APPENDIX 1
Memorandum by the Director General of
HM Prison Service
HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO BLANTYRE
HOUSE
INTRODUCTION
1. HMP Blantyre House is a 120 place low
security category C prison located near Tunbridge Wells in Kent.
It provides a specialist resettlement role in preparing long-term
adult male prisoners for their return to the community. It also
caters for approximately 20 life sentence prisoners as part of
their progression towards eventual release. It is one of three
such specialist prisons in the prison estate, the others being
Kirklevington Grange and Latchmere House. Of the three, Blantyre
House tends towards a longer-term population. There are also resettlement
units in some open and closed prisons. Resettlement is a principal
function of open prisons.
2. Blantyre House holds a mix of category
C and category D prisoners. About half of the population, following
a risk assessment, is released on temporary licence to go out
of the prison for work placements. However, unlike an open prison,
Blantyre House also receives serious offenders who have a considerable
period of their sentence left to serve and who are not yet ready
for open conditions or temporary release. The resettlement process
for these prisoners starts within the prison. These are normally
prisoners who are making good progress through a long sentence
and who would be judged suitable for category C conditions.
3. This means that prisoners who have daily
access to the outside world are mixing with serious offenders
who have not yet demonstrated that they can be trusted in open
conditions. Management of that risk relies on balancing security
and resettlement needs. While Blantyre House generally fulfils
its difficult role very effectively, the critical balance can
be lost, if security measures are not given sufficient weight.
I decided, on 28 April 2000, that the then governor of Blantyre
House should be moved, and on advice from the area manager for
Kent, Surrey and Sussex, supported by the Deputy Director General,
that a full lock down search of the prison should take place.
On 4 May, I informed Paul Boateng of my decision, by which point
it had been decided that the search should take place on 5 May.
A new governor of the prison took up post on 5 May, and the search
was started that evening at 2100 hours. The decision to make the
search at night was made because of the large number of prisoners
who would have been out of the prison during the day.
4. There have been no radical changes to
the role or function of Blantyre House, nor are any envisaged.
The new governor has made changes to the way in which the prison
is run, and has placed a stronger emphasis on security measures.
I am likely to accept the full range of recommendations made by
two internal Prison Service investigations, which include the
confirmation of a need for a national strategy on resettlement,
and a review of the security standards that should be applied
to Blantyre House.
REASONS FOR
THE SEARCH
5. The relative freedom for those prisoners
preparing for release needs to be carefully managed. Since 1995
there have been anxieties about the possibility of places in Blantyre
House being "bought" by or on behalf of affluent and
powerful prisoners. Sir David Ramsbotham expressed his concern
to me about this possibility earlier this year. The background
to this is that, in 1995, a group of known criminals conspired
to get a prisoner, who was a known electronics expert, transferred
to Blantyre House. The principal officer involved arranged a work
placement for the prisoner in a local car firm, which was a front
for the conspiracy. The prisoner concerned had not known of the
conspiracy and acted as an informant for the police. The conspirators
were arrested before they had the opportunity to implement their
plan of a multi-million pound fraud. Five of the conspirators
(none of them prisoners) pleaded guilty to the offence and were
given custodial sentences. The prisoner informant was eventually
released and is now on the protected witness scheme.
6. A full procedural audit of the Blantyre
House working out/temporary release scheme was commissioned by
the area manager in 1998, because of ongoing concerns. The report
of this audit, conducted by a senior governor from another prison,
confirmed a serious breakdown in the control of the temporary
release scheme at Blantyre House.
7. In the weeks leading up to 28 April,
emerging intelligence was building up into a worrying picture
of possible security breaches, concerns that prisoners may be
involved in criminal activities, and the emergence of inappropriate
work placements, including some in the guise of charitable working-out
schemes. I took the judgement that, if true, the activities the
intelligence pointed to were sufficiently serious to jeopardise
the protection of the public, the security of the prison and its
resettlement work. I authorised a full search of the establishment
to determine the extent to which unauthorised items were in prisoners'
possession, and to provide the incoming governor with a snap-shot
of security and control measures. I also finalised my decision,
formed some weeks earlier, that the then governor (who had been
in post for four years) should be moved at the same time as the
search took place. I also agreed that a more junior member of
the Blantyre House management team should be moved.
