WEDNESDAY 25 OCTOBER 2000

Members present:

MEMORANDA SUBMITTED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

RT HON ROBIN COOK, a Member of the House, (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), MS ROSALIND MARSDEN, Director, Asia/Pacific Department, and MR TONY SPRAKE, Head, China/Hong Kong Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, examined.

Chairman: Mr Rowlands?

Mr Rowlands

224. I declare an interest in that I travelled to Taiwan on 8-14 October as a guest of the Taiwanese Government.

(Mr Cook) I hope it will not become a question for me to have to declare where I have travelled to since I last saw you.

Chairman

225. I will not call on the Foreign Secretary to declare interests. May I, on behalf of the Committee, welcome you and your two colleagues, Ms Rosalind Marsden, on your left, who is the Director of the Asia/Pacific Department, and Mr Tony Sprake, Head of the China/Hong Kong Department. I understand that towards the end of the two hour period we have with you you will be joined by Mr Alan Goulty, who is the Director for Middle East and North Africa. Foreign Secretary, first can I, on behalf of the Committee, say during our visit in June to China that we had enormous help from both the embassy in Beijing and the two Consulates-General we visited and we would like to express, through you, our enormous appreciation of the work they had done on our behalf.

(Mr Cook) Thank you very much. I will make sure that is passed back to them.

226. Turning now to China. Foreign Secretary, you will know the famous saying of the late Gerald Segal that China has great potential and always will. Certainly you and your colleagues have expended enormous political capital into bilateral relations with China. My question is, has it all been worthwhile? Have there been any results? Has China taken any serious notice of us and any representations that we have made?

(Mr Cook) First of all, as to why we have invested a considerable effort in relation to China, it is evident that there are many issues which we have to address in relation to China. China is a parent member of the Security Council. It is one of the five parent members we frequently meet to discuss international affairs and international crises and, therefore, it is important that we have a working relationship with them. It is also a nuclear power and, therefore, very relevant to the work we have been doing to try to maintain a global non-proliferation regime of weapons of mass destruction. It is the largest single country in the world at the present time. It may in the next quarter century be overtaken by India but for the time being it is the most populous and that in turn gives rise to other issues of immediate direct interest to our foreign policy priorities. For instance, on climate change, within a generation China will be producing as much greenhouse gas as the United States.

227. Critics will say that, yes, the bilateral dialogue has taken place but the benefits are largely one sided and I think both you, our EU colleagues and certainly all of the non-governmental organisations working in the human rights field, accept that there has over the past few years been a serious slippage in China in respect of human rights.

(Mr Cook) Can I then deal with the human rights question because in your initial question you did not refer specifically to human rights, I was taking your broad question why does China matter and what have we achieved. On many of these other issues we have achieved considerable progress in the course of that dialogue and that is why we continue to establish a working relationship with China. On the specific question of human rights, I think it is fair to say that the United Kingdom has probably the most constructive and the deepest of the dialogues that exist with China. We certainly raise a wider range of topics with rather better - I would not want to overstate it - transparency than is secured in some of the other human rights dialogues. There has been progress on them and I think one has got to take the balance sheet in the round. In the course of the last two years Mary Robinson has visited China and will be going back again shortly to sign a Memorandum of Understanding. We have secured China's signature to the two international covenants on economic and social rights and civil and political rights. We have still got some way to go before we get ratification of that but on some of those we are working in a practical way to try to prepare Chinese law for them.

228. If the balance sheet is substantially against ---

(Mr Cook) I have not got anywhere near finishing the balance sheet, so let me carry on, if I may. There has been an introduction of democracy at the village level. We have, in our dialogue, made some progress in engaging them on the death penalty. We had visits by our team to China on the death penalty and in the recent round of the dialogue in October did have quite an extensive discussion on the death penalty and steps towards reducing its use.

229. But no results?

(Mr Cook) I would not necessarily say that. The death penalty exists in China and it is used far too highly. It has shown some tendency towards reduction and there is a genuine interest in those we are speaking to to find ways of further reduction. We would like to see elimination but we have not got anywhere near remotely achieving that. Out of the dialogue we have developed projects funded by our Human Rights Projects Fund and about 13 of them currently in China are a direct result of the dialogue. They are making constructive and practical steps forward. That said, there is of course a negative side to the balance sheet of which perhaps the most clear and stark is that there has been an increase in administrative detention and an increase in the arrest of dissidents and increased vigour with which they have tried to suppress freedom of expression and freedom of political association, also accompanied by significant religious harassment, for instance, of the catholics who do not renounce the Pope. All of that is a very serious debit side and I have repeatedly raised that with the Chinese. In September at the New York meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister I did express our deep concern that these negative moves were coming at the time of our human rights dialogue and expressed the very strong view that if the dialogue is to continue in its present way we would expect to see more results.

230. You accept that the balance sheet is substantially negative?

(Mr Cook) No, I did not say that. Pardon me for saying so, like some of the press you are putting words in my mouth there. I described the balance sheet in its rounded quality. There have been gains but there have also been failures to secure gains. In some cases, such as the suppression of dissidents and the arrest without proper legal process, there has been a marked increase. I think we have to be realistic about the extent to which we or any other single country is going to dramatically change in a rapid period the quality of human rights within China. There are severe human rights failings in China and over a period of time it may be possible for us to make progress but I would not wish to overstate the extent to which we can secure that through dialogue or through any other channel. Our judgment, and it has to be a subjective judgment, is that over the past two years we have made more progress through dialogue than we would have in any other way, but I am not under-stating the many shortcomings and the many failures along the way.

Mr Chidgey

231. Good afternoon.

(Mr Cook) Good afternoon.

232. On this point of human rights, perhaps I could encourage you to be a little more specific. For example, do you accept Human Rights in China's assessment that the Chinese Government is "conducting the most ruthless suppression of dissent since the crackdown on the 1989 demonstrations"?

(Mr Cook) I am not familiar with that particular assessment but I would certainly repeat what I have already said to the Chairman, that there has been a sharp rise in administrative detentions, probably of the order of an increase of 25 per cent over the past two years, and there has been a very determined effort at rounding up dissidents. Yes, in the past two years that has represented a marked increase over the preceding two or three years.

233. In that context, I believe there was a meeting last week between the EU and China human rights delegation.

(Mr Cook) Yes, a round of the UK/China dialogue.

234. What exactly was achieved in the context of this particular discussion now and your feeling of progress? What progress was made?

