Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Memoranda


Memorandum submitted by Foreign and Commonwealth Office (China)

V.  UK/CHINA BILATERAL DIALOGUES

  65.  The UK (together with its EU partners, the US and other allies) is seeking to engage China in a series of constructive, but nonetheless critical, dialogues over a range of issues. These include human rights issues (including developments in Tibet), environmental issues (including pollution, climate change, biodiversity and endangered species), issues relating to combating drugs, organised crime and corruption, security issues (including arms control and non-proliferation), and other international and regional issues of mutual concern.

Human Rights

Dialogue

  66.  The human rights situation in China remains a matter of serious concern to HMG. Over the last two years there has been a marked deterioration in the respect of key civil and political rights including the freedoms of expression, assembly, association, conscience and religion. The handing down of excessive sentences to democracy activists, Falun Gong leaders, Tibetan and other activists, including those from Xinjiang has become a regular feature. There also remain serious concerns about the right to fair treatment in the legal process, including the right to a fair trial and freedom from arbitrary detention and about the use of "Re-education through labour". There is widespread abuse of the system of administrative detention, through which the police hold thousands of individuals without judicial assessment of the validity of the "crime" or any right to challenge the detention. China continues to carry out more judicial executions than all other countries combined. The Chinese Communist Party also views free religions as a threat to its authority and has set up "official" religions to try and demonstrate that there is freedom of religious practice in China. They have however continued to clamp down on any "unofficial" religious activities.

  67.  Between 1990 and 1996, the UK joined EU partners in addressing these issues and others by tabling resolutions critical of China at the annual sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. The Chinese were successful in blocking discussion through a procedural "no-action" motion, every year except 1995 when the resolution was voted on but narrowly defeated. Partly because of this consistent failure and the lack of any tangible evidence that improvements in the respect for human rights in China had been achieved as a result, EU unity broke down in 1997. In that year, the UK and a number of other European countries co-sponsored a resolution tabled by Denmark in its national capacity. This was again defeated by a Chinese "no-action" motion and the Chinese Government imposed limited commercial sanctions on Denmark.

  68.  During the UK Presidency of the EU in 1998, the EU agreed to suspend the tabling of the resolution in favour of embarking on a process of dialogue. In 1999 and 2000 the US tabled a resolution critical of China. The UK with other EU partners did not co-sponsor the resolutions. This did not in any way indicate approval of China's human rights record but was intended to signal a preference for handling such matters through a policy of dialogue. The Chinese for their part have made it clear that they will withdraw from the dialogue if the EU or other dialogue partners co-sponsor the resolution. This however has not stopped us from being critical of China's record in public. The EU Presidency, in a statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights on 18 April, condemned the continuing restrictions on fundamental freedoms, and the situations in Tibet and Xinjiang.

  69.  The policy of critical dialogue with the Chinese is designed to enable us to voice our criticisms and concerns directly to the Chinese government, and to seek common ground where we can identify areas where we can work together to produce real improvements in the observance of human rights, through reform of the legal and judicial systems. We are also seeking to engage China more fully in the international human rights mechanisms.

  70.  The formal EU and UK bilateral dialogues began in the latter part of 1997. These dialogues have opened up human rights as an accepted area for discussion with the Chinese authorities. This is an important step forward. Before the dialogue process started, China had always maintained that human rights were purely an internal matter and that other countries had no locus to intervene. China has now become more open to participation in international human rights mechanisms. It has signed, though not yet ratified, the two major UN Covenants on human rights: the International Covenant on Economic Social, and Cultural Rights in 1997 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, visited China in 1998 and, more recently in March this year. Disappointingly, however, agreement was not reached with Mrs Robinson on a programme of technical co-operation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. China has, though, allowed visits by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, including visits to Tibet. A visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture is planned for later this year, though negotiations are currently stalled on the terms of reference and the specific dates.

  71.  During the last UK/China bilateral dialogue held in Beijing between 16-18 February this year China agreed to receive representatives of the Foreign Secretary's Death Penalty Panel to discuss approaches to the abolition of capital punishment which the Chinese have told us they wish to work towards. The Chinese authorities have also agreed that the All Party Parliamentary Group on Tibet could visit Tibet. A commitment was also given by the Chinese side to work constructively with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on a prison visiting programme. Talks between the Chinese Government and ICRC representatives have started but as yet no conclusion has been reached. Agreement was also reached on establishing a joint working group to work towards ratification of the two UN Covenants which China has signed but not yet ratified.

