WEDNESDAY 7 JUNE 2000
_________
Members present:
Mr Donald Anderson, in the Chair
Ms Diane Abbott
Mr David Chidgey
Sir Peter Emery
Dr Norman A Godman
Mr Andrew Mackinlay
Sir David Madel
Mr Ted Rowlands
Sir John Stanley
_________
MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
THE RT HON ROBIN COOK, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, MR EMYR JONES PARRY CMG, Political
Director, MR NIGEL SHEINWALD, Director, European Union, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, examined.
Chairman
124. Good morning, Foreign Secretary. I know that this is going
to be a busy day for you, as it is for the Committee. I would like to welcome
you and your two colleagues, Mr Emyr Jones Parry, Political Director at the
Foreign Office, and Mr Nigel Sheinwald, who is a Director for the European
Union, shortly to be translated to Brussels as the United Kingdom Permanent
Representative to the Council. We congratulate you on that. Can I say this,
that we understand you will be leaving for Sierra Leone later ----
(Mr Cook) Immediately after this hearing.
125. So we have timetabled this for 10 o'clock until 12. We have
a very busy agenda. May I also say that the Committee, at 12, will be having
the press launch of our report on Kosovo which we believe is a significant
report and, therefore, we will be, virtually immediately, going into the press
conference relating to our report.
(Mr Cook) I, of course, look forward to studying the report on Kosovo
when it comes out. Can I thank the Committee for agreeing to shift the
hearing to this morning. I am advised that if I do not land in Sierra Leone
in daylight I have to transfer to HMS OCEAN by dinghy rather than by
helicopter, and I am anxious to land in daylight.
Sir Peter Emery: Even the opposition would not wish that on you!
Chairman
126. Foreign Secretary, the very important Council at Feira. We
know that much of the work is, in effect, not related to one council but is,
essentially, work in progress, whether it be the size of Europe and
innovation, and science, whether it be the social context deriving from
earlier conferences, or justice and home affairs. I would like to begin on
the IGC and enlargement, because we understand that a progress report will be
given by the Portuguese Presidency at Feira on that. Of course, the progress
report on the IGC will eventually point to the date timetable for enlargement
since the whole institutional changes are an essential pre-requisite to
enlargement. On this, do you recognise that some applicant countries are
being frustrated at the slippage in the timetable? Poland and Hungary seem
to have promised their electorates that they would aim to complete
negotiations by, say, the end of 2001, then the ratification process, and they
would hope to be members by the end of 2003. Now there is talk, in part
because of the Polish question, of slippage until 2005. We understand that
Commissioner Verheugen was talking of a timetable in the autumn but he may
have been slapped down by the Council of Ministers on that. So may I put this
to you: first of all, is it your judgment that there is inevitably slippage
from the original expected date of 2003 or thereabouts for the first wave -
perhaps, the Luxembourg wave - of candidate countries?
(Mr Cook) Can I firstly say that the policy of the British Government,
and I think this is the consensus when one compares it with the European
consensus across all parties, is that we must maintain momentum in the
enlargement process. It is fair to say that within the European Union Britain
has been the foremost advocate of rapid progress in enlargement and the need
to take the decisions that are necessary to prepare Europe for enlargement.
At the same time, even Britain has been careful not to, at any point, announce
specific deadlines on dates, precisely because, as we have always said, the
rate will be determined on the pace of reform in the European Union and, also,
amongst the applicant countries themselves. That is what will decide the
date, not any arrival of a day in Canada. I would not accept that there has
been any slippage in any realistic timetable. For instance, on the question
of the intergovernmental conference, there has been intense discussion. We
have not yet reached decisions but decisions were anticipated at the end of
the year. It remains our judgment that it is possible to get the decisions
at the end of the year, if there is a willingness to face up to the decisions
that are required. So I do not see slippage in the IGC's timetable. What
Commissioner Verheugen said at the end of last year was that the objective
should be to prepare the European Union to be ready to receive new members in
2002, and by that he meant that we should have completed our own internal
reform process. If we complete the IGC at the December Nice European Council
it is entirely credible that we could complete the ratification process in
2002. That, of course, does not imply a judgment as to whether enlargement
can then proceed because that will require the candidate countries to bring
their laws and their economic practices into line with European standards.
We have made good progress on that. We have managed to get through most of
the chapters of the European Union acquis with the first wave of applicant
countries. I would shade in the margin, of course, that one of the reasons
we have secured that is because, I think rightly, the more difficult chapters
were left to the end so we could build up momentum to help carry us through
the larger hurdles. There will be some difficult decisions reached then, but
at the moment I think we have made as realistic progress as was possible.
There has been, I share this with the Committee, some concern among the
applicant countries, not I think about any real complaint about the timetable
but about the tone of some of the comments from parts of Europe over recent
months. I think they have found it helpful to have Britain constantly saying
we must make rapid progress on enlargement and that those coming in must be
full members of the European Union.
127. Provision is made in the six-year budget as from 2003 for new
applicants. That may be some target date.
(Mr Cook) I am told that there is provision made in 2002 but, let us be
clear, that is very much contingency planning. At Berlin the European Union
did adopt a financial perspective up to 2006 which did involve quite
substantial changes to the budget lines in order to create the room for
enlargement. It is well-known Britain would have liked to have gone further
in relation to the agricultural spend, but we made good progress and some
painful decisions were taken.
128. Certainly some of us have noticed a degree of frustration on
the part of the candidate countries. If, Foreign Secretary, you agree that
the process of enlargement is irreversible, can one not see some way of giving
a clear signal to the candidate countries that they will be accepted by, say,
making progress where progress can be made and allowing them already to be
part, say, of the CFSP process, where I understand already the dossier on CFSP
has already been closed in respect of a number of countries - I think in
respect of Bulgaria, as it happens, was it last week. Since this is not
something which impacts on the budget as such, would it not be a useful signal
to allow those candidate countries to be accepted as part of the CFSP?
(Mr Cook) In terms of practical execution of the CSFP I think it is
fair to say, to all intents and purposes, they are part of it. For instance,
if we adopt sanctions as a European Union we expect associate members also to
apply those sanctions, and in relation to the Serbian conflict in Kosovo most
of the associated countries were quite diligent during the period of the
conflict in applying the measures we took and have been supportive. It is
difficult to foresee us getting agreement to a situation in which associate
countries sat with members of the European Union and participated in decisions
of the European Union while they, themselves, are not members of the European
Union. We have regular discussions with them and, indeed, they will all be
coming to Brussels next week for discussions with the General Affairs Council
of Foreign Ministers, and I think it is fair to say that there is no major
difference in our international perspective. We would certainly wish them and
encourage them to carry out with us a foreign policy, but it is difficult to
see them as being participating members whilst not members of the European
Union.
129. Although it is a relatively discrete area with limited
financial implications.
(Mr Cook) The financial implications of the CSFP is a matter of some
controversy at the moment, but it is not that discrete. For instance, let us
take the case of Montenegro. The General Affairs Council adopted the position
that we really do have to show solidarity in Montenegro, and we also had to
defeat Milosevic's attempt to undermine the economy of Montenegro. This has
involved us, over a period of time, in consultation with the finance ministers
and has had substantial impact on the decisions of the finance ministers. I
think it would be more difficult to get finance ministers to listen with care
to us if they felt decisions were heavily influenced by people who were not
representative of the finance ministers.
130. I think, with respect, your own views are less advanced on
this than those of the Portuguese Presidency, who seem more willing to make
that sort of gesture.
(Mr Cook) I am not aware that we are behind anybody on the question of
enlargement. As I said, to all practical intents, in terms of carrying out
the CFSP, associate members are shoulder to shoulder with us. I am not aware
of any complaint with them on this matter.
Dr Godman
131. You talk about realistic progress being made and you are not
so sure that slippage will occur. You are being a little optimistic, are you
not? If part of the task is to prepare the European Union itself for
enlargement - in other words, prepare Member States for enlargement - it seems
to me, and I have said this to you before, that a major stumbling block,
particularly where Poland is concerned, is the failure of our partners in the
European Union to agree to the radical reform of the CAP.
(Mr Cook) Our views on this are on the record, and I am very happy to
confirm that there has been no change in that. We wanted to see a more
radical reform of agricultural spending, and, actually, within the
Agricultural Council, which operates by a qualified majority, we secured a
more radical package. Some of those changes were rolled back upon at the
meeting of the European Council, which presently proceeds not by majority
voting but by unanimity. It is a clear example where majority voting works
in Britain's interests and not against it.
132. Even with majority voting, the opposition amongst Member
States to such comprehensive reform of this institution, of the CAP must mean
we are still not going to hit the target dates, are we? There are some
countries which are perfectly prepared to delay enlargement in order to
protect their farming communities, in order to see that CAP remains largely
unchanged. It is not going to change before 2006, is it?