(Mr Cook) The dialogue on that occasion did indeed raise the question of our concern about the increased use of administrative detention. It also, as I indicated to the Chairman, discussed progress we might make working together on the reduction of the use of the death penalty. We raised the jamming of the BBC Radio and expressed our deep concern with that continuing jamming. We pressed for Red Cross access to the prison service so they could have access to particularly the prisoners of conscience, whom we have already discussed. We secured some further information on Tibet and raised our concerns about Tibet. Now, I am not going to pretend that at the end of that there was a sudden cry from the Chinese side "now we see the light we shall change our ways", but we did not really anticipate that. In so far as diplomatic dialogue can provide added value, and we have to be very realistic about the extent to which it can produce dramatic or rapid development, I nevertheless feel that it was valuable in both finding a means over an extended period and in depth of registering our concerns and obliging the Chinese who were taking part in it to consider whether or not there are ways in which they can modify their behaviour in order to avoid these concerns in the future.

235. Can I just widen this whole principle of human rights concerns in China. So far you have talked about specific behaviour in terms of the way criminals are treated, in terms of the death penalty and so on, but ----

(Mr Cook) Not necessarily criminals, many of them are people who have expressed different views.

236. I think you take my point. I would like to address, if I may, a broader spectrum of human rights as we in the UK might perceive them and particularly in the European Union. I find this a little strange. On the one hand the Government's policy, which I endorse, is to support the European Union's declaration of a Charter of Fundamental Rights. We see, I understand from Government policy, the European Union as a super power and yet when we come to deal with China as a very powerful bloc, which perhaps sets the standards for human rights in its widest sense, we do not seem to be making any progress, we do not seem to be batting to our particular strengths on this. If we are meant to be the bastion of fundamental rights for ordinary citizens, we do not seem to be getting anywhere with China. I wonder whether you have a view on that?

(Mr Cook) If I may say so, the latter part of your statement confused two separate things.

237. It was quite deliberate.

(Mr Cook) You suggested that we do not raise these issues and, on the contrary, I have just described how we do.

238. My comment was make progress.

(Mr Cook) Your second point, which is a separate point, not that we do not raise these issues or seek to achieve improvements, your second point was that we are not achieving progress. I would certainly agree with you that we are not making the progress we would wish but, with the greatest respect, that is not the fault of the Government of Britain, that is the result of the failure of the Government of China to change its position.

239. I am surprised that the European Union, which is a group which we obviously endorse, is not able to make better progress with the power behind that bloc, the super power.

(Mr Cook) I would not want to be too defeatist in this because to the extent we ourselves fear not to expect further progress we have diminished the pressure on China to respond to that pressure for further progress. I do think we have got to be realistic. We are not the Government of China. It is still a very internal addressed community and government and the extent to which outside pressure can move them to shift their internal policies is limited. In so far as there are pressure points available to us and they will keep a dialogue, we are exploiting them.

240. So the EU and Member States have no influence so to speak of?

(Mr Cook) No, I did not say that at all. We have influenced, and I demonstrated earlier when I responded, some of the progress we have seen over the past two years. Some of that - the visits of Mary Robinson, the signing of the international covenants, the dialogue on death penalties - is very much on our initiatives. We do not run China or even pretend to run China.

Dr Godman

241. Good afternoon, Foreign Secretary. You just touched upon very briefly there when you referred to the recent dialogue to Tibet. What I would like to ask is what new information has China provided concerning Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the boy who, as you well know, was chosen by the Dalai Lama as the Panchen Lama.

(Mr Cook) We regularly raise Tibet at each of the six monthly dialogues and, indeed, it was at the previous one earlier this year that we got agreement from China to admit the All-Party Group to Tibet. Every time we raise the question of the Panchen Lama and we have also raised it bilaterally both by myself and by Mr Battle and his contacts. We have received assurances from the Government of China that he is in good health and well cared for and that his parents do not wish international intervention. At the last meeting last week they produced two photographs of what we were informed was the Panchen Lama showing him at home. We have not received what is the focus of our demands, which is access to verify this for ourselves.

242. This young lad and his family disappeared in 1995, did they not? You mentioned photographs. I want about to ask you about them. Did you ask for, and obtain, copies of those photographs?

(Mr Cook) I think we were given copies of the photographs. Mr Sprake, is that right?

243. So those photographs are a matter of the official record now, are they?

(Ms Marsden) The photographs were not handed over. We were shown them from their side of the table.

244. Could the Committee gain access to those photographs, I think there were two?

(Mr Cook) There were two. If what Ms Marsden says is correct, we do not have the photographs. We were shown them but did not take them.

245. Why did you not ask them?

(Mr Cook) I do not know. Ms Marsden, did we ask to receive them?

(Ms Marsden) We did not, but the Chinese side made it clear that they were not prepared to hand them round.

(Mr Cook) I was not present so I cannot say whether or not that was the way in which it was done. It is certainly a matter we can pursue with the Chinese authorities and say "thank you for showing the photographs, now could we please have copies?"

246. That would be very, very helpful to those people here and elsewhere who are particularly concerned about this young lad and his family. The photographs were there in London, are you saying that ----

(Mr Cook) No, the meeting was in ----

247. This was the European Union?

(Mr Cook) No, it was the UK one. I doubt if the European Union dialogue would have quite got to that point.

248. The photographs were shown and then whipped away from the table, is that what you are saying?

(Ms Marsden) Yes.

249. But you have given us your word, Foreign Secretary, that you will seek to obtain copies of them?

(Mr Cook) I will seek to obtain them. I am not going to fall into the Mr Chidgey position of being held responsible if I cannot get them.

250. I will not hold you responsible, Foreign Secretary, but, as I say, it would be very, very helpful if you could obtain them. What other steps are you taking to pursue the serious concerns that many people have about this young lad and his family?

(Mr Cook) As I said, we have raised it on every occasion of the dialogue. We have raised it in most of our bilateral contacts at Foreign Minister level. I have raised it in the past, Mr Battle has recently raised it, and we will continue to do so. I think the Government of China is under no illusion that this is an issue that is going to go away. If we were not shown photographs we would wish to have some independent or international body have direct access in order to satisfy ourselves both about the health of the child and, indeed, the extent to which he is of his own free will where he is.

251. Do you think that these matters would be helped with the appointment of a European Union Special Co-ordinator for Tibet?

(Mr Cook) I am sceptical, Norman. That is not a statement that in any way under-states the enormous importance of this issue or the extent of our anxieties. There is a risk when you appoint a special co-ordinator that you sub-contract concerns to that special co-ordinator. I do actually think that there is merit in all 15 Member States of the European Union, and collectively the European Union, pursuing it rather than referring everybody to a special co-ordinator.

