and Britain is one of the most enthusiastic supporters of strengthening the verification process. We will work hard to achieve that. You ask whether it would be satisfactory and in the real world it is very difficult to give a guarantee. On the whole the verification system of the NPT is quite credible. The International Atomic Energy Agency has a very high standing in expertise, has secured with parties to the NPT a very wide degree of access. A development of a nuclear weapons programme requires very large significant installations to produce the fissile material which is one of the great bottlenecks and also to acquire extremely sophisticated and unusual engineering facilities such as centrifuges to render it capable of weapons use. It would be difficult; I am not saying impossible but difficult for a country to develop a substantial nuclear weapons programme clandestinely. 215. Lastly on a purely personal note, not a Committee question, I have been visiting Vienna and the IAEA now for 12 to 14 years. We have been awfully bad at keeping them up to date with funds. We do not increase even by the percentages of normal growth to that body. Would you have a look at that funding and see whether we ought not to play a greater role in trying to make certain they are financially independent? (Mr Cook) We have of course made a major contribution to the agency both in terms of personnel and also technology as well as our financial contributions. 216. Of course. (Mr Cook) I do have to say to the Committee that this begs a much wider question which is that it is the policy of this administration, as it was the policy of the last administration, to allow for zero growth in international organisations as a means of containing the costs to the British budget. Plainly we are always willing to look at exceptions to that where a very strong case is made. It is of course a difficult and judicious judgement because every organisation advances a strong case. 217. But they have been kept short of money. (Mr Cook) So has every international organisation in the past. Sir Peter Emery: So have I. Chairman 218. On the question of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, what efforts are we making to get negotiations started? Given the volume of existing stocks, do you believe that the proposed treaty should address both existing stocks and future production? (Mr Cook) On that latter question, definitely yes. Indeed it is our policy to use the negotiations on it, not simply to achieve a freeze at present level of fissile stocks but also to deal with the management and reduction of existing fissile material stocks. That is broadly agreed as the basis on which the negotiations should go. Taking them forward is a very difficult and frustrating task as you indicate, not because countries are necessarily saying that they are opposed in principle to this exercise; that would be a fundamental argument but at least one which we could grope with. A lot of the difficulties and delays have arisen over procedural points which leave one wondering quite often if those are necessarily the real points at issue. The fact of the matter is that a freeze on fissile material would be a threat to the ambitions of some states either to expand their nuclear arsenal or to develop a nuclear arsenal. Therefore there is an issue objective here which is difficult to handle. Our best prospect is to make sure that the peer pressure of the rest of the world's opinion prevents them from delaying further progress. Sir John Stanley 219. The aspect in relation to Russia to which I want to refer is also directly related to the issue which we have just been discussing which is fissile material reductions. When the Committee was in Washington in March some of us were able to go to the Department of Energy there to be briefed by the senior American official who deals with fissile material reduction. She gave us figures which I certainly found quite staggering as to the size in metric tonnes of the Russian stockpile of both plutonium and highly enriched uranium. She also gave us the American assessment of the cost of the destruction of their plutonium stockpile. She put the cost of converting their plutonium stockpile into mixed oxide fuel at US$1.5 billion. She made the point, which I think is a very reasonable one, that it is not just the United States, it is really the whole of the world, not least we in western Europe who have a huge security interest in getting this vast stockpile eliminated, certainly from the point of view of being used as fissile material in nuclear weapons. Against that background, do you not think there is a very strong case for the European Union Member States and perhaps for Britain to be taking the lead in trying to arrange a European financial contribution to this huge cost in our security interests of reducing the Russian stockpile? (Mr Cook) You are quite right to draw attention to the very substantial backlog in reducing Russian weapons which are now overtaken by arms control agreements and it is not just on the nuclear front, it applies very strongly also in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In some cases the problem is not simply one of finance; particularly in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention it is a question of the technological base. I certainly have never ruled out the need for Russia to receive financial and technical assistance in that. As the Committee will be aware, I have myself been very active in trying to reach agreement with Russia for Britain to fund programmes to eliminate nuclear hazards from Russia, particularly in the case