Select Committee on Health Minutes of Evidence



Examination of witnesses (Questions 1420 - 1439)

WEDNESDAY 16 FEBRUARY 2000

MR M BROUGHTON, MR K CLARKE, MR C BATES and MR D CAMPBELL

  1420. Yes, it is. Given that you are making very serious accusations or statements, you cannot base them on supposition and your interpretation and say that means that it is actually accurate. That is why I should like to ask Mr Broughton what his interpretation of those two sentences is.
  (Mr Broughton) Frankly again it ism as you are seeing and I am seeing as well, two lines out of a report. I do not know what they mean quite honestly. I do not know what they mean. I could put several interpretations on them. I could certainly put the interpretation, I can see why Mr Bates would put that interpretation on, I can see that interpretation, but I do not think it is the only interpretation.

  1421. The point is that it is an interpretation, it is not a 100 per cent fact. Am I right?
  (Mr Bates) All we can do is present documents and attempt to interpret them as best we can. The danger is that we could approach this with a sledgehammer and present you with 150 documents which build up a much larger more elaborate case. Here I am saying that, as far as the documents we have seen and what is written there, a reasonable interpretation, a reasonable person looking at that, taking into account the terminology used in all the documents and everything we have seen, that is what that means and Mr Broughton rightly confirms that that is a plausible and reasonable interpretation.
  (Mr Broughton) It is plausible. May I just say that I think the point you are making is a very fair one. I do not think this Committee should assume that an interpretation made by the head of an organisation whose sole objective in life is to harass the tobacco companies as far as they possibly can, through whatever means possible, is a purely objective interpretation.

  Chairman: We shall have to make our own judgements.

  Mr Burns: May I move on?

  Chairman: I am sorry, I thought you had finished.

Mr Burns

  1422. I have not even started my main question. I was with certain incredulity beginning to understand that a lot was interpretation and personal opinion and we certainly do not want this Select Committee to be used as a kangaroo court. I think it is only fair on both sides of any argument that both sides have the opportunities to make their points but with respect that the points should be based on fact rather than on interpretation and personal views because of the seriousness of the allegations.
  (Mr Bates) I do agree with you actually. We are not suggesting that people should be led from this meeting in handcuffs and charged or convicted. All we are saying is that there is a case to answer and as far as we are concerned BAT should look into it properly and not just wave away these things and that DTI should launch an investigation into the conduct of BAT. The level of confidence that we need in these things is that required to suggest there is a case to answer, not to prove absolutely with one document beyond reasonable doubt that they had been up to smuggling. I think they have, they may have a defence.
  (Mr Campbell) I do sympathise with your point because it troubled us immensely as we went through these documents. There are documents which are grey, there are documents which we threw to one side saying it could not be fair to put this meaning. I understand the point you are making but I do say that if you read it in the context and look at the marketing information for the country concerned, you will see that those were smuggling routes. I think I could assist you further by taking you perhaps to documents which are completely unambiguous on their face and on their meaning. In 1993, as I am sure the Committee is aware, Canada faced the position that the United Kingdom is in now in that there was massive smuggling, primarily recycling through the United States—its Andorra—and Indian reservations which were the routes across the St Lawrence. In that context several companies planned massive increases in smuggling; one of them, RJ Reynolds has already been convicted in the American courts, its executives are going to gaol as we speak and it faces a racketeering action in the United States by the Canadian Government. British American Tobacco, acting through its current managing director, Mr Ulrich Herter, not only endorsed the massive increase of smuggling into Canada in June of 1993 as company policy, it is on the letterheading of BAT Industries and I do not want to be accused of having anything out of context here, so as soon as I have finished speaking I am going to pass this letter right over to Mr Clarke and I am going to find the additional pages of the correspondence which you will notice are not there, but they will be with him by the end of the session. What it says here from the Director of the BAT Group Company, Imperial Tobacco Limited in Canada, in Montreal, is that an increasing volume of our domestic sales in Canada will be exported then smuggled back for sale here. There is no ambiguity there. Perhaps you might think, and you would certainly want to know and I did want to know, did Mr Ulrich Herter, then managing director tobacco, now the chief executive for Mr Broughton, hold up his hands in horror and say you must not do that. It is one thing if smugglers happen to take our product through but quite another to plan for a massive increase in smuggling which, as this Committee will know, had the purpose and effect of defeating the health policy of the Canadian Government.

  1423. Do we have copies of those letters?
  (Mr Campbell) No.

  1424. Then may I ask a question. How long have you had copies of those letters?
  (Mr Campbell) I have had them for about three weeks.

  1425. Why are you springing them on the Committee now when you are covered by privilege with the press looking on rather than supplying them to us in advance so that we could look at them and prepare for this hearing.
  (Mr Campbell) How many volumes would you have liked?

  1426. Obviously that letter—
  (Mr Campbell) Every one of these documents—and I have three volumes—deals with smuggling.

  1427. I accept that. I will ask the questions. Obviously, because you have taken that letter out and basically sought to read it into the record just now, it has a special importance to you because you have not tried, fortunately, to read the other three files into the record during the course of this afternoon. I can only assume that letter is particularly important to you and particularly damning from your point of view.
  (Mr Campbell) I think so, yes.

