Examination of Witnesses (Questions 440
- 459)
THURSDAY 13 JANUARY 2000
MR MARTIN
BROUGHTON, MR
PETER WILSON,
MR GARETH
DAVIS, MR
DAVID DAVIES
AND DR
AXEL GIETZ
440. Non-privileged documents?
(Mr Gareth Davis) Yes, indeed.
441. We can simply send for documents you know.
What are you excluding when you use that term?
(Mr Gareth Davis) Documents that have legal privilege.
442. I think that you would need to consult
the Clerk to the Committee before you excluded anything on those
grounds because the Committee itself has privilege. Since you
are using their names and that does carry an implication with
it then I think you should be willing to substantiate that implication
by letting us have the actual documents. If there are no documents
then I think you should tell us that because that does call into
question the extent and the weight and the thoroughness of the
consultation that you had with them. Either way I think we would
be very interested.
(Mr Gareth Davis) I take your point, Mrs Wise, and
I can only suggest to be helpful on this that I will put the Committee
in touch with our people so that we can discuss how best we can
assist you. As I say, I am not totally familiar with the archive
myself or the practical and legal issues associated with it. I
will also take advice before providing you with our full response.
I think that is as helpful as I possibly can be.
Mr Burns
443. Can I move on slightly to when the tobacco
companies knew about the risks associated with smoking. When did
your companies reach their current public stance on the risks
of smoking?
(Mr Wilson) That is a hard one to answer. We have
acknowledged the risks going back to the 1950s when the first
Doll and Hill Report was published. We immediately worked both
within the industry and with Government to address the very significant
and important issues that were raised there.
444. Can I come back to that in a minute when
I have had answers from your colleagues.
(Mr David Davies) We have acknowledged the statistical
association for decades. I think it is fair to say that our thinking
has evolved on this issue over the course of the years. Today
our position is quite clear in acknowledging the consensus in
the medical and scientific community that smoking causes serious
diseases. If you are a smoker the only safe thing to do is to
stop smoking. If you are not a smoker then the only safe thing
to do is not to begin to smoke.
(Mr Broughton) As Mr Wilson said, since the mid-1950s
or early 1950s the working hypothesis of research has been that
there is a link between smoking and health and, therefore, let
us assume that is the case and do some research. The changing
position of the company is like anything else, as time goes by
you get more information. A lot of it comes down to the different
roles. The company has never done epidemiological studies, that
is not the role of the company, I think that is the role of academics,
scientists, public policy persons. The role of the company is
to say "Let us take this as a working hypothesis and see
what can be done about it? What are the biological mechanisms
that are likely to be causing these statistics to come out? What
product modifications can be made?" From a research position,
since the 1950s we have taken that as a working assumption and
the research within the company has been directed towards "Okay,
now what? What can be done about it?"
Chairman
445. Could you be specific about when in the
1950s? There is a reason behind my question. The first ever statement
that was made by a Health Minister in this place was in 1954.
When would you accept that there was a general consensus around
this working hypothesis that you have referred to among all of
these tobacco companies?
(Mr Broughton) I thought it was 1952 actually.
446. Possibly.
(Mr Broughton) The early 1950s. I think that was the
first time when there was serious epidemiological evidence. From
time immemorial, from James I to the First World War comments
about "coffin nails", I do not think the industry has
ever worked on the assumption that these are safe. I think the
real research into the hypothesis that these are unsafe and what
are we going to do about this was in the very early 1950s, 1952
or 1954. I cannot be certain which year but it was around about
then.
(Mr Gareth Davis) I would echo the formation of it
was in the early 1950s and through the 1950s. Indeed, my belief
is that the Harrogate Laboratory established in 1962 was set up
to work on the basis of that working hypothesis. To answer you
specifically, the positions that we have arrived at are based
on our internal experts reviewing the literature, the studies,
and taking expert advice from scientists outside of the company.
I would say that it is over the last ten years or so that those
positions have become more clear.
(Dr Gietz) The research work and the development work
in this context is more important. It certainly began around the
time that my colleagues have mentioned.
Mr Burns
447. The research work began rather than you
actually discovered?
(Dr Gietz) Within our company. What is important to
explain is the role that the scientists in the R&D department
of, say, our company have. They do not do the medical research,
they monitor the medical research, they monitor what the scientific
community comes up with, as it were, and then review it and try
to translate it into responsible development work. This is certainly
what they have done since this point in time that we can jointly
agree on.
448. So by and large it would be fair to say
that from the early/mid-1950s your companies knew that there were
risks and dangers to health related to smoking?
(Dr Gietz) If I may, the important point is that our
scientists at no point knew anything that nobody else knew. It
was not that they had privileged knowledge, it was the other way
around really. They monitor what others have developed.
449. Given that from the early/mid-1950s it
was generally known in your companies that there were risks and
health related problems with regard to the product that you produce,
what did your companies do, what action did they take having reached
that decision bearing in mind, and you may want to give evidence
to refute this, it would seem to the outside observer that ever
since that time until fairly recently kicking and screaming your
companies have objected to things even like the size of the health
warning on a packet of cigarettes, the question of advertising
of cigarettes?