of the nuclear waste at Murmansk which was largely a product of the Russian military programme. By and large what has happened between the division of responsibility in Europe and the United States is that Europe has focused its funding which is quite substantial on nuclear safety within Russia in terms of the civil reactor programme and the costs there are very substantial indeed. We are also of course examining that in relation to the Ukraine in the context of Chernobyl. The tendency has been that the United States as part of that basic sphere of influence take major responsibility for handling the disposal of fuel from the nuclear weapons, in part of course because the nuclear weapons being dismantled are a consequence of the START programme of which the European Union is not a member. We have formidable challenges of the nuclear environment from Russia, both of the waste, of the nuclear reactor programme and of the nuclear weapons programme. It takes all of us to work on that to try to help Russia to cope with that problem. I entirely agree both the United States and Europe have a great interest in tackling both of those issues. If you take the totality of effort to assist Russia with its nuclear environment, Europe comes out rather well and what you were hearing when you were in Washington was the repeated difficulty they had on the Hill getting agreement to funding for Russia. 220. Have you received any request from the US administration for a British, or more likely EU contribution to the funding of the conversion of their plutonium into mixed oxide fuel and the destruction of their highly enriched uranium stockpile? (Mr Cook) I am not aware of that, but I should not like to say no categorically. (Mr Hare) The major concerted effort on this at the moment is going on in the G8 group, G7 obviously. Although the EU is looking at a possible contribution, we are more hopeful that the framework of an international financial arrangement in which we would be involved would be agreed through the G8 mechanism. It will be discussed in great detail at Okinawa next month. Mr Rowlands 221. Let me take you to a couple of key countries, China being the first. Is there any evidence to suggest that China is helping other countries to build nuclear warheads or delivery systems? (Mr Cook) I am not aware of that. On the whole China does not tend to raise concerns of proliferation. (Mr Hare) Proliferation concerning ...? 222. Either nuclear warheads or delivery systems to third parties. (Mr Hare) We have had concerns in the past, obviously particularly in relation to the Pakistan programme where there has been cooperation. We hope that they are now introducing better export controls. There are signs of them doing that. In the last couple of years they introduced dual use controls and we are looking for further evidence that yes, indeed they have stopped the flow to Pakistan. 223. When you say they are strengthening and toughening their arrangements does that imply they did not know what was being done, that the Chinese forces did not know or that they wanted to sell? The sense of your reply seemed to be that they were toughening up their licensing arrangements. (Mr Hare) In fact China only entered the NPT in the early 1990s. They are not members of the nuclear supply group yet. They have recently joined the Zangger Committee, which imposes an obligation to put export controls on nuclear materials. They would regard their cooperation programme with Pakistan as legal. They are now in a between stages process of gradually coming into these regimes and imposing better controls, but I do not think the situation is perfectly clear at the moment one way or the other. 224. What about Iran? Any indication that they may or may not be? (Mr Hare) That the Chinese would be supplying Iran? 225. Yes. (Mr Hare) There have been indications in the past but the concern is not as clear currently. Chairman 226. Links with North Korea? (Mr Hare) Yes, as well, but of course the North Korean nuclear issue is being dealt with under the Kido framework and there is a freeze on their nuclear programme. The Chinese involvement there is more historical than current. Sir John Stanley 227. In Beijing last week we did have the opportunity of a fairly extended conversation with the senior Chinese official responsible for their arms control negotiations. We discussed at some length the issue of whether China might be willing, one would hope at a fairly early date, to join the missile technology control regime. I have to say we got a very dusty reply. We were told that this was a rich man's club. We were told that this was discriminatory against developing countries and so on. I do not know whether you can give us any assurance that HMG will be doing its best to try to bring about a change of view in Beijing because this is one of the few real arms control breaks on this crucial area of missile technology which spreads round the world the implications not just merely for nuclear but chemical and biological as well; obviously very serious, as we all understand. It is vitally important that all countries understand that the widest possible participation in that regime is in everybody's interests. (Mr Cook) You are absolutely right to draw attention to the fact that the proliferation of delivery system technology is every bit as much a matter of concern as the weapons of mass destruction themselves. I absolutely share your concern to make sure that we have the maximum effective measures to prevent missile technology proliferation. Plainly I shall continue to do all I can to encourage China to adhere to it although I