APPENDIX TO THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE
Memorandum submitted by Amnesty International
UK
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
UK
This memorandum has been prepared and submitted
by the United Kingdom section of Amnesty International. Amnesty
International has over 147,000 members in the United Kingdom and
more than a million members worldwide.
The organisation works to promote the rights
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It campaigns
throughout the world to:
— Free all prisoners of conscience;
— Ensure prompt and fair trials for
political prisoners;
— Abolish the death penalty, torture
and other cruel treatment of prisoners;
— End extra-judicial executions;
— Stop abuses by armed opposition groups.
Amnesty International UK seeks to inform the
UK Government and Parliament on human rights issues and monitors
the development and execution of UK external relations policies.
Amnesty International is independent of any
government, political persuasion or religious creed. It does not
support or oppose any government or political system. It does
not support or oppose the views of the victims whose rights it
seeks to protect.
The organisation welcomes any opportunity to
further the work of parliamentary select committees with written
and oral evidence on any subject that falls within its mandate
and expertise.
INTRODUCTION
1. Amnesty International believes that all
human rights are interdependent. The realisation of economic,
social, cultural, civil and political rights are necessary for
the full freedom and dignity of the individual. In practice, they
are mutually reinforcing. People use their civil and political
rights, for example, to campaign for their economic rights.
2. Recognising the importance of economic,
social and cultural rights, Amnesty International welcomes DFID's
objective of halving the proportion of people living in extreme
poverty by 2015.
3. According to DFID's figures, 270 million
people live on less than a dollar a day in China[1].
We therefore recognise the importance effective strategies to
combat poverty within China if the internationally agreed objectives
for 2015 are to be achieved.
4. However, we are concerned that DFID policy,
as expressed in its 1998 country strategy paper for China, fails
to address or acknowledge the very serious human rights situation
in that country.
5. Due to the limited time available to
prepare this memorandum, we regret that we may have failed to
provide as much detail as the Committee, or indeed we ourselves,
would have wished. We further regret that the constraints of time
have prevented us from commenting on the situation on Pakistan,
as this is another country where we have serious concerns.
6. In this memorandum, Amnesty International
has sought to provide:
— An indication of our concerns in
China;
— Some observations on DFID's country
strategy paper for China.
We will endeavour to respond to any further
requests that the Committee might make for further information.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S
CURRENT CONCERNS
IN CHINA
Prisoners of Conscience and Arbitrary Detention
7. The past 12 months has witnessed a great
leap backwards for the human rights situation in China. The authorities
have carried out the most serious and wide ranging crackdown on
peaceful dissent since 1989.
8. In November 1998, just over a month after
China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the authorities arrested three key dissidents who had
attempted to form and register an alternative political party
(the China Democratic Party—CDP). They were put on trial
within a month, with a speed rarely seen in recent years, and
sentenced to harsh prison terms for subversion after unfair trial
proceedings. The three individuals were Wang Youcai, Xu Wenli
and Qin Yongmin. Members of the Committee might remember that
Xu Wenli briefly hit the British headlines after he was detained
and then released during the Prime Minister's visit to China in
1998.
9. Since then, other members of the CDP
and a broad range of people who merely exercised peacefully their
rights to freedom of expression, association or religion have
been arbitrarily detained.
10. Among the latest victims of the Chinese
authorities' crackdown are the followers of Falun Gong, a spiritual
movement banned by the Government in July 1999. Thousands of its
followers were arbitrarily detained and put under pressure to
renounce their beliefs and denounce the group. Whilst many were
held for short periods, some were reportedly tortured or ill-treated
in detention. Arrests have continued since then and the number
detained is believed to be in the thousands. According to Chinese
official sources, as of 22 November 1999, 150 members of the group
had been formally charged with crimes ranging from "disturbing
social order" to "stealing state secrets". Hundreds
of other followers of the group are reported to have been sent
to forced labour camps without charge or trial, while others still
are held in police custody without charge. Four of those charged
were tried in late November in Hainan province and sentenced to
long prison terms on such charges.
11. There have been reports that detained
followers of the Falun Gong have been tortured or ill-treated
in various places of detention in China. In early October 1999,
one member of the group, a 42 year-old woman, was reportedly beaten
to death in police custody in Shandong province. Many followers
of the group remain in detention across China and it is feared
that they may be at risk of torture or ill-treatment.