CHANGES AT
BLANTYRE HOUSE
SINCE 5 MAY
8. The following changes have been put in
place at Blantyre House since 5 May, in response to recommendations
of the investigation into the management of Blantyre House and
the new governor's own assessments:
(a) decisions on individual prisoners' progress
through the regime at Blantyre House are now made on the basis
of evidence-based risk assessments. Hitherto, prisoners progressed
through the system on the basis of a standard timetable involving
one risk assessment only. It is unacceptable that there is no
evidence that formal risk assessments were carried out in a way
that complies with Prison Service standards;
(b) a throughcare policy group has been set
up, led by the deputy governor and with probation representation
at senior probation officer level. Throughcare processes are crucial
to effective resettlement, yet the throughcare policy group appeared
to have lapsed;
(c) categorisation decisions will now be
taken based on risk, rather than institutional behaviour;
(d) the new governor has restored a full
time probation officer to provide greater input into sentence
planning and risk assessment. This means that risk assessments
can be taken at each significant change in a prisoner's circumstances;
(e) the governor has issued operational instructions
to clarify standards and processes in 17 key areas. He has addressed
areas in which professional roles were becoming blurred, for example,
staff sharing meals prepared for prisoners;
(f) a review of security systems has been
commissioned. Security was previously not a high enough priority.
While the questions about access to keys during the search remain
unresolved, new arrangements for the storage and issue of keys
have been introduced;
(g) all prisoners returning from external
activities are given a rub down search and bag search. 5 per cent
are strip searched;
(h) 10 per cent of domestic prisoners are
given a rub down search and all bags are searched;
(i) regular staff briefings have been formalised.
Blantyre House is a small establishment, but the new governor
nevertheless feels it is insufficient to rely on informal channels
to communicate key messages;
(j) work placements have been reviewed to
ensure that prisoner attendance and activity can be monitored
and restricted to activities consistent with the instructions
for release on temporary licence and contributing to resettlement.
One placement has been ended and one suspended but two new placements
have replaced them;
(k) where prisoners drive vehicles in the
course of work, the establishment now monitors insurance closely.
Checks following the search found 10 out of 22 prisoners using
cars did not possess valid insurance;
(l) the selection process now focuses on
prisoners most likely to benefit from the resettlement programme
at Blantyre House. The new governor wishes to place a greater
weight, in the light of developing work on a national resettlement
strategy, on prisoners' resettlement needs. While Blantyre House
had a good record of success with its previous population, some
of them do not show demonstrable resettlement needs.
PEFORMANCE AT
BLANTYRE HOUSE
AGAINST KEY
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
9. Blantyre House has a history of high
performance against KPI targets, and this success has been maintained
since 5 May by its new management team. Although much has been
said about a loss of Blantyre House's ethos, performance figures
strongly suggest that what is best about Blantyre has been maintained,
and in some key areas, enhanced.
10. Increased investment is reflected in
the year-to-date rise of £1,185 per prisoner place from last
year's cost. New resources have been directed, for example into
prisoner throughcare and risk assessment. An escape in August
is the prison's only failure against target for the year so far,
and reflects the importance of establishing correct procedures
in an establishment with minimal perimeter security.
11. In all other KPI areas Blantyre House
continues to exceed its targets, achieving 44.9 hours purposeful
activity (target 36 hours); 99.85 per cent successful R.O.T.L.[1]
(target 95 per cent); 100 per cent timely response to correspondence
(target 95 per cent) and 5.2 per cent staff sickness (target 6
per cent). Blantyre House continues to record no assaults on prisoners
or staff, and enjoys very low levels of drug use, with only 1.5
per cent of those tested giving a positive reading (target 4.3
per cent).