Mr Rowlands

252. Given the dialogue and the forums that have been created, why do you think that there has been such a deterioration in the human rights issues in China in the last two years?

(Mr Cook) I do not know.

253. You do not know?

(Mr Cook) I do not know. I am not here on behalf of the China Government. Some of these questions are questions that they themselves would have to respond to. There is no doubt that the Government of China has felt uneasy at some of the political upset it has seen around the world. It is determined to pursue its policy of economic modernisation whilst maintaining political stability and, therefore, is determined that nothing should happen that would give rise to what it perceives as political instability. I think in the long run China is going to have to confront the contradiction of, on the one hand, an extremely fast pace of economic modernisation with access to new technologies and new sources of information and, on the other hand, the failure to modernise and change its political system.

254. You said you did not know and then you went on to give a set of reasons why you thought there was a change. Surely you and your office are attempting to analyse why because if we do not know why then we do not know whether we can change it.

(Mr Cook) We can speculate but I feel ultimately as to why they do it is a question that the Government of China would have to answer. I cannot answer with authority but I could speculate.

255. Would you ask them?

(Mr Cook) We have repeatedly asked them about the increase in detentions.

256. What have you asked?

(Mr Cook) We have not asked for the motivation as to why. I think you would run the risk if you were starting a dialogue and asking "what is your motivation", you would be getting into justifications for it and I do not think there is any justification for the rise in administrative detentions.

257. You did indicate that one possibility is that they want economic liberalism and WTO and all that and they fear this brings with it possible political plurality. If that is one of the reasons, and commentators have given that as a reason, if that is the case as we help to promote economic liberalism we will not see an improvement but we will see possibly a further deterioration in human rights.

(Mr Cook) I do not think I made that linkage, Ted, if you check the record afterwards. There are parallel processes, and I will come back to that in a second. What I did say was that they have witnessed political upheaval in other parts of the world and have a view that they are not going to permit that to happen within China. The parallel that they might make privately is with Russia where there was political liberalisation and, on their interpretation, as a result instability and economic decline within Russia. What I said is I think they are mistaken in imagining that you can proceed with a programme of economic modernisation on the quite dramatic scale that is happening in the coastal provinces and southern provinces without that setting off in train a process of political change and demand for political pluralisation. I think that will come. So I think quite the reverse conclusion to the one that you are proposing. I think that the more China does get engaged in that modern economic culture of individual enterprise, of access to information, of communication, of technology, of mobility, of contact with the outside world, the better the prospects of promoting change in the political culture and structure of China.

258. One thing that struck me on our visit comparing China with Eastern Europe and an old regime where I found the old-fashioned stifling concepts and inability to have a proper discussion as opposed to dialogue very reminiscent of Prague in the 1980s when the Select Committee travelled. There are no Havels, there are no Solzhenitsyns, there are no intelligencia leading an alternative view on political pluralism and rights in China. Am I right or is it just that we have not met them or seen them?

(Mr Cook) I think it would be impossible to say that they do not exist, Ted. After all, in fairness, one only hears of the Solzhenitsyns and the Havels in retrospect after they have arisen. It may well be ten years from now that you will be looking back at names which you can bracket in the same mould from Chinese society and culture. It is, of course, still a society with a much more collective culture than any of the European countries, whether Eastern European or not. I think that one has got to be careful not to necessarily equate some of the regimes of Eastern Europe that remained in power by force and by repression with the society in China which lacks pluralism, lacks democracy and lacks freedom. One should not under-state the fact that there is a degree of support for the regime.

259. I am just wondering where the leadership for political change is going to come from? You have not got any idea where?

(Mr Cook) I would not want to predict. Indeed, if I name certain individuals I could probably predict confidently that they would be arrested tomorrow, so this might not be wise. Within the governing party itself there are pluralist pressures, even if they are not of the kind that we ourselves would recognise. For instance, there is quite a substantial difference of perspective between those who represent the coastal provinces, which are developing well and rapidly and perhaps have more contact with the outside world, and in the next congress in two years' time there may well be some pressures for change there because some of them understand the need for change.

Sir John Stanley

260. Foreign Secretary, your opening balance sheet in relation to human rights in China was in considerable contrast, I felt, to your own Department's paper to this Committee at the outset of this inquiry. In paragraph 66 of the paper that you submitted to the Committee it contains a really withering description of the deterioration in human rights in China over the last two years, including the sentence, "Over the last two years there has been a marked deterioration in the respect of key civil and political rights including the freedoms of expression, assembly, association, conscience and religion." Do you still accept that is a valid statement, Foreign Secretary?

(Mr Cook) Not only that but I actually requested that statement to be put in. When this memorandum was first submitted to me it did not have that paragraph and I requested it, so I fully stand by it. If I may say so, I think it is entirely consistent with what I said earlier about the increase in administrative detentions and the vigour with which they are suppressing freedom of expression and the harassment of the catholic members who do not renounce the Pope. That is entirely consistent with what I said and, yes, I fully agree with that. I requested it.

261. Given that your confirmation that there has been a serious deterioration of human rights in China over the last two years, could you tell us whether you have been considering whether this is now the time to look fundamentally at whether there should be a major change in policy on trying to further human rights in China? In particular recognising that the British Government cannot be on its own in trying to bring about such a major change, recognising that some of our major EU partners clearly have the pursuit of contracts very much in the forefront of their minds in their bilateral relations with China, given that the United States has now effectively normalised its trading relations with China, is there not a case to think radically as to whether a new approach might be more effectively based on developing internet access, telecommunication access, broadcasting, television, education, all of those key elements of the information age which in the short-term as well as in the long-term could do far more to advance human rights and a multi-party political in China than the sort of conventional battering on the door that has been pursued over the last two or three decades?

(Mr Cook) I am not sure that I would recognise our human rights dialogue as a battering on the door. Indeed, it was very much a conscious decision that we should try to engage Chinese interlocutors in dialogue on these issues, both to register our concerns and to press them to justify their behaviour and to consider ways in which they could improve that behaviour. In that sense the key change was three years ago when we set up the structured dialogue. I do not see that structured dialogue as in any way incompatible with the rich and broad strategy that you outline which I myself would entirely share, and indeed I think I said something similar in response to Mr Rowlands. The more China becomes involved in the modern technologies, particularly of communication, the more they are exposed to the outside world and the more they have to recognise that modern commercial and industrial success comes from individual enterprise and individual skills and individual access to knowledge and education, then the more we are likely to see changes in the political structures. I would absolutely agree with the proposal that you make, and I think it is consistent with what we are doing, but it is not in any way compatible with having a dialogue with those in the current political leadership. Perhaps the two trends are complementary and reinforce each other rather than compete with each other.

