APPENDIX 39
Memorandum by the Office of Legislative
Affairs, Newton Hall, Cambridge
CONTROLS OVER FIREARMS
Contents
Table of contents
The Office of Legislative Affairs
Summary and conclusions
The Committee agenda
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE
BANS INTRODUCED
IN 1997
Firearms control legislation in the UK and public safety
DESIGN
ADMINISTRATION
Multi-force firearms scrutiny (ACPO 1991)
Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte (1991)
Proposal to establish a National Firearms Control Board (1992)
The Administration of Firearms Licensing (HMIC 1993)
The use of records generated by the system
EFFECTS OF
THE LEGISLATION
Shaping attitudes
Effects upon criminal use
The illegal pool of firearms
Administration
Police training
Development potential of the present control regime
Recommendations
Annex A: The removal from circulation of pistols (1997)
Annex B: Firearms control in the UK—essentials of the system
Abbreviations and references
The Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA)
1. The OLA is a small organisation concerned
with the principles and administration of firearms law, primarily,
though not exclusively, in Britain.
2. The OLA, which maintains contact with
the leading auction houses, national museums, learned societies,
trade and other bodies, has: served on Home Office working parties;
advised national and European parliamentarians; made submissions
to the Home Office, Health and Safety Executive, the Jersey Defence
Committee, the European Commission and Lord Cullen's Inquiry into
the Dunblane shootings. The OLA was closely involved in the process
of making provision for historic pistols in the Firearms (Amendment)
Act 1997.
Summary and conclusions
3. Our firearms control legislation does
not enhance public safety as it should. The possession of
firearms in the UK is controlled by a system designed when firearms
crime was rare and intended not as a crime control measure. An
anachronism, the system today is so over-extended by incident-led
amending legislation as to be difficult to follow. At no time
has the effect of the system been measured against its objectives;
but then its objectives have long been obscure.
4. Research in support of legislation
has been lacking: there are, for example, no meaningful records
of the frequency with which legally-held guns occur in crime.
In other words, no one knows whether the control regime works.
Moreover, the manner of its administration suggests that in some
quarters it is not given as high a priority as the public might
expect.
5. As a means of removing pistols from
circulation, the 1997 legislation was ineffective. A fraction
of the money spent on securing the surrender of legally-held pistols
could have established a research programme into the issues raised
by the Dunblane shootings.
6. That the low level of armed crime
in the UK must be due to the rigour of our gun licensing system
is a misconception; but firearms control is more complicated
a subject than at first sight it might appear. Whereas "banning"
removes the opportunity to regulate (and is tacit acknowledgement
that the police cannot be relied upon to enforce the law), control
requires regulation.[59]
Those who would legislate with the aim of reducing firearms crime
should be aware that prohibition is not the same as control; indeed,
prohibition and control are mutually exclusive. Striving to take
guns `out of circulation' is probably a waste of effort and money,
for illegal supply may be expected always to fulfil criminal demand.
7. The present system, originally a means
to the location of firearms already possessed, has been adapted
over the years into a mechanism to reduce the number of firearms
lawfully held. This may be beneficial and sensible, but never
has there been an attempt to discover whether it is or not; nor
whether the tying down of the equivalent of a complete police
force to accomplish it is a prudent use of resources—but
that firearms crime has risen dramatically over the same period
is a matter of record. The illegal pool of firearms now represents
a threat to public safety; but recent legislation has placed the
weapons favoured for criminal use beyond the control of the licensing
system.
8. The escalating use of firearms in
robbery over the past 30 years and the more recent shootings at
Hungerford and Dunblane, and in Manchester and London this year,
raises the question whether a firearms control system—which
cannot control possession, only transfers—designed for the
early years of this century (when there was virtually no gun crime)
is still relevant today (when there is).
9. As crime control measures, the amending
Acts of 1988 (certainly) and 1997 (probably) will prove to have
been counter-productive. The shootings at Hungerford (1987)
and Dunblane (1996) brought a rush to legislate: an already ill-conceived
system of firearms control was further misdirected. The 1997 Acts
have reduced the likelihood of further `amok' shootings only in
the sense that henceforth licensed pistols cannot be used for
them—because the licence has been abolished. The cost to
the taxpayer of removing from circulation those pistols at risk
of being used for firearms crime (Firearms [Amendment] Acts 1997),
has been disproportionately high—approaching 400 times their
market value (Annex A); nor is it likely that the effect of the
removal of so few will be noticed. Good governance demands that
the failings of past legislation be identified by a thoroughgoing
review, the `fundamental appraisal of firearms law' as called
for by the Labour Party (Labour Party 1996, para 12).
10. The UK needs a better firearms control
regime. To extend the existing system yet further will not
produce a better but weaken a poor one. For the UK to have a firearms
licensing system truly of social benefit will require legislators
to adopt a realistic and sophisticated approach to new legislation,
having first considered the results of research into key issues.
11. Whilst it may be politically uncomfortable
to revisit recent legislation, consideration should be given to
returning those firearms favoured by criminals to the control
of licensing. Having ensured that would-be Thomas Hamiltons
(Dunblane) will come to the notice of the police only after they
have acted, the 1997 Acts have made research into the phenomenon
of "amok" attacks an urgent priority. No control system
can rule out deliberate misuse, nor can it stop a determined malefactor;
but a well designed and diligently administered control system
should be capable of giving appropriate warnings.
12. To decide objectives for a new control
regime requires informed research design; but researchers
should be prepared for counter-initiutive results.