POLICY: RESETTLEMENT
12. The Chief Inspector of Prisons, in the
preface of his most recent report on Blantyre House, recorded
what he described as "confusion" over the role of Blantyre
House. His remarks were, at least in part, coloured by the uncertainty
caused by the consideration of whether Blantyre House should be
re-roled as a young offender's institute. That possibility was
prompted by my very serious concerns about the need to relieve
population pressures at Feltham. Blantyre House's role as a resettlement
prison has since been confirmed, and the Youth Justice Board and
the Prison Service are urgently looking at alternatives for housing
under seventeens.
13. There has, however, been an absence
of a national policy framework on resettlement, which is being
put right. The primary purpose of resettlement regimes is to reduce
the risk of reoffending and risk of harm. Within this, the key
objectives are:
(b) to assess risks and needs;
(c) to reduce institutionalisation and provide
elements of personal responsibility and trust, to test out the
prisoner's ability to function in the community;
(d) to provide opportunities to address offending
behaviour;
(e) to provide opportunities to resettle
in the family and community, including access to housing and employment;
(f) to facilitate a smooth transition from
the custodial part of the sentence to supervision on licence in
the community;
(g) to provide a final stage of preparation
and testing for life prisoners who have been given a provisional
release date; and
(h) to provide a period of preparation and
testing for discretionary conditional release (DCR[2])
prisoners who need it in order to be considered suitable for release.
14. A national strategy, including requirements
on eligibility, selection, regime, monitoring and evaluation is
in preparation, with implementation planned for the end of this
year. National requirements (which are still subject to internal
consultation) are expected to include:
(a) rigorous assessment of risk, including
security and police information regarding ongoing criminal associations;
(b) systematic assessment of needs related
to reducing reoffending, matched with appropriate regime provision;
(c) more formal separation of category C
and category D stages, to ensure readiness for release on temporary
facility and resettlement licences and to reduce opportunities
for breaches of security and control through mixing category C
and category D prisoners;
(d) the expectations on resettlement prisons
in delivering offending behaviour programme boosters; and
(e) checks to be carried out on suitability
of placements and on conduct while on temporary licence.
15. The development of a formal framework
and national standards will provide greater clarity for the Service,
and for the governors of the three specialist resettlement prisons
in particular. Blantyre House's experience is central to this
detailed work on resettlement. Independent research on selection,
commissioned by the Prison Service, has recently been completed
by Dr Roger Grimshaw and Andrea Kilvington of the Centre for Criminal
Justice Studies. It identified good practice that will be fed
back to participating prisons, including Blantyre House, at a
workshop in October to consult on draft national requirements.
POLICY: SECURITY
16. One of the most important recommendations
of the report to the internal Prison Service investigation into
the management of Blantyre House is that the security category
of Blantyre House should be reviewed to clarify if category C
or category D security standards should be applied to the prison.
It is recommended that this should take place within a wider review
of the security standards that should apply to resettlement prisons.
I have accepted this recommendation and believe that this, along
with the development of a national framework on resettlement policy,
will sharpen and clarify the security requirements for Blantyre
House.
17. Kirklevington Grange, Latchmere House,
and Blantyre House are all resettlement prisons with a security
classification of category C[3].
Each of them has a different population mix. Of the three, Blantyre
House has the highest proportion of category C prisoners. In management
terms category C prisoners are subject to a level of supervision
and risk assessment that assumes there is some risk of escape.
Security procedures applied in prisons holding category C prisoners
take into account the risk factors posed by the population. Category
D prisoners are managed on the assumption that they can be trusted
in open conditions and will in general terms be subject to lower
levels of supervision and greater freedom of movement.
18. Local security standards are derived
from the central security manual, but fitted to the particular
circumstances and risk factors which prevail in individual establishments.
There are certain core requirements, but to some extent, there
is flexibility for governors and area managers to adapt the application
of the standards. For example, methods of searching are centrally
prescribed in the manual, as is the requirement to have in place
a searching strategy, agreed between governor and area manager.
The frequency and timing of the searching, however, is determined
locally by the governor and agreed with the area manager with
publication through the prison's searching strategy. In this way,
particular differences can be incorporated to reflect the specialist
role of the prison, its physical layout, type of accommodation
and its population. It would have been expected that Blantyre
House would have adopted the more stringent application of the
standards, given the nature of its prison population.