262. Thank you for your response as to the value of the wider information age approach. Just following that further, Foreign Secretary, can you give us your own views as to what the British Government can do to try to further internet access, to try to further free broadcasting into China, to remove the jamming that is being imposed on the BBC, to try to get access for BBC television in China? What more we can do in terms of making the British Council still more effective in China and furthering the advance of education and knowledge about freer systems, freer political systems, freer systems of religious freedom and educational freedom?

(Mr Cook) The latter point gets us to our concerns on human rights and we have deep concerns about the suppression of religious freedom. To take your earlier point about process, I think we can say that we are actively engaged in all the processes that you have outlined. The British Council is very active in China and is a major channel for English language teaching throughout China. It has also worked closely with us on our Human Rights Projects Fund work, notably in the work for improvement in the legal and judicial system within China within the limitations of holistic resources. I think the British Council is doing a first class job and as much as can be expected in both the human rights and the communication fields within China. On the BBC, we regularly raise the jamming of the BBC World Service. We raised it again last week when our Chinese interlocutors informed us, which is their standard response, that there was no jamming, it was just an unfortunate coincidence with local Chinese radio stations. On the question of the BBC world television, we did secure agreement from China at the same meeting very recently that BBC world television will be made available in hotels throughout China. This is welcomed by BBC world television but it does not actually meet our objective, which is to get through to the Chinese population itself.

263. Is there any further assistance you can give on the issue of jamming? As we on this Committee know, the idea that there is some unfortunate technical conjunction is complete hogwash and there is deliberate jamming of the BBC World Service.

(Mr Cook) I merely report what we were informed, I did not endorse it. We know from the BBC World Service that many of the frequencies are deliberately jammed. We will continue to press this upon the Chinese authorities. It is both objectionable in principle that there should be that suppression of access to people, an expression of freedom of information, and it also prevents us from sharing with the Chinese population an objective impartial view of the wider world over which, as the Committee will be aware, I personally have no editorial control nor any wish to exercise editorial control.

Chairman

264. Foreign Secretary, will you confirm that the internet, far from opening new windows for the Chinese, has made it more restrictive because the Chinese are on the point, if they have not already done so, of introducing new restrictions in terms of foreign ownership, in terms of keeping records of those who have consulted the internet? Again, one is going backwards.

(Mr Cook) I am not sure that I necessarily assent to the term "going backwards" but you are quite right to highlight the limited extent to which internet usage has opened up China. For a start there are only 15 million people with access to the internet in China out of an enormous, large population. They are, of course, a very influential, potentially pivotal 15 million people. I would not underrate the difficulty of limiting access through the internet, it is a very difficult medium to control or to regulate, and some seepage, despite any efforts of the Chinese authority, will take place. There was a similar reaction when the fax machine first arrived but they have now more or less abandoned their original restrictions on the fax machine. In the modern world it is impossible to develop a skilled, knowledgeable, educated workforce, which the Chinese are doing, and they put a high stress on education, and prevent them from getting access to information from the outside world.

265. They are doing their best.

(Mr Cook) I would not deny that they are not making it easy but it is impossible to succeed in that task and I think many in the Chinese regime would understand that.

Ms Abbott

266. You have explained to the Committee about the progress that has been made at the level of high diplomacy on human rights. You have conceded to the Committee though that at the level of the reality of the lives of ordinary Chinese people their experience has been a deterioration on the question of human rights and you explained about the increase in detentions and so on. I just wondered then about our strategy in relation to the UN Commission on Human Rights and the resolution that was tabled by the United States in April. Obviously we voted against the Chinese no action motion but we ourselves did not actually co-sponsor the US resolution. Do you think there is any possibility that the European Union will co-sponsor or will be willing to sponsor such a critical resolution next year? If the European Union is not willing to do so, will the United Kingdom be willing to do it on its own?

(Mr Cook) On the latter point, I personally would not welcome a situation in which we split the position of the European Union. I hope that we can try and retain a common European Union position. In answer to your question, the strict answer is, yes, there is that possibility because the decision we took in March made it plain that this was a decision for this year and a decision for any future year would be reviewed in the light of the progress of the dialogue. That is why in September I did make it clear to the Chinese authorities that our decision on the dialogue and the continuation of the dialogue will depend on getting concrete results from the dialogue. I would just stress to the Committee that we have to be open-eyed about this. If we do co-sponsor such a resolution it will be the end of the dialogue, there will be no further dialogue, and that requires a subjective, balanced judgment as to whether ending the dialogue for the sake of a resolution which may not even be debated is the right way forward.

267. We have taken a lot of evidence, both verbal evidence and written evidence, in Hong Kong, although not in China, on the human rights question. Professor Rosemary Foot told us that "the draft resolution in the past prompted several positive developments in China's response to the international human rights regime...." and she went on to say that it "helped prompt Beijing's 1997 and 1998 decisions to sign the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights..." There is a view that China does take the threat of such resolutions going through seriously and does take action in response to them. If we simply do not push the issue in that way at that level we are losing a further opportunity to put pressure on China.

(Mr Cook) Let us be clear, it is not a further opportunity, it is an alternative opportunity. The dialogue vanishes the moment you take that step. I will study with care the paper to which you refer. I am not sure that what you quote supports the contention because the announcement about China in relation to both the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights came after we started the dialogue, not at the time when we were co-sponsoring resolutions in Geneva.

268. So you would argue then that the concrete results of the dialogue in relation to the experience of the ordinary Chinese on the ground justify failing to sponsor these resolutions?

(Mr Cook) Those are two separate issues. First of all, in terms of how we proceed on human rights, either through the dialogue we have at the present time or through co-sponsorship of resolutions, as I said that is a matter of judgment and necessarily these issues are subjective. Our judgment hitherto has been that we have made more progress through dialogue than we would by co-sponsoring a resolution which has never yet actually made it on to the table. But, at the same time, we are making it clear to the Chinese authorities that we expect concrete results from that dialogue. I personally never use the phrase "high diplomacy", I find it frankly really rather pointless and distasteful. I do not think when we talk about the death penalty or we talk about rights in Tibet that we are engaged in something called high diplomacy. In terms of the impact on the lives of the ordinary people it is certainly the case that there is no pluralism or freedom of expression for them. On the other side of the balance sheet I think one should add that there has been a dramatic improvement in the standard of living of the ordinary Chinese.

269. I was talking about human rights. I deliberately did not talk about the standard of living.

(Mr Cook) The economic and social rights are also human rights and I think one should not ignore this.