(Mr Cook) It will change in that the decisions on the dates and the
decisions on the price cuts were taken at Berlin and at the European Council,
and only a further European Council could change those decisions. There are
no proposals for it to do so. We would have liked to have seen more rapid
progress on those dates and targets, particularly in relation to dairy
products, but the package is still quite substantial. Indeed, in the food
bill for the average household of four it will represent a saving of œ64 a
year. So one should not under-rate what we secured. Britain, traditionally,
quite rightly, is in the forefront of demanding further reforms of CAP. I do
think, on this, the tide of international pressure is with us. The next WTO
round is almost certain to compel the European Union to look even more
searchingly at what is a protectionist system.
133. Not dismissing for one second some of the gains that you have
secured - this question of the saving of œ60 odd on the food bill is very
important, especially for families on low incomes, that goes without saying.
However, at the same time, if the CAP is not comprehensively reformed we face
the danger, if we stick to the timetable, of introducing a two-class system
vis-a-vis the CAP. Do we not?
(Mr Cook) That is a contentious issue, and the Berlin agreement made
the assumption that there would not be direct payment to farmers in accession
countries. That, of course, is not something that is necessarily welcome news
within the accession countries. I have to say, if we are serious about reform
of the agricultural policy then the direct payment to farmers is not something
that we should be expanding at the present time, and I think if we want to
secure a more searching reform of the agricultural policy in the future we
should minimise the extent to which we create clients to the present programme
in the process of enlargement.
134. Some of these other Member State governments are keenly aware
of the farming vote.
(Mr Cook) Not just the accession countries, some of the present ones,
too.
135. Sure. I think of the Republic of Ireland and other countries
where these matters loom large. This question of the applicant countries
facing the problem of being denied the same rights that others enjoy vis-a-vis
the CAP must cause you, surely, considerable concern. You are not going to
achieve that radical reform, are you? Bluntly.
(Mr Cook) I think there will be radical reform of the agricultural
policy, yes. I think it is inevitable. We can speculate and debate the time
it happens but it is inconceivable that in the modern world the agricultural
policy will continue unchanged and without radical restructuring. Norman, you
began your question, quite properly and quite rightly, by encouraging me to
reach further for reform of the agricultural policy, and I am very receptive
to further ambitions and aspirations in this regard. However, if we are
serious about doing that then I think we have to be very careful about the
extent to which enlargement creates further clients and further pressures
against reform. That is why we are very anxious that in the course of
enlargement the process of reform of the agricultural policy is given a boost
and not given a major obstacle. I think the other point I would make is that
one should look at the totality of the package available for the accession
countries. The terms of the package are pretty generous. The major changes
that were made at Berlin were in relation to the Structural Fund spending.
Those were painful - painful for us and more painful for other countries. But
the consequence of that is that we provided the headroom for up to 4 per cent
of GDP to be received by each new member country in Structural Funds. 4 per
cent of GDP is a very big contribution. It is equivalent to the contribution
of North Sea oil at its height in Britain. One should not under-rate the
extent to which the overall financial impact is positive. To some extent it
is down to the countries as to how they contribute and how well they use that
additional resource.
Sir John Stanley
136. Foreign Secretary, could I turn to European defence. In the
paper, which you have tabled for the Committee, you say that amongst the
United Kingdom objectives in this area are (and I quote from your paper)
"agreements that the EU can carry out crisis management operations under the
existing Treaty provisions but that a package of desirable Treaty amendments
could be incorporated into the IGC." The question I would like to ask you is:
does the British Government support amendments of the existing EU Treaty to
accommodate a greater defence authority for the EU, or does the British
Government oppose going so far as Treaty amendments in this area?
(Mr Cook) We are not in favour and are opposed to the European Union
having a defence competence. For instance, on the question of the European
Security Initiative, we see that strictly as an intergovernmental arrangement
within the Union. We do not see a role in the Commission for it. Nor at any
time have we countenanced an Article 5 commitment for territorial defence.
Our view is that this is squarely within NATO. On the issue of Treaty
amendment, there is something of a debate at the present time within the
European Union, as to whether a Treaty amendment is necessary in order to
legitimise the arrangements we are making for crisis management. Our view is
that it is entirely possible for those arrangements to proceed without any
technical amendment to the Treaty. Frankly, we are quite keen that we should
get on with making progress and putting structures into place, rather than
disappear down what could be a lengthy process of Treaty amendment and
ratification. On the balance of views at the present time, I think most
countries, with one or two exceptions, are now subscribing to that view. I
would anticipate that the balance of probability is that the European Security
Initiative will proceed without Treaty amendment but any Treaty amendment
required is of a fairly narrow and technical character.
137. That is very helpful. Obviously you cannot foresee
immediately what the outcome is going to be. You have given a view that it
is unlikely that at the end of this Council there will be a proposal to make
Treaty amendments in this area. However, (I am speaking, of course, entirely
theoretically), if it came out differently and there was some endorsement of
Treaty amendments in this area, would you be able to assure the Committee that
this would be a matter that would be dealt with, with immense care, with NATO?
This is because amongst your four working groups, which you refer to in your
paper - the four working groups between EU and NATO on Berlin plus,
capabilities, security issues and permanent EU-NATO structures - none of those
four groups specifically deal with probably the most important issue of all,
if we are going to get into the Treaty amendment area, which is the interface
between the EU Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty. Can you, therefore,
assure the Committee that if by any chance it came out that the EU was going
to go down the road towards Treaty amendment, that this would be the subject
brought up most carefully within the working groups, that it is proposed to
set up with NATO.
(Mr Cook) I am very happy to give an assurance that we would handle
this with exceptional delicacy and care. It might be helpful if I repeat that
although it may be desirable at some point to amend the Treaty to recognise
what we are doing with European security, we are very clearly of the view that
this must not either give a role for the Commission or in any way undermine
the Article 5 commitment that is squarely within NATO. I would say that this
is not a matter of contention within the European Union. There are few
countries who would welcome an Article 5 commitment. All the non-NATO
countries would find it extremely problematic because they have never agreed
to a collective defence alliance. There are other members of NATO within the
European Union equally committed, as we are, to preserving the central role
of NATO for territorial defence. The argument about whether there is a Treaty
amendment is a relatively narrow and technical area permitting the present
proposals for crisis management. The country, at the moment, that is most
attracted to a Treaty amendment is the Netherlands, which alongside Britain
is the most pro-NATO member of the European Union. I would not see this, in
any way, infringing upon the prerogatives of union with NATO.
Mr Chidgey
138. Continuing with defence for a moment, particularly with
regard to the CFSP, given that there is a drive to create a rapid reaction
force, which would be, quite rightly, capability led, I was interested in the
plans for a Capabilities Commitments Conference, which would seem to me to
require some of our European allies (and indeed ourselves) to look very hard
at our defence budgets. What sense do you get that Member States are prepared
to increase their defence spending in order to make the CFSP a reality?
(Mr Cook) Let me take one step back to be clear about what is proposed.
It is very substantial. We have adopted, as the headline goal, that in the
event of a crisis requiring an intervention or a peace keeping role, the
European countries should be capable of putting into the field within 60 days
a force of core strengths of about 60,000 personnel, and then maintain that
in the field for at least a year. Now since you anticipate a roulemont every
six months, that actually means you have to find 180,000 personnel, not just
60,000 personnel. We have taken the lead within this debate in trying to
focus the European initiative on capacity, not just on elegant decision making
mechanisms. We have also stressed the great importance of working with NATO
in defining this capacity. I have to say that I think we have made very good
progress under the Portuguese Presidency in getting the interface with NATO
right, and we very much welcome the paper that the Presidency have negotiated
on collaboration with NATO.
139. What sense do you have that other Member States are prepared
to make the same commitments that you are putting forward?
(Mr Cook) I think there is going to be a willingness on the part of a
large number of the European countries to make such a commitment. To come
back to your earlier point of an uplift in the defence budget, for most of
them this is not necessarily going to be a question of uplift in the total
bottom line of the defence budget, but it will require some searching
examination of what they require their defence spending to do and what is the
posture of their military forces. In Britain we are widely recognised in
Europe as having trail-blazed on this with the development, particularly
through the Strategic Defence Review, of more mobile, rapidly deployable,
flexible forces. We and France are the two countries in Europe which can
actually do that at the present time. There are other Member States who have
quite substantial standing armies but they lack flexibility. They are not
deployable, not mobile. Therefore, the first task for them is within their
existing defence spending: to look and make sure that they are allocating in
a way that would be supportive to the kind of roles that a modern defence
force has to do in an intervention capacity, rather than simply static defence
of their home territory. Some, at the end of that exercise, may need to look
at whether their overall spend is sufficient, but for most the starting point
is to look at whether they are spending wisely.