  72.  The dialogue process allows us to raise individual cases directly with the Chinese authorities. Both we and the EU have submitted lists of cases of concern through the dialogue. In addition British Ministers regularly use the opportunities provided by high level visits to and from China to raise concerns over human rights including individual cases with their Chinese counterparts. During the Chinese State Visit in October 1999, the Prime Minister discussed human rights concerns with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, as did the Foreign Secretary with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan. We also make formal representations about current concerns to the Chinese and public statements such as that made by the EU Presidency on behalf of the EU at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

  73.  The dialogue has helped to create a climate which facilitates technical co-operation on human rights issues between China and the UK. This involves not only Ministries and Government institutions, but also increasingly the non-governmental sector. China is one of the major beneficiaries of the FCO Human Rights Project Fund. Projects which have been supported recently include: human rights scholarships to Chinese academics and officials working in the field of human rights; various projects on time limits in criminal proceedings, sentencing procedures in the Chinese courts, and the treatment of witnesses in the criminal process; an internet based human rights consulting service and a children's helpline; various seminars on criminal court proceedings and so on. All these programmes and the others which we run on legal co-operation (see paras 81 to 83 below) are specifically targeted to support the process of change and to encourage greater respect for human rights in Chinese institutions.

  74.  There have been modest improvements in some civil rights in China including greater freedom of information and individual speech for ordinary citizens and greater protection of rights for the accused under the legal and judicial system. There have also been improvements in economic and social rights including higher standards of living, greater freedom of movement and greater scope for individuals to have control over their own lives.

  75.  There has, however, been relatively little progress in the field of political rights. In particular, 1998 saw a clamp-down by the Chinese authorities against democracy activists who were trying to register the "China Democracy Party". This clamp-down continued in 1999 with extensive arrests and heavy sentences designed to inhibit any attempts to form alternative political parties.

  76.  In July 1999 the Chinese Government banned the "Falun Gong"—a popular movement based on certain physical and psychological doctrines—and declared it "an evil cult". (This followed a peaceful demonstration by 10,000 Falun adherents outside the government compound in Beijing in April.) The government ban of the Falun Gong movement was followed by a jailing of its leaders and the sentencing of many of its followers to a "programme of re-education".

  77.  There has also been ongoing repression of non-sanctioned religious groups including underground Church Christian groups (often known as house churches). Severe restrictions have been placed on the Catholic Church, and there has been frequent repression of Buddhists in Tibet and Muslims in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region.

  78.  These various developments have led many commentators to suggest that the dialogue process has failed. However, it was recognised from the outset that the dialogue process could not realistically be expected to bring about early or dramatic improvements in political rights in China. This will only come about when there is a fundamental change in the political system. Nevertheless the process of dialogue and co-operation are contributing to positive change in China, including improvements in the legal rights of ordinary Chinese citizens. Each round of the dialogue sees greater openness and depth of discussion, even on issues of considerable political sensitivity to the Chinese such as Tibet, democratisation and political dissidence.

  79.  However, we would obviously like to see more tangible progress from the dialogue in terms of real improvements in respect for human rights on the ground. In the EU Presidency statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on 18 April, referred to earlier, EU members expressed their deep concern at the continuing restrictions on basic freedoms and stressed that it was fundamental that the dialogue process should be translated into concrete actions towards the effective and full realisation of the human rights of all persons under Chinese jurisdiction.

  80.  At the suggestion of the UK, the General Affairs Council on 20 March this year agreed that the EU's approach to next year's resolution would take account of what results had been achieved through the dialogue process.

Legal Co-operation

  81.  In 1999, China enshrined in its Constitution, for the first time since the founding of the People's Republic, the concept of the rule of law. The Chinese are keen to learn more about the British legal system, and this is an area where co-operation provides good opportunities to improve the lives of ordinary Chinese people. As mentioned elsewhere in this Memorandum, the Lord Chancellor visited China last year, and the Chinese Justice Minister visited the UK in April this year.

  82.  There are two memoranda providing for exchanges of information and personnel in the legal sphere: one between the Lord Chancellor's Department and the Ministry of Justice (September 1999) and one between the Attorney General and the Chinese Supreme People's Procuratorate (November 1999). The Great Britain China Centre does much work on legal and judicial reform, and the UK/China Forum has a Legal sub-committee. Some of the FCO-funded Chevening scholarships are awarded to lawyers. The China Law Council (formally the Bar Council and Law Society Joint Committee) has a remit to help Chinese lawyers to understand the English legal system, and to facilitate closer contacts. The Council administers Government-funded training programmes including the Practical Training Scheme which enables Chinese lawyers to learn English and to gain placements in solicitors' firms and barristers' chambers. There is also a similar scheme to train Chinese judges in this country, administered by the Great Britain China Centre.