The Committee agenda
13. The phrasing of the topics for consideration
implies that prohibitions are capable of restraining firearms
crime. This memorandum will argue that the existing licensing
system lacks effectiveness as a crime control measure and that
to extend it would further weaken controls. The argument is based
in the design of existing firearms legislation, the manner of
its enforcement and the practical effects of both—an exercise
which requires consideration of the extent to which the bans introduced
in 1997 have been effective in removing handguns from circulation.
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE
BANS INTRODUCED
IN 1997
14. The Firearms (Amendment) Acts of 1997
brought the surrender of 162,353 pistols which had been possessed
with the sanction of the police (NAO 1999, 32). These pistols,
identified by serial number, were `in circulation' only in the
sense that they would circulate within the group authorised to
possess them in the first place.
15. Inevitably, a small number of legally-held
firearms will find their way into the illegal pool. The number
will be smaller than the total of legally-held firearms which
are stolen: some stolen arms are recovered, others discarded.
Of those that remain unlocated, not every one will be used for
criminal purposes.
16. In order to evaluate the effectiveness
of the 1997 Acts in removing pistols from circulation, then, it
would be necessary to know how many of those 162,353 surrendered
pistols were at risk of being used for criminal purposes. The
number of such pistols can be shown to have been rather small:
31 in any one year; but so limited is the available data that
this estimate is little more than an indication of the appropriate
order of magnitude (Annex A).
17. To arrive at an indication of the benefit
set against the cost of legislation, the cost to the exchequer
of the legislation is determined by dividing the cost by the number
of `at risk'
pistols involved. Present indications are that
the 1997 Acts cost £98.4 million.[60]
The number of registered pistols denied law breakers until the
former are no longer capable of functioning may be estimated at
1,300. Thus for each pistol at risk of joining the illegal pool
the taxpayer has already paid £31,742; the final figure is
likely to be greater.
18. This figure should be compared with
the market value of unregistered pistols. One recent press report
tells of children obtaining semi-automatic weapons, presumably
pistols, for £80.[61]
If this is a true indication of the market then prices of illegal
guns have fallen steeply of late.[62]
19. Thus the 1997 Acts were an expensive
way to collect the small number of guns assumed to be at risk
of leaching into the illegal pool—a number so small that
supply from other sources would be easy to arrange.
20. The remainder of this memorandum addresses
the question whether any further changes are needed to the
licensing system or to existing controls.
Firearms control legislation in the UK and public
safety
DESIGN
21. The design of the system which operates
today—close monitoring by registration of the possession
and transfer of firearms and ammunition—was established
by the Firearms Act 1920 (Annex B). Although Parliament understood
the legislation to be a crime control measure, the aim of the
Act was unstated,[63]
but its design suggests its true object to have been the location
of firearms already in the hands of the law abiding. A curious
priority, until one recalls the historical context.[64]
22. Such equivocation at the outset has
made it difficult to evaluate the system ever since. Having been
incident-led, the subsequent shaping of the legislation over the
intervening 80 years has built a body of law with evident effect
but without clear purpose.
23. Since its introduction in 1920, the
legislation which established firearms control in the UK has been
amended 12 times:[65]
on no occasion, however, have changes followed upon an assessment
of what was already in place, nor have they been driven by research.
Rather have the most drastic extensions of the control systembeen
undertaken in haste,[66]
following unusual and dramatic incidents.[67]
This has prompted criticism from workers in the field in the UK,[68]
concern within the Home Affairs Committee[69]
and the regret of Lord Cullen.[70]
24. Researchers abroad have also been driven
to comment: `One of the startling things is that in contrast to
the United States, Canada and Australia, where the government
and academia are both very interested in the gun issue and so
write scholarly articles on all sides of the issue, there is just
not that interest in Britain among government researchers or academic
researchers. Gun control has just been accepted as a given without
any real need for supporting evidence' (Kopel 1994).[71]
25. As a crime control measure the present
legislation is misdirected for it concentrates a disproportionate
effort on a very small part of the problem of firearms crime (HAC
1996, xxxv.). The Home Affairs Committee concluded in 1996 that
the problems posed by illegally-held firearms are on a far greater
scale than those posed by firearms legally held. The official
gloss on the present situation: `The proportion of all notifiable
offences[72]
in which firearms (including air weapons) were used is small:
0.3 per cent in 1997'.[73]
Excluding air weapons,[74]
however, reduces the proportion to 0.1 per cent (CSE&W 1997,
54); but since for the purpose of the statistical returns `firearm'
includes imitation and `supposed' firearms[75]
and not all offences are notified,[76]
even this figure is likely to be misleadingly high.
26. Dunblane was a paradigm for the failure
of the UK licensing system. What did it achieve to have recorded
the serial number of every gun and every last round of ammunition
purchased by Thomas Hamilton, when the man himself was the danger?
ADMINISTRATION
27. In the UK, `gun control' is largely
a matter of procedural regularity. In practice, much police attention
is directed at the monitoring of transactions initiated by the
certificate holder himself and, it follows, the pursuit of technical
offences the commission of which, given the complexity of the
legislation, can be involuntary.
28. The degree of executive discretion exercised
by police forces in implementing firearms legislation since the
1988 Act came into effect has tended to alienate the shooting
community: shooting associations have been more prepared to support
their members in disputes with the police, to such an extent that
legal costs insurance is now offered as a routine benefit of association
membership.
29. In its Second Annual Report,
the Firearms Consultative Committee recalled that `During both
our first and second years of work, the way in which the firearms
licensing system is administered has been a major topic of discussion
for the Committee. It is clear from the many representations we
have received over the past two years that a significant number
of problems about a substantive number of aspects had arisen primarily
from police administration of the controls' (FCC 1991, 8.1).