270. I think if you spoke to activists in Hong Kong - we could not talk to activists in China - they would make a very clear distinction between economic rights and human rights.

(Mr Cook) And they would be perfectly right to make such a distinction. I accept that there is such a distinction, I make it myself. If we are talking about the lives of the ordinary people, which is your phrase, I do not think we can entirely ignore the improvement in the standard of living.

271. The Human Rights in China Group have said a number of concrete ways in which dialogue could be improved, amongst them a clear, substantive agenda, discussed in advance, or a transparent and accountable process or independent participation in the dialogue, co-ordination between dialogue partners at the international level and an integrated strategy, with no compromises on human rights standards, with a willingness to exert pressure and a willingness to withdraw from the dialogue if no progress is made. I do not know whether you are aware of their proposals. Are you in any way sympathetic to them?

(Mr Cook) I have already said that we will continue to review with a dialogue a resolution to a better way forward and we will be doing that before the next round at Geneva. I think we have got to be careful. This is not, as I said, high diplomacy, it is a working meeting between officials from both sides, it is not a party conference we are devising here. Having said that, on some of these points we have tried to open up the dialogue. I think I am right, and Ms Marsden can correct me if I am wrong, that we have invited participation of NGOs, some of whom have refused participation.

272. I do not want to pursue this much longer but you seemed to be suggesting earlier - I may have misunderstood you - that if we sponsor the resolution, if the EU sponsors the resolution, the dialogue falls, but the United States sponsored the resolution and they still have a dialogue.

(Mr Cook) They do not have a human rights dialogue as far as I am aware.

Ms Abbott: Could I just ask a couple of questions on Hong Kong?

Chairman: Let us continue with human rights.

Mr Chidgey

273. Foreign Secretary, if I could just turn the discussion to China's application for accession to WTO, the World Trade Organisation. You are familiar with the fact that there has been a stalling, temporary or otherwise, currently in negotiations - and I phrase that very carefully - over how China's application should be treated. The question I want to ask you is do you believe that concessions should be made to facilitate the entry of China into the WTO at an early date within the framework of the dates that were originally considered, ie by the end of this year?

(Mr Cook) I would not favour concessions, no. We have had extensive negotiation with China both from the European Union and also from the United States in order to find terms of accession which are realistic but also ones with which we are comfortable and can live with.

274. What in your view are the most important sticking points that you would not wish to concede?

(Mr Cook) Personally I am not aware of any sticking point from a European Union perspective. We did reach an agreement, we expect that agreement to be honoured and, of course, it is a sequential agreement whereby we expect China to be doing things before entry into the WTO.

275. For example, Pascal Lamy says that there are major areas which have to be resolved before the Chinese entry application can be proceeded with and particularly the main sticking points are China's readiness to commit itself to transparency, which I think touches on the freedom of speech areas we went through earlier.

(Mr Cook) I am not quite sure that that is what the Trade Commissioner meant when he referred to "transparency". I think he was referring here to transparency in commercial and financial matters. I will refer this to Mr Sprake who may be able to help us.

276. To take it a little further, your colleague, Mr Byers, the Industry Secretary, has said, I believe, that it is more important to settle outstanding issues than meeting artificial deadlines for Chinese entry. Can you help us on what some of those outstanding issues might be?

(Mr Cook) As part of its agreement to enter to the WTO China did agree to make a number of commercial steps, for instance the granting of licences for the insurance industry, for the financial sectors. As far as I am aware those steps have not yet been taken and we wish to see them resolved before China proceeds. That is not an issue for further negotiation, that is a matter of honouring steps that were agreed as part of the process to WTO. Possibly I could bring in Mr Sprake here who has been more in contact with the negotiations.

(Mr Sprake) I have to say that I am not an expert on the WTO negotiations but I understand that part of the difficulty now, of course, is bringing together all the bilateral agreements that have been reached, as you know, within a common framework agreement. In other words, all the concessions which are granted to one country are then extended across the board. In doing that one is, as you know, drawing up an agreement. There are now problems essentially of definition. To take one example, there is the question of retailing and distribution within China and how this is defined. It is very largely, I think, now a matter of definition and going into greater detail of how these agreements are going to operate in practice.

277. Thank you very much. I think, if I may say, it is also an issue of freedom in the marketplace in its more general sense.

(Mr Cook) Yes.

278. In that context can I ask you whether in your own role you have offered any advice in terms of foreign policy and the implications of WTO membership of China to your colleagues and what advice that might have been?

(Mr Cook) First of all, the pursuit of the WTO accession has been a matter in the hands of the General Affairs Council, which as Foreign Minister I attend and so do the Foreign Ministers of the other European countries, so it has been very much driven by the foreign policy consideration. The strategic foreign policy issue for us here is we want to see China a member of the WTO but not at any price. We want to see it a member of the WTO partly because in order to achieve that membership it will have to face up to some of these issues of financial and commercial transparency, it will have to open up some of its markets, as it is now committed to doing on the insurance market, and it will facilitate the kind of increase in access to the outside economy through communication technology of the kind that I referred to earlier and which I think will be beneficial in promoting those other political freedoms. In a sense I would agree with you that one cannot pigeonhole transparency of the financial markets and freedom of commercial activity and, on the other hand, freedom of expression and freedom of information. You cannot have a transparent financial market without access to information about the market. So the one will have an effect on the other but they are not explicit political conditions on the application.

279. Have you any idea in your own mind when these issues might be resolved and China might become a full member of the WTO? Will it be months or years?

(Mr Cook) I would not wish to make a prediction. Indeed, one of the reasons I am reluctant to make a prediction is primarily that it is in the hands of the Government of China and the quicker they get on with implementing the steps we have undertaken, the quicker they will come into the WTO.

Mr Rowlands

280. I have a WTO Taiwanese point. Presumably we have given our full support to the Taiwanese application to join the WTO

(Mr Cook) I will have to take advice on that, Mr Rowlands. What is the position, Mr Sprake?

(Mr Sprake) We are hoping that WTO accession can take place for Taiwan at roughly the same time.

281. We would therefore oppose any attempt by the Chinese to prevent Taiwan joining the WTO?

(Mr Cook) That would logically follow but I am not sure that I necessarily anticipate that. China is neuralgic with anything that suggests that Taiwan is an independent state but it has been extremely tolerant and, indeed, co-operating in the commercial activities of Taiwan. Taiwan is, after all, one of the major investors in mainland China.

282. It would be absurd if China, a far less open economy than even Taiwan has now, could join and somehow they could obstruct the application of Taiwan.