12. Others arbitrarily detained over the
past 12 months include people who have raised a new range of issues,
such as labour rights, the environment and corruption.
Torture
13. Although torture is prohibited by Chinese
law, it continues to be widespread and endemic. Few perpetrators
are punished. Many policy, prison and labour camps officials show
utter contempt for the human rights of detainees and for the law,
knowing full well that they are unlikely to be punished. Superior
officers, prosecutors, judges and other officials often cover
up cases of torture and ignore the complaints made by the victims.
Rule of Law
14. In 1997, the Chinese Government won
international plaudits when the overly politicalcounter-revolutionary
crimes were removed from the Criminal Law. The Government has,
however, rejected all calls to demonstrate the practical significance
of this move by reviewing the cases of all remainingcounter-revolutionary
prisoners, which include most of those still imprisoned for participating
in the 1989 pro-democracy movement.
15. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
which visited China in 1997, has determined that the new crimes
against national security, instead of bringing Chinese law more
in line with international standards, have significantly expanded
the potential for imprisoning people who peacefully exercise their
fundamental human rights. Amnesty International believes that
this legislation, as well as that providing for administrative
detention, should be urgently reviewed.
16. Rule of law in China will be fatally
undermined in practice if equality before the law is not respected
and if state officials are free to ignore, distort or manipulate
the law and legal process. There are many examples that double
standards prevail in the application of the law and that government
interference is common. Among other recent examples, following
the ban on the Falun Gong, lawyers in Beijing were reportedly
instructed by the city's Justice Bureau not to agree to act in
defence of Falun Gong followers without gaining first the approval
of the authorities.
Death Penalty
17. The death penalty continues to be used
extensively. More people are executed every year in China than
in the rest of the world put together. While Amnesty International
welcomed some changes made to the law in 1997—notably the
removal of the death penalty as a punishment for minors under
the age of 18—the organisation remains concerned that over
60 crimes can be punished by death in China, including manynon-violent
offences.
18. According to incomplete records gathered
by Amnesty International, at least 2,600 people were sentenced
to death and at least 1,500 were confirmed to have been executed
in China in 1998. From 1990 to the end of 1998, Amnesty International
recorded over 25,400 death sentences and over 16,600 executions,
an average of at least 2,800 death sentences and 1,850 confirmed
executions every year in China. These figures are believed to
be far below the real numbers.
19. Many death sentences are imposed following
trial proceedings which can only be described as summary. Appeals
are rarely successful and, while the number of confirmed executions
recorded by Amnesty International represents in average about
66 per cent of death sentences, the actual execution rate is believed
to be around 90 per cent.
Tibet
20. Severe human rights violations continue
in Tibet. Hundreds of prisoners of conscience, many of whom are
monks and nuns, remain in prison.
21. There has been an intensification of
the "patriotic education" campaign against Tibetans
in the Tibet Autonomous Region, as well as in Quinhai and Sichuan
provinces. Since the campaign began in May 1996 re-education teams
have taken up residence in monasteries to instruct monks and nuns
in "patriotism" and to get their written denunciations
of the Dalai Lama. Monks and nuns suspected of resisting the campaign,
including organising photograph displays of the Dalai Lama, have
been detained. "Unpatriotic" monks and nuns have been
ill-treated, expelled from monasteries and nunneries, and some
monasteries have been closed.
22. At least 10 prisoners are reported to
have died following the violent suppression of protests in Drapchi
prison on 1 and 4 May 1998. Many prisoners who had taken part
in the protests were severely beaten during subsequent interrogation
and placed in solitary confinement. The Chinese authorities later
admitted that "minor disturbances" had occurred at the
prison in early May, but denied that any prisoners had died as
a result.
23. EU representatives were visiting the
prison on 4 May but reported that they were unaware of any disturbances.
They later made representations to the Chinese authorities. We
are not aware that they received any substantive response. The
EU delegation was one of several human rights delegations to have
visited Tibet in 1998. A number of these visits prompted protests
by individuals or groups of prisoners, resulting in beatings for
many of the prisoners involved and increased sentences for some.
In September 1998, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary
Robinson, led a delegation to Tibet. According to unofficial sources,
two monks from Drepung monastery were later arrested on suspicion
of preparing a letter to give to her during her visit.