30. Between 1991 and 1993, four studies
(ACPO 1991; Coopers & Lybrand 1991; Home Office 1992b; HMIC
1993) were conducted into the administration of the firearms control
system. None attempted to measure the effectiveness of the system
as a means to regulating firearm use but all presented evidence
that efficient and effective administration of the existing system
appeared beyond the competence of the police.
Multi-force Firearms Scrutiny (Association of
Chief Police Officers 1991)
31. Failures in the management of intelligence
were noted: some forces were found to have been unable to ensure
that firearms licensing departments would be made aware of an
applicant's previous arrest for a serious crime. The failure of
Central Scotland Police in this area was a key finding of Lord
Cullen's Inquiry into the Dunblane shootings five years later.
32. The full ACPO report was not made public;
an `Executive Summary' made 24 recommendations.
Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte (1991)
33. With the aim of identifying problems
and suggesting solutions, the British Association for Shooting
and Conservation (BASC) commissioned a report by Coopers &
Lybrand Deloitte into the operation of the firearms licensing
system.
34. The Firearms Consultative Committee
(FCC) identified a `considerable degree of common ground' between
this and the ACPO reports, noting that in many respects they complemented
each other (FCC 1991, 8.11).[77]
Proposal to Establish a National Firearms Control
Board, (Home Office 1992b)
35. Despite the issuing of Home Office guidance
to the police, the ACPO `Multi-force Firearms Scrutiny' and ACPO
participation on a Home Office working party to identify best
practice, a report by a Home Office working group[78]
had revealed persistent inconsistencies both of policy and practice.[79]
Since one effect of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 had been
to increase the administrative burden laid upon the police, these
findings had raised `acute' concerns within the Home Office about
the implications for public safety. For example:
— Lack of technical knowledge—`Many
police officers making enquiries of applicants for firearms or
shotgun certificates are not fully skilled in handling firearms
or particularly experienced in sporting weapons. As a result,
some are not well equipped to assess potential public safety issues
arising from the licensing procedure' (6).[80]
— The police career structure—`police
firearms departments may be hampered in their attempts to build
up expertise as police officers are subject to postings to other
departments. An officer who has developed a valuable degree of
skill and experience may have to be moved (on account of force
priorities or personal career needs) thereby depriving the firearms
licensing department of the knowledge and experience vital for
making informed public safety assessments'(8).
36. Moreover, the existing system was shown
to be cost-ineffective: `Police officers are more expensive to
employ than civilians. Firearms licensing, though it requires
expertise in firearms, does not utilise police skills and is,
for the most part, administrative: using police officers for such
work is expensive in direct terms, but also fails to capitalise
on their valuable specialist police training and experience' (Home
Office 1992b, 12).
37. The result of this appraisal of firearm
licensing was a costed Home Office proposal to remove responsibility
for firearms licensing from the police. By listing the advantages
of a National Firearms Control Board (NFCB), the Home Secretary
identified the shortcomings of the licensing system. An NFCB would
(he said) "put public safety first" by:
— being administered by experts trained
in firearms and crime prevention;
— being best placed to operate a fast,
efficient and cost effective service;
— eliminating inconsistencies between
forces; and
— freeing the police to concentrate
their resources on normal policing activities—`work only
they can do' (Home Office 1992a).
The Administration of Firearms Licensing (HMIC
1993)
38. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
(HMIC) sought to discover the quality of service offered by the
police to certificate holders and applicants. The inspection,
conducted by interview with the firearms licensing staff of 12
forces,[81]
measured the performance of each force against the recommendations
of both the ACPO `Multi-force Firearms Scrutiny' (ACPO 1991) and
the findings of the Home Office Working Group (Home Office 1991).
No force matched the `best practice' guidelines in every area
of operation. HMIC found:
— a system collapsed (3.10; 3.11);[82]
and
— Home Office inaction (9.10);
— impenetrable documentation (3.4;
3.6);
— inconsistent and unlawful police
policies (9.5);
— money wasted by poor administration
(7.5; 9.3; 9.8);
— that recommendations had been ignored
(9.11).[83]
It is understood that due to public demand this
HMIC report was reprinted five times.
39. The findings of these four studies were
still relevant in 1996, when Thomas Hamilton used licensed firearms
and ammunition at Dunblane Primary School; indeed, the findings
are relevant still.[84]
The use of records generated by the system
40. Whilst these reports of the early '90s
identified deficiencies in the implementation of the control system,
it was the Dunblane shootings which showed how serious can be
the consequences of failing to give proper attention to firearms
control. Both the ACPO `Multi-force firearm scrutiny' (ACPO 1991)
and the HMIC report (1993) had recommended the setting up of internal
information exchange systems. By 1995, Central Scotland Police
had yet to act upon the recommendation, so that against the advice
of several officers ThomasHamilton's certificate was renewed[85]—`a
glaring deficiency in the operation of the force's information
system' (Cullen 1996, 6.72).
41. Thus it was an operational police failure
which caused the shootings to have been carried out with certificate-authorised
firearms and ammunition at Dunblane, for the system, flawed as
it was (and may be still) as a crime control measure, did catch
Hamilton (Cullen 1996, 6.48-50; 6.61). Moreover, since a firearm
certificate `shall not be granted to a person whom the
chief officer of police has reason to believe . . . to
be for any reason unfitted to be entrusted with . . . a
firearm' (Firearms Act 1968, s 27(1); emphasis added), it would
seem that by renewing Hamilton's certificate the police had acted
unlawfully.