Sir Peter Emery
140. In replying to Sir John, I think you made it clear that you
were not in favour of any defence activity being a matter of control by the
European Commission.
(Mr Cook) Yes.
141. I wonder, therefore, whether you would explain to me how we
are going to stop that when it appeared quite definitely at the NATO
Environmental Assembly in Hungary last week that WEU was going to merge and
move into the European Union. With Mr Solana now in Brussels, how is his role
really not that of yet another commissioner, a defence commissioner, of the
European Union?
(Mr Cook) Xavier Solana is not a member of the European Commission.
142. As I say, working with the European Commission.
(Mr Cook) Xavier Solana and the Commission are both very jealous of the
fact that they are distinct entities. Xavier Solana is technically the
Secretary General of the Council of Ministers. He is the servant of the
intergovernmental arm of the European Union, not of the institutional arm of
the Commission. You use the phrase "working with". Of course, we will work
with them. Indeed, what we want to achieve - and I think this is the
attractive strength of the European Union in crisis intervention - is a
positive synergy between the defence contribution that Member States can make
collectively through the Council, and with the oversight of Xavier Solana, and
all the many humanitarian and financial economic assets which the Commission
can sum up. For instance, we saw in case of Kosovo - and have repeatedly seen
in the Balkans - that successful intervention requires a range of tools
available, one of which indeed is the military component, but equally
important is the humanitarian and economic involvement. I think the European
Union is the best placed organisation to bring those assets together in one
coherent holistic approach, but that does not mean to say that the Commission
will gets its fingers in the pie running the military.
143. Two further questions. If the WEU does merge, surely it will
mean that where there are specific commitments amongst the present members of
the Western European Union, where do the non-WEU members come to fit into the
decision making which will then arise with the European Union WEU unification?
Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Finland, all non-members of WEU, but obviously
having some role in whatever is newly created. That is the first question.
The second question is: if this comes about, what sort of Parliamentary
control or say might we have on what is happening? Will it be entirely
ministerial? Will the British Parliament have any sort of interplay with the
decisions that might be being made?
(Mr Cook) The national Parliaments would, of course, have the key
democratic role of holding Ministers to account for what they do in that
intergovernmental context. I would stress that we see that as very important.
This is because we are quite explicit that in terms of security commitments
we are contemplating this as not something on which we should be accountable
to the European Parliament. It is something for which Ministers should be
accountable to their national Parliaments. On the issue of the four members
of the European Union who are not members and, therefore, not fully in the
WEU, those countries that are fully participative in the development of the
structure, I think in some of them there was some concern, (which is
understandable, given their traditional posture of neutrality and
non-alliance), where this was going. They are now all content and some
enthusiastic about what is proposed. Sweden and Finland, although they have
never been part of a collective defence alliance, have played a very positive
and honourable part in peace keeping around the world. There is also the
issue of the interface with the other members of the WEU, particularly the six
who are in NATO but not in the European Union. Now I think it is reasonable
to say that we have played a leading part in trying to broker arrangements
with which they would be content. The paper that has now come out of the
Presidency, and approved at the recent General Affairs Council, reflects a lot
of our thinking. It is a very good base for co-operation with those six. In
brief, they will have the right to routine meetings - at least one at
ministerial level - during every Presidency, to discuss common co-operation
in this area. They will have the right to consultation if we are
contemplating launching a European led operation. And they will have the
right to participate in it. If they choose to participate in it, they will
have the same rights over the management of that operation as any other
participant, whether or not they are members of the European Union.
144. Thank you. Lastly then, how do you see certain worries and
criticisms from the Americans and Canadians about their having no
participation or role at all in this new European structure, which on the one
hand they are delighted to encourage and on the other hand they appear at
times to be slightly worried about?
(Mr Cook) America has certainly been very supportive of what we are
doing. Indeed, I notice that President Clinton, when he was in Portugal at
the European Union Summit only last week, did make a very bald statement
saying that there is no contradiction between a strong European and strong
trans-Atlantic partnership. Canada has a slightly different area of concern.
It is not at all hostile, in any way, to the European Union initiative. It
does want to be able to participate in such an initiative. We are looking for
ways in which we can reassure the Canadians that contributions from them will
be possible when it is appropriate. Obviously Canada is not a member of the
European Union and does not aspire to be so. However, it does have some very
real military assets. For instance, it has a team of 30 doing aircraft
movements at Lungi Airport in Sierra Leone at the present time. We certainly
want to keep open the door to create ways in which they could contribute if
we were in the field.
Sir David Madel
145. Can greater mobility of the static European forces be
achieved without greater expenditure?
(Mr Cook) The answer to that is certainly yes. After all, we have
achieved it in the United Kingdom. Our forces are more mobile, more flexible,
and as we have shown in Sierra Leone, that can be deployed more rapidly over
a budget that reduced very substantially in the past decade and is not
increasing now. Whether all countries can achieve that envelope is a matter
for them to address individually but some certainly can.
146. Do you think there is a political will in Germany to do this?
(Mr Cook) The great advantage of handling this issue of crisis
management for security within a European Union level is that in a number of
those countries it creates political momentum for fulfilling a commitment that
would not otherwise be there. Of course, in a sense, the proof will come in
the autumn when we have the Pledging Conference on Capabilities but the
existence of that conference does increase the pressure on Member States to
honour the obligation that they undertook a year ago when we set out that
headline goal. It is, if you like, an added source of incentive, an added
source of pressure, to move towards rapid, deployable, flexible, mobile
forces. If we do not do it this way, we will never do it any other way.
147. To what extent are you relying on German co-operation to make
it more effective?
(Mr Cook) Well, we rely on the co-operation of all Member States.
148. Yes, but Germany is the largest contributor.
(Mr Cook) Germany has a very large standing army and the Kosovo
experience has prompted a very healthy and proper debate within Germany as to
whether their very significant standing army is sufficiently flexible and
mobile.
Chairman
149. But Germany has already cut back substantially on their
present defence budget.
(Mr Cook) Yes, and so has Britain, but Britain does have a more
flexible and mobile force.
Dr Godman
150. The Helsinki Summit called for the creation, and I quote: "of
an autonomous capacity to be used for NATO as a whole ... is not engaged to
launch in conduct EU led military operations in response to its national
crisis." Is the thinking that such military operations would only, or very
largely, be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations? Which
operations, does the thinking go, would be concerned with peace keeping
operations out with Europe?
(Mr Cook) There is no present contemplation of a European Union led
operation outside Europe.
151. Outside the United Nations?
(Mr Cook) We would not be perceived to be (to use your phrase) "under
the auspices" of the United Nations in the sense of being a United Nations
force. I think recent experiences have shown that there are sometimes
advantages in the UN sub-contracting the running of the force to other
regional organisations. But we would always seek, wherever it is possible and
appropriate to do so, United Nations authorisation for what we do. We would
not necessarily wish to make that a precondition because there may be
circumstances in the case of the veto, where it might not be possible to
secure that authorisation, but it would be our preference to do so and we
would achieve it where it can be done.
152. You said "preference" and you mentioned the term
"sub-contracting". That sub-contracting for the United Nations would, of
course, give any such operation legitimacy in the eyes of the international
community.
(Mr Cook) Absolutely. We have been very supportive of the United
Nations and it is highly recognised that Britain has worked very hard to
uphold the authority of the Security Council. The reason why we would find
it difficult to make that an absolute precondition is, of course, that there
are four other members of the Security Council veto, two of whom are not
members of NATO nor of the European Union. If you take the Kosovo example,
we achieved early in the Kosovo conflict a vote in our support of 12 to 3, but
since two of the three had a veto it was never possible to get Security
Council authorisation.
153. But an EU led military operation, if it encountered hostility
or opposition within the Security Council, that would be likely to cause,
would it not, some considerable dismay amongst some of our EU partners?
(Mr Cook) First of all, I would very much prefer that we proceed on a
basis which has not only consensus within the European Union, but within that
wider group of the European Union plus the six European members of NATO, which
also had a wide international consensus. That would be our objective. On
many occasions that would be entirely achievable but I do not think I could
persuade my European partners at the outset that there would be, in effect,
a rational veto on what the EU decided to do, which is where you find yourself
if you make authorisation of the Security Council as a precondition.
Mr Rowlands
154. Following that up, Secretary of State, could you envisage a
relationship where the European Union would proceed against US opposition?
(Mr Cook) No, frankly, because any significant operation requires
access to NATO common assets, such as planning, intelligence, logistics
support, and it is not going to be possible to get access to that without the
consensus of NATO.
Chairman
155. Whilst we are on defence, the Russian Federation has been
fairly relaxed about the Baltics' accession applications. As the European
Union takes on a greater role in defence, do you anticipate that this might
lead to a change in the Russian attitudes to the Baltics?