(Mr Wilson) Let me volunteer. In the 1950s when the
reports starting with Doll and Hill first emerged, that caused
considerable concern, yes. I was not around at that time, please
understand that, I am doing my best to try to recreate what went
on. This resulted in a significant amount of research by the industry
and individual companies and involving Government. That research
started on a simple premise as we set out in our submission—and
it is there so if I am wasting your time, please tell me—to
try to understand what it was in a tobacco product that was causing
the potential damage with a view to identifying it and then eliminating
it. That proved immensely complex. It started off on the basis
that there were about 20 different elements in tobacco smoke and
the more this was analysed the more complex it got and today I
believe there are probably somewhere around 3,500 to 4,000 elements
in tobacco smoke. It became clear after a considerable while that
this was not going to be a fertile way forward. The work then
changed to start seeing how cigarettes could be modified and that
led to the development of the low tar programme tobacco substitutes
and other things which I am happy to talk about should you wish
to do so. Certainly in 1971 we voluntarily put health warnings
on our packs. You talked about not doing this or not wishing to
do this but we have done it.
450. No, I did not say that at all. What I said
was arguments about the size of the warnings on packets of cigarettes,
not that you refused to do it although now you have no choice
in the matter. Certainly there were arguments as recently as the
late 1980s when you as an industry objected to larger sized health
warnings on packets of cigarettes.
(Mr Wilson) I think that particular point you are
making relates to an interpretation of the European Directive
which was there to harmonise the size of health warnings across
Europe. We had one interpretation of it and the Government had
another interpretation.
451. But you fought the Government's interpretation?
(Mr Wilson) Yes, we did.
452. Which was to have larger ones.
(Mr Wilson) Because we thought it was a wrong interpretation
of the Directive.
453. Even if that were the case, and I am not
conceding that was the case, if my memory is right what the Government
was doing in their interpretation of that Directive was to have
larger health warnings on packets of cigarettes and you were fighting
that on the basis that you felt the Government had wrongly interpreted
an EU Directive. That does seem like splitting hairs and relatively
unimportant if one is concerned about making something as prominent
as possible for the potential customer of the risks of the product
they are going to buy or they had bought.
(Mr Wilson) It is all a question of degree. We have
agreed since 1971, as I say, to health warnings on our packs.
Going back before that there was ample evidence, and we have summarised
it in our submission to you, of the high level of awareness of
the risks of smoking in the population at large. To me the essential
thing is to ensure that every smoker is aware of the risks. Whether
the health warning is four per cent or five per cent, the important
thing is that the message is there. We are more than happy to
co-operate with the Government but we need to make certain that
we are working to the objective of getting that message across.
It is important to us how much of our pack is devoted to the competitive
issues, of having a pack of cigarettes which our smokers can choose
in preference to our competitors' brands, and at the same time
creating the right balance on that pack in getting the health
message across. Yes, there were differences of view between us
and Government as to what that right balance was.
454. Fair enough.
(Mr Wilson) The message has to be there.
455. If the message is so important to warn
people of the dangers related to smoking, why is it that in the
past, in the relatively recent past, certain tobacco companies
have targeted the next generation of smokers, ie children? Why
have they used cartoon characters for getting across their message
which particularly attract the young people? Why do they spend
so much time seeking to open up the highly lucrative Far Eastern
market?
(Mr Wilson) We do not target children in any way.
456. I said until relatively recently tobacco
companies have through the use of cartoon characters for advertising,
etcetera, etcetera. It may not be happening at this moment but
it certainly has happened in the recent past.
(Mr Broughton) We do not target children for advertising.
457. Not now but you will accept it has been
done in the past. Joe Camel?
(Mr Broughton) You will have to address that question
to Dr Gietz.
458. The Flintstones?
(Mr Broughton) I do not recall—and I cannot
say this with certainty—any case of British American Tobacco
using cartoon characters.
459. But the tobacco industry has in the western
world.
(Mr Broughton) I think in essence the point you are
getting at is why do youth start smoking and in all of the studies
that have been done I do not think you will find that it is because
they like an advert. I think you will find there is ample evidence
to say it is peer pressure, it is parental behaviour, it is various
societal issues and I do not think it is actually for great debate
from the research. When you ask, and it is not us who ask, children
why they start they do not refer to advertising as a reason.
Mr Burns: No but they might be influenced by
an image conveyed by an advertisement, however subtley it is
done. For example, and I go back to American advertising techniques,
cartoon characters can be helpful. The classic Marlboro advert
of the macho cowboy on the horse in the far West of the States,
that all creates (to use common parlance) a "cool" image
that certainly in the past may well, almost certainly did, attract
young people to start smoking because they thought it was cool
and it dovetailed in or linked in with other issues you have mentioned
like peer pressure, etcetera, but advertising did have a role
to play which the tobacco companies fully exploited at the time.
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