am not aware at the present time of concern we have about them sharing missile technology. I am not sure there is much I can do to meet the essential argument because in a sense it is an unavoidable consequence of an export control regime that its whole purpose is to deny it to others. One cannot quite get round that. Mr Rowlands 228. I also recall that conversation. It began with a reference to General MacArthur and we took it from there. One thing we could do is remind the Chinese that MacArthur was actually sacked by the US administration for it. India and Pakistan are by far the most serious possible regional nuclear arms race. What sort of diplomatic initiatives, not necessarily unilateral ones by the United Kingdom but by the collective or any other combination possible, are we able to mount to try to persuade India and Pakistan to slow down and start to proceed to disarm? (Mr Cook) You will recall that when the nuclear test took place in South Asia, Britain gave a vigorous response and was very active in trying to put together an international coalition to try to maintain pressure on both India and Pakistan to renounce the nuclear option. Indeed Britain took the initiative in proposing that we should set up the task force in order to bring together a number of like-minded countries to both maintain dialogue with India and Pakistan on this question but also look at ways in which we might be able to help technically, for instance on confidence building between them and also in mapping out the way in which they could renounce the nuclear option. What I did when I drew together that task force, because at the time Britain was in the presidency of the G8, was deliberately to invite the countries who had renounced the nuclear option to play their part in that task force. One point I would stress is that actually if you look across the totality of the 1990s what is encouraging is the number of countries which actually turned their back on the nuclear option: Brazil and Argentina through their treaty which has provided a nuclear weapon free Latin America; Ukraine; to a lesser extent Kazakhstan who came out of the former Soviet Union and renounced the nuclear weapons, of which there were many on their soil; South Africa, which since the end of apartheid is the first country to have actually wound down and dismantled a nuclear weapons programme. We invited those countries to join us in the G8 to work together in a task force to encourage India and Pakistan to join them and renounce the nuclear option and to provide technical advice on how to go about it. The task force still meets. It is not particularly popular in South Asia but it is a means of crystallising international concern in a way that it is difficult to rebuff because here are countries who have deliberately chosen not to exercise the nuclear option. We also regularly discuss nuclear weapons matters with India and other countries of South Asia. Chairman 229. With any result? (Mr Cook) There is a dialogue. I shall come onto the root problem in a moment, but we did agree in the course of my visit to India the other month that we would have a bilateral dialogue between India and Britain on nuclear weapons issues. The basic problem with the Indian sub-continent of course is not essentially one of arms control, it is essentially one of tension between the two countries and ultimately we shall continue to have difficulties making progress on arms control unless and until we make progress on what we delicately term the roots of tension between them. (Mr Ricketts) The non-proliferation dialogue which the Foreign Secretary launched when he was in India will be taken forward next week when there is a delegation of Indian officials coming to London for two days of full discussions on these issues. The task force is still very much alive with active participation from the non-nuclear weapons states and also Russia and China who both see very clearly that a nuclear arms race in the sub-continent is not in their interests and that the benchmarks we set out in that UN Security Council Resolution 1172 are still very much applicable. The pressure is still there. (Mr Cook) In terms of what progress has been made, it is worth recording that there have been no further nuclear weapon tests in South Asia. Both countries appear to have accepted a moratorium on tests. We are encouraging both countries to adhere to the comprehensive test ban treaty. If they were to do so that would be quite a significant barrier to any further development of a nuclear arms race between them. Mr Rowlands 230. Frankly would not the most simple example to set be for us to continue rapidly to nuclear disarm on the grounds of what is our function at the moment as a nuclear power, what role do we play in the post Cold War era? If that happened in European Community nuclear powers, outside United States and Russia, would that not really set a good example to and encourage Pakistan and India to follow? (Mr Cook) I would not wish to overstate the extent to which India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear weapons programme in response to British or French nuclear weapons programme. I suspect any decision we take unilaterally would have no bearing on their own calculations. I would stress to the Committee that we have already taken quite remarkable unilateral steps in terms of our nuclear posture and I listed them in response to Sir Peter. Those steps are widely appreciated outside Britain. I find they do not necessarily get the attention that they merit inside Britain but in the nuclear arms control debate around the globe, what Britain has