Consultants' accountability
27. A basic part of allowing managers to appraise
consultants effectively is giving them accurate information about
the level of work carried out by those consultants. A minimum
level of knowledge about where, when and how staff work is needed
for any manager to function
adequately. Yet we are concerned that consultants'
managers do not have this basic level of information. Fixed commitments
should provide that level of information, because the commitments
specify a time and place when they should be carried out. And
yet even here, the Audit Commission found that, after adjusting
for sick leave, study leave, annual leave and commitments cancelled
for reasons outside the consultants' control, only 68% of consultants
were attending most (over 90%) of their fixed commitments. The
BMA were sceptical about this statistic as they thought that consultants
might be absent from fixed sessions because they were fulfilling
another duty, for example, "in actual fact most people are
off doing some management meeting because that is the commonest
reason why people are not doing their fixed session in my experience".[49]
28. It is regrettable that almost a third of consultants
were missing fixed sessions when evidence was last collected on
this. We accept that there may be good reasons in some circumstances
for them doing so, but this highlights the need for NHS chief
executives to be able to monitor the working patterns of consultants
in order to ensure that their valuable time is being used effectively.
We recommend that where consultants fail to meet fixed commitments,
their explanations for doing so are collected. Consultants persistently
failing to meet these commitments, without adequate explanation,
should be subject to disciplinary proceedings. Trusts should collect
information and publish figures regarding the number of fixed
sessions missed on a monthly basis. The Department should set
targets and be prepared to act in cases of underperforming trusts.
29. Even if all fixed commitments were being
met, in cases where consultants meet the guideline of having five
such commitments, this would leave them with half the contracted
week to carry out flexible commitments. Flexible commitments are
not mere adjuncts to the main part of a consultant's role - they
include important functions such as clinical audit, teaching and
research. And yet little information seems to be recorded about
when, how, or even if these commitments are being met. The Department
has told us that "there are no parallel arrangements [to
those relating to fixed commitments] that pin down flexible commitments".[50]
30. Other evidence has gone further in stating that
it is difficult to establish what hours consultants work outside
of fixed commitments. Professor Donald Light's evidence stated,
referring to our terms of reference, that "there are few,
if any, scientific studies on the "accountability, effectiveness
and efficiency" of the NHS consultants' contracts that would
pass the research standards that would be applied to other human
activities, because so much of what consultants do cannot be observed
or their effects well measured..... Consultants have made it extremely
difficult to observe and measure what they do, so that terms like
"effectiveness" and especially "efficiency"
are nearly impossible to apply to their work".[51]
31. Assessing what evidence was available in terms
of time spent on NHS clinical activities in theatres and outpatient
commitments (ie fixed commitments), and private practice (which
we look at below), Professor John Yates stated that "we are
left with the conclusion that large volumes of non-clinical NHS
activity takes place outside normal working hours. It must be
doubtful whether this is the right time for audit, teaching, administration,
research and clinical governance".[52]
He also referred to a "lack of objective evidence".[53]
32. There is no hard evidence which can confirm
that consultants are meeting their important 'flexible' commitments.
Given the fact that so-called 'fixed' commitments are missed surprisingly
frequently, we are not confident that the situation will be better
for flexible commitments. Also, we are not convinced that trusts
are able to hold individual consultants to account concerning
their flexible commitments. Therefore, we recommend that trusts
require consultants to provide accurate figures for hours worked
on flexible commitments on a regular basis. Again, action should
be taken against consultants who persistently fail to meet flexible
commitments.