(Mr Cook) It would be a complication if we went down the road by which
Sir John was quizzing me earlier, namely an Article 5 commitment to collective
territorial defence, but that is not on the horizon. What is currently
proposed is a crisis management operation. We have detected no unease about
this on the part of Russia.
Mr Rowlands
156. A couple of aspects on enlargement. Foreign Secretary, are
we happy now that all applicant countries are meeting the Copenhagen criteria
on good governance, etcetera?
(Mr Cook) Those within the accession process have made very good
progress on this. There is always room for further improvement and we
continue to have dialogue with a number of these countries, for instance, on
the question of ethnic minorities. But, broadly speaking, those currently
within the accession process are making good efforts to meet the Copenhagen
criteria and have accepted that this is the standard by which membership will
be judged.
157. And the slightly larger group outside?
(Mr Cook) The one case that is not yet in negotiation but is recognised
as one of the candidate countries is Turkey. The Helsinki conclusions
recognised Turkey as a candidate for membership but also made it clear that
negotiations could not commence until Turkey met the Copenhagen political
criteria.
158. The other point you made was, in fact, that a lot of the
access countries already have close relations within the CFSP. Are all
applicant countries prepared to accept in advance of accession the Code of
Conduct on arms sales? The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Sales?
(Mr Cook) I think my impression is that they all do.
159. Because that is quite serious. Places like Bulgaria and
others are major suppliers of small arms - and brokers.
(Mr Cook) Indeed. The Code of Conduct is part of the European Union
acquis. They would have to accept it as a condition of membership. I think
the governments do accept it also as an obligation on them at the present
time. Some of them have perhaps a more challenging environment in which to
apply it than existing Member States, such as ourselves, and one of the
serious issues - and it is one that is recognised by the governments - is that
Central and Eastern Europe have large quantities of surplus weaponry, not all
of which is under the immediate control of the government.
160. But the process of consultation and denial is in force, as it
were, in Central and Eastern European countries?
(Mr Cook) I would need to take advice as to whether the denial process
works. I am advised that probably the process of notification and denial does
not at present embrace the accession countries, but possibly I could do a note
to the Committee on this because this is an interesting point.
Mr Rowlands: An important one, I think.
Mr Mackinlay
161. If I could take you back to questions which were largely
raised by my colleague, Dr Godman. Both in this session and other sessions
we have had with yourself and other Ministers, this matter of the scale of
agriculture in the applicant countries. Poland is mentioned frequently when
this comes up. I have listened to these questions but it seems to me, and
from my own discussions with Polish Ministers and Polish politicians, none of
them are saying that they want - I think it is your phrase - to be additional
client countries to the agricultural subsidies. I think the question is, this
is a red herring, is it not? While it is a fact that they have big
agriculture - and I am not trying to minimise that as not being important or
a problem - they do understand, do they not, that there is not going to be an
extension of the subsidies? That is accepted, is it not?
(Mr Cook) It is certainly understood by them. I would not wish to
pretend that it is universal assent throughout all political classes but it
is understood and it is not a matter of live negotiation.
162. That is right.
(Mr Cook) Mr Sheinwald, do you wish to add to that?
(Mr Sheinwald) I think, as far as I know, all of them, and certainly
Poland, the factual position is that countries among the applicants, including
Poland, have sought to have direct payments applied to them from the date of
accession. They also understand, as the Foreign Secretary has made clear,
that there is not an understanding amongst the EU Member States that is part
of the Berlin settlement, so there is a problem there; a problem which will
have to be dealt with later in the enlargement negotiations. That will not,
fortunately for the United Kingdom point of view, prevent us, we hope next
week, from opening the Agricultural Chapter for all the Luxembourg six
countries. It will be quite an achievement to get the negotiations on to that
new footing. By next week we should have opened 29 of the 31 Chapters, which
comes back to Dr Godman's point about maintaining some momentum in the
negotiations, which I think we have achieved during the Portuguese Presidency,
despite some of the doubts that have been raised. So there is this problem
but it is not a problem for today. It will come back later in the
negotiations. Ultimately, whatever the ultimate regime for agriculture is,
it has to be one which treats the new Member States and the old ones on the
basis of equality. But usually after an accession you have a period of
transition. Maybe during that period of transition this issue can be sorted
out.
(Mr Cook) Our own preference would be that the issue of equality is
secured by reducing spending within the Member States rather than increasing
it among the applicant countries.
163. On flexibility, it is called various things - multi-speed
Europe, flexibility - I think in the past HMG has expressed the view that we
do not want to favour this. I wonder if you could give us an update on the
latest position on this. I happen to agree. I think HMG is quite correct.
(Mr Cook) Thank you. I am very happy to rest on this point.
164. I do not know there is much more I can do but assent!
(Mr Cook) The current in-vogue phrase is "enhanced co-operation", by
which it is proposed that a number of core members may forge ahead with a
further development of integration between themselves. One should clearly
distinguish between that concept and the other use of the word flexibility,
which sometimes appears, which is the flexibility to opt out of existing parts
of the acquis. There is no such proposal among the present Member States and
interpretation of flexibility in that form would mean vigorous resistance of
the very countries which were proposing the enhanced co-operation of
flexibility. We should remember that enhanced co-operation was, of course,
provided for in the Amsterdam Treaty. Therefore, it has been fully enforced
now for well over a year. In the times since Amsterdam nobody has actually
produced an example of what would be a function of enhanced co-operation. It
is broadly accepted that it would be improper to proceed with enhanced
co-operation if that would distort the single market. You must have a single
market. You cannot have an outer and an inner single market. There is
already a form of enhanced co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs through
the Schengen Agreement. Within the Common Foreign Security Policy, by
definition, a common foreign policy has to be a common foreign policy. Things
like the European Security Initiative offer models for variation of
participation. Not every country might take part in the European led
organisation and those who do not take part would not be responsible for its
operation. Beyond these different observations, which affect all three
pillars of the European Union, it is very hard to see how much room there is
for further enhanced co-operation; and those who are promoting it as a model
have not come up with an example of where it might be applied. Now what would
be under discussion, perhaps in the remainder of the Intergovernmental
Conference, is how we refine and amend the arrangements that were put in place
at Amsterdam but, to be candid, those refinements would be relatively modest
and at the present time those promoting enhanced co-operation have not come
up with a model of how it would work.
Chairman
165. One form of enhanced co-operation is the euro.
(Mr Cook) Indeed.
Sir Peter Emery
166. Enhanced co-operation without us seems to be the move which
was announced over the weekend, with a greater co-operation of what I think
used to be known as the X Committee working towards a furtherance of economic,
financial and commercial policies of the 11, with us sitting outside the door,
having no say in what is going on. That is hardly enhanced co-operation, is
it, Foreign Secretary?
(Mr Cook) I fear, to come back to what you say, that you put your
finger on exactly why we have a degree of scepticism about enhanced
co-operation. On the question of Euro 11, the rules for Euro 11 were drawn
up at the Luxembourg European Council. Those rules may be perfectly plain.
Where every financial or economic decision is taken affecting the whole of the
European Union, then the whole of the European Union has to take part. In
other words, those decisions have to be taken in the full ECOFIN meeting.
Plainly we cannot and should not object to members of the euro currency taking
technical decisions about the management of the currency of which they are
part. As we are out of that currency we cannot expect to participate in that.
But where this moves beyond technical decisions about the currency to wider
financial and economic issues which affect us, then that is certainly
something where all members of the European Union within ECOFIN should
participate.
167. But if the Government made its position much more clear about
its final intent to enter into the euro, would this not allow us to be a
greater participant in the Committee of the 11?
(Mr Cook) No, you could not join the Committee of Eleven unless you
were joining the euro. A statement of intent is not going to give you the
pass to the door. But, of course, it is very important for us that our
partners in Europe understand that this Government accepts the case for
membership in principle has been made and that it is our intention to join if
the economic conditions are met. Perhaps I should add for the Committee, that
after Feira it will not be the Euro Eleven, it will be the Euro Twelve,
because Greece will become a member at Feira. Denmark is holding a referendum
in September, Sweden has an active debate at the present time, and plainly a
consideration for the British debate is the extent to which the balance of
forces shift further every time somebody else joins and we are left that bit
---
Sir Peter Emery: We are left more isolated?
Mr Rowlands
168. Are you accepting the word "isolated"? You are nodding. Is
that the word which could be put in your nodding mouth?
(Mr Cook) I do not express a view on it.
Sir Peter Emery
169. Oh do!
(Mr Cook) I have always expressed the view, and I do not resile from
it, that the longer the euro continues and achieves stability and soundness,
the greater the arguments tip in favour of Britain eventually becoming a
member.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, linked to enhanced co-operation is Franco-
German co-operation and the recent speech made by Herr Fischer, and I think
Sir David as a question on that.
