WHAT IS THE
PRISON SERVICE TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN RESETTLEMENT?
109. Prison governors are set targets known as
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).[129]
The targets and performance of Blantyre House compared with the
rest of the Prison Service are set out in the table below in the
year April 1999 to March 2000:
| | Purposeful Activity (hours per week)
| Successful temporary release[130]
| Drug Misuse(% of tests positive)
| Assaults | Escapes
| Staff Sickness |
| Prison Service Targets | 24 hours
| No Overall Target | 18.5%
| 9% | 0.05%
| 12.5 days |
| Blantyre House Targets | 36 hours
| 95% | 4.29%
| 4% | 0
| 4.53 days |
| Prison Service Actual | 23.2 hours
| 99.8% | 14.2%
| 10% | 0.06%
| 12.7 days |
| Blantyre House Actual | 43.6 hours
| 99.85% | 0.7%
| 0 | 0
| 8.39 days |
110. We were concerned that these targets do
not include one important measure of the effectiveness of the
criminal justice system: a low rate of re-offending. What would
a 20% drop in the re-offending rate at one prison be worth in
terms of resources? Which other key performance targets might
be sacrificed for such a gain? What risks would be publicly acceptable
to achieve a re-offending rate of 8% compared with an average
of 54% for other prisons?
111. It is possible to argue that part of Blantyre
House's success with re-offending is based on the fact that those
most likely to respond positively to its regime applied for and
were selected to go there. This may account for it having a better
than average record on re-offending, but it hardly accounts for
that rate being one-seventh of the average.
112. The significantly lower re-conviction rate
of prisoners leaving Blantyre House strongly suggests that its
resettlement ethos of trust does have an impact on the lives of
its inmates. The fact that in the last six months Blantyre House
has experienced five prisoners absconding and one escape,[131]
compared to one escape and 15 absconders in the preceding five
years raises serious questions as to in what ways the regime at
Blantyre House has changed.[132]
113. This Committee recommended in 1997 that
performance indicators and targets for reducing re-offending should
be established.[133]
The Government reply to that report, in December 1997, said that
the Committee's suggestion would be taken into account when considering
changes to key performance indicators for 1998-99.[134]
We recognise that in a system where a prisoner moves between prisons
in the course of his sentence, it is not just his last prison
which can have a beneficial effect on whether he re-offends. Nonetheless
it would be instructive to see league tables of the eventual re-offending
records for all prisoners, broken down between the institutions
in which they had served part of their sentence. This might identify
for the Prison Service which prisons were doing better than others.
114. The Prison Service has a prime duty to
protect the public. It has key performance targets which measure
many things from the number of escapes to the speed of response
to letters. It does not have any key performance targets concerned
with the long-term protection of the public: whether those who
graduate from a system which costs the taxpayer about £23,000
a year for each prisoner commit crime again. We believe the Prison
Service must take a longer-term view of its duty to protect
the public and devise targets which measure rates of re-offending.
115. The Chief Inspectors of Prisons and of the
Probation Service are conducting a review of preparations for
release and resettlement and the Social Exclusion Unit in the
Cabinet Office is looking at improving the resettlement of offenders.[135]
The Prison Service is developing a policy. The elements of what
such a policy might contain are available in research and experience,
not least at Blantyre House. A possible policy on resettlement
might start on this basis:
- almost all prisoners, however serious their crime
and however long their sentence are likely to return to live in
the community eventually
- it is in society's interest that when they do
return to the community they do not offend again
- time spent in prison should be used productively
to reduce the likelihood of re-offending
- how that time is spent and what needs to be done
to reduce the chance of re-offending should be planned from the
start of the sentence and reviewed as it progresses
- resettlement needs to be targeted at the individual
prisoner - covering educational needs which otherwise would make
it difficult for him to hold a regular job and preparing him for
living again in a community which will have changed much during
his absence
- some form of controlled liberty in the community—whether
for work, home detention curfew, temporary release on compassionate
grounds etc—is probable before the completion of the sentence
- risks are part of any resettlement or release
process.
116. The Prison Service's objectives for a resettlement
policy start with managing and assessing risk. They continue:
- reduce institutionalisation and provide elements
of personal responsibility and trust, to test out the prisoner's
ability to function in the community
- provide opportunities to address offending behaviour
- provide opportunities to resettle in the family
and the community, including access to housing and employment
- facilitate a smooth transition from the custodial
part of the sentence to supervision on licence in the community
- provide a final stage of preparation and testing
for life prisoners who have been given a provisional release date
and for other prisoners suitable for discretionary conditional
release.