  83.  A first "British Law Week" was held in China to coincide with the Prime Minister's visit in October 1998. It included a mock trial in the English High Court. During the Lord Chancellor's visit to China in September 1999, this was followed up by a bilateral Seminar on Criminal Court Procedure and a session of discussions on, for example, sentencing, human rights and the independence of the judiciary.

Tibet

  84.  Successive British governments have regarded Tibet as autonomous while recognising the special position of the Chinese there. We have consistently informed the Chinese government of our view that greater autonomy should be granted to the Tibetans. We have also emphasised that the current political difficulties in Tibet can best be resolved through dialogue between the Chinese government and the Tibetan people, including the Dalai Lama. We seek to encourage the Chinese authorities to enter into a dialogue without preconditions and have noted that the Dalai Lama has stated publicly that he does not seek independence, but greater autonomy for Tibet. Central to our interest in Tibet is our deep concern at evidence of human rights abuses.

  85.  Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have held private meetings with the Dalai Lama (in his capacity as a spiritual leader) during his visits to the UK. These contacts reflect our interest in the situation in Tibet. We draw the attention of the Chinese government to our concerns both through the bilateral human rights dialogue and through ministerial meetings. The Foreign Secretary urged the re-opening of a dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama during his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan on 20 October 1999; the Minister of State, Mr Battle, reiterated our views in his meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yingfan on 9 November 1999.

  86.  We shall continue to raise concerns over the human rights situation in Tibet both bilaterally and in co-operation with EU partners. In particular we shall continue to draw attention to cases of special concern, such as that of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the child selected by the Dalai Lama as the eleventh Panchen Lama (the second most important position in Tibetan Buddhism) but not recognised by the Chinese authorities. The child has not been seen in public for over five years. We are pressing Chinese authorities to grant international access to him, to substantiate their assurances that he is in good health and leading a normal life. We shall continue to monitor developments in Tibet closely.

Xinjiang

  87.  The Xinjiang Autonomous Region in North-west China is home to over seven million Uighurs, who are Muslim and speak a Turkic language. Despite substantial increases in the ethnic Chinese population since 1949, the local ethnic groups of whom the Uighurs are the largest community still predominate. Agitation against Chinese rule in the Region, about which little information reaches the outside world, is a source of worry to the Chinese authorities.

  88.  We are concerned by reports of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and we have drawn these concerns to the attention of the Chinese government, including reports of infringements of religious freedom, arbitrary detention of ethnic minority activists, and an increasing number of executions in the region. In particular, the Foreign Secretary raised with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan during the Chinese State Visit in October 1999 the case of the prominent Uighur businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer, who had been charged with passing state intelligence abroad. The allegations are reported to have been based on her having sent newspaper clippings to her husband in the United States. Mrs Kadeer was subsequently sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. Her son, Ablikim Abdyrim, was sentenced to two years "re-education through labour" on similar charges. Mr Battle raised Rebiya Kadeer's case with visiting Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in March this year.

Global Issues

Environmental Issues

  89.  China is facing a wide range of environmental challenges including serious air pollution in some cities, water pollution (exacerbated by water shortages in Northern China), depletion of natural resources, and increasing damage caused by natural disasters.

  90.  The UK is playing a prominent role to help China to tackle these problems. There is an increasing number of exchanges between government officials as well as experts and NGOs. UK companies are active in promoting environmental technologies in China, including in the water sector and in clean coal.

  91.  A Memorandum of Understanding on bilateral co-operation on environmental issues was signed in 1998. DFID supports the China Council for International Co-operation on Environment and Development (CCICED), a body of international experts set up by the Chinese Government to provide advice on environmental issues. UK experts participate actively in CCICED and its working groups.

  92.  China is also playing an increasingly active role in international environmental issues. There are regular discussions between UK and Chinese Ministers and officials on issues such as climate change, biosafety, biodiversity and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). The UK is supporting a number of co-operation projects related to these areas, including feasibility studies for renewable energy production through the Climate Change Challenge Fund; assistance on biosafety legislation; wetlands management in Tibet, and support for CITES enforcement in China (in particular in relation to the endangered Tibetan Antelope).

Drugs

  93.  Under the Whitehall-wide assessment of the overseas drugs threat to the UK, co-ordinated by the FCO, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan are not judged as posing direct threats to the UK. But China is now a major market for synthetic drugs and heroin from Burma. China is taking measures to stem its growing domestic drug abuse rates, including strengthening control of precursor chemicals—of which China itself is a major producer. In support of these measures, earlier this year the FCO funded a Drugs Workshop for Chinese Customs and Police Officers, which involved 10 days' training by HM Customs and Excise.