42. Since 1920, the police have authorised
in advance every firearm (and ammunition) sale, transfer and possession;
yet the number of licensed firearms remains uncertain:
The HMIC report had already made it clear that,
contrary to the Home Secretary's assumption that police forces
were `well on their way to operating best practice', the best
practice guidelines issued for some three years before remained
widely ignored: `It is now almost two years since the publication
of the [Home Office Report on the Administration of the Firearms
Licensing System] and it is clear that, if the forces visited
as part of the inspection are representative of the country as
a whole, the Police Service has failed to adopt sound practical
guidelines that would make them more efficient in a key area of
interface with the public. This is also in spite of its own Chief
Officers multi-force scrutiny carried out in 1991' (HMIC 1993,
9.11). Moreover, the Ernst & Young report itself had noted
that `current systems and procedures may not be set up in accordance
with the best practice models' (Ernst & Young 1992, 2).
— computerisation of shotgun certificate
records held by the Metropolitan (1985) and Thames Valley (1988)
forces brought to light some 14,000 certificates of which they
had been unaware (HOSB 1997, Table 3);
— in 1991, Essex, Kent and West Mercia
forces discovered that they had issued 17,000 fewer shotgun certificates
than they thought (HOSB 1997, Table 3); and
— when the time came for handguns to
be surrendered (1997 Acts), the police could not give an accurate
estimate of how many to expect: following the surrender, there
was a discrepancy of some 25,000 between expectations and the
number collected (NAO 1999, 2.39).[86]
43. A Home Office report published in 1993
found that:
— `in 1973 there were thought to
have been about 5,000 (shooting) clubs in England and Wales';
— prior to 1988, the record of approved
clubs `may not always have been updated';
— in Scotland, the number of approved
cadet corps was in 1989 unknown (Corkery 1993, 53; emphases
added).
44. No central register of certificate holders
exists even now. Thus the Government has yet to comply with their
obligation,[87]
to establish a central computerised register of persons who have
applied for a firearm or shotgun certificate, or to whom a firearm
or shotgun certificate has been granted. More than two years have
passed since the relevant section came into force (1 October 1997).[88]
EFFECTS OF
THE LEGISLATION
Shaping attitudes
45. For its first 60 years or so, however,
although the 1920 control system was unlikely to have been instrumental
in preventing firearms crimes—and did nothing to solve them
once committed—it was fairly easy for the public to understand
and the police to administer. Moreover, the legislation had the
effect of tending to foster a responsible attitude among firearms
users and owners, a benefit due less to the mechanism of control
than the climate of opinion established by its application.
46. The firearm certificate has established
the possession of guns as a privilege rather than—as it
was at one time in common law—a right; by denying a certificate
to convicted persons[89]
it has also, automatically but incidentally, defined certificate
holders as a highly law-abiding group. Belief in the exclusivity
of the firearm certificate is strengthened by the attitude of
target shooting officials sensitive over their club `approved'status.[90]
The resulting informal but early `screening' helps to explain
the relatively small number of firearm certificate applications
recorded as having been rejected formally by the police. The cumulative
effect of the certification process therefore has engendered responsible
attitudes on the part of those granted firearm certificates, moreover,
a gun owner knows that these days virtually any brush with the
law will put his continued possession of guns authorised by firearm
or shotgun certificate at risk.
The police had overestimated the numbers of
pistols subject to surrender by 24,886. The National Audit Office
(NAO) found that the number of pistols actually surrendered was
within 10 per cent of police estimates in only 16 of the 51 forces.
Twelve forces overestimated by 13 to 65 per cent; 23 forces underestimated
by 11 to 62 per cent. Only one force (Dumfries and Galloway) was
accurate in its estimate (NAO 199, 2.36 ff).
47. The existence of a ponderous and, for
the applicant, expensive licensing process will have discouraged
those with less than a serious interest in shooting or collecting;
and no doubt some will have been, for one reason or another, unsuitable
to possess firearms. To some degree therefore the very existence
of the system will have brought some social benefit, albeit probably
unquantifiable; but only those predisposed to stay within the
law are discouraged: to those who are not, the present licensing
system is an irrelevance—except for quantifying penalties,
eg for illegal possession.
Effect upon criminal use
48. Gross figures are subject to inconsistencies
in firearms identification and reporting. The complexities of
recording and classifying offences suggest the need for an indicator
of the trend of firearms in crime. For this purpose, the incidence
of robbery[91]
has been suggested as the most informative (Greenwood 1972, 155 ff).
49. Between 1976 and 1986 there were 19,161
firearms robberies reported; for the decade which saw the Firearms
(Amendment) Act 1988 take effect (1987-97), the corresponding
figure was 45,502, but the criminal use of firearms has been increasing
since the late 1960s (Cullen 1996, 9.7). However, since this increase
has coincided with a steep decline in the number of firearm and
a moderate decline in the number of shotgun certificates on issue,[92]
it can hardly be used as an argument for stricter controls. Whilst
it used to be the case that few members of the public faced firearms
criminally used, with the criminal use increasing of (fully-automatic)
machine guns, which `in untrained hands can be virtually uncontrollable'[93],
the bystander is at greater risk than ever before.[94]
The machine gun has been classified as prohibited since 1937.
50. Despite a decline in the incidence of
armed robbery, the criminal use of pistols increases: `There were
more than one and a half times as many handgun offences in 1997
as in 1987' (CSE&W 1997, 3.8). The official statistics for
robbery for the decade prior to 1997 show that although shotguns
(whether sawn-off or unmodified) occur in a significant number
of cases, the robber's preferred weapon—by a wide and increasing
margin—is the pistol. Given that the ratio of firearms robbery
to robbery of all kinds remains broadly constant, it should cause
no surprise that the recently-noted decline in the incidence of
robbery has brought a corresponding reduction in the incidence
of firearms robbery too. But if the incidence of robbery is falling,
the popularity of the pistol for the commission of serious crimes
is rising. By 1997, pistols were used in robbery more than six
times more frequently than shotguns; 10 years earlier, pistols
had been used about twice as frequently.
