Select Committee on Home Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 340 - 359)

WEDNESDAY 18 OCTOBER 2000

MR MIKE NEWELL, MR DAVID RODDAN AND MR EOIN MCLENNAN-MURRAY

  340. Do you see kindred spirits elsewhere in the Prison Service who would subscribe to your philosophy and what you achieve?
  (Mr McLennan-Murray) Many, many governors believe that people can change and do change.

  Mr Howarth: David Roddan is nodding.

Chairman

  341. Could you just let us know, Mr McLennan-Murray, what project you are actually engaged in at the moment? I seem to remember you did not take up this career move thrust upon you?
  (Mr McLennan-Murray) I am pleased to say that that was reviewed and a decision was taken that it was not a suitable career move. I was offered a secondment with the Department for Education and Employment, a very exciting position, which I was looking forward to starting. There has been a delay in that, partly because of these proceedings, and that has been deferred until these matters have been finalised. I hope then to take up that appointment. I have just begun to give some assistance to the Education Services in the Prison Service and I will be going up there on odd days in the coming weeks until I take up this new appointment.

Mr Stinchcombe

  342. Just a couple of matters of clarification as to what lessons you feel we should learn from this operation: firstly, in respect of the way in which the Governor was replaced, secondly the way in which the service itself was conducted, and thirdly in respect of what we learned from the outcomes of that search. Is it appropriate, do you believe, to have removed the Governor in this way? Should a different procedure be followed in similar circumstances in the future?
  (Mr Newell) Absolutely. A different procedure should be followed. If there are performance issues—we are not suggesting, I do not think Eoin would, there were not things in performance where the Area Manager had the right to say, "You need to improve that"—there are procedures for dealing with those, covered by handbooks and covered by a whole series of personnel documents. They should have been followed. There should have been an exchange in writing when it was clear what the targets and improvements that were required were. There should have been appropriate resources provided to deliver that. There should have been a monitoring process. People should have been aware of the outcome. These sorts of removals do nothing for the morale of the service, for the individuals concerned, and bring no credit on the personnel system in the Prison Service.

  343. Can I then move on to the way the search was conducted and what led up to that? Are there lessons to be learned about the sharing of intelligence with the governor?
  (Mr Newell) I can see no case, other than where the governor is being himself investigated for matters, where intelligence is not shared. It is the duty that that is shared. What has led to these circumstances and what the reason is that the intelligence could not be shared are still, to this day, not known to the Association. We do have to reaffirm that principle. Management of an institution is a complex task. A whole series of decisions about responding to intelligence are required to be taken into account at local level. It is particularly important that anything that has to be done in an establishment has a delicate ethos and is done in a way that delivers the objectives of the search without damaging the establishment and the relationships. Security searches do have to go on in every type of establishment. This one seemed completely disproportionate. The briefing to the search team as to what they were looking for is not clear. If they were looking for contraband this is a highly inappropriate way to go about it.

  344. In which way is it inappropriate?
  (Mr Newell) Contraband is not the sort of thing that we would mount a search of this nature for, it is too risky. Basically you are putting a lot of people into a potential conflict situation. We would only do it where the threat—

Chairman

  345. What are you saying, there could have been a riot?
  (Mr Newell) That is not impossible. If you put a large number of people into that situation, particularly in an establishment where the security is low, the physical protection to the people who go in there is low.

Mr Stinchcombe

  346. Can I ask a few more questions on that? Is there any justification for sledge-hammering doors down when keys are available?
  (Mr Newell) No.

  347. Is there any sense in making insecure a health area where there are drugs, and then not making it secure again?
  (Mr Newell) No.

  348. If I can ask you in respect of the third area, what can we learn from the outcomes? We know that there was a very minor amount of drugs found. We know that there was some money found. We know that there were certain other artifacts found, such as mobile phones, credit cards or whatever. Given the nature of this establishment, do the outcomes justify the search?
  (Mr Newell) In no way. As I mentioned, you would not risk that damage for contraband. The sort of circumstances that I can think of for that type of search are basically for firearms and threats to national security or the security of individuals, not for mobile phones and credit cards.

  349. You would have to have intelligence or information that there was that kind of artifact to be found, that would justify a search on that scale?
  (Mr Newell) You would have to have some indication that there were firearms, or other matters which presented a real threat. If you had intelligence about contraband for an individual, you would do an individual search in the normal way, you would target that individual.

  350. Is it surprising there were some locked doors and some locked cupboards that were ignored during the search?
  (Mr Newell) Yes. There are clear procedures for those in charge of a search to conduct what we call an area search. That is a wide-ranging search.

  Mr Stinchcombe: Thank you very much.

