WHAT WERE THE
RISKS INVOLVED IN THE RESETTLEMENT REGIME AT BLANTYRE HOUSE?
57. There is an obvious tension between maintaining
adequate security and preparing prisoners for release into the
community. At Blantyre House this tension occurred against a background
in which the Prison Service was itself confused about the security
classification of the prison and has no policy on the running
of resettlement prisons. We deal in paragraphs 87-93 below with
those wider issues. First we describe the competing interests
of security and resettlement.
58. Allowing any inmate out of a prison involves
a risk that he will become involved in criminal activity or re-offend.
There are also risks to the community—beyond the discretion
of a prison governor—when a prisoner is let out on completion
of sentence. The Governor has to judge risk when a prisoner is
let out temporarily for a day's work, a hospital visit or a family
occasion. The same applies when prisoners are released early with
electronic tags under the Home Detention Curfew (HDC) scheme.[72]
All over the country prison governors have to take a vast number
of individual decisions about daily or longer release. In the
period April 1999 to March 2000 there were 256,179 temporary releases
from prisons;[73]
over 16,000 of those were daily releases from Blantyre House;[74]
in the prison system as a whole, 2,600 prisoners were released
on parole;[75]
a further 14,800 prisoners were released under the Home Detention
Curfew scheme (of whom 5% were recalled to prison).[76]
59. For each temporary release, a decision has
to be taken by a prison governor on the balance between the risk
to the community and the benefit to the prisoner's eventual resettlement.
Each decision, however right it seems at the time, may be called
into question by subsequent events. But a decision to grant a
temporary licence is more risky than a decision not to:
if something goes wrong, the consequences will be immediate. If
a licence is not granted, the consequences of not properly preparing
a prisoner to live again in the community are less obvious.
60. In weighing up the risks, any governor will
have to take into account the benefits to the individual and to
the community. Many long-serving prisoners become institutionalised
and ill-equipped for release. At the simplest level, they may
have been in prison since before the introduction of remote controls
for televisions, cash dispensers and the widespread use of computers.
If they are going to learn about developments since they were
imprisoned and not be driven by incompetence back into the ways
of crime, they need some careful preparation.
61. The regime at Blantyre House would have made
it possible for prisoners to abscond while on temporary release
or to engage in unauthorised activities while outside the prison.
The layout of the buildings and the physical security at the prison
was less than the normal standard for a category C prison. The
staffing level and routines did not enable full searching of prisoners
returning after work. All these made for a climate capable of
being exploited by prisoners and even staff. The only deterrent
to such abuse by prisoners was the spirit of trust which under-pinned
the resettlement ethos of Blantyre House. If a prisoner breached
that trust, he would be sent straight back to a more secure prison
and lose the job and training opportunity Blantyre House offered.
We have heard examples of prisoners resisting the temptation to
abuse such trust. The fact that only one person escaped (in 1996)
in the five years up to 5 May 2000 suggests that the former ethos
of Blantyre House seemed to be working.[77]
62. This means that difficult assessments had
to be made of the risks involved in giving a prisoner temporary
day release against the need to place trust in him as part of
the resettlement process. Trust is also a two-way process. Relationships
had to be built between staff and inmates so that they would not
break the trust given to them. A phrase we have heard informally
from prisoners is: "The more trust you are given, the harder
it is to break it." A former prisoner told us:
"It is not just one-sided,
it is not just about the Governor and the staff trusting us as
prisoners, it is about us actually learning to trust them as well
and trust their judgment".[78]
63. Two incidents in 1995 illustrate the vulnerability
of the Blantyre House regime and may have influenced the approach
of the Area Manager. A serious financial conspiracy was foiled
before damage was caused. Kenneth Noye, then a prisoner at another
prison (and recently sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder
of a motorist) was reported to be linked to the plan. Five people
were sent to prison for conspiracy.[79]
The Blantyre House connection was that a prisoner there was, without
his knowledge or wishes, implicated. The second incident occurred
when a prisoner, returning to prison by car, was pursued by an
unmarked police car. This resulted in the tragic death of another
motorist. The prisoner was sentenced to six years' imprisonment
for driving without due care and attention. We note that these
incidents are serious and show the risks of a resettlement regime.