done in the last three years is widely appreciated, recognised and understood. Our commitment of course is to take further steps in the context of moves towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Personally there is a case to be made for us pressing the other countries to follow the example we have already made in our transparency, our reduced alert, our reduction of nuclear arsenals and to continue to use a voice among the nuclear weapons states for further progress. Chairman 231. We have had evidence from Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, of no great nuclear disarmament. He said that the case for an independent nuclear capacity of the UK is markedly less cogent than it was during the Cold War. Do you agree with that? (Mr Cook) The tension and the threat is demonstrably much less than it was at the height of the Cold War. It does not mean that all threats have disappeared and indeed we spent the first half of this session reviewing new threats. 232. What is the best intellectual argument that you can advance for the continued possession of nuclear weapons? (Mr Cook) From the point of view of the Foreign Office and our concern about further progress on arms control, I should be extremely reluctant to see us take a step which was not reciprocated by others. The most useful way in which we can take forward that objective is within the nuclear weapons states. 233. So the best case is as a bargaining counter. (Mr Cook) I do not say best case, I am merely answering as the Foreign Secretary, not as the Defence Secretary. I am answering as Foreign Secretary in relation to the arms control requirement. Dr Starkey 234. The Middle East is obviously another region where it is not exactly all sweetness and light. Can I ask how hard Israel is being pressed by Britain and others to become a party to the NPT as a non nuclear weapons state? Do you view recent reports of their testing of cruise missiles as reassuring or otherwise? (Mr Cook) Do you mean the Israeli denial? I have no reason to disbelieve the Israeli denial of the cruise missiles and I have no evidence to suggest that the reports were accurate or that the denials are wrong. In terms of our view on this matter, we should very much wish to see Israel come into the NPT. We should very much wish to see Israel adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because, if I remember rightly, it is one of the countries which has to adhere for it to come into force. At the Review Conference we signed up enthusiastically to a commitment that all countries of the region should abandon weapons of mass destruction and enter into the international regimes. An Israeli of course would respond by saying that whilst they might be willing to do that, other countries, notably Iraq, have to do so as well. 235. I should simply remark that Israel has a history of denying things which subsequently turn out to be true. It has consistently denied that it had any nuclear facilities. Of course the defection of Mordecai Vanunu blew that one away. (Mr Cook) Yes, but it is difficult to launch a cruise missile without somebody noticing, particularly in such an intensive electronic environment as the Mediterranean. 236. People may have noticed and it not have been in their interests to say. Turning to other states within the region, what prospects do you think there are of drawing all the Arab states into the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Convention in the absence of Israel's membership of the NPT, particularly given the current asymmetry between the weapons potential of Israel and other states within the Middle East. What incentive is there for them to be the ones who move first? (Mr Cook) If both sides to any particular standoff like that sit and wait on the other to move first, we have a recipe for stalemate which is sadly something only too familiar in diplomacy. In the case of the Middle East my own expectation of progress would be more pinned on making progress in the Middle East process. When I visited the Middle East in autumn of last year, when there was some optimism about progress, I was very encouraged that then there were several countries enthusiastically contemplating a very different security environment which would arise in the wake of the Middle East peace process settlement. Looking at regional parallels for instance to OFCE in Europe which has provided a basis for confidence building and security arrangements and inspections within Europe, some equivalent to that in the Middle East would be revolutionary. I personally would be sceptical whether we are going to make that much progress on the question you raised without first resolving the current position in the Middle East peace process. I should be hopeful that if that were achieved we could then make more rapid progress both between the Arab nations and with Israel. One exception to this of course, and it is a very large exception, is Iraq which is likely to pursue its ambitions for weapons of mass destruction irrespective of the Middle East peace process because that is about securing regional domination, not about concerns about Israel. 