19. Because of the flexibility provided
in the operation of security standards, all three resettlement
prisons operate lower security than the general Category C estate.
It is unsettling, therefore, that Blantyre House, with the highest
proportion of category C prisoners, for example, in its searching
procedures at the gate, was applying the least stringent standards
of the three prisons. This has now changed. The security in Blantyre
House should be at the very least comparable to Kirklevington
Grange and Latchmere House and I believe that the changes being
made by the governor and the area manager restore the necessary
balance between resettlement needs and security.
PRISON SERVICE
INVESTIGATIONS
20. There have been two main Prison Service
internal investigations following the search operation on 5th
May. Copies of the full reports of these investigations have been
made available, in confidence, to the HAC Committee. I commissioned:
(a) an investigation into the management
of HMP Blantyre House; and
(b) an inquiry into the search of HMP Blantyre
House.
THE MANAGEMENT
OF BLANTYRE
HOUSE
21. The investigation made a number of detailed
recommendations relating to the temporary release of prisoners,
financial control and sponsorship, arrangements for vehicles driven
by prisoners, the use of mobile phones, the allocation of prisoners
to Blantyre House, the use of breathalysers, decisions made regarding
three prisoners, access by prisoners to banking facilities, and
security. It also concluded that the Prison Service should put
in place policies and procedures for resettlement prisons as a
matter of urgency.
22. The report concludes that there are
grounds for taking internal disciplinary action against the former
governor and the head of management services. The Deputy Director
General has directed the area manager for the Eastern area to
act as hearing officer. He informed the former governor, the head
of management services, and their trade union representatives,
of the charges on 28 September. The charges relate to financial
management of Blantyre House.
THE SEARCH
OF HMP BLANTYRE
HOUSE
23. Although the inquiry made a number of
detailed recommendations about the way in which such searches
should be conducted in the future, it concluded that the search
had been carried out professionally and with good humour and that
there were no identifiable grounds for instituting disciplinary
proceedings against any member of staff. No disciplinary charges
were sustained against prisoners, because charges were not made
within 48 hours. Five prisoners were transferred from Blantyre
House. One of these has since returned to the prison.
24. With the exception of one positive drugs
test, for which there was a medical explanation, all drug tests
of prisoners proved to be negative. The search found some cannabis,
three ecstasy tablets and some pornography. It also revealed inadequate
arrangements for locking up tools and mobile phones, authorised
for outside work, but which should not have been kept within the
prison.
25. Although it is unusual to conduct a
full lock down search of a resettlement prison, it is standard
practice to conduct full lock down searches, in which all areas,
all cells and all prisoners are systematically searched, of category
C prisons if it is in the interests of security to do so. In the
last six months at least five searches of this type have been
conducted in Category C prisons, as well as a much higher number
of partial searches.
CONCLUSION
26. I fully accept that the management of
a prison like Blantyre House is difficult. I do not accept that
it is impossible. The investigation into the management of the
prison revealed weaknesses in the supervision of prisoners working
outside the prison, serious shortcomings in the application of
security measures, weaknesses in the allocation and selection
procedures for the transfer of prisoners to Blantyre House and
apparent financial mismanagement of charitable and subsidiary
funds. As a result, action is being taken to correct these, and
work is in hand to clarify a national policy framework for resettlements,
and to review whether category C or category D security standards
should be applied to the prison. Although a full lock-down search
of a resettlement prison is unusual, I believed that Blantyre
House gave unique cause for concern, and that my decision to order
a search was, under the circumstances, a proportionate response.
27. I believe that Blantyre House today
is a safer prison, where the public are at reduced risk and preparation
for temporary release and eventual permanent releases is likely
to be more effective.
Martin Narey
9 October 2000
1 Release on Temporary Licence. Back
2
DCR is granted at the discretion of the Parole Board to determinate
sentence prisoners serving sentences of four years or more. Prisoners
become eligible for it at the half way point of their sentence. Back
3
Category C: "Prisoners who cannot be trusted in open conditions,
but who do not have the resources and will to make a determined
escape attempt". Category D: "Prisoners who can be reasonably
trusted in open conditions". Back
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