Ratio of pistols to shotguns used in robbery
(U.K.)
`Killing culture where "respect" means
only terror on our streets'—`Scotland Yard plays down the
fears of the rise in gun law and instances of machine guns being
fired off in the streets, pistols being whipped out in night clubs
and fired triumphantly into the ceiling are rarely released, but
within the culture that are becoming commonplace . . .A police
study in 1998 of the use of firearms in London found that since
1996, guns were fired 291 times, of which 115 were multiple discharges
. . . In some parts of London detectives say shootings are frequent
occurrences. One detective said . . . `the public really only
hears about the murders, but we are often being called to the
scene of shootings and there is nothing there but the cartridge
cases' (1 June 1999). This same issue also reported (on page 5)
the armed robbery of a milkman in Bexhill, East Sussex.
51. The 1997 Acts, which placed pistols
(other than historic pistols, narrowly defined)[95]
in the `prohibited' category do not appear to have reduced this
popularity.[96]
Notifiable offences involving handguns
(England and Wales)
Inspector Maybanks' cautionary conjecture (1992,
157) that extending prohibitions to arms already in circulation
will tend to increase the criminal use of such weapons appears
ever more ominous.
The illegal pool of firearms
52. In 1996, the Home Affairs Committee
concluded: `It is obvious that panic legislation, which might
be seen at its outset to bear the seeds of failure, should be
avoided. What would be the point of a total ban on the lawful
holding of handguns if there remained easy access to unlawful
handguns . . . ?' (HAC 1996, 59). Whether the 1997 Acts prove
this monitory observation to have been prophetic will take time
to establish; but the signs are not encouraging.
53. The 1997 Acts have established the illegal
pool of firearms from which the criminal market is supplied as
a public safety issue. Successive amnesties have shown that ever
tightening `controls' appear to have had little effect upon the
pool of unregistered guns.[97]
It is likely that the firearms currently in unlawful circulation
within the UK are sufficient to supply all conceivable criminal
requirements into the foreseeable future and beyond.[98]Nor
is it difficult to make guns clandestinely in quantity, even given
brutally strict regulation.[99]
The principal of the gun, which has been with us since the 14th
century cannot be uninvented.
54. The horror of the Dunblane shootings
diverted attention from issues central to public safety: from
the conduct of the Central Scotland Police to the pistol Hamilton
used; from the (frequent) criminal use of firearms to (infrequent)
amok killings. The Dunblane legacy persists: the news media report
that the police in London play down recent shooting incidents.[100]
55. The size of the illegal pool of firearms
is unknown but Lord Cullen heard estimates which varied from over
one million to four million or more (Cullen 1996, 107)—an
indication of the degree to which there is uncertainty over its
size. Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that the licensing
system is missing more than half the number of guns in unrestricted
circulation within the UK.
56. There will be arms still possessed,
war souvenirs or guns acquired before the firearm certificate
was introduced, which even now lie—some no doubt forgotten
but all unlicensed—in attics or wardrobes. This is the innocuous
(sometimes described as `benign') component of the illegal pool,
from which there has long been a small but steady migration to
the legal, via dealers, following (for example) the owner's decease.
However, for certain types of rifle and shotgun the 1988 Act closed
that door by raising their status to `prohibited'. In consequence,
the likelihood of certain unregistered but otherwise innocuous
long-arms falling into criminal hands has increased: with no legal
market for them, the value of prohibited arms may be realised
only by unlawful sale. The 1997 Acts have done the same for those
pistols currently part of the innocuous unlicensed pool;[101]
since for them there is no longer a route to the legal market,
henceforth their value also may be realised only by unlawful sale—an
encouragement to illicit disposal. Moreover, the severe penalties
for possessing a prohibited weapon may also be expected to discourage
the surrender of pistols to the police outside amnesties. With
pistols the preferred weapon of the armed criminal, this is particularly
unfortunate: since 1945, for every gun handed in during an amnesty,
two or more are believed to have been handed in outside amnesties
(HAC 1996, 27).[102]
57. The effect of reducing the types of
firearm which may be licensed and tightening control on those
which remain has been to make legal firearms ownership even more
exclusive and expensive—and the process more onerous. The
other side of this coin is that illegal firearms ownership, in
certain quarters de rigueur,[103]
is now by comparison markedly cheaper and less irksome. It is
now more difficult to obtain a rifle legally than a pistol, semi-automatic
centre-fire rifle or sub machine gun illegally. The news media
report that since the 1997 Acts came into effect, illegal guns
have become more widely distributed, and in unexpected quarters.[104]
Administration
58. The 1997 Acts, which introduced more
complicated application and notification procedures, also require
closer police involvement in rifle and muzzle-loading clubs; but
there is anecdotal evidence that individual certificate holders
are receiving more attention from the police. Thus the police
workload brought by firearms legislation would appear greater
today than it was in 1992, when the Home Secretary admitted that
"The licensing function places an onerous administrative
burden on police forces and diverts police officers from skilled
police work" (Home Office 1992a). Notwithstanding the extra
effort required from the police, those who seek to possess or
shoot pistols henceforth will remain unknown to the licensing
authority.
Police Trainiing
59. One further unfortunate consequence
of the 1997 pistol ban and the closure of pistol-shooting clubs
has been that police officers—who were `the largest single
occupational group in pistol shooting as a sport'—are now
denied `a useful supplement to [their] necessarily limited training'
(HAC 1996, 47).
`Police said gun possession among children
had increased because it had now become a `fashion' statement
. . .'
