Select Committee on Home Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 5

Supplementary note by HM Prison Service

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER TO THE CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE

CHECK OF KEY REGISTER

  John Podmore undertook to return to you (Q558) as to whether the key register was formally checked on entering the establishment. Some confusion may have been caused in the use of terms. The straightforward answer is that the key register was not checked. The key register would not, however, have been the most effective means for the search team to establish the extent to which Blantyre House staff left keys available following the 8.30 pm roll call. This would be done by checking the gate book.

  As John Podmore said at (Q553) he took with him on the search a governor who had written the key systems for Blantyre House. Mr Shipton spent time at the gate with the Blantyre House gatekeeper going through the key systems in his efforts to locate the Healthcare Centre keys. He checked the key safe (press), gate book and supplementary keys. (This is documented in Appendix 1 to John Robinson's report into the conduct of the search).

  Examining the key register would not have done this. The key register, which is checked quarterly, is a formal record of keys held by the establishment setting out, by key type, how many are on issue and how many held in stock. It is not a document which pinpoints the availability of a particular key at any given time.

SEARCH OF LOCKED CUPBOARD

  John Podmore also undertook to confirm his explanation (QQ627-8 and QQ692-5 of the transcript). The search of this area was undertaken using prison dogs trained in detecting drugs, arms and explosives. The cupboard was locked, and would, as part of the searching strategy, as it was a communal area, only have been opened if one of the dogs had indicated any traces of drugs, ammunition or explosives. Where cupboards or desks are unlocked it is standard practice to search them manually, hence the discovery of cash in the open desk in the chaplaincy suite.

ESCAPES/ABSCONDS

  Martin Narey also undertook to check on escape and abscond figures for Blantyre House (Q657). There were two absconds from Blantyre House in the 18 months leading up to 5 May, and there have been five absconds since 5 May. There was an attempted escape by three prisoners from Blantyre House in December 1999 and there has been one escape since 5 May.

INSURANCE

  Mr Cawsey disputed (Q654) Martin Narey's description of the number of prisoners without valid car insurance. Martin Narey was quoting from the Report of the investigation into the Management of HMP Blantyre House, where you will see that precise detail is provided at 9.2 (pages 33 to 36 of the report). The report's conclusion at 9.5 (iv) is: "Of the 22 prisoners using cars at Blantyre House, 10 did not possess valid insurance policies that recognised their status as prisoners. Two MOT certificates were also missing." The audit to verify that insured prisoners had notified their insurers of their status (ie that they were serving prisoners) revealed that eight prisoners had failed to make this disclosure.

WORK PLACEMENTS

  Martin Narey undertook to check the case raised of a prisoner whose work placement had been stopped (Q662). The Committee might find it helpful to have a precise explanation of the outcome of the review of work placements at Blantyre House. Mr Delaney was employed at Frontier Pictures Limited. This placement was found by the prisoner and is 20 minutes travelling by car from Blantyre House. When all Blantyre House work placements were reviewed, this was the only work placement that was terminated. The company is run by associates of the prisoner, and there is no schedule of work and therefore no realistic means for the external security officer to carry out ad hoc checks. When earlier checks had been made, the prisoner was not at the office, but was contacted by mobile telephone. He was only ever 15 minutes away, which did not appear to square with the job description.

  The only other temporary cancellation of a work placement, has been with the distribution company called Sunburst. At the time of the review, two prisoners, Mr Smart and Mr Saywell, were employed at Sunburst. Although, after a temporary cancellation, the work placement was reinstated. Mr Smart has subsequently been discharged and Mr Saywell found other employment.

  The Director General is concerned that the Committee has gained the impression that a large number of prisoners were affected. For example, at Q191 of the transcript of the oral evidence given by prisoners at Blantyre House on Tuesday, 17 October, reference is made to work being stopped. The prisoner referred to here is Mr Houghting. In this case, the placement was not ended by the prison, but by a new manager at the company who ended the arrangement. A contributory factor may have been Mr Houghting's false statement on his insurance.

  At Q198 of the transcript, Mr Bertram says: "Before I got stuffed into Unipart, I was a team leader on the railways, responsible for a dozen men." He was working with Comatec Limited, and the company still employs prisoners from Blantyre House. Mr Bertram himself asked to work for Unipart. No work placement was cancelled.

  Reference has also been made to a work placement (Mr Dean) in a tattoo parlour in Woking having been regarded as unsuitable. Although this work placement was regarded as raising issues of public acceptability, Mr Dean's equipment (confiscated during the search) was released to enable him to continue his work placement until his eventual discharge. We understand that Mr Dean continued as a tattooist there after his release.

EVIDENCE GIVEN AT BLANTYRE HOUSE

  It is not, of course, for the Home Office to make any amendments to the transcript of that evidence, but I make some factual comments below.

TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE GIVEN BY PRISONERS

  Family days at Blantyre House have been postponed until April 2001 (QQ 167-8). This decision was only taken after consultation with prisoners, who, generally, expressed a preference for community visits. Family visits are used less frequently in the winter months in any event, and the gap will allow the prison to address some health and safety issues.

  The impression is given (QQ183-5) that selection criteria no longer apply for Blantyre. That is not the case. Senior staff at Blantyre House have recently held a meeting with five prisons in the area, and the selection procedure remains based on an identified resettlement need.

  Reference is made to Principal Officer Collard. He was given the choice, and chose to move to residential activities.

TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE GIVEN BY MEMBERS OF BOV AND OTHERS

  On the night of the search (Q113) vans were only available to have moved a maximum of 14 prisoners at one time.

  It is perhaps worth clarifying that the education provided at Blantyre House (Q121 and Q147-8 of the transcript) is by contract: it is for the Prison Service to decide the content of the programme, and for the governor to retain responsibility for the grounds on which temporary release is given. This is an authority that cannot be delegated to the education department.

Clare Checksfield

27 October 2000


 
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