24. Prison conditions remain harsh and many
prisoners are forced to work for long hours in unacceptable conditions.
Few prisoners escape ill-treatment and torture, which is particularly
harsh during the early stages of custody. Kidney and liver ailments
are common among prisoners as a result of kicking and beatings
by prison guards aimed specifically at these sensitive organs.
25. Other common forms of torture reported
by prisoners are the use of electric shock batons, particularly
on sensitive areas such as the mouth and genitals, being forced
to stand in awkward positions for long periods and being suspended
from the ceiling by their arms. Prisoners report being tied in
agonising positions with ropes and also being forced into awkward
positions with the use of ankle cuffs, handcuffs and thumb cuffs.
A great many prisoners suffer serious long-term physical and psychological
effects from ill-treatment and torture in detention.
26. Amnesty International continues to call
for information on the whereabouts of Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the
Dalai Lama's choice of reincarnation of the 11th Panchen Lama.
Gedun Choekyi Nyima was 10 years old on 25 April 1999. His whereabouts
have remained undisclosed since he was last seen at his home in
May 1995.
27. There has been no recent news of Chadrel
Rimpoche, the former abbot of Tashilhunpo monastery, appointed
by the Chinese authorities to head the search committee for the
11th Panchen Lama. Chadrel Rimpoche was sentenced to six years'
imprisonment in 1996 for allegedly communicating with the Dalai
Lama about the search for the reincarnated Panchen Lama.
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
28. Gross violations of human rights are
being perpetrated in the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang,
in the west of China. The victims of these violations are mainly
Uighurs, the majority ethnic group among the predominantly Muslim
local population.
29. Thousands have been arbitrarily detained
over the past few years. Thousands of political prisoners, arrested
at various times during the 1990s, are reported to remain imprisoned,
some having been sentenced to long prison terms after unfair trials,
others still detained without charge or trial after months or
years in jail.
30. Many of those detained are reported
to have been tortured, some with particularly cruel methods which,
to Amnesty International's knowledge, are not being used elsewhere
in the People's Republic of China.
31. Scores of Uighurs, many of them political
prisoners, have been sentenced to death and executed in the past
two years. The ratio of death sentences to population appears
to be several times higher in the XUAR than elsewhere in China,
as does the execution rate vis a vis the number of death
sentences. Others, including women, are alleged to have been killed
by the security forces in circumstances which appear to constitute
extra-judicial executions.
32. Most of those sentenced to death in
the region have been accused of offences related to clandestine
opposition activities, street protests, violent clashes with the
security forces, or terrorist incidents. Political prisoners are
often tried in secret, under procedures which are reported to
be summary. Trials are a mere formality, with the verdict usually
decided by the authorities before the trial. Convictions are frequently
based on forced confessions and statements extracted under torture.
33. Defendants who appeal against the verdict
invariably see their appeal rejected. If they do not appeal and
their case is reviewed by the regional High People's Court, as
required by law in death penalty cases, the process of review
is also a mere formality. In none of the cases recorded by Amnesty
International in recent years have any death sentences been reversed
on appeal or review in the XUAR.
34. These gross violations of human rights
are occurring amidst growing ethnic unrest fuelled by unemployment,
discrimination and curbs on fundamental freedoms. Over the past
10 years the local ethnic population has witnessed a steady erosion
of its social, economic and cultural rights. Economic development
in the region has largely bypassed the local ethnic population
and they have faced increased restrictions. This trend has exacerbated
long-standing ethnic tensions between Uighurs and Han Chinese
in the region, and contributed to the escalation of violence.
35. Many Uighurs complain that racial abuse
and discrimination against ethnic minorities in the XUAR is common,
and that they have no equal opportunity in education, health care
and employment. Unlike their Chinese counterparts, for example,
many Uighur schools and hospitals are poorly equipped, and some
Uighur village schools are reported to be so poor and totally
deprived of equipment that the pupils have to sit and write on
the earthen floor.
36. Official reports about "separatists
and terrorists" obscure a more complex reality in which many
people who are not involved in violence have become the victims
of human rights violations. Over the years, attempts by Uighurs
to air their views or grievances and peacefully exercise their
most fundamental human rights have been met with repression. The
denial of legitimate channels for expressing grievances and discontent
has led to outbursts of violence, including by people who are
not involved in political opposition activities.