"Legislation introduced after the
Dunblane massacre made it illegal to possess a full-bore pistol,
with a sentence of up to 10 years for offenders. The legislation
has, however, failed to stem the illegal gun trade, with dealers
importing guns from eastern Europe or buying decommissioned weapons
and reactivating them. According to the latest Home Office figures,
27 girls aged 17 or under and 1,062 boys were cautioned or convicted
on firearms offences in 1997. Although the majority of offences
related to airguns, the data disclosed evidence of children as
young as 12 having access to lethal firearms . . ."
`The victims of the guns are also often
young teenagers. In one shooting in Longsight, Manchester, in
April last year, two youths aged 14 and 17 were attacked by a
gang with automatic machineguns' (9 May 1999).
Development potential of the present control regime
60. The diversion of yet further police
resources to the monitoring of those willing to submit to the
licensing system may be of public benefit; but no attempt has
been made to discover whether such a commitment is worthwhile,
or whether police time and manpower could be more productively
employed in other areas.
61. the body of legislation which bears
upon the use, possession, etc. of firearms is large: some 51 statutes
and 20 Statutory Instruments; but as a result of successive amendments
the Principal Act itself is now so labyrinthine that the Home
Office guidance on its application is bulkier than the legislation
itself, even without the updating—which has yet to appear
(October 1999)—required by the 1997 legislation.
62. To extend prohibitions to more classes
of firearm offers diminishing returns politically: the likelihood
of future serious shooting incidents being carried out with `banned'
firearms is automatically increased, but the commitment to further
prohibitions is strengthened thereby—a process which draws
attention to the futility of prohibition and as the firearm sub-types
which remain unbanned diminish, narrows the options for future
legislation. Already this is in process: for the news media, firearms
crime in London and the ineffectiveness of the legislation has
become a cause célèbre.[105]
63. With each such extension of the existing
system reducing its potential for control, the criminal use of
guns may be expected to increase, unchecked by regulation. Such
is the inflexibility of the present control régime that
development is most conveniently accomplished by the extension
of existing procedures—by moving one class of firearm into
a category designed for another, for example, as was done when
pistols were moved from section 1 to section 5 of the Principal
Act (1997). Not only is this approach likely to be evidently counter-productive
in terms of public safety but it also offers politically diminishing
returns at best; but the inevitable outcome of such a process
must be: no guns licensed—and millions beyond control.[106]
64. To achieve an effective system the first
step must be research, and the first step in research is a research
design. The following sample topics suggest themselves:
— the definition of objectives—and
recognition of the unattainable
— the consequences of the present system
(eg, those of the 1988 and 1997 Acts upon real control; the utility
of gathering serial numbers and regulating ammunition quantities)
— narrowing the gap between system
design and implementation
— the nature of the threat of criminal
use
— a risk assessment of firearms in
society
— who is to be permitted firearms
— the firearms control systems of other
countries: objectives and effects
— the design of a unified and centralised
database, accessible to all police forces
— amok killers, with a view to advance
identification.
RECOMMENDATIONS
65. To extend the existing legislation would
be unwise.
66. The movement of unregistered firearms
into the licensing system should be facilitated.
67. An independent, academic body should
be commissioned to prepare a research design and undertake research
into the issue of firearms control with a view to proposing the
design of a firearms control system for the UK which will truly
promote public safety.
68. That a better system of firearms control
be adopted as a result.
59 The distinction is recognised in Part I of the
Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997: `Prohibition of weapons
and ammunition and control of small calibre pistols' (emphasis
added). Back
60
Source: Home Office 30 September 1999. There remain some 200
claims for compensation which remain to be settled; some of these
are substantial. Back
61
Sunday Times, 9 May 1999. `Children of 14 carry guns for
"status"' -handguns have become the latest status symbol
for teenagers as young as 14 on Britain's streets . . . An investigation
by the Sunday Times has found that semi-automatic weapons
have been obtained by children for as little as £80. A senior
police officer said juvenile gun ownership had become "an
act of machismo" . . . . `Police said gun possession among
children had increased because it had now become a "fashion'
statement . . . .' Back
62
Currently, the supply of illegal firearms appears to exceed demand.
Were the situation to be reversed (which, at first sight might
appear desirable), then it would become profitable to provide
criminals with guns. The encouragement given organised crime in
the United States by the Volstead Act of 1919 offers a cautionary
parallel: `. . . [N]ewfound popularity for bootleg guns might
result in handguns becoming cheaper than they are now, just as
in alcohol prohibition days, bootleg gin often cost less than
legal alcohol had. If handguns were cheaper, they might become
more available to small-time teenage criminals and other low-end
miscreants; criminals might end up more widely armed that ever
before' (Kopel 1993, 318). It is happening here already. Back
63
Other than that it was intended `to amend the law relating to
firearms and other weapons and ammunition, and to amend the Unlawful
Drilling Act 1819'. Back
64
For concern, albeit publicly unstated, over the possibility of
Bolshevist-inspired civil unrest and the wish to be able to locate
weapons for redistribution to friends of the Government, see eg
Burton 1990, 27. Back
65
1934, 1937, 1952, 1965, 1968, 1969 (fees), 1970 (fees), 1988,
1992, 1994 and 1997 (twice). Back
66
Following the Dunblane shootings, the decision taken by the Scottish
Office to use one year of data (1993) for its evaluation of serious
incidents involving the use of a firearm was taken `because of
the requirement to report within four weeks' (Oag et al
1996). Back
67
Criminal Justice Act 1967/Firarms Act 1968 (the shooting with
pistols of three police officers-controversy over the abolition
of the death penalty: regulated the issue of shotgun certificates).