237. Indeed and indeed it is as much of a threat to Iran for example as it might be to Israel. May I just press you on this notion that the Middle East peace process should take primacy and then after that there might be discussions about weapons of mass destruction? Western nations have a significant leverage within the Middle East peace process in that they are going to have to pay for it. Might it not be sensible to couple discussions about weapons of mass destruction and the Middle East peace process slightly more nearly together, particularly given the fact that western nations will be expected to put a huge amount of money into the region after the conclusion of a peace agreement and that we might expect some quid pro quo in greater helpfulness in overall regional peace from the nations involved in return? (Mr Cook) First of all may I just make clear that I am not asserting a primacy of the peace process over arms control agreements as a matter of policy, I am merely making a statement of reality, that in reality if the peace process is successfully resolved we can expect better progress on some of these other questions. I am not saying that is the way it should be. I am certainly not saying that in any way reduces our calls on Israel and other states in the region to adhere to the relevant international agreements. On the question of the financial contribution we are making to the peace process, you are quite right to point out that the peace process will require very substantial international support, particularly for example on the settlement and compensation of refugees. That will primarily be funding for the Palestinian entity and for other countries in the region such as Lebanon. I am not sure that there will be that much financial leverage in relation to Israel. 238. Except that successful financing of the agreement adds to the stability of the agreement and that certainly is to the advantage of Israel. (Mr Cook) I would agree with that but I really do not think you would thank me if Yassar Arafat reached agreement with the Prime Minister of Israel and I refused to fund it because I was waiting on another agreement with the Prime Minister of Israel. (Mr Hare) In relation to Israel we do call on them immediately to ratify the CTBT. We also see the cut-off treaty as a very realistic immediate measure to which they could come in as a negotiator alongside the other non- NPT parties, India and Pakistan. Just as with India and Pakistan, where we have a non-proliferation dialogue, we also have one with Israel. We are making those points and in our view there are immediate things they can do which would be short of adhering to the NPT but nevertheless very worthwhile. Sir David Madel 239. Would Israel's attitude change if all its surrounding neighbours would recognise it as a state? (Mr Cook) That is essentially a question for Israel. It is certainly true that its development of its programme of nuclear weapons was a reflection of a perception of itself as threatened. 240. We shall continue to press. Some of its immediate neighbours do recognise Israel but we shall continue to press those who do not - I am thinking particularly of Syria - to recognise Israel as a state. (Mr Cook) Yes, but that of course is part of the peace process. We have always said we want to see a comprehensive peace process on all its tracks; not just the Palestinian track but also the Lebanese and the Syrian track. I hope that we shall secure that. We are working hard to do so. 241. Israel has said that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons in the Middle East. (Mr Cook) Since it is the only country in the Middle East which possesses nuclear weapons that is not particularly advancing the argument. 242. You say that, but how close is Iraq to using nuclear weapons? (Mr Cook) Iraq is now some distance away from nuclear weapons. The threat from Iraq and the area which remains of very serious and live concern for us in relation to Iraq is its near capacity for chemical and biological weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which was the invigilating body, the inspection body under the UN resolutions, has confirmed that Iraq is some way away now from a nuclear weapon capacity. 243. Would you agree that it is the Middle East peace process, the recognition of Israel, which needs to come first before Israel will start? (Mr Cook) No. As a matter of policy I would not say that: as a matter of reality I recognise that that is the most likely way forward. Sir Peter Emery 244. In what way does UNMOVIC differ from UNSCOM? When is UNMOVIC likely to commence work in Iraq? (Mr Cook) I take one step back and say that the difference between the two resolutions which set up these agencies lies in other parts than the inspection regime, particularly the fact that the new resolution removes any ceiling on the oil exports of Iraq. I do not think that fact has yet been adequately recognised. I still keep reading articles in the press which talk about oil sanctions on Iraq. There is no ceiling on Iraq's oil exports and they are currently at an historic all time record high, which leaves us puzzling why so many people in Iraq are starving and short of medicine. 245. Do you think that the work of UNMOVIC is unnecessary then? (Mr Cook) No; no, no. I was making the point that the distinction in the resolutions lies in other parts than the inspection regime. It is our view that one cannot be confident that one is containing Saddam Hussein's well-known ambition for weapons of mass destruction unless there are inspections on the ground. There were four dossiers which were set out in the original Security Council resolution: nuclear weapons, missile technology, biological, chemical weapons. None of those has been formally closed and the latter two remain issues of very live concern. It is very difficult from aerial and external intelligence to get on top of the chemical and biological capacity. Chairman 246. I am turning now to chemical and biological weapons and the danger of proliferation. Clearly the two conventions in this field are in themselves insufficient. What other measures, what other instruments or other means, is the UK pursuing to try to prevent the passage of these weapons to other states? (Mr Cook) I am not sure I would accept your contention that the Chemical Weapons Convention is itself strategically flawed. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides a very clear international regime for elimination. It does have a system of verification. There is a provision for challenge inspections where it is suspected there are chemical weapons facilities and there is a target date for 2012, by which they have to be eliminated. I am not going to pretend it is easy to implement it because by definition we are dealing with a weapons programme which can be easily mistaken for a chemical process and a manufacturing process. It would not be very easy to identify many areas where in legal drafting we could strengthen that. The Biological Weapons Convention does give us grounds for real concern because it does not have the process of verification written into it, which is why Britain is attaching high priority and putting a lot of effort into trying to get agreement on a protocol for inspection. (Mr Hare) The Chemical Weapons Convention is very much a landmark convention, the first universal convention applied to eliminate a class of weapons, destroying a class of past production of weapons, 135 countries adhering, new ratifications coming through. It is an impressive achievement in three years. There is still a lot of work to do to ensure it is implemented satisfactorily, that all the provisions are properly used. We know we are contributing very directly to that. Just this week we are staging another practice challenge inspection in a military base in the UK with several foreign observers present. This is designed to show that we mean business, we mean to implement fully the Chemical Weapons Convention in all circumstances on an objective but tough basis. What the Foreign Secretary says about the Biological Weapons Convention is absolutely right. The major arms control negotiations in WMD at the moment are the biological weapons protocol negotiations. There is another major session in July where we hope further progress will be made. There is already a very substantial document there in draft form. We, the UK, have an important role as friend of the chair in the compliance portfolio which is one of the major issues to be resolved. As to your initial question, you asked what other measures we applied to supplement the work of the conventions. A big area currently is export control, both our national controls and our harmonisation and consultation with like-minded countries in groups like the Australia Group, where we maintain common control lists, we discuss intelligence questions and we look at patterns of proliferation. All those issues are dealt with in that context and we do not just put all our reliance on effective implementation of the conventions. Sir John Stanley 247. Turning to the Biological Weapons Convention and the need for a verification protocol, may I say how very much I welcomed your decision to place in the public domain, I believe for the first time, early in the life of this administration some information about the horrendous nature of the release of biological weapons in a densely populated area. For example the unclassified Foreign Office paper which you placed in the House of Commons Library on 4 February 1998 contains this chilling sentence, "One hundred kilograms of anthrax released from the top of a tall building in a densely populated area could kill up to three million people". I believe the Government has been right to highlight the immense dangers of these appalling weapons. Against that background, do you hold out any prospect of being able to achieve a common position amongst the P5 countries, in particular in the verification protocol for the BW treaty? Do you think you will be able to avoid the less than satisfactory position which was created in the Chemical Weapons Convention whereby the United States as the price of their ratification of it effectively have a form of presidential opt-out from a particular challenge inspection? (Mr Cook) As a matter of principle I should of course be opposed to countries entering an opt-out from challenge inspections. Of course in that particular case, though the administration itself has no difficulty with support, the administration in fact assisted in negotiating, that particular reservation was entered at the insistence of the Hill not of the US administration. I am not immediately up to speed on what is the position of all of us in the P5. As a broad principle I should hope that over a period of time we can secure progress on the protocol on two grounds. First of all, it is extremely difficult for any country to say that it is reserving the option to develop biological weapons, so there is a large international consensus that this is a valid negotiating objective. Secondly, a very large number of countries has already signed up to the Biological Weapons Convention. They have done so partly to have the reassurance that other countries are not developing these biological weapons and they cannot have that reassurance without some system of inspection and challenge investigations. The difficulty here of course, and there is a bona fide issue here, I am not saying we should be defeated by it or that we should accept it as a reason for giving up but there is a bona fide issue, in that the challenge inspections on chemical and biological weapons are often carrying out inspections or could be carrying out inspections of bona fide chemical or other