37. Since the late 1980s, the enforcement
of the national birth control policy in the XUAR has created strong
resentment among Uighurs and other ethnic groups. Both official
and unofficial sources indicate that the implementation of the
policy has led to incidents of violence, including attacks on
birth control offices or personnel. Under the official birth control
policy, national minority couples are allowed to have three children
in rural areas and two children in urban areas. According to unofficial
sources, however, the authorities in the region have increasingly
exerted pressure on couples to reduce the number to two and one.
38. Amnesty International does not take
a position on the official birth control policy in the PRC, but
it is concerned about human rights violations falling within its
mandate which result from the implementation of the policy. In
the XUAR, these include reports of forced abortions and sterilizations,
and of arbitrary arrests made in the aftermath of attacks on family
planning offices or birth control officials.
39. Forced abortions have allegedly been
carried out on women nine months pregnant. Procedures for abortions
or sterilizations are reportedly carried out with little regard
for the health of the women concerned, as a result of which many
women reportedly suffer permanent health damages. Some have reportedly
died.
OBSERVATIONS OF
THE DFID COUNTRY
STRATEGY PAPER
(SEPTEMBER 1998)
40. The 1998 DFID Country Strategy Paper
fails to provide any assessment of the situation of civil and
political rights in China. It notes that "the Government
of China . . . has held the view that the rights of its population
to economic security and basic social welfare override the realisation
of other rights" (p.4). This view is a statement of policy
which needs to be challenged. It implies that violation of civil
and political rights is acceptable in the name of development.
Furthermore, sustainable development requires harnessing local
initiatives, as well as transparency and accountability; this
is unlikely to be achieved without respect for all human rights.
41. The strategy paper goes on to claim
that "in recent months, the [Chinese] Government has shown
a new and welcome openness to discuss wider issues of human rights
observance" (p.4). To reinforce this view, it cites China's
signature of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women. Indeed, shortly after the DFID paper was published,
China also signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
42. However, China's commitment to these
international instruments must be cast into doubt by the events
of the past 12 months. It is worth reiterating the point made
in the previous section, that human rights violations in China
are widespread and serious, and that the crackdown on peaceful
dissent carried out by the authorities since the end of 1998 is
the worst since the clampdown that followed the Tiananmen Square
protests. We believe that Her Majesty's Government must openly
acknowledge the extent of this reversal, and its impact on the
potential for truly participatory sustainable development in China.
43. The strategy paper notes that civil
and political rights are "the subject of active bilateral
and European Union dialogues, supported by a programme of practical
co-operation" (p.4). The Department states its intention
to "look to enhance the rights of poor vulnerable people
through all our activities in China. More specifically, we will
work in the context of the bilateral and EU dialogues on human
rights issues to encourage and support Chinese adherence to the
relevant international standards and conventions".
44. Amnesty International is concerned that
the UK Government appears increasingly reluctant to highlight
human rights concerns in China in public. There is a danger of
"pigeon-holing" human rights concerns into specific,
formal and private meetings that are held on the margins of bilateral
relations. The Government must resist such temptations.
45. Neither the DFID strategy paper, nor
any of the public statements emerging from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office allay our concern that the UK Government does not appear
to have established meaningful benchmarks to measure progress,
or to have the flexibility to adapt its policies to changing circumstances.
46. We are also concerned by DFID's statement
that "the scope for influencing wider policy directly is
limited and mechanisms for donor co-ordination and for collective
dialogue between donors and Government are weak" (p.5).
47. We feel that this statement requires
further elaboration. Since China occupies a prominent place in
the thinking of this Government and appears to be similarly prioritised
in the external relations of important EU, North American and
East Asian partners, it would be helpful to explain why donor
governments are unwilling or unable to co-ordinate their activities.
48. Given China's size, the scale of the
developmental challenges it faces and the seriousness of civil
and political rights violations in the country, effective donor
co-ordination would appear to be of fundamental importance in
the efficient use of resources and the pursuit of the 2015 targets.
It is similarly clear that the chances to press for an improvement
in civil and political rights are not enhanced by the confusion
and disorganisation exhibited by the "Western European and
Others Group" at recent meetings of the UN Commission on
Human Rights.