Firearms (Dangerous Air Weapons) Rules 1969 (a response to questions
on the control of airguns: made airguns which exceeded certain
kinetic energies subject to certification-no case of a such airguns
ever having been used in crime could be cited, reduced sales of
the more expensive, imported air rifles). Green Paper 1973 proposed
restrictions where there had been controls-withdrawn: but some
proposals were adopted as `force policy' by certain chief constables.
Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 (Hungerford shootings: transferred
semi-automatic and pump-action centre-fire rifles into prohibited
category). Firearms (Amendment) Rules 1992 (European Weapons Directive:
prohibited expanding pistol ammunition, many exemptions necessary).
Firearms Act (Amendment) Regulations 1992 (European Weapons Directive:
introduced European Firearms Pass). Firearms (Dangerous Air Weapons)
[Amendment] Rules 1993 (European Weapons Directive: airguns disguised
as other objects moved to section 1 control). Firearms (Amendment)
Act 1997 (Dunblane shootings: extended the existing control system
and transferred centre-fire pistols into prohibited category).
Firearms (Amendment) (No 2) Act 1997 (Dunblane shootings: extended
prohibition to `small calibre' pistols). Back
68
`One of the most glaring defects to be found in any study of
the legislation is an almost complete absence of proper research.
The statistics produced to support Bills have invariably been
inadequate and have lacked points of comparison' (Greenwood 1972,
241). In his study of the provenance of guns used in London robberies,
police inspector Adrian Maybanks compared the lack of research
in the UK-which he found a constant source of frustration-with
the `abundance' of research conducted in other countries. Moreover,
he expressed regret that the results of research undertaken elsewhere
had been ignored by legislators (Maybanks 1992, 162-3). Back
69
`. . . we are concerned that policy on firearms control appears
to be formed without the benefit of statistical material which
we believe to be highly relevant' (HAC 1996, para 35). Back
70
`. . . there is unfortunately no systematic recording as to the
extent to which legal, as distinct from illegal firearms are used
in the commission of crime in Great Britain; and there is no routine
research into this subject' (Cullen 1996, 9.4). Back
71
David B Kopel: attorney and research director of the Independence
Institute, Denver. Back
72
"Notifiable offences" recorded by the police cover
a wide range of crimes, from homicide to minor damage (HOSB 1998,
3). Back
73
A figure which has remained unchanged since 1993. Back
74
Although airguns fall within the definition of `firearm' in the
Acts, we are not aware of this being the case in any other EU
Member State: it is clear from the context of the Weapons Directive
(Council Directive of 18 June 1991 91/477/EEC), for example, that
its provisions do not apply to air weapons. Airguns are not firearms;
those classified as `specially dangerous' require the authority
of a firearm certificate in England, Scotland and Wales. All airguns
are required to be authorised by certificate in Northern Ireland. Back
75
`Something was concealed which was presumed to be a firearm'
(CSE&W 1997, 3.1). The report of the recent killing by police
of a man who proved to have been carrying not a gun but a table
leg in a plastic bag (report: Evening Standard, 24 September
1999) suggests that a significant proportion of such assumptions
are likely to be incorrect. Back
76
Notifiable offences are fewer than those presented in the British
Crime Survey. Under recording is to be addressed by a `more honest
approach', announced recently (Home Secretary: letter, Daily
Telegraph, 13 October 1999). Back
77
The FCC saw only the ACPO `Executive Summary'. Back
78
Which included representatives from several police forces and
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. Back
79
`Many of the difficulties are inherent given that [Firearms licensing]
is a subject which is specialised but not, essentially, a police
matter, being tackled by 51 different forces, with inevitable
local variations' (Home Office 1992a, 14-15). It may be supposed
that the centralised data gathering required by the EC Weapons
Directive (81/477/EEC) was considered impossible to achieve with
the existing system. Back
80
Cp Cullen 1996: `Chief Constable Cameron observed that in his
experience the use of civilians had brought a level of experience
and expertise to the process [of firearms licensing] which
had not been there before' (8.12; emphasis added). Back
81
Avon and Somerset; Bedfordshire; Devon and Cornwall; Greater
Manchester; Lincolnshire; Kent; Northumbria; North Wales, South
Yorkshire; Suffolk; Thames Valley and West Yorkshire. Back
82
The inspection discovered that in some forces the certification
process had actually broken down, with expired certificates remaining
unrenewed. In Greater Manchester, the inspectors found a three-month
backlog of shotgun certificate renewals; in West Yorkshire, in
one quarter of the sample applications examined, the certificates
being renewed had already expired. For South Yorkshire, this was
so in three cases out of four. Back
83
Even two years after the Home Office Working Group had made its
report and the findings of the ACPO multi-force scrutiny had been
made known, `the Police Service [had] failed to adopt sound practical
guidelines which would make them more efficient in a key area
of interface with the public. This is also in spite of its own
Chief Officers multi-force scrutiny carried out in 1991' (9.11). Back
84
Announcing the June 1999 publication of the HMIC report Police
Integrity: securing and maintaining public confidence (HMIC
1999), the Home Office (174/99) drew attention to `a growing public
concern about levels of integrity in the police service and a
related decline in public confidence in policing'. Back
85
By the time of the previous renewal of Hamilton's certificate
(1992), at least eight police officers were aware that Hamilton's
suitability to possess firearms was in doubt; five officers had
expressed their misgivings to colleagues and superiors. Lord Cullen's
Report revealed that there had been successive failures of internal
communication relevant to Hamilton's fitness to hold a firearm