Organised Crime

  94.  Contacts between UK Law Enforcement Agencies and their Chinese counterparts are improving, not least due to recent bilateral co-operation over a number of kidnappings in the UK of Chinese illegal immigrants by Chinese organised crime gangs. This co-operation has proved highly successful and has resulted in a number of convictions. Exchanges are taking place between the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad and the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. A visit to China by the Directors General of the National Criminal Intelligence Service and of the National Crime Squad takes place in late May.


  95.  China participated in early meetings of the Asia Pacific Group on money laundering (APG)—but stopped attending when Taiwan was included in the Group. The UK is proposing to co-fund, with the EU, an Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) anti-money laundering initiative to develop sustainable institutional capacity in the Asia region to tackle money laundering at a national, international and global level.

Corruption

  96.  Combating corruption is a major priority for the Chinese government. HMG plans to co-sponsor, with the Chinese government, an anti-corruption initiative at the third ASEM Summit in Seoul in October this year. The aim is to obtain a broad commitment by ASEM leaders to co-operate in combating corruption and to commission further work at expert level, drawing on national case studies and exchange of best practice, to be reviewed by ASEM Foreign Ministers in 2001.

Security Issues

Arms control and non-proliferation

  97.  China is the world's third largest nuclear weapons state and plays a pivotal role in international negotiations on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. We seek to engage the Chinese in constructive discussions on all such issues, and have had regular exchanges with them since 1996.

  98.  China is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has signed, but not yet ratified, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It is a member of the Zangger Committee (which interprets the nuclear transfer obligations on states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty), but not of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (which seeks to control the movement of nuclear material and equipment).

  99.  China is a party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention and to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. It is not, however, a member of the Australia Group—the international export control regime related to chemical/biological weapons—as it shares the view of Non Aligned Movement countries that the Group is a western cartel restricting legitimate trade. We continue to urge China to tighten its export controls in the chemical/biological area.

  100.  HMG would like to see China join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to counter the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering WMD (weapons of mass destruction) warheads. China has so far declined invitations to join, and its export controls are not yet necessarily consistent with membership of the regime, although it describes them as similar.



Defence Relations

  101.  Defence relations form an important part of the UK's overall strategy of improving contacts with China. Although direct UK defence interests in China are limited, China's increasing military power and the implications for regional security mean that there are clear advantages in developing and maintaining contact on defence matters, including at the highest levels.

  102.  Our defence policy towards China is based on increasing contacts in a balanced, reciprocal and measured fashion with the aim of exposing the Chinese to UK defence policy and military thinking, and improving our understanding of Chinese defence matters in order to promote confidence-building and dispel mistrust. There has been a gradual increase in our defence contacts with the Chinese, and there is the potential for further expansion of the political-military dialogue, particularly in the area of Peacekeeping, and a programme of senior military visits and ministerial exchanges. Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian visited the UK in January this year. The Secretary of State for Defence will visit China in June.

  103.  HMG provides funding for one Chinese student a year to attend the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS). The MOD have also, for the first time this year, started to fund a place for a Chinese student at the Joint Services Command and Staff Course (JSCSC).

Defence Exports

  104.  The EU imposed an embargo on the export of arms to China following the events of Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The embargo is not a full scope embargo and the UK's national interpretation of it, as set out by Mr Fatchett in his reply to Parliament on 3 June 1998 (Hansard Official Report Columns 26-29), covers the following:

    —  lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles;

    —  specially designed components of the above, and ammunition;

    —  military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms;

    —  any equipment which is likely to be used for internal repression.

  105.  We assess all licences to export arms to China against our national interpretation of the EU Embargo, the UK's national criteria on arms exports (announced by the Foreign Secretary on 28 July 1997) and the EU Code of Conduct. We would not approve any application where there was a clear risk that the equipment would be used for internal repression or contribute to regional instability.

  106.  Details of the exports of defence equipment to China are published in the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls. (The 1998 Report was published in October 1999.)

International and Regional Issues

  107.  As the UK and China are both Permanent Members of the UN Security Council we frequently hold discussions on a range of international issues, including the question of the reform of the Security Council. We also conduct a number of regional dialogues on Asia, Africa and the Middle East. China and Britain are both full members of the Asia European Meeting (ASEM) and participate in its activities. As indicated earlier, we are currently developing an anti-corruption initiative with the Chinese within the ASEM framework. We also work with the Chinese on regional issues through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). We seek to engage the Chinese in discussions about Taiwan, emphasising the need for a peaceful solution through dialogue. (Our policy towards Taiwan is set out in a separate memorandum).


 
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