Sir David Madel
170. Foreign Secretary, this is the speech that the German Foreign
Minister made in Berlin on 12th May in which he supported the EU moving
towards a new constitution and direct elections for a European government.
Would it be correct to say that that would not be your view and would not be
the view of the British Government?
(Mr Cook) I am happy to say that is absolutely the case. One of the
delights of being a member of the European Union is that we have 15 foreign
ministers and that greatly adds to the richness and diversity of European
Union debate, but a speech by one of the 15 does not become European Union
policy. I think it is also fair to say that in this reaction we are not
alone. There was a very robust statement from the Swedish Foreign Minister
recently saying that a Federal Europe is not the vision of the Swedish
Government, and they of course will have the presidency come January, and
indeed the Finish Foreign Minister has been even more robust in his comments.
171. There was a robust statement last December by the German
Chancellor at his party congress, when he said that the nation state would be
the centre of Europe's hopes and needs. You would agree with that?
(Mr Cook) I would, and indeed it is interesting that President Chirac
recently, after the Fischer speech, did say that the European force today is
a natural convergence of national desires. President Chirac is, of course,
already on record as saying his vision is not a United States of Europe but
a United Europe of States.
172. But really what the German Chancellor was saying last
December was really giving us, if we so wish as a nation state, considerable
flexibility within the European Union to do what we wish. We appear to have
a powerful ally in the German Chancellor.
(Mr Cook) I think it is fair to say that nearly every Member State of
the European Union sees the future of the European Union as being very firmly
based within the identity of the nation state and as a union of member states
preserving their identity, preserving their own democratic traditions. It is
quite interesting that if you look at Joschka Fischer's speech in detail,
there are strong passages in the speech where he himself also recognises that,
for instance in the context of the European Parliament he appears to propose
that the European Parliament should be formed from the national parliaments
rather than, as at present, directly elected.
173. Do you think that one of the reasons why there is a degree of
unpopularity about the European Union in this country - and it is difficult
to measure - is because so often the European Union has been over-ambitious
in what it is trying to do?
(Mr Cook) I would not accept that the Union has been over-ambitious in
what it has set its hand to do. I think that we possibly get over-excited by
an occasional isolated speech which then appears reported, as that particular
one was, as some grand European master plan. I think - well, I know - at the
present time I feel more comfortable that our approach over the European
Union, working together in close co-operation, tackling in a cross-border way
the increasing number of cross-border problems we have, but preserving our
identity as Member States and our democracies as nations, is one which
actually has much more support in the majority than a concept of a federal
government with its own sovereignty within Europe.
Mr Chidgey
174. Just on the back of Sir David's questions, could I refer you
to a meeting that Sir Stephen Wall had before the European Parliament's
Constitutional Affairs Committee when, understandably, the question of Herr
Fischer's speech was raised? He replied to the comments made that he did not
believe that Herr Fischer's speech was extraordinary and that close co-
operation was always going to be on the agenda, "however it raised fundamental
questions about the underlying philosophy of the EU." Would you agree with
me that the underlying philosophy that is now being questioned is whether or
not the EU will continue to be what it is supposed to be, which is an
inclusive group of nation states, or that it will become an exclusive grouping
of different states?
(Mr Cook) I think you very accurately identify where the critical issue
of debate is now going to develop. To be fair to Joschka Fischer, in his
speech he does himself stress that, for instance, any version of enhanced co-
operation must be inclusivist, not exclusivist, in other words must be open
to all Member States who wish to join, and that the members of any enhanced
co-operation project are not entitled to draw up rules by which others can
then join which become barriers. So he would, were he here, argue that he
adopted an inclusive approach to the European Union. I think there is an
alternative perspective among particularly the applicant countries who are a
bit nervous that the debate, of which that speech was part, runs the risk that
they will not be treated as full members on membership. Our perspective ---
175. Full or equal, Foreign Secretary?
(Mr Cook) I am very happy to accept either formulation.
176. One can see the difference?
(Mr Cook) Well, full and equal, let's say. We believe that it is very
important that they should, partly because in order to obtain membership they
have to carry through some very painful and unpopular reforms, and it is vital
that we give them every incentive to do so.
177. I have three or four questions, Foreign Secretary, on the
Charter of Fundamental Rights which are a bit complicated, so I will try and
take them carefully but I think they are very relevant to the current debate
which, sadly, seems to be carried on in the press rather than Parliament about
the Charter of Fundamental Rights at the moment. To start off, in your
understanding will the Council during the deliberations on the Charter in Nice
be able to amend the text of the draft charter in order to reach agreement,
or will the proposals just be a text we either take or leave?
(Mr Cook) Nothing can take away the right of the Heads of Government to
amend anything they choose to set their hands to. By convention, we try to
pre-cook it so that the Heads of Government can make as much progress as
possible on consensus, but ultimately the European Council can make its own
decisions and will do so. Can I say on the recent press reports that, of
course, what was published on that occasion was not a final plan, what was
produced on that occasion was the text of work in progress and there will be
a lot of changes before we ever get anywhere near Nice.
178. Has the Government considered enabling the Union to become a
high contracting party to the ECHR? How will that be achieved in the context
of the Charter rights and its position in the Treaty? What will be the
ramifications for our legal system and the ECJ in those circumstances? It is
a three-part question.
(Mr Cook) At this point I think it is probably prudent for me,
Chairman, to confess to not being a lawyer, so I can robustly express my
policy positions on this but at some point I may need to seek legal advice on
some of the complex issues which have been referred to. First of all, the
Government's position is that the Charter should not become a legally-based
document. When this enterprise was launched in Cologne we foresaw it as, and
it was agreed as, a presentation of existing rights. There is a case for a
declaratory code which establishes what the existing legal human rights are
in the European Union and I do not think anybody could reasonably object to
gathering them in one document, but that is a different matter from that
document becoming a legally-binding text with justiciable authority.
Secondly, we were clear that going into the Charter should be a codification
of existing rights which would not be the basis for rolling forward new
rights. Indeed what are human rights are well-established and have been well-
discussed over the decades, so there is not any great controversy as to what
is within the corpus of accepted fundamental human rights. You raise a
separate question which is the issue of the European Convention on Human
Rights. One of our concerns about the Charter becoming legally binding is
that this could have the perverse effect of undermining the present structure
of human rights law in Europe which is firmly based on the European Convention
and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. It would not seem to
us actually helpful in reinforcing the primacy of human rights law within
European societies if we were to create a rival to a system which has served
us well. Presumably, if the Charter of Rights were to be legally justiciable,
one could envisage a situation in which the European Court of Justice was
giving rulings which may not necessarily be the same as the rulings in the
Strasbourg Court.
179. Indeed I accept that readily. One final point, just to take
us a little further, and I do accept it is incredibly complicated to put it
in terms of our policy, but I think it is important just to tease this out,
Foreign Secretary. As we have discussed, there has been a lot of press
invective about the Charter as a sort of quasi-constitution for Europe but it
is important to remember that Chris Patten was recently supportive of a
document or statement specifying what the responsibilities of nation states
should be with regard to the Union. That sounds to me a little bit like a
constitution or a statute of limitations which sets out the roles of each
tier. What is the Government's position on such a limiting document? Would
you agree, Foreign Secretary, that should the Charter become justiciable - and
I obviously heard your argument why it should not be but should it become
justiciable - it would best be done within the format of such a document?
(Mr Cook) We have always been very sceptical about any clear and, if
you like, constitutional text setting down the European competencies of Member
States. I understand why some people feel that clarity might be desirable,
indeed one can see there are two sides to the argument, but, frankly, we think
it would take up an enormous amount of energy, emotion and effort and it is
probably rather better that we get on with making the European Union actually
work. This may be a characteristically limited British perspective and does
not always chime with the more Napoleonic approaches elsewhere within the
European Union, but it does seem to us to be the right set of priorities. On
the Charter of Rights, as I say we opposed it being legally justiciable. I
do think you are right to be sceptical about some of the press claims of the
last few days; it is very hard to see how a declaratory statement of existing
human rights could possibly be misrepresented as a European constitution.
These are the human rights we ascribe to, we do not challenge them, they are
not in themselves a threat to the fundamental rights of Britain but our view
is that for justiciable authority we should rely on the European Convention
on Human Rights.
Chairman
180. On this same matter, Foreign Secretary, the Portuguese
Foreign Minister has recently said that the Council of Europe will ultimately
follow the WEU into oblivion. There in one bound you will have solved the
question of any conflict between the ECHR and this Charter. Do you think that
will happen?
(Mr Cook) I would be very surprised if I see that in my life time,
Chairman. After all, the Council of Europe embraces a wide range of Central
and Eastern European states, such as the Ukraine and Russia, currently
suspended, and it has served an extremely valuable role over the decade since
the collapse of the Cold War in helping to encourage and underpin democratic
and human rights values within Central and Eastern Europe. I think the work
done by the High Commission for National Minorities is, frankly, not
sufficiently appreciated. I therefore do not see any foreseeable prospect of
the Council of Europe and its very important work on Central and Eastern
Europe being superseded by the European Union.