33. We consider the more general principles raised
by the work of NHS consultants in the private sector in our final
section below. However, we raise the issue of private practice
at this point in terms of trusts' knowledge of the total hours
worked by NHS consultants during the course of a week. We have
already noted that, according to self-reported surveys, many consultants
work for many hours more than those for which they are contracted
for the NHS each week. On top of this, most consultants also work
in the private sector. The Consumers' Association told us that
"a 1994 Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland
report.... said that maximum part-time consultants worked on average
51 hours a week for the NHS, plus 6 to 10 hours a week in private
practice".[54]
Professor John Yates also told us that "the self-reported
studies undertaken for the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in
1992 reported an average 62 hour working week, of which 11 hours
were spent in the private sector".[55]
34. The Consumers' Association told us that "according
to self-reported figures many consultants work long hours for
the NHS and more than the 35 hours they are contracted to work
each week. These figures don't always fit with the findings of
other studies into the extent to which consultants meet their
NHS commitments.... But, assuming these figures are reliable,
they raise some concerns about the hours some consultants spend
working overall. Long working hours in the NHS, supplemented by
work in the private sector cannot be a good deal for consultants
or patients, either NHS or private. Our research has led us to
believe that serious consideration must be given to setting national
guidelines on the maximum number of hours that consultants should
be permitted to work outside of their contracted NHS obligations".[56]
35. Evidence from consultants' self-reported surveys
suggests that, when combined with private work, consultants spend
an average of over 60 hours working each week. Some will spend
many more than this. This raises serious issues of patient care.
We believe that NHS trusts should know the total number of hours
worked by consultants overall, so that they can take action if
those hours appear to be inappropriately high. Therefore we recommend
that trusts require consultants to provide accurate details of
weekly hours worked in the private sector. We believe that the
Department should give guidance regarding the maximum number of
hours it is safe for a consultant to work. Although it should
be possible to exceed this limit in exceptional circumstances,
trusts should be able to tackle those consultants who do so regularly,
be it as a result of NHS and/or private work. Giving trusts
details of the hours worked by consultants in the private sector
will also help them to tackle those consultants who fail to meet
NHS commitments as a result of their private work, a topic we
examine in our final section.
The implementation of the 10%
rule
36. As we saw at paragraph 18, not all trusts now
retain the 10% rule as a contractual obligation for whole-time
consultants. However, we do not believe that the rule is implemented
in a consistent and fair manner in those trusts which do nominally
retain it. The Consumers' Association told us that "a study
was done by the Pay and Workforce Review Body and they looked
at whether trusts, which have a right to, ask a consultant how
much they have earned from private practice within the last year
- and if they are working under the 10% rule they need to so that
they know that is working - and only six out of 72 trusts did
that. From our own survey, we found that it is not a tool that
is used widely by chief executives and they did not think it was
particularly effective".[57]
The NHS Executive told us that "We do not have information
centrally that enables us to make a clear judgment about whether
every single consultant who is on a full-time contract is keeping
to the 10% rule, it is a matter for local employers to enforce.
I think there has been historical data to suggest that might not
always be the case, but I do not have up to date information on
that centrally".[58]
37. The BMA explained that "The usual method
of policing it is to send fulltime consultants a statement
for them to sign indicating they have not, in the previous 12
months, exceeded the 10% rule".[59]
They conceded that this system relied on a relationship of trust,
but noted that managers "have a right to ask for a certified
copy of accounts.... I have heard of examples where there has
been a question and certified accounts have been asked for. They
must be provided".[60]
Despite this it appears that some whole-time consultants do earn
more than 10% of the value of their NHS salaries in the private
sector. The King's Fund's evidence states that figures combining
NHS incomes and consultants' additional incomes from private practice
demonstrate that "many [whole-time consultants] must have
been earning more than the allowed 10% over and above their NHS
incomes: that is, they were breaking the terms of their contract".[61]
For as long as NHS consultants are allowed to undertake private
practice, any contractual arrangements governing that private
practice should be applied uniformly. It is unsatisfactory that
the 10% rule may not be consistently applied, and that trusts
do not routinely collect accounts. We recommend that all trusts
require to see the accounts of all consultants who do private
practice and that they implement the rule rigorously on the basis
of those accounts.
42 Ev., p. 30, para. 5. Back
43
Ev., p. 1, para. 1. Back
44
Q 205. Back
45
Q 182. Back
46
Ev., p. 5. Back
47
Q 180. Back
48
Q 277. Back
49
Q 208. Back
50
Ev., p. 30, para. 5. Back
51
Appendix 8. Back
52
Ev., p. 12, para. 34. Back
53
Ibid. Back
54
Ev., p. 4. Back
55
Ev., p. 11, para. 27. Back
56
Ev., p. 7. Back
57
Q 54. Back
58
Q 104. Back
59
Q 186. Back
60
Q 188. Back
61
Appendix 1, para. 25. Back