(Mr Cook) We have no reason to believe that they will obstruct and should they do so we will report to the Committee. You are absolutely right, Taiwan would not have any difficulty of significance in meeting the terms of WTO membership.

Sir John Stanley

283. If I may ask two trade related questions. Foreign Secretary, as you are aware, the Foreign Office in China has a wholly unique arrangement for carrying out its British trade promotion activities. In China alone in the world there is both a publicly funded private sector organisation, the China Britain Business Council, working alongside British Trade International. Can I ask you, are you happy that that is the optimum arrangement for the promotion of British trade in China?

(Mr Cook) I think to say one was happy it was the optimum would smack of complacency. There is always room for review and for improvement. Indeed, at the present time the DTI and the FCO are reviewing our investment strategy on trade in China and I hope that will produce some streamlining of the present arrangement. Both bodies have a role to play, both bodies have a contribution to make. I think it is probably helpful that we review quite how they fit together and how they act in a complementary way. We anticipate an outcome of this review in late November/December and I will advise the Committee as soon as we are aware of the outcome.

284. When you say, Foreign Secretary, that you think that both bodies have a role to play, would the Committee, therefore, be right in concluding that you do not agree with the CBBC's recommendation that it should take over the whole responsibility for British trade promotion in China?

(Mr Cook) I fully understand why it might wish to make a negotiating bid of that character but I am not quite clear how it would work since, after all, the whole point of BTI is it brings together the DTI's old networks in Britain with the Foreign Office's networks around the world. The strength of BTI is that interface between those who deal with businesses within Britain and those who promote British business abroad. I think it would be very unwise to take that immense strength to the network out of the picture.

285. The second question I would like to put to you arises from the fact that I, together with three other Members of the Committee, was part of the Committee that went to Chongqing where the UK is the first country to establish a Consulate-General in the city that China regards as the gateway to the great western development programme that it has. I think that all of us who went to Chongqing were hugely impressed at the immensely cost effective way the Foreign Office had established a Consulate-General there with just two UK diplomatic personnel, both you will be glad to know Scottish.

(Mr Cook) Of course.

286. They are ably assisted by a number of excellent and extremely English fluent speaking locally engaged Chinese staff. Could you tell us, Foreign Secretary, given that demonstrably successful case of how the Foreign Office can establish, at relatively low cost, a Consulate-General covering a commercially extremely valuable area with a large population, do you think that what the Foreign Office has done in Chongqing might be a model that can be copied elsewhere around the world as to how to rapidly and quickly establish a new Consulate-General where there are commercial opportunities on a large scale to be had?

(Mr Cook) Absolutely. We have maintained a very clear review of our overseas posts and we have been able to do it in the context of expansion as a result of the last two financial settlements which have enabled us to expand our representation abroad rather than to contract it. I think I have already explained to the Committee that even in the context of increasing resources it is important that we review very carefully whether the pattern of missions relates to where the maximum advantage for Britain rests and, therefore, Britain's interests. We have closed, therefore, a number of missions and focused on opening missions where there are particular trade and commercial prospects, moving away from increasing the number of missions which are not themselves in capital posts. The Consulate, to which you are referring, is one I think we have opened in the last two years. I am very pleased that it was part of a deliberate strategy that we have taken of opening up commercial posts where there are future commercial opportunities. I welcome your support for that and I can assure you that, resources permitting, I want to do more.

Chairman

287. It was indeed a very impressive visit, as Sir John has said. Before calling Dr Godman can I ask one further question on human rights. The question always is where are the pressure points, where are the points of leverage in negotiations with the Chinese who have a very high reputation as hard negotiators? To what extent are we and our EU colleagues willing to use issues like the World Trade Organisation and, for example, the Chinese bid for the Olympics as pressure points in trying to obtain a better deal in respect of human rights in that country? Given the fact that human rights was probably the reason why China did not succeed in their bid for the 2000 Olympics, and now we accept there has been deterioration in the human rights situation in China, do ourselves and the EU draw the necessary conclusions?

(Mr Cook) First of all on the WTO, it is an accepted and very deeply embedded convention that one does not import political judgments into WTO decisions but that is not to underrate the immense impact there will be on political culture within China of exposure to WTO conditions and WTO activities. On the question of the Olympics, the decision that was taken for the year 2000 speaks for itself, as you have said. Those considerations will no doubt remain in the minds of those who take that decision in the future, though I am relieved to say it will not be the General Affairs Council of the European Union.

288. Will the EU be seeking a common decision?

(Mr Cook) Can I say here that I am very conscious of the frustration that we are not able to obtain more rapid progress on human rights and nobody shares that more than I do. I am also very open to suggestions of ways in which we can edge - and it is not going to be a dramatic stampede - towards securing better human rights within China. Those of us from outside should do all we can to try and achieve progress towards an improved standard of political and democratic behaviour within China. It is going to take a long time and I think we have also got to be alert to the fact that some things one might do in the name of human rights can actually be counter-productive in securing our objective of raising human rights. In particular, and I know the deep frustration this causes those who campaign on the issue, I fully understand it, sometimes the more visible and flamboyant the gesture, the more counter-productive it can be.

Dr Godman

289 Just a very brief question on Taiwan. I have not been there, I have no interest to declare. What is the Government's position on the desire of the Taiwanese to secure membership of the World Health Organisation?

(Mr Cook) I cannot answer that without notice but certainly I can get you a reply.

290 I just have a couple of questions on the United Nations. In your memorandum, paragraph four, you talk about the China/US relations having improved following President Clinton's decision not to proceed with the deployment of the national missile defence. Has that led to any improvements between this Government's discussions with China on UN peacekeeping operations? I ask that because in the very same paragraph you talk about the Chinese having as a major foreign policy preoccupation the principle of the inviolability of national sovereignty. Has China at any time recently criticised this Government's intervention in Sierra Leone, for example?

(Mr Cook) No, not that I am aware of, but it would be surprising if they were to do so in the terms of the ideology you refer to there because they have always drawn a clear distinction that where you are present in a peacekeeping role at the invitation of the host government then you are not infringing sovereignty. Our presence in Sierra Leone is wildly popular with the people of Sierra Leone and has the whole backing of the Sierra Leone Government. There is not a sovereignty issue there. Where China draws the line is in actions which do not have the support of the host government.

291 As in Kosovo?

(Mr Cook) Yes, where by Chinese ideology we would have required the permission of the Government of Belgrade to rescue the Kosovo-Albanians from the troops of the Government of Belgrade.