181. There is one legal view that even this Charter,
unincorporated into the corpus of the Union, will still be justiciable. Is
that the view which you have?
(Mr Cook) I am open to correction but I think it would not be
justiciable but the European Court of Justice does have a record of accepting
declaratory statements as guidance in judgments it might make. In other
words, if it was not justiciable one would not expect individual citizens to
appeal to the European Court of Justice on the basis of the Charter in the way
they can appeal to Strasbourg on the basis of the Convention, but in giving
any ruling on a matter before it, the European Court of Justice may make
reference to it.
182. It can take cognizance of it?
(Mr Cook) Yes. That, of course, is why we say that it is important
that the Charter should contain only existing rights and not be used as the
basis for a cutting edge for establishing new rights.
183. The French were particularly concerned that Lord Goldsmith,
who presumably was effectively speaking on behalf of the British Government
---
(Mr Cook) He is the leader of the British team.
184. --- was so adamant against the incorporation of any economic
and social rights. How do you answer that as a Labour Minister?
(Mr Cook) I do not have a problem as either a minister of the
government or as a member of the Labour Party in saying there is a distinction
between what is a fundamental human right and what is a desirable social and
employment goal. For instance, at one stage, it was proposed within the
discussions - it is not in the current text and some things in the current
text will drop out between now and Nice - we should create a right for every
citizen to three months' paid parental leave. That may or may not be a
desirable policy goal but it plainly is not a fundamental human right.
Mr Rowlands
185. I wonder if I could briefly turn to the tax issue because
that is mentioned in both the memorandum by the FCO and we had very useful
evidence on March 28th from Mr Vaz and Mr Lyall Grant which was quite clear.
Can we first of all get up to speed and hear from you on the question of the
withholding savings tax? Where does it stand and what is going to happen at
the Council on that matter?
(Mr Cook) There is a further meeting of ECOFIN before we get to Feira
but it is not possible to anticipate what may come out of it, but the movement
in Helsinki from our perspective has been very positive. It is now broadly
accepted within the European Union that the way of resolving the perceived
problem is not by a European Union-wide tax but by European Union-wide
standards of disclosure of information, so that the appropriate country can
make sure that the capital of its citizens is disclosed and is available for
tax, and that we do that on the same basis ourselves, and that we then seek
to make sure that such a disclosure of information is shared more widely than
just the European Union. This results very much from the lead taken by
Britain that the issue is a question of transparency, the issue is not one of
a pan-European tax. We have made a lot of progress on that argument and we
have got a very substantial majority of support. There is still a minority
who are holding out against withholding information, some for their own
differing domestic reasons, I hope that it will be possible to persuade them
to join the consensus, but at the moment Britain is now in a very large
majority.
186. So the confrontational high noon aspect of this is no longer
a valid description of the situation?
(Mr Cook) I think it was always slightly overdone but we are now in a
majority and we are not in any shape or form isolated on this question. I
also do think that the proposals we have made and the agreement we are near
to reaching on exchange of information is entirely healthy.
187. The other area that we raised in March was the third element
of taxation - there are three elements according to earlier evidence - and
this was the code of conduct and unfair taxation. What new kinds of tax
directives or harmonisation are going to flow from this code of unfair
taxation?
(Mr Cook) Let us be clear that the code of conduct on unfair taxation
is not about harmonisation. The code of conduct starts on the principle that
each nation state may have its own tax structure and its own tax rates. What
it is not entitled to do is, in the context of that tax rate or tax structure,
discriminate in favour of its own nationals or particular sectors of its
industry. In other words, it can adopt whatever tax rates or tax structure
it wishes, but it must apply it consistently to its own and to other European
Union companies, citizens and industrial sectors. With that in mind, the
working group has gone through the tax structures of Member States - it has
of course been chaired by a British Treasury Minister, we have taken very much
the lead on this - it has identified a significant number of practices which
it regards as discriminatory and therefore unfair. I would say that
overwhelmingly this exercise is in Britain's interests because of course that
unfair discrimination discriminates against our own exporters and investors
and, as one of the largest per capita exporting nations in the European Union,
it is very much in our interests that such unfair discrimination is ended.
188. But there is a fine distinction between harmonisation, which
you say is not going to happen as a result of this, and the idea that you have
to conform with this tax and that tax because that is the level of tax in
Country A, B or C.
(Mr Cook) It is not a question of level tax. For example, if Country
X had a tax rate of 20 per cent but had introduced a clause that its own
domestic companies would pay the tax rate at only 10 per cent, that plainly
is unfair and discriminatory. We are not saying to it, "You have to have a
tax rate of 20 per cent or 10 per cent", but "You will have to apply the same
tax rate to other Member States as you apply to your own companies."
189. So it would be possible, say under Objective 1, for the
United Kingdom to have differential corporation tax rates of the Irish kind
without offending this unfair code of conduct?
(Mr Cook) I am not familiar with the Irish corporation tax, so I cannot
really comment on that but we at the present time ---
190. It is very favourable, 10 per cent.
(Mr Cook) Yes, but we have a low corporation tax, and we are perfectly
entitled to a low corporation tax and nobody is saying we cannot have a low
corporation tax, just so long as we apply it evenly across the board.
191. Just for confirmation and to make sure it is on the record,
in reply to Sir John's question you said that there can be no tax change under
QMV, it has to be by unanimity?
(Mr Cook) We have repeatedly said that we do not see QMV applying to
taxation. Our red lines are taxation, social security, own resources, treaty
amendments, defence, border controls. By the way, I am advised that within
the code of conduct list of unfair discriminatory taxes there are currently
no UK practices.
Mr Mackinlay
192. At the Summit, will the question of Gibraltar come up at all?
(Mr Cook) It may well be discussed in the margins but there is nothing
on the agenda relating to Gibraltar. There is a number of very serious
European dimensions to the Gibraltar question. We have continued to press the
Commission for action on the border controls. We are pressing for Gibraltar
to have the right of election to the European Parliament in the course of the
forthcoming legislation in relation to the European Parliament, and there is
a number of other issues where we are seeking Commission support, for instance
on telephone numbers. I am not myself sure that tactically the right place
to raise that is in the European Council which would invite comments from
another Member State.
193. I do not want to debate with you on that but I think you are
wrong. Frankly, it is a thundering disgrace that some of our citizens are
prevented from moving freely within the European Union, but you and I would
disagree on that.
(Mr Cook) No, we would not disagree.
194. It would be very unacceptable if they were from Livingston or
Thurrock; there would be a hell of a row.
(Mr Cook) We do not disagree on that at all. I totally agree with you
on that. I do not think it is tactically wise, though, to raise it in the
full European Council.
195. We have a debate tomorrow in Westminster Hall, where no doubt
Mr Vaz will be responding, but how long are we going to have to tolerate this
before Her Majesty's Government does raise it as a substantive item, this
continuing unsatisfactory situation in Gibraltar? At what stage do you say,
"This is intolerable", rather than "We will do it at the margins" and so on?
(Mr Cook) We have been saying it is intolerable, we have been saying
that for a long time.
196. But it is like hitting the door with a wet sponge. It has no
effect, has it?
(Mr Cook) You asked me when I was going to say it was intolerable and
I was saying we have been saying it for some time. I am merely responding to
the tactic you have been advocating. If it is an insufficient tactic, I am
very happy to hear alternative proposals from you. We have raised this as
intolerable both with the Spanish Government - repeatedly bilaterally - and
also with the European Commission for action to enforce the European
legislation in relation to border controls.
197. Moving away from Gibraltar and moving on to more of a
machinery point, when we had Mr Vaz here in March we raised the question with
him, and I think the officials were going to look into this, of the disparity
of treatment amongst the 15 Member States of governments in relation to their
national parliaments. Some, as you know, choose, and it is a matter for their
choice, to actually come before parliamentary committees prior to Councils or
indeed IGCs with a view to canvassing the agenda with parliament and that is
a matter for debate elsewhere. What there did seem to be a disparity about,
and they said they would look into it, was that information should be
available to national parliamentarians simultaneously throughout Europe.
Another point was that there was evidence that the Council itself was going
to discuss what category of information should be available and when because
there had been a patchy situation depending on the presidency as to when
information should be put in the public domain. I do not want to belabour the
point but I wonder if you or your officials have any news on that or if it
could be looked at with some expedition with a view to coming back to this
Parliament because what was canvassed there was that documents should be made
available in the Vote Office. So it is availability in the Vote Office,
clearly the availability for parliamentarians, there should be parity of
treatment throughout the 15 states, and the Council itself was to discuss that
there should be consistency in the availability of information in the public
domain regardless of presidency.