certificate (Cullen 1996, 6.40ff). Back
86
The Home Office estimated that 200,490 pistols were lawfully
held on firearm certificates in April 1996; the police estimated
there to have been 187,239 pistols due for surrender. Parliament
heard that 162,198 pistols had been surrendered; the National
Audit Office found that 162,353 had been handed in. Subsequently,
police forces suggested that the discrepancies were due to pistols
found not to be subject to prohibition, those for which individual
exemptions had been granted and those exported, deactivated or
destroyed. Having allowed for all these, it was found that 712
more pistols than expected had been surrendered (NAO 1999, Appendix
6). Back
87
Section 39 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997. Back
88
The matter is now the subject of a Parliamentary Question from
the Lord Marlesford (at the time of writing, no day has been fixed). Back
89
Firearms Act 1968, s21. Firearm and shotgun certificate applicants
must declare spent convictions (Rehabilitation of Offenders Act
1972 [Exceptions] Order 1975). Back
90
A concept, introduced by the Firearms Act 1920, which permits
a member of a rifle club or miniature rifle club approved by the
Secretary of State to have in his possession, use or carry a firearm
or ammunition without the need for a firearm certificate when
engaged in or in connection with target practice (s1[8][e]), These
provisions were re-enacted without amendment by the Firearms Acts
of 1937 and 1968. Thus approval avoids a proliferation of firearm
certificates. An analogous arrangement exists for shooting galleries
(Firearms Act 1968, s11[4]). Some clubs preferred to recruit exclusively
from among those who already held firearm certificates; since
for them this exemption offered no advantage, they did not seek
inclusion on the Home Office list. Being `unapproved', therefore,
does not mean or even imply that the Home Office disapproves;
accordingly, `exempted club' would be less ambiguous. Back
91
Stealing, using violent means (Theft Act 1968, s8). Robbery is
generally neither an amateur's nor a first offender's crime (Greenwood
1972, 156; citing McKlintock and Gibson 1961). Previous offences
automatically disqualify a person from holding a firearm certificate
(Firearms Act 1968, s21). Back
92
In 1971, 190,600 firearm certificates; in 1997, 133,600-a reduction
of 30 per cent. In 1971, 715,500 shotgun certificates; in 1997,
623,100-a reduction of 13 per cent (HOSB 1998). The over-and under-recording
by four police forces brought to light 1985-91 roughly cancel
out. Back
93
Evening Standard 1 June 1999. The news media identify
the machine pistol as the favourite weapon of `Yardie' groups
(Evening Standard May to June 1999, passim). Back
94
See, for example, front page headline and stories building May
to June in the Evening Standard `Seven Shot in London Night
Club Battle: victims caught in crossfire of Yardie gang war' (5
May 1999); `Gang War. Two More Shot Dead-Four killed in a week
as Yardies battle over drugs'. `Another resident of Acton Lane,
who wished not to be named, said: `This sort of thing is becoming
the norm . . . Teenagers into drugs want to get guns to protect
themselves on the street and everyone knows where you can get
them' . . . The latest killing this morning was the 26th murder
in north-west London this year' (28 May 1999). Back
95
Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997, s7. Back
96
Official Report, 15 June 1999, col 103. Back
97
More weapons were surrendered during the 1988 amnesty (nearly
48,000) than during the amnesty held 20 years before (41,000).
The most recent amnesty (1996), produced 22,939 guns (Home Office
News Release 203/96; cited HAC 1996, 26). Guns and ammunition
surrendered in amnesties are, of course, unwanted. Back
98
Assuming (i) 2 million illegal and unregistered firearms, (ii)
4,000 armed criminal acts annually in which illegal firearms are
used and (iii) that each firearm is used but once, the existing
illegal pool would be sufficient for more than 500 years' criminal
supply. Back
99
Occupied Europe provides examples of clandestine production of
sub-machine guns: in Denmark, the STEN gun; in Italy the Variara
(1943-44). In 1942, a Russian engineer designed and produced a
new sub-machine gun (the PPS-42) during the Leningrad siege. A
study undertaken by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
found that one-fifth of the guns seized by the police in Washington
DC were home-made (BATF, Analysis of Operation Concentrated
Urban Enforcement, interim report 133-34 [15 February 1977]:
cited Kopel 1993, 318). Back
100
"Scotland Yard plays down the fears of the rise in gun law
and instances of machine guns being fired off in the streets,
pistols being whipped out in nightclubs and fired triumphantly
into the ceiling are rarely released" (Evening Standard,
1 June 1999). Back
101
Historic and muzzle-loading pistols are not included in the prohibited
category. Back
102
There have been nine formal amnesties since the First World War
(HAC 1996, 26). Since the Second World War, over 300,000 weapons
and 112 million rounds of ammunition have been surrendered (FCC
1991, 43). Back
103
On 9 May 1999, the Sunday Times carried a report under
the headline `Children of 14 carry guns for "status"-`Handguns
have become the latest status symbol for teenagers as young as
14 on Britain's streets. Back
104
`An investigation by the Sunday Times has found that semi-automatic
weapons have been obtained by children for as little as £80.
A senior police officer said juvenile gun ownership had become
"an act of machismo" . . .' Back
105
Evening Standard, 7 September 1999, quoting Inspector
David Nash of Kilburn police: `Guns are designed to kill and are
very difficult to control. We really need the public to let us
know who has got these weapons.' There have been 13 fatal shootings
in London this year as well as a string of gangland gun battles
. . . Posters have gone up in Hackney, Lambeth and Brent with
the message: `Don't let our city become a shooting gallery.' Back
106
An absolute prohibition on gun-ownership is not really practicable.
The Labour Party has recognised that some people will have to
own deer rifles or shotguns (Labour Party 1996). Back
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