49. The DFID Strategy Paper states that
"the incidence of corruption and abuse of office [in China]
is . . . a matter of concern. The Government has taken a tough
stance on this and steps to deal with it, including measures to
hold officials more accountable for their actions" (p.4).
50. However, the Chinese Government's tough
new stance appears to consist mainly in moving back to executions
for corruption, with several heavily publicised cases in recent
months. Furthermore, it is clear that independent public scrutiny
of officials is not tolerated. While the Chinese Government has
proclaimed anti-corruption to be a national priority, it has cracked
down on individuals and independent groups, like the Corrupt Behaviour
Observers, who were seeking to expose corruption. If HMG is concerned
about corruption in China, it is of paramount importance that
it questions the crackdown on such groups and transmits its concerns
to the Chinese authorities. It should also strongly question the
use of the death penalty as a method to curb corruption.
51. DFID strategy includes taking measures
"to improve the lives of poor people and other vulnerable
groups, including women and minorities" and focusing DFID
activities geographically to the poorer and populous provinces
of the middle west, while "bearing in mind the scope for
poverty-focused activities in the remoter western province . .
." (p.8). It is also envisaged that, in the British Embassy
administered Small Grants Scheme, particular attention will be
given to community based projects in the poorer areas of western
China, including Tibet (p.10).
52. Amnesty International welcomes any projects
which aim to enhance economic security for the most deprived communities
in western China. However, it is difficult to ascertain with any
confidence how far DFID is able to target the most vulnerable
among deprived groups in these areas, who are ethnic minorities.
Efforts should be made to target such groups. In light of the
recent controversy over a World Bank project in western China,
we believe that there is a need for greater transparency and scrutiny
of such projects. In addition, DFID's policy in the remoter and
poorer western regions must be complemented by concerted political
efforts to address the gross human rights violations in these
areas, particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang.
53. In the previous section, we have outlined
our concerns in these areas. However, we would wish to emphasise
the point that not only have civil and political rights been denied
to Tibetan and Uighur peoples, but their economic, social and
cultural rights have also increasingly been curtailed. This is
a consequence of official Chinese policy that is clearly at odds
with DFID's central policy aims.
CONCLUSION
54. The Chinese authorities continue to
violate human rights on a systematic and widespread basis. The
past 12 months has seen a marked deterioration in respect for
civil and political rights.
55. In common with other government departments,
DFID appears reluctant to provide any public expression of its
concerns regarding civil and political rights in China. The 1998
Country Strategy Paper is marked by an absence of analysis in
this respect. We would join DFID in emphasising the importance
of addressing extreme poverty in China as a crucial step in achieving
the 2015 targets. However, we believe the department must clearly
demonstrate that it does not share the Chinese Government's view
"that the rights of its population to economic security and
basic social welfare override the realisation of other human rights"
(p.4). By simply stating this view or glossing over the possible
consequences of its underlying policy, the UK Government is potentially
undermining the efforts of local activists and other people in
China who are struggling to assert the rights of ordinary people,
including the most vulnerable and underprivileged in China.
56. The lack of attention to civil and political
rights within DFID's strategy paper might arouse less concern
if other UK government departments were compensating for this
by an emphasis on civil and political rights. However, we remain
concerned that the primary vehicle for this, the bilateral and
EU human rights dialogues, remain closed to public scrutiny and
are largely ineffective. Although they may have contributed to
some limited initial successes, they have failed to prevent or
mitigate the deterioration in human rights witnessed over the
past year. Furthermore, the successes claimed by the dialogue's
proponents, such as China's signature of the two international
human rights covenants, must be cast into doubt by the events
of the past year. Such claims of success contribute to the Chinese
Government's belief that it needs no longer fear international
censure and that symbolic gestures, rather than significant changes,
are enough to satisfy the international community. Amnesty International
has therefore come to the conclusion that the Government's policy
towards China, of which DFID's strategy forms a part, must be
reviewed.
Amnesty International UK
November 1999
1 Department for International Development China:
Country Strategy Paper 1998, September 1998, p 1. All subsequent
quotations and page numbers appearing in this memorandum are taken
from this source, as downloaded from the DFIDweb-site on 25 November
1999. Back
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