292 Have there been any changes in the Chinese perception concerning the reform of the United Nations, for example on the issue of the further development of peacekeeping operations and the setting up of more stable permanent operations within that peacekeeping dimension?

(Mr Cook) No. China's political hostility to this area of debate relates to those matters we call intervention which by definition they see as hostile to the host government. In terms of developing a peacekeeping operation of the kind described by the Brahimi Report, their contributions have been measured and constructed and, indeed, the Millennium Summit produced a discussion among the P5 members which showed a very substantial degree of common ground in relation to the Brahimmi Report. We are now seeking to take that forward and Britain is very much in the vanguard of trying to push for agreement to the Brahimi proposals. I hope we will be able to make progress by next spring and so long as China does not feel that this is the thin end of the wedge for the wider kind of intervention we are talking about I would not anticipate a major dispute with China.

293 Are they willing to engage in any way in the debate concerning the principle of the reform of the United Nations?

(Mr Cook) By that you mean the Security Council?

294 Yes.

(Mr Cook) I cannot claim to recall a recent announcement by them on this but the Brahimi Summit did produce 150 different commitments in support of reform of the Security Council. We are now actively trying to build on that to get agreement during this General Assembly to an increased ceiling for the numbers of permanent and non-permanent members. How they are then filled is a much more difficult task but until we get the numbers right we cannot proceed to that. Mr Sprake, can you inform us about China's attitude to this question.

(Mr Sprake) I think China tends to be fairly conservative in its approach and does not want to take the lead on these issues. I think certainly it would not be unwilling to see changes in the Security Council provided this was not likely to undermine its veto, to which it obviously attaches very great importance.

Chairman: We will now move on to Hong Kong. Ms Abbott?

Ms Abbott

295 This Committee takes a great interest in Hong Kong, we have visited it twice in this Parliament. Obviously the overall handover went tremendously well but there are a few issues that were raised with us when we were last there. One of them is the Hong Kong administration on the mainland are negotiating extradition agreements. What is the Government's attitude towards this?

(Mr Cook) First of all, can I very much welcome the interest that the Committee shows in Hong Kong. I think it is very important that we send a clear signal, first to Hong Kong and to Beijing, that we retain a great interest in Hong Kong, we regard it as a friend and as a major trading partner and that is not something we have moved on from. On the extradition negotiations that you refer to, this is a matter for the Government of the special administrative region but we would expect any outcome to be wholly consistent with the basic law and with the judicial process of Hong Kong.

296 Does Her Majesty's Government feel there is anything it can do, or should do, to discourage mainland intervention in Hong Kong politics?

(Mr Cook) We spent the whole of the negotiating process up to the handover trying to get agreements so that could not happen, or should not happen. Indeed, the agreements that we reached with Beijing were specifically designed in order to prevent that from happening. Hong Kong, since handover, has retained its democratic institution. The turn-out in the recent election was slightly down on the first election at the time of handover but it was still quite high, it was higher than the elections that preceded hand over, so there was a marginal increase in the vote for the Democratic Party. We have some concerns about some issues that have developed since hand over but by and large the institutions have remained in tact and we do not currently have major concerns about political interference from Beijing.

297 As I said, overall the handover went very well but, for instance, in April of this year the Deputy Head of the Central Liaison Office in Hong Kong issued instructions that "the media [in Hong Kong] should not treat speeches and views advocating Taiwan's independence as normal news items, nor should they report them". This has caused a lot of concern in the territory. Is this anything which Her Majesty's Government feels able to do anything about?

(Mr Cook) We would wholly disagree with that statement. I think at the time we issued a statement disagreeing with it. If I recall rightly it was covered in our six monthly report as well. It is not a statement we would agree with, nor is it one that we believe is proper in terms of the agreed terms for the establishment of a Hong Kong special administrative region. Ms Marsden, would you like to amplify that?

(Ms Marsden) If I could just add that both in April and June of this year the British Government did make statements on some controversial remarks which had been made by officials of the Chinese Government's Liaison Office in Hong Kong. On both occasions we did publicly make our views clear.

Mr Rowlands

298 The Chinese have blocked the appointment of a Taiwanese Liaison Officer in Hong Kong, have they not?

(Mr Cook) I am not sighted on that. We can enquire into that. We should not underrate the extent to which China is opposed to anything which provides Taiwan recognition of state. Do you know any more on this, Mr Sprake?

(Mr Sprake) No. I know that there was an issue of a Taiwanese. I do not know whether he was there as a travel officer or whatever but there were problems over that. I think we had better write to the Committee.

(Mr Cook) We will submit a note.

Ms Abbott

299 On both visits we were privileged to meet the Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, and he was very amiable both times, but if anything on our last visit he was less interested in moving rapidly to universal suffrage than when we originally saw him. Does Her Majesty's Government see any scope at all towards more rapid movement to universal suffrage for all of the seats in the LegCo and direct election of the Chief Executive? You will know the views of people like Martin Lee and Emily Lau on this subject.

(Mr Cook) If I recall rightly there is a timetable for the achievement of both a wider franchise for the LegCo and for the direct election of the Chief Executive by 2007. The timetable was part of the agreement and we would expect that timetable to be adhered to.

300 But you do not see any possibility of it moving any faster than that?

(Mr Cook) I would strongly counsel the Committee against pressing for anything that disturbs the agreements of the Joint Declaration on Basic Law because the moment we start pressing for rearrangement of it, the Chinese will start pressing for it.

Chairman

301 Foreign Secretary, you mentioned the problems of those members of the Roman Catholic community who are in difficulties because they profess allegiance to the Vatican, the Holy See and not to the Chinese appointed authorities. Did this issue arise in your recent visit to the Holy See, the question of China?

(Mr Cook) No, it did not. I would not wish that to be interpreted as any lack of interest or strength of feeling in that within the Holy See. We have ourselves raised it and I think we did so in the dialogue last week - yes, Martin confirms that - and we will continue to do so.

302 Do we have any views on the fact that His Holiness, the Pope, was refused a pastoral visit to China?

(Mr Cook) It is our view that His Holiness should be entitled to visit any country where he has a pastoral role.

303 Have we or our EU colleagues made any representations in that respect?

(Mr Cook) I would need to enquire into that and come back to you, Chairman.

Chairman: We have probably covered quite a substantial amount of the ground. I know Sir John wants to take matters a little further on the co-operation side.

Sir John Stanley

304 Before asking this question I wish to declare an interest in that I visited the Republic of South Korea as a guest of the South Korean Government in September. Foreign Secretary, as you know there are continuing close relations between the Chinese Government and the Government of North Korea and, as has been well recorded, prior to the historic meeting between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-Il, Chairman Kim Jong-Il went to Beijing. Foreign Secretary, can you tell us do you think that an area where Britain and China may be able to work together constructively in foreign policy terms is in trying to assist and support the process of the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula?