117. Most of the themes listed in the paragraph
above are familiar because they are objectives which were already
being pursued at Blantyre House. The Prison Service says "Blantyre
House's experience is central to this detailed work on resettlement".[136]
It is not clear to us how the Prison Service actually intends
to harness the direct experience of Blantyre House. It may be
possible to make comparisons between the regime before and after
5 May. The effects of the search and the changes made since that
date will make it very hard to treat the post 5 May experience
as continuing seamlessly from that which existed from 1987 to
2000.
118. HM Chief Inspector of Prisons report says
there is an urgent need for a person in authority in Prison Service
Headquarters to direct the work of resettlement and open prisons:
"The fundamental
part of it is that there should be somebody who is responsible
and accountable for the delivery of whatever that policy is, and
that is responsible and accountable to the Director General, and
so to the Home Secretary, because unless you have somebody in
that position who is responsible for ensuring that the policy
is delivered consistently at every point of delivery, then you
are going to get ups and down and that would be thoroughly unfortunate".[137]
119. We recommend that the Prison Service
publish urgently a policy on resettlement and report to the House
in one year's time on what has been achieved. We also want it
to consider the appropriateness of appointing a Director of Resettlement
with specific responsibility for the three resettlement prisons
and resettlement programmes in all other prisons.
CONCLUSION
120. It is hard to escape the conclusion that
what took place at Blantyre House was a self-inflicted injury
by the Prison Service. Management drifted into an avoidable situation.
The only way out may have seemed to be to remove the Governor
and search the prison. That was done in ways that have alienated
everyone connected with the prison. Now the Prison Service needs
to prove its commitment to resettlement across the whole Prison
Service by devising and articulating a clear policy. The status
of Blantyre House must be clarified and a real effort made to
revive the ethos of trust there. Capable governors and staff need
to be reassured that they work for a competent employer. Then
perhaps something positive can grow from this serious error of
judgement.
97 QQ 81 (Mr Cottle, Board of Visitors); 163 (Mr Semple,
former Governor); 239, 243, 250-1, 275-7 (Sir David Ramsbotham,
Chief Inspector); 300-5 (Mr McLennan-Murray); 324 & 326 (Mr
Newell & Mr Roddan, Prison Governors Association); 473, 478
(Mr Narey, Director General). Back
98 Q
225 (Sir David Ramsbotham). Back
99 Q
251 (Sir David Ramsbotham). Back
100 Appendix
1. Back
101 Modernising
the Management of the Prison Service. An
Independent Report by the Targeted Performance Initiative Working
Group, pp 28 + 29. Back
102 Q82
(Lady Clarke), Q 85 (Mrs Tipples). Back
103 Q
301. Back
104 Q
477 (Mr Narey). Back
105 Q
228. Back
106 Q
131. Back
107 Q
481. Back
108 Q
532. Back
109 Prison
Service internal report into management of Blantyre House para
15 (i) p 68. Back
110 HMCIP
Report, p6. Back
111 Q
330 (Mr Newell). Back
112 Q
235-6 (Sir David Ramsbotham). Back
113 Q
231 (Sir David Ramsbotham). Back
114 Q
335. Back
115 Official
Report 28 July 2000 col.
1169w. Back
116 P
2. Back
117 Q
233 (Sir D Ramsbotham). Back
118 Q
250 (Sir David Ramsbotham). Back
119 Q
732. Back
120 Q
754 (Mr Boateng). Back
121 HC
506-i Q 13 (Mr Narey). Back
122 Letter
from Martin Narey 20 June 2000. Back
123 Courier,
Kent Messenger. Published 26 May 2000. Back
124 Official
Report [Lords] col WA73. Back
125 Official
Report 25 May 2000 col 625W. Back
126 Q
10 (Mr Boateng) 16 May 2000 published in HC 506-i,1999-2000. Back
127 Modernising
the Management of the Prison Service. An
Independent Report by the Targeted Performance Initiative Working
Group. Back
128 Consultation
Paper Inspecting the work of the prison and probation services:
options for the future August 2000. Back
129 Period
April 1999 to March 2000. Data for Prison Service taken from the
Home Office report "Prison Statistics England and Wales 1999".
Data for Blantyre House taken from Appendix 1. Back
130 Release
on Temporary Licence. Back
131 Appendix
6. Back
132 Q
247 (Mr Allen). Back
133 Second
Report 1996-97 The Management of the Prison Service (Public
and Private) HC57 para 140. Back
134 Cm
3810 p10. Back
135 Q
231 (Sir David Ramsbotham). Back
136 Appendix
1. Back
137 Q
232 (Sir David Ramsbotham). Back