biological factories and installations and there is a proliferation at the present time of biological technology and biological industrial production. Some countries - this was reflected in the debate in the Senate - have a legitimate concern that this would compromise their own industrial confidentiality and security. We have to find a way forward in which one can respect that industrial commercial confidentiality, but at the same time respect the very powerful strategic need to give us confidence that those who adhered to the convention are actually standing by its terms. What is the position within the P5? (Mr Hare) All the P5 are fully engaged and on the whole very constructively engaged in the BW Protocol negotiations. It is right to say that there are still some differences, but they are not the only differences which do exist. There are important countries in the NAM which are taking particular positions but we are working hard to resolve them. The important thing is that all the P5 and the major NAM countries are fully engaged and are addressing the key issues. The experience of the Chemical Weapons Convention will be extremely important. There have been over 500 inspections worldwide in that; a good proportion of those will have been done in the P5. The Chinese may have mentioned to you the extraordinary thoroughness with which they set up their own national authority for chemical weapons, in fact the burdens it has imposed on them in terms of the number of inspections they have received. We shall expect that to happen in the Biological Weapons Protocol as well. The answer is that of course you cannot have a realistic protocol in biological weapons without the P5 being engaged, but the signs are good that eventually they will come round. The Americans have of course only just produced their full industrial declaration in the Chemical Weapons Convention and as I understand it inspections are starting there now in industrial facilities. That will boost the numbers of inspections considerably that the US themselves are receiving. Chairman 248. Are you concerned that the US presidential veto on challenge inspections could become a precedent for other countries to adopt that and to obstruct the implementation of the convention? (Mr Hare) As I understand it, it was imposed on the administration. 249. But it is there. (Mr Hare) It is seen as very much a last resort in perhaps very unusual circumstances. Obviously we hope it is not a precedent. We do not see the CWC as having that sort of precedent integrated in it. 250. Do you have any evidence that others are proposing to use it as a precedent? (Mr Hare) None that we have seen. 251. Back on the Chemical Weapons Convention again, we understand that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in its verification capacity has failed to investigate a number of allegations in relation to breaches of the convention. These include for example breaches in relation to India, Russia, Sudan and Turkey, allegations that they have employed chemical weapons since ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. Have we responded to these allegations in respect of those countries? (Mr Cook) I am advised that few of the allegations which have been made have been backed up by fact, indeed the occasions which are authenticated of the use of chemical weapons are very few, the most obvious ones being the use by Iraq during its war with Iran and also against its own population in the Kurdish area. I am not aware of an allegation in which there was evidential corroboration which has been ignored by the OPCW. You may want to take evidence on that yourselves. 252. We have seen references to these allegations. Obviously we do not know the quality of the evidence which is available. Can I take it that HMG is not convinced of the quality of the available evidence? (Mr Cook) I should have to rely on advice on that? Mr Mackinlay: Could you clarify what evidence you are referring to? Chairman 253. These are the four cases in our footnote. One was during the Kargil war last year in relation to Jammu and Kashmir. Another was in relation to the Russians and Chechnya. Another was in southern Sudan during July and August of last year. Finally, against various Kurdish fighters. There are clear allegations but your view is that the evidential basis is insufficient. (Mr Cook) In the case of the southern Sudan, soil samples were taken which provided no evidence of chemical weapons having been used. In the case of the use in the Kurdish area of Iraq, it is well known and well authenticated that Saddam Hussein did use them. 254. The Turkish army. (Mr Cook) I am sorry. I am not aware of any such allegation, nor am I aware of any evidence to support it. I do not think any investigation has been carried out either in the Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir or in Chechnya, but I have not myself seen any evidence to support the claim that chemical weapons were used. (Mr Hare) What we are confident of is that the mechanism exists in the OPCW to carry out the necessary investigation. It has been shown in the Sudan case most recently that that can be done. Mr Rowlands 255. I notice from our notes here that all our references are from The CBW Conventions Bulletin. Is that a respected source? (Mr Cook) I would have to defer to either of my officials who read it. (Mr Hare) Yes, it is. 256. It is a respected source. (Mr Hare) It is. (Mr Cook) I cannot say that it has figured on my reading list. It has never been put in my Red Box. Chairman: On that basis of respectability it is appropriate to thank you and your colleagues very much.