(Mr Cook) I would certainly hope so. It is very significant that the Government of South Korea welcomes any increased international involvement with North Korea because they rightly identify increased contact between North Korea and the modern world as being helpful and supportive of their process of rapprochement between the two Koreas. The decision that I announced last week that we were going to commence diplomatic relations with North Korea was warmly welcomed by President Kim in South Korea. It is not easy to be certain what role China has played in this but it is interesting that the President of North Korea did visit China the month before the famous summit which achieved the breakthrough and I think the very least one can infer from that is that China did not obstruct that move and may well have been supportive of it. Therefore, I hope that together we can help to open up dialogue with North Korea and encourage it to become engaged with the modern world, to understand that modern world and, as part of that process, bring down the barriers between it and South Korea.

305 Do you think the Chinese Government would be supportive of a policy decision by the North Korean Government, which of course the United States is pressing for, to abandon its strategic missile programme?

(Mr Cook) Strictly speaking that is a question for the Government of China and I am not sure to what extent I would wish to anticipate what their policy position might be. It is the case, as has already been referred to, that the Government of China is extremely apprehensive and concerned about the implications of the National Missile Defence programme. Therefore, anything that reduced the pressure for the National Missile Defence programme one assumes would be welcomed in Bejing.

Chairman

306 Foreign Secretary, the European Union, you sit on the General Affairs Council, and clearly any developed Common Foreign and Security Policy must encompass China. Can you tell the Committee about the extent to which there is co-operation within the EU context in respect of China?

(Mr Cook) There are frequent occasions when we discuss China together, particularly in the build up to the annual Geneva meeting. We had an extensive closed session on our policy in relation to China in the context of the Geneva meeting in February or March of this year which was quite a full discussion. It was again a matter on which we had an informal discussion over dinner at the Avignon meeting of ministers only a month ago. It is a matter on which we frequently compare notes and exchange views.

307 Is it a matter of comparing notes and exchanging views or is there any attempt to go beyond exchanging views?

(Mr Cook) I do not want to put that forward in a diminishing way. Indeed, in the context of our discussions in the spring about Geneva we did reach very formal conclusions which were binding on us all.

308 Given the position of Mr Solana, how would you like to see the EU policy in respect of China evolve over the next few years?

(Mr Cook) I think we have established already what is the central dilemma about China. We can all readily identify the direction in which we wish to see internal changes go in China on democracy and human rights. What is much more difficult is to readily identify how we promote those human rights and democracy within China. If we can find ways in which we can achieve greater progress on that then that is certainly something I would warmly welcome within the European Union. Our voice on this is likely to be more successful if we can all say the same thing at the same time rather than different things.

309 Do you find that commercial differences obstruct the possibility of a co-ordinated approach?

(Mr Cook) No. I do think this is rather over-stated. China is a significant market. During 1999 we exported as much to Finland as to China, in 1998 we exported as much to Denmark as to China. Our policy towards Finland and Denmark is not ruled by commercial consideration.

Dr Godman

310 Just very briefly, following on the question the Chairman put to you concerning the European Union and its security policy. Have the Chinese at any time voiced an opinion regarding the creation of a European Union rapid response force or are they totally uninterested in such a development?

(Mr Cook) I am not aware of any opinion they have expressed. Certainly in my meetings with Mr Tang, the Chinese Foreign Minister, this is not an issue on which he has expressed any unease. I do not think they have any grounds for anxiety nor am I aware of them having expressed any anxiety. Am I wrong, Mr Sprake?

(Mr Sprake) No, I think in general China welcomes any moves towards European integration because they see the EU as a counter-balance to the United States. Certainly I have not heard them express any views about the EU force.

Mr Rowlands

311 As I declared at the beginning I went to Taiwan for a week. It was fascinating. This is a society that had been an autocratic one, a one party state since 1949. It began to embrace political reforms to the point where at the last election they elected for the first time an opposition president, albeit on a 39 per cent vote. The Taiwanese put it to me that if this had happened almost anywhere else there would have been resounding declarations of congratulations and best wishes from almost every Western power of such good governance and development of political plural democracy but there was a very sotto voce rather quiet, almost silent response to this chain of events. Do you think those observations are fair? If so, is it because we are over-sensitive to China's attitude?

(Mr Cook) No. Taiwan is not a state and, therefore, you would not expect the same degree of international acclaim for the election of a president there as you might for a recognised independent state. Nevertheless, we do value the strength and health of democracy within Taiwan, which is very good news indeed, and the Taiwanese Parliament in some ways has stronger powers than our own Parliament in relation to its government. President Chen, since taking office, has been very responsible and very sensible in how he has taken forward his statements in relation to China and has not provided the statements which had caused concern and anticipation within China. We were rather taken aback by his election. We strongly support the mature, responsible line being taken by President Chen. Because of that I think he himself would fully understand why the world would not treat his election as if it was the election of a head of state.

312 We and our European partners presumably take every opportunity to make it very clear that any resolution of the conflict over status of Taiwan should be resolved not by the threat of force or by force, it should actually be done by political negotiation and discussion?

(Mr Cook) Absolutely.

313 We need to repeat that over and over again, do we not?

(Mr Cook) It is our clear policy and our clear position and, to be fair to the Government of China, it has not departed from that perspective. Provided there is no attempt at a declaration of independence by Taiwan the Government of China would see its way forward in relation to Taiwan through that process of negotiation by peaceful means. We should perhaps remember that the basis of the Hong Kong handover of one country two systems was a formulation originally developed for Taiwan, not for Hong Kong.

314 Finally, in the supplementary brief that your Department sent us, paragraph ten, there is rather a sad observation that because we granted a visa to President Lee the Chinese cancelled the visit to our Economic Secretary to the Treasury. If such future types of applications arrive are we going to be affected by such pettiness as clearly occurred in this case or will we maintain a reasonably independent role when dealing with the application for visas of this kind?

(Mr Cook) I would hope the Foreign Office would always maintain an independent robust view. The visa granted to former President Lee was entirely consistent with our policy which is that we will grant visas for private visas or business visas to the United Kingdom but we will not grant visas for political visits to the United Kingdom. It was on that basis that former President Lee obtained a visa in order to attend the graduation - if I remember rightly - of his daughter.

Chairman: Foreign Secretary, we now move on to the Middle East. I understand Mr Goulty, the Director on the Middle East and North Africa has arrived.