(Mr Cook) First of all, on the issue of principle, Britain is very much
at the front of the debate on transparency, and we have consistently argued
for greater transparency and openness and we did use our presidency in order
to establish some new bench marks. In particular, we exploited the use of the
growing internet websites to make available documents on that so there was
universal access not just by Members of Parliament but also members of the
public, and we will continue to press for maximum transparency. Broadly
speaking, once each presidency establishes a new bench mark subsequent
presidencies then carry out that practice, and I do not think any of the
introductions we made in our presidency have actually been rowed back.
Possibly, Mr Sheinwald could bring us up to date on the current controversies.
(Mr Sheinwald) We can certainly provide another piece of paper on that
subject. There is a negotiation going on which has not yet reached the
Council on the issue of access to documents which is what probably our Europe
Minister was referring to. The main part of that negotiation has been the
rights of individuals to documents which have not already been released, and
I think what you are asking about is primarily to get a level playing field
for the release of information to parliaments and to the general public in the
first place. There is much more information around. We can look at the
Scrutiny Committee's Report on the IGC and they, very early on, give a list
of a dozen or 15 websites which have a vast amount of information on the way
in which the IGC is being conducted. So compared with a few years ago, there
really is a lot of information around, but we will follow that up.
(Mr Cook) During our presidency there was quite a step change in the
availability of documentation. I would also add from my own experience,
Brussels is not a particularly secretive institution, indeed sometimes the
problems are quite the reverse.
Mr Chidgey
198. Just returning briefly to this issue of the IGC and tax, you
said a few minutes ago that it was one of your red line issues, by which I
understood that the Government would veto such measure as was discussed but,
nevertheless, there has been speculation in the press that France and Germany
may push for a constitutional amendment at the IGC which would give effect to
qualified majority voting on fiscal matters. Firstly, do you expect such a
measure to be on the table at Nice? I imagine, secondly, we can be assured
that the Government would veto that, but, thirdly, are you aware of the level
of support that there might be in other Member States for such a measure?
(Mr Cook) I try to fight shy of the word "veto", because the word
"veto" immediately confers the implication that you are isolated, and winning
on this is also a matter of making sure that you have alliances and partners
and support, and on none of those issues are we isolated. I can assure the
Committee that we will remain robust and firm on this question and I do not
anticipate that in Nice we will be confronted with having to agree to such a
proposal to which we take exception. There is a very few number of areas yet
identified in which there is consensus for movement to qualified majority
voting. Some of them are issues we have proposed. For instance, we would
actually like to see qualified majority voting in terms of the reform of the
procedures of the European Court of Justice. I think it is very much in
Britain's interests that we should enable the Court of Justice to give more
expeditious rulings on breaches of Community law, and if we can secure
qualified majority voting on that, that would circumvent obstacles to reform
and an effective European Court of Justice.
199. Do you expect to see on the table at Nice such a proposal?
(Mr Cook) On none of our red lines is there a consensus against us. On
none of them are we alone.
Dr Godman
200. On a point of order, Mr Chairman, with respect to the Foreign
Secretary, in light of the contents of the note I have just passed to you, it
is my view that this session should end somewhat earlier than planned in order
that we can discuss that matter before our next meeting. I would be happy to
explain to my colleagues why I have raised this unusual point of order at that
time.
(Mr Cook) I hope it is nothing I said.
Chairman: It is a matter relating to our report on Kosovo.
Dr Godman: It has nothing whatsoever to do with the Foreign Secretary
and his two officials.
Chairman: I would still hope we could use the time available with the
Foreign Secretary, and then deal with that matter depending on the amount of
time. We will go into private session obviously immediately afterwards.
Sir David Madel
201. Foreign Secretary, you gave one example of where Britain
supported QMV, in relation to reform of the European Court, I wonder if you
could give another one?
(Mr Cook) The truth is, David, that there are really small, modest
areas for further movement on qualified majority voting. Remember, if you
take the actual decisions they made within the Council of Ministers in the
last couple of years, 80 per cent of all decisions have actually been made by
qualified majority voting, and much of the balance is where there is consensus
but it has to be decided by unanimity. So the margin for further advance is
not great and it will mostly refer to areas where it will not give rise to the
anxieties of those within our red lines. There are some other areas which we
have considered on a case-by-case basis where we could see merit in moving
forward qualified majority voting. For instance, there are some aspects of
transport and industrial policy where we feel it would be of help in
completing the Single Market if we could do it by qualified majority voting,
but we are approaching it with great care.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, one of the remarkable features of the
Portuguese Presidency has been the enhanced clout of the Union in external
relations. We had the EU/Africa summit at Cairo which of course you attended,
new relations with MERCOSUR, the San Jos‚ Group and EUROMED, and the Stability
Pact, and it is that broad area I would like to turn now and ask Mrs Abbott
to begin on matters of external policy.
Ms Abbott
202. I want to ask a couple of questions on external policy, one
on China and the other on the Balkans. As you know, the Committee is going
to China in two weeks' time. We are very concerned about human rights and we
are hoping to meet human rights activists when we are out there and we are
assuming obviously that the Embassy will be able to facilitate that. The
specific question I wanted to ask you is we understand that the EU has reached
a deal with China on China's entry into the WTO and we wondered whether the
EU would be considering imposing human rights conditions on China's membership
of the WTO?
(Mr Cook) I do not think that it would be proper for us to do so within
the WTO rules. I am open to advice on that but I do not think the WTO Charter
provides us with any basis for making a human rights requirement. I would
also say that there are a number of human rights activists who have expressed
support for China's membership of the WTO on the basis that it would bring
China into the wider world and be of assistance in pursuing the reform agenda.
I welcome the fact the Committee is going to China and I welcome the fact that
you will be focusing on issues of human rights; they are a matter of concern
to us.
Chairman
203. You will be happy to facilitate meetings with human rights
activists?
(Mr Cook) We will certainly seek to do all we can to assist that. In
the nature of China we cannot guarantee we will succeed but we will certainly
give you every possible support.
Ms Abbott
204. We are pleased and charmed by your willingness to give
assistance. The other question is really about the Balkans. Again we are
about to launch a major report on Kosovo in ten minutes and we wondered if
there are likely to be any measures to be taken at Feira in relation to the
Balkans and in particular will there be any response made to the clamp-down
by Milosevic on independent media in Serbia?
(Mr Cook) We have already responded bilaterally. For instance, when
B92 was taken off the air we immediately arranged to reconnect it to the BBC
World Service. We give quite a lot of support to independent media operations
in Serbia. One of the things changing some of the access to independent
opinion in Serbia has been the dramatic change in Croatia which of course has
resulted in a very different message of news coverage coming out of Croatian
television which is widely received in Serbia and of course they can fully
understand it, and that is very positive. The Balkans tend to make up the
largest item of discussion at virtually every monthly meeting of the General
Affairs Council. We have a substantial programme of activity in and around
Serbia and we will continue to exploit every opportunity we can to get
messages into Serbia.
Dr Godman
205. I am glad that you emphasise the importance of the
independence of the media. What I would have thought was also of considerable
significance is the holding of elections in Kosovo and given, as you have just
said, that the Balkans are always on the table when you meet your colleagues
from other Member States, at your last meeting with colleagues was concern
expressed over the delays to the holding of local elections in Kosovo?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure I accept the definition of delays. The OSCE is
charged with making the election preparations and is making reasonable
progress, given the nature of society in Kosovo, in making those preparations.
We are all committed to local elections and, indeed, I met the Foreign
Ministers to discuss specifically the question of the Balkans last week and
we were all united in our support for local elections as soon as can be
reasonably done. There is one difficult question which I will share with the
Committee and that is the participation of the Serb minority in those
elections. We are keen that Serb residents of Kosovo should take part in the
elections. We are keen also that Serb residents of Kosovo currently in Serbia
should have the right to register for those elections. It would obviously be
very important for them to have the opportunity to cast their democratic vote.
It is perfectly plain that Belgrade is operating an intimidatory policy of
persuading Serbs in Kosovo not to register and preventing us from registering
Serbs normally resident in Kosovo currently in Serbia. We have come to a view
that we cannot allow Belgrade to beat us on whether the elections proceed but
we will still work hard to try and encourage those Serbs who are willing to
do so to register to vote.
206. Your view is that local elections should proceed Kosovo-wide
for some kind of assembly. Is that view shared unanimously with your
colleagues in the other Members States?
(Mr Cook) These are elections at a local municipal level. They will
have significant local control of services and administration and they will
work jointly with the UNMIK administration and UNMIK have also just created
a joint interim administration with Kosovar Albanian participation and from
time to time also Kosovo Serb participation. I think it is very important
that we do get those local elections embedded first so that the Kosovar
Albanian population can take responsibility for the delivery of local
services. It would be unhealthy if UNMIK remained the sole body responsible
for delivery of education and health services. Thereafter, at some future
date there will need to be some Kosovo-wide elections. That is not currently
in the foreseeable future timetabled. We would want to see evidence of
progress in local elections before we make any further commitment. But you
are right it is the next logical stage.