  1428. Why—I get back to my original question—did we not get that letter in advance rather than having it sprung sight unseen on us by reading it into the record when you have had it for a week?
  (Mr Campbell) I wonder whether you had troubled yourself to read The Guardian articles which led to this hearing.

  1429. Yes.
  (Mr Campbell) If so, you would have seen this letter referred to. You would have seen the quotations.

  1430. Yes, but you have the full text of it, The Guardian article does not.
  (Mr Campbell) I am not trying to read it into the record. Yes, we do not have the space in The Guardian.

  1431. That is besides the point you are sidestepping the principle.
  (Mr Campbell) If you want five volumes or 50 volumes of documents concerned with smuggling, they are available. But if I may finish the point on this one

  1432. No, actually because with respect I should like to move on because we are not going to be here all night.
  (Mr Campbell) It is only two sentences. It is to say that the response of Mr Herter on behalf of British American Tobacco was not to say stop smuggling in Canada, he said pay us the two per cent royalty on those volumes. In other words, if you as one of our group companies are going to smuggle more into Canada to defeat the health policy of the government and evade taxes we should like to have a two per cent profit here in London. I hand over those pages now.

  1433. I now want to go back to something, I shall be quite frank, which I do feel rather queasy about which was discussed at the beginning of this hearing and that is that this Committee's aim is to produce a report on the health effects of tobacco amongst other things and that what we are seeking is information, accurate information on the whole area. We are, as has been mentioned, covered by parliamentary privilege, but with privilege comes responsibility as well and it does no committee any good, nor does it enhance the reputation of the select committee system, if that privilege is then used to become a kangaroo court. So there is an important balance between unproven allegations and facts. What I am interested to know is that in the submissions we received in advance, the answers to questions since we started here today, a number of very serious and very eye-catching allegations has been made with a dearth of fact. Certainly Mr Campbell's submission has some very serious allegations in it but basically no facts. They are taken as facts in the way it is written, but nothing to back that up.
  (Mr Campbell) May I respond?

  1434. I will finish my question first. Mr Bates's document does have many sub-paragraphs and lots of extracts. As we found out a few minutes ago, discussing the China one, that is open to interpretation and it is not a killer fact to prove something. People may draw an interpretation of that and of course what we have are only selected extracts. We do not have the document in its entirety so that we can form a common view. What I should like to know, and this is my final question, the straightforward question, is why was The Guardian article far less, for want of a better word, sensational in its accusation than the briefs which have been given to us, the discussions we have today, which are covered by parliamentary privilege?
  (Mr Campbell) I do not accept the premise. I do not think that in any way The Guardian was less sensational. It is perfectly clear from the headline and from the text that what was being said in plain language and with the force of the presentation was that British American Tobacco PLC deliberately arranged for the smuggling of cigarettes as a major and substantial part of its corporate policy. The same article also alluded to the peso brokering traffic in the Caribbean, that is the narcotics connection, and made clear the prominent involvement of executives such as Mr Herter who was named, as I recall, in the article. All these matters were put on the record. I think they were sensational, if you want to put it that way. They occupied three pages, the front page and two other pages of a prominent national newspaper and I think that is what is in my trade called a sensation.
  (Mr Broughton) It just so happens that this document is a document which I think—I cannot remember accurately—Mr Campbell said was the unimpeachable, categoric, ultimate document to prove that BAT manages smuggling. I have to say that it is typical of the interpretation which he puts on a document which does absolutely no such thing whatsoever. I do know something about this document and I can give you the background to this document and it is totally different to the one Mr Campbell was suggesting.

Chairman

  1435. Could you give us that background very briefly?
  (Mr Broughton) I shall try to give it to you briefly. Substantial smuggling was occurring in Canada. The Imperial Tobacco Company, Mr Don Brown specifically, had negotiations with the Government, extensive negotiations, well over 12 months as I recall, trying to get the Government to take action. Government promised action, it did not take the action, his competitors were continuing to export to the USA and some of the cigarettes were coming back; some were staying in the USA but some were coming back through the Indian reservations. Mr Brown explained to the Government that this was an impossible situation to continue losing share and unless the Government took action they would have to continue—continue—the original position of exporting to the US, indeed they were under legal pressure from US persons. There are constraints on competition and constraints on the strength of trade if you refuse to supply, so he was under pressure from that side. Every single export which was made to the US after this process was reinstated was registered with the Canadian Government, registered with each province in Canada, submissions were made to each province to try to stop this. This was not managing exports, this is the classic case, pretty well identical to the one we were talking about earlier of supplying Tescos and the Carrefours on the other side of the Channel, knowing that some of it is going to finish up back in the UK. This was supplying exporters, legitimate traders, in the US knowing that some of it was going to come back into Canada and telling the Government it was going to come back into Canada and asking them please for God's sake to try to do something to stop it coming back into Canada. If that is Mr Campbell's unimpeachable definition of BAT managing smuggling, well that is all I can say to it.