Mr Linton

  351. I want to come to the question of the way in which the Prison Service conducts inquiries at places like this. I am sure you will recall the sequence of events. The search was conducted on 5th May, we saw the Minister of State and the Director General on 16th May, they promised us a full account. It was not until the latter part of July, when we met again to consider this, that in a period of two days, miraculously, a Report was commissioned on the internal management of Blantyre House and the search on 24th July. Sir David's Report was finally published six months after it was submitted, on 26th July. I do not know whether you have seen this Report that came out on the internal management of Blantyre House. I just really want to ask you, and indeed Mr McLennan-Murray, to what extent this Report has been conducted with sufficient independence in order to really shed light on what happened?
  (Mr Roddan) This has really been our difficulty right from the outset. We knew that so many people were involved in the events at various levels and we had a very strong view that it had to be investigated at a very senior level. It had to be investigated by somebody who was detached from the events. Neither of the people involved in the investigation could be completely detached from the events. Mr Pollett, for example, the junior investigating officer was Mr McLennan-Murray's predecessor, who was a subordinate to Mr Murtagh. Mr Smith, the area manager investigating it, had previously been the Governor of Elmley, who had been involved in sending prisoners to Blantyre House. That makes it difficult to examine the selection procedure, and so on and so forth. When Sir David published his Report we were left, really, with no alternative than to ask your good selves to look into this. It was clear to us that the Prison Service could not or would not widen this scope of the investigation to include everybody involved in the management of Blantyre House, not just the Governor downwards. I will just make a brief aside here, just to remind everyone listening, it was not just the Governor, there was another Governor as well. I have to be slightly careful because the people who wrote that Report are also members of our Association, as, indeed, is the Area Manager for Kent. I find it difficult to marry some of their observations about volumetric control being okay, which would surprise me in a resettlement prison, I think.

Chairman

  352. What does that mean, Mr Roddan?
  (Mr Roddan) Volumetric control, allowing prisoners to have a certain amount of property that can fit into a certain size container. I find it difficult to marry some of the observations and findings with their conclusions. You will know from your own rules that we cannot touch on in any detail disciplinary matters, suffice it to say that from our point of view they are relatively minor, nothing to do with dishonesty, and, in any case, would be strongly challenged. Was it the kind of report we would expect from an external inspector? No.

Mr Linton

  353. To be specific about that, the Report is by a fellow area manager of the area manager's and by a subordinate. In no sense is it somebody in a senior position to the area manager?
  (Mr Roddan) Correct. I want to stress, we are not impugning the integrity of Mr Smith or Mr Pollett. I think they were given a hugely difficult task to accomplish.

  354. It was difficult for them to be entirely independent about what they were investigating.
  (Mr Roddan) The other issue is that Mr Smith ended up investigating Mr McLennan-Murray on matters which were referring to an investigation Mr Smith carried out in 1998.

  355. Can I ask you to comment on one particular finding of the Report? It is dealing with the problem that this night time search by 86 staff into a prison, that was supposedly awash with drugs, found that there was not a single prisoner who, having been drug tested, came up positive. The amount of drugs they discovered was negligible. It then says, "The argument often put forward is, because nothing has been found to have gone wrong, or no more that one would expect, does not hold water. There have been serious difficulties at Blantyre House in the past six years", this is the bit I wanted to point out, "we are sure that it is likely that there have been ones of which we are not aware".
  (Mr Roddan) That is an entirely unsustainable comment. That kind of comment defies a response.

  356. That was the reaction we had when we read it. Do you have any comments? Do not feel obliged.
  (Mr McLennan-Murray) I just happened to highlight that very passage that you have just read as the thing which typified the Report to me.

  357. It does remind me of that famous book Catch 22.
  (Mr Roddan) We live that all of the time.

  358. I want to ask one further question, which is much broader, and particularly aimed at Mr Newell, the Association really. What effect do you think the events of Blantyre House will have on the ability of the Prison Service to recruit and, indeed, retain able governors?
  (Mr Newell) I think there are some issues about this. I do not think it is any secret that they could not get a governor for Birmingham when Birmingham became vacant, the current governor suffering ill-health from the pressures. I think it is significant that they went outside the Service to get a governor for Brixton. I have heard rumours that they may be going outside the Service to get a governor for Feltham. There are issues which say that the reputation of the way senior people are treated in the Service at the moment is such that it may not be the wisest career choice. We do not say that the remuneration is bad, but it is not where you would go, bearing in mind the pressures.

Mr Winnick

  359. Can I ask you if you have the impression that there has been a whitewash as far as the Government is concerned, or ministers, in giving Parliamentary answers on events at Blantyre House?
  (Mr Newell) I think one of the difficulties with this is where certain information was known and not known, and who was briefing what. I would not like to think that anyone was accused of misleading if they were actually telling what they had been told. That is not misleading, that is passing on. The question is the quality of the briefing and the research that may take place before that. If you take the example of the intelligence, if I say, or if somebody comes up to me and gives me a piece of intelligence—the classic that happens to a prison governor is the note in the box that says, "There is a gun in the prison"—I cannot ignore that piece of intelligence, but I do not start tearing the prison apart on the basis of that piece of intelligence. I begin to try and get some quality assessment on that intelligence before I take action. In this particular case our understanding is, at this moment, is that there was no criminal intelligence. There was intelligence from the Chaucer team that has been mentioned. If that information is passed on in a way that we end up with "send three and four pence, we are going to the dance" type information and that is what is passed to ministers, then it is not good practice. It does not necessarily mean to say that it is misleading intentionally.

  Chairman: Thank you.


 
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