207. Would you agree that the role of the media in Kosovo is well
nigh essential in attempting to maintain the fairness of election campaigns
and the election itself?
(Mr Cook) An independent and free media is essential to a democratic
process anywhere. Within Kosovo it is more open than it ever was before the
entry of KFOR but there is always room for debate about the objectivity of the
media, even in Britain.
Sir David Madel
208. Are the Russians encouraging the Serb minority to register
for local elections?
(Mr Cook) My understanding is that the answer to that is yes. To what
extent Russia really have influence over Milosevic is of course a very
debatable proposition. I should say one of the possible ways forward we are
contemplating on this is if we are frustrated by a Serb embargo on the
elections, one way of proceeding may be in the appropriate municipalities
where they are a Serb minority to reserve places for them on the Council. If
they choose themselves not to take part in the election and if those remain
empty seats it is plainly their choice not our choice.
209. Has Russia really washed its hand of Milosevic completely
now?
(Mr Cook) No, I do not think that would be a fair way of expressing it
but it is perfectly plain that Russia shares the frustration at the difficulty
of getting Milosevic to behave in a manner that recognises international
obligation and from time to time has been treated by Milosevic very directly
in a way which they find unreasonable. I would say to the Committee that we
are, of course, deeply concerned by the very sharp increase in repression in
recent weeks but my own interpretation of this - and it is one shared by many
people in the region - is that the recent ratcheting up of repression is not
a sign of strength with Milosevic, it is a sign of desperation. The situation
in Serbia is becoming much more difficult and challenging for him.
210. Is the opposition in Serbia growing in strength and
competence?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure I would necessarily say that of the formal
opposition parties, but there are new networks in civic society which he is
finding much more difficult to respond to. The new student network, for
instance, is showing a capacity for imaginative and innovative ways of
registering their disagreement with his policies. What he is now faced with
is something much more difficult to contain. It is not a number of opposition
figures, it is a wide movement across civic society.
Sir John Stanley
211. Foreign Secretary, if I could just come back to defence
again. As European defence is obviously going to feature in the Council and
given the fact that President Clinton has offered American National Missile
defence technology to European countries, will the British Government be
seeking in the final Communiqu‚ for this Council to establish any EU-wide view
on the American National Missile defence programme, and if the British
Government is not going to do so, do you anticipate any other European
countries might be seeking to get a reference to this into the final
Communiqu‚?
(Mr Cook) I am not sure I would regard it as wise for us to seek a
specific European Union policy on NMD given our own very entrenched view that
the European Union should not be a place for territorial collective defence.
NMD has been intensely debated in NATO. Indeed, we had a very full discussion
about this in the North Atlantic Council in Florence only the other week and
we would see NATO as being the forum in which America consulted its European
allies rather than the European Union. I do not know that it would
necessarily help that process if we were to seek a specific Communiqu‚
statement on that in Europe.
212. I am delighted that is the British Government's view but do
you think that same view would be shared by other European nations, for
example by the French?
(Mr Cook) I do not think France will seek to text on NMD and certainly
the NATO members of the European Union will, by and large, see NATO as the
proper forum for that discussion.
Chairman
213. We are having what used to be called a "Cook's tour" but I
hesitate to use the phrase now. Would you confirm that you and your
colleagues have agreed in respect of Zimbabwe that representatives of only ten
of the EU members will send representatives to monitor the elections?
(Mr Cook) I think the European Union response to the call for observers
has been very good. If I remember rightly, we have got 130 observers from the
Union.
214. Is it right that those observers will only be drawn from ten
of the Union countries?
(Mr Cook) I think that is possibly correct.
Mr Rowlands
215. In effect, have we accepted a de facto veto on any British
participation?
(Mr Cook) No, there are, I believe, British participants in the
Secretariat to the Commonwealth observers but I will be quite candid with the
Committee, and I do not see this as a basis for dispute, our objective
throughout has been to get international observers in. We took the lead both
within the European Union and within the Commonwealth in proposing
international observers and I can say to the Committee we have been vigorous
in prodding, pressing and cajoling to make sure not only that we fulfilled and
delivered on that decision but that we moved on as expeditiously as we could
to get observers into the field as quickly as possible. I am pleased with the
outcome. 130 European observers is a large number, 40 from the Commonwealth
is the largest team we have ever put into the field for international
observers and, remember, that they will be working with a network of thousands
of monitors at the polling stations. I spoke at the weekend to Morgan
Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition in Zimbabwe, who did particularly
express his appreciation of all we had done to get international observers in.
Of course it is a matter of judgment, but I think the most important issue is
to get international observers in.
216. What you are saying is we decided to pay a price for that by
not putting in any significant high-profile British observers?
(Mr Cook) I do not think we paid any price for it. We have got the
same number of observers in without any reduction in the number of observers
and we have secured our objective of getting those observers in. I certainly
do not think it would be wise for us to hand an excuse to President Mugabe to
prevent the deployment of these observers.
Chairman
217. But for the greater good we have been prepared to acquiesce
in the refusal of President Mugabe to accept British observers?
(Mr Cook) I have never formally accepted that, Chairman, and I would
suggest it would be unwise for me to do so.
218. In fact you have just done so.
(Mr Cook) I have not formally accepted that, Chairman, and I am not
going to concede any formal statement that we are accepting that refusal. It
is a matter of record that we have got observers teams in and I am very
pleased that we have and I think that was the objective, not to stand pat on
our own dignity.
219. The European Union has decided to send representatives from
only ten countries of the European Union.
(Mr Cook) That is not unusual, Chairman.
Mr Rowlands: It is Zimbabwe after all, Secretary of State, and we have
long contacts.
Chairman
220. We do have long contacts.
(Mr Cook) I have to ask if we can get real in this discussion. You are
right of course that we have long contacts. President Mugabe is trying to run
this election in which he is a candidate standing against Britain and in which
Robin Cook is the opponent. I have consistently sought for the last two
months to deny him that election strategy. He is standing in Zimbabwe as to
who can best run the economy and society of Zimbabwe and his opponent is the
leader of the opposition, not the foreign spokesman for Great Britain. I do
not think it would have been helpful to the opposition if we had got ourselves
into a another, frankly, rather pointless conflict.
221. That is the stage you have got to with the opposition as
well?
(Mr Cook) I have regular contact with the leader of the opposition. We
have fully discussed how we conduct our policies. His consistent message has
been that we should not ratchet it up in a way that enables Mugabe to try and
pretend he is a national liberator standing up to bullying by Britain but he
should be forced in the election to confront the damage done to the economy
and society of Zimbabwe during the time while he has been President. The
clear demand of the opposition is that they wanted international transparency
as the best prospect of inhibiting the violence and intimidation of the past
two months.
Mr Rowlands
222. Has it been inhibited? We are getting very confusing reports
but most of them are pretty depressing ones.
(Mr Cook) Peter Hain on Monday did express our deep concern at the
continuing intimidation and violence within Zimbabwe. I do not think there
can be any doubt that already the process of democracy has been compromised
by that violence and that intimidation. Our task is to try and make sure that
the observers are there as quickly as possible as widely deployed as possible
in order to make it difficult for that violence to continue. Although the
violence unquestionably has continued there is beginning to be some evidence
that they are hesitant where the observers are present and there have been
some moves by the police in towns which have been quite encouraging. It is
important, though, that we get observers out of the towns into the countryside
which is where most of the intimidation is taking place.
Chairman
223. Foreign Secretary, before wishing you bon voyage can I
address a question to you as a fellow parliamentarian. You know that there
is in respect of European matters on defence currently a turf war between the
WEU Assembly and the European Parliament as to who will have the degree of
oversight over defence arrangements and you have said specifically that the
whole defence initiative is inter-governmental and therefore ourselves and the
Westminster Parliament are more relevant here. How do you see the question
of parliamentary accountability in respect of the new defence initiative
working out?
(Mr Cook) I am unequivocal that as this is an inter-governmental matter
that the parliamentary scrutiny should be carried out by national parliaments
holding ministers accountable for the decisions they make as representatives
of the nation. It is difficult to see how the European Parliament could
properly become involved in this in circumstances in which the Commission has
no immediate role.
224. I am obliged. May I thank you again. We have rearranged
this and we are delighted you are with us. More particularly, we wish you
every success in your mission in Sierra Leone.
(Mr Cook) Thank you very much, Chair. I look forward with interest to
reading the copy of the Kosovo report on the way back.
225. Some newspapers claim that they have previews of it.
(Mr Cook) I never believe anything I read in the newspapers!