We also note that the Board of Visitors, drawn from people who
live near the prison, did not think they required a change in
the resettlement regime at the prison.
64. In managing risk at Blantyre House, the best
case scenario might be:
- A prisoner who has spent many years confined
for a serious offence gets an outside job which his employer wants
him to keep on final release from prison
- Prisoners with a long criminal record are motivated
not to re-offend on release from prison
- Voluntary work carried out by inmates enhances
the reputation of the prison within the local community
- Prisoners are properly selected according to
their individual resettlement needs
- Any prisoner who abuses the trust inherent in
the resettlement ethos is removed to a more secure prison before
he does any harm to the public.
65. A worst case scenario might be:
- Inmates pursue their criminal careers while on
temporary day release
- Prisoners comply with the regime while at the
prison but resume their offending on final release
- Prisoners are able to buy places at the prison
due to a corrupt selection process
- A serious offence caused by a prisoner on temporary
release causes the local community to lose confidence in the ethos
of the prison
- Prisoners on temporary release bring illicit
items into the prison for the use of other prisoners not yet licenced
to work outside the prison
- A high proportion of prisoners reoffend within
two years of their release.
66. There is a difference between calculating
the risk to the public and the public acceptability
of letting prisoners out on temporary day release. While the risk
to the public may in fact be minimal, media interest can heighten
public concern about the potential dangers of prisoners working
in the community. When assessing risk it is important to distinguish
between these two factors. The Prison Service's internal reports
on these events refer to "public acceptability" as a
measure of risk. One example which was said to fail this test
was:
"In May 2000 one
prisoner was undertaking a work experience placement in a relative's
tattoo parlour...the nature of the work involved, whilst possibly
relevant to future release plans, would be hard to justify as
part of a prisoner resettlement programme".[80]
67. Working in a tattoo parlour does not of itself
constitute a risk to the public—but there can be
a legitimate debate about whether such work is a suitable form
of resettlement and whether, as in this particular case, the prisoner
was given a job on release. If public acceptability were the
test of risk—rather than more common and proven methods—then
it could be argued that the best people to judge that public acceptability
would be the local community in which the prisoners work. All
the evidence we have heard suggests that there was general support
locally for the work placements outside the prison.
68. As long ago as 1997, research commissioned
by the Home Office found that:
"for Category C prisons,
dynamic security—i.e., security resulting from well developed
staff/inmate relationships and an active regime—was more
important than physical security in the maintenance of control".[81]
69. The Prison Service's own report into the
management of the prison reveals the confusion which existed between
security and resettlement:
"There is a clear
conflict between the two roles of Blantyre House as a Category
C prison and as a resettlement prison".[82]
"We believe that it should be entirely possible
to have both successful rehabilitation through the resettlement
ethos and the proper structures to control risk, although there
may be some financial implications".[83]
70. There were things wrong at Blantyre House
which did pose a potential threat to public safety— some
of the prisoners were driving cars without valid insurance because
they had not disclosed to their insurance companies that they
had criminal records or were in prison.[84]
The former Governor, Eoin McLennan-Murray, accepted this:
"Firstly, I think
it is a very serious breach. I am ashamed that it has happened.
I am responsible for that. I set up the system for actually rigorous
checking of insurance two and a half to three years ago, where
I insisted that every prisoner disclosed that he was a serving
prisoner. It crossed my mind if that was not the case there may
be some difficulty in any claims. I think I came to that conclusion
because of the history of the establishment, where there had been
a previous driving incident, and I knew there was some insurance
wrangle. It is a valid criticism, and something that I take full
responsibility for. It has slipped and some prisoners were able
to manipulate things so they were not disclosing accurate information.