Dr Stoate

  1436. May I just say for Mr Clarke's information and also for the record that The Guardian article, which I have in front of me, in fact refers 11 times to specific BAT documents. So it is quite wrong to say that The Guardian article did not directly refer to individual documents. It does on 11 occasions
  (Mr Clarke) It does not refer to complete documents. Bear in mind that it is a sentence from a document and in The Guardian article some of the documents are unidentified. You cannot find them without knowing what the document is from which it is taken.

  1437. There were enough references. I can help you because there were enough references on 11 occasions to identify those documents in BAT files and I am quite sure your archivist, given this information, could have found those documents. That is simply for the record. The other thing I should like to put on record is that I resent your notion that somehow this inquiry this afternoon is at the behest of ASH or at the behest of The Guardian. It is a most serious inquiry and the reason I say that is because as a doctor I can tell you that 120,000 people a year die of cigarette smoking in this country; 50 per cent of regular smokers will die of their habit. It is the only legally available product that kills 50 per cent of its users when used as the manufacturers intend. Therefore it is not a frivolous inquiry, it is a serious inquiry and we are looking at smuggling as one aspect of a very much wider inquiry, as well you know, into the whole process of what the companies are doing and what we can do as a committee to reduce the death toll.
  (Mr Clarke) May I respond to that first of all? I understand this is an inquiry into the health and tobacco issue, which is a perfectly legitimate thing and a very sensible subject for the Health Select Committee of the House of Commons to choose. I understand that and I have not been asked to give evidence on that but it is a subject with which I am familiar. Obviously I have views on that which is why I have taken up this post with British American Tobacco with a completely clear conscience. I take the view, which I think is the position of the present Government as well as ours, that no-one is talking about banning smoking. Smoking is a product which carries health hazards, we know that and that the sale of tobacco should be conducted to adults and adults who are properly informed of the health hazards. I smoke and among the many other things I do in life I make my own judgement about the risks I incur. I have taken part in motor racing, for a time the Government would not let me buy T-bone steaks. I do all kinds of things which incur a certain amount of risk. So long as I am an adult, so long as I am properly informed, so long as the tobacco companies join with the Government in giving proper information, I think in a liberal society like ours people make their own judgements and that is the basis on which we appear. You had almost finished that, I think. So far as I understand, the evidence had been taken on health and tobacco and then The Guardian produced an article on smuggling. Using the methods used by Mr Bates and Mr Campbell you could have had the whisky distillers here, you could have had the brewers, you could have had the manufacturers of motor cars, you could have had anybody who has their product smuggled worldwide. I can tell you that in Colombia in days gone by everything was smuggled. If you go to Paraguay or Andorra everything is smuggled. If you go to South-East Asia, to Myanmar to Vietnam, parts of China, a lot of things are smuggled. Of course it is serious if any company, whatever its product, if it is a publicly quoted company in the United Kingdom, is unethically taking part in that smuggling. However, I can tell you that there are stacks of publicly quoted companies in this country who make products which are smuggled and they are losers by the smuggling and we should like governments to be more effective in stopping it, including the British Government. That is a separate issue, probably more for Treasury and Government rather than this Committee.

  1438. I wish to come onto that. I should like to expand on that but just before I do I should like to clarify one point. You do not see therefore any ethical conflict between your role as deputy chairman of BAT and your previous role as Secretary of State for Health. Even given the fact that you pointed out the health risks of smoking do you see any conflict?
  (Mr Clarke) I took exactly the same view when I was Secretary of State for Health. I was quite against the idea of prohibiting the product, making it illegal, anything of that kind. I took the view that it was the duty of the Government to give information about the health hazard, that it was a product which should only be sold to adults and I was involved, not knowing I was ever going to have any contact with a tobacco company in the way I now have, in supervising negotiations then of a voluntary agreement with the tobacco companies about warning notices and so on. My views and my behaviour have not changed all the way through from being Secretary of State for Health to my position now.

  1439. That is fine. Can you therefore outline what was your strategy at the time when you were Secretary of State for Health, your strategy to reduce the burden of smoking related illness in this country?
  (Mr Clarke) At that time and until the first year or so as Chancellor, I thought the best strategy, the proper strategy for the Government was to raise the tax steadily to increase the price in order to make people think about smoking. By about 1994 it became clear to me that the policy was not working, indeed it had gone wrong in a way which should have been predicted. The idea was that you steadily raised the revenue from tobacco until such stage as you got a downward demand. The Government was quite braced for declining revenues in due course if that meant that we were actually reducing the consumption of tobacco to those adults who enjoyed smoking sufficiently to be prepared to take the risk. I do many riskier things in my life than smoke, so I am one of those who would do that. What began to go wrong, and actually if I had known then what I know now about the history of Canada, Sweden, other places, and Mr Bates and ASH are still blind to this, what we failed to judge, was what we were doing was making a market for smugglers. If Pitt the Younger had come back and advised me he would have told me that this policy is a disaster. What you are doing is creating a hugely profitable trade which criminals move into. The result now is that we are not serving any health purpose because the price of cigarettes is getting cheaper for those who have access to the 25+ per cent on the market which is smuggled.


 
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