I have no defence against that and I regret that. ... we did check
rigorously the previous driving records of prisoners. I was the
first Governor in the service to set up breathalyser testing.
It was not the legal limit but zero tolerance, because I thought
it was an explosive cocktail to have alcohol and prisoners driving.
It would be indefensible if a prisoner was ever involved in an
accident under the influence of alcohol. I took those responsibilities
seriously. It was always my intention to safeguard the public.
I feel really bad".[85]
71. The very nature of resettlement by temporary
release for work runs the daily risk that an individual failure—highlighted
perhaps by media interest—could bring the whole process
into disrepute. The benefits are harder to measure but absolutely
critical. In the long-term, the aim is preventing re-offending.
In the short-term it is essential to satisfy the local community
that temporary release of prisoners in their area is acceptable.
Local opinion is the best barometer of public acceptability. On
a local level Blantyre House has used community projects and charity
work as an opportunity for prisoners to interact with the local
population, with the result that there is nothing but praise for
the work of the prison. We have been told that:
"People locally are
very proud of their prison" .[86]
"There is not a village hall or a church
or school round here that has not been supported by men from Blantyre
House".[87]
"there was an enormous culture shock in seeing
how well they were treated and the respect they were given. I
began to see the enormous value of it".[88]
"the Governor was willing to let his men
come out to the church and do work. I was so impressed with these
men because they could be trusted".[89]
"[prisoners were] feeling hopeful about the
future, feeling there was something out there for you apart from
crime, feeling you were going to be released into a job with a
future".[90]
72. We have been told that since the high profile
escapes at Whitemoor and Parkhurst in 1995, the Prison Service
has become much more risk averse.[91]
This has meant a much higher emphasis on the needs of security,
which seems to be at odds with the aims of the three resettlement
prisons in England and Wales.[92]
An experienced governor and inspector told us:
"I think I would
be very doubtful about whether, if Blantyre House did not exist,
it would be created in the climate of today's Prison Service.
The reason for that is the aftermath of the escapes at Whitemoor
and Parkhurst, the ramifications of which with regard to physical
security and preventing escapes are still very heavy with the
Prison Service".[93]
73. Looking at risk management in the Prison
Service in a wider context, two recent reports have highlighted
good practice and the dangers of risk aversion in relation to
Home Detention Curfew. This scheme has some similarities in terms
of risk with the release on temporary licence for work placements
at Blantyre House and elsewhere. The National Audit Office has
drawn attention to the successful use of risk management by the
Home Office in the HDC scheme. It said:
"risk management
policies and the benefits of effective risk management should
be clearly communicated to all staff... Risk assessment has enabled
the Home Office to limit potential and adverse effects of releasing
prisoners early into the community and they can all participate
in the scheme aware of the risks and their responsibilities for
managing them".[94]
74. Another inquiry into failing prisons said:
"there should be
a distinction between 'risk aversion' and 'risk management'. It
is impossible to eliminate risk entirely and the Prison Service
will make mistakes. This should not lead to an attempt to avoid
risk altogether, but an acceptance that it is an inevitable part
of the Service's business. This in turn means that Governors need
clear guidance in making decisions when conducting a 'risk assessment'.
Home Detention Curfew is an example. Some prisoners will inevitably
re-offend while on licence. The only way to prevent this is to
stop the HDC scheme altogether, but the cost would be that more
prisoners would remain in prison for longer, and the resettlement
value of HDC would be lost".[95]
75. We have not inquired in detail into the changes
in prison policy taken in the 1990s in response first to the Woolf
report following the Strangeways prison riot in 1990 and the subsequent
swing back after the Whitemoor and Parkhurst escapes in 1995.
We have heard some echoes of such policy swings in this inquiry
and are conscious of the difficulty of developing a long-term
approach within the Prison Service. Jim Semple, the Governor who
set up and ran Blantyre House from 1987 to 1995, gave us some
impression of this in his oral evidence.[96]
We deal later, in paragraphs 109-125, with resettlement policy.
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