Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence



Examination of witnesses (Questions 40 - 59)

THURSDAY 3 FEBRUARY 2000

MR DAVID BATT, MR JOHN ROBERTS and MR CHARLES BRIDGE

  40. One of the other questions related to this one is that the small farmers particularly suffer the most because of the structure exists at the moment. Is there any provision within the next couple of years to protect the interests of the small farmers?
  (Mr Bridge) At large or banana producers?

  41. I am now talking about at large.
  (Mr Batt) As a broader question I would just again refer—

  42. I know that small farmers in India are contributing to a very great extent to the agriculture of the country and they are very much concerned about the trade situation where they find themselves completely excluded from the agreement and they were actually present in Seattle during last summer.
  (Mr Batt) The Special and Differential Treatment available under the Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture to developing countries provides a number of exemptions like investment subsidies and input subsidies available to low income and poor farmers. So that is one of the examples of a number of the provisions in the Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture which we believe, on the basis of the research which I have mentioned, do offer the flexibility to developing countries and in this case would meet the particular concerns which Mr Khabra has raised about poor farmers. This may be an area, chair, where we could try to provide a slightly more detailed answer separately.[6]

Chairman

  43. Yes, the nature of subsidy in India particularly is a complex one because of course the subsidy comes in the form of free electricity and water pumps and so on. I do not know whether that is included in the negotiations for the Seattle Round.
  (Mr Roberts) One of the provisions in the Uruguay Round in the agreement on agriculture is that there can be subsidies up to a so-called de minimis limit. This limit for developed countries is five per cent and for developing countries ten per cent, ten per cent of the value of agricultural output, and within the ten per cent limit if the Indian authorities think that subsidies for electricity is what is really important that would count towards that element of ten per cent.

  Chairman: I see what the Indians are trying to protect. Andrew Robathan?

Mr Robathan

  44. I assume you know something about the Marrakesh Decision.
  (Mr Batt) Yes I do.

  45. Did you roll your eyes, Mr Batt? What, if anything, is being done to implement the decision? If nothing, it could be one word.
  (Mr Batt) I would not say nothing. I would say that we do not see this as a well-conceived decision. It relates to problems that were anticipated that net food importing countries would suffer as a result of higher food prices, which we have already touched on. I think I would make several points. Firstly, there are factors other than trade that would affect price movements and have bigger effects, such as the trends in exchange rate movements, so prices did go up but we do not see it as being essentially because of these trade measures. The second point is that we see any movement in prices of food, be it for a combination of reasons not just liberalisation in the Uruguay Round, as being only one factor in the broader balance of payments position of the country concerned. When countries get inter-border balance of payments problems then we do need to look at ways of addressing that, but I think food aid, which is what the Marrakesh agreement was talking about, is not actually an effective way of addressing those broader balance of payment problems.

  46. I do not necessarily disagree with you, Mr Batt. Was it officially part of the Uruguay Round?
  (Mr Bridge) Yes, I think it was.

  47. So it is something that people have agreed to?
  (Mr Bridge) Yes.

  48. So it needs to be revisited at some stage if we are not going to implement it?
  (Mr Bridge) Yes.

Chairman

  49. I am surprised you are not opposed to the Marrakesh Round because it seems to me to be a serious protectionist measure.
  (Mr Batt) We think that it was a seriously flawed approach to a problem, but we nonetheless understand why people were concerned about it at the time.

  50. I am just thinking about net food importing countries. There could be serious distortions if you permitted this because you would find that you were importing food which would be to the detriment of their own home produced products which, of course, benefits some traders in those countries but undermines the agriculture of their own country.
  (Mr Batt) Particularly undermining the poor.

  Chairman: And the poor who are usually in the farming sector. Can we go on to TRIPs, that is Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in case anyone is in doubt.

Mr Worthington

  51. As you know, the Uruguay Round Agreement was given so that developing and transition countries should have implemented the Uruguay Round, as far as intellectual property is concerned, by the end of last month and least developed countries have got until 2006. In the evidence that has been put to us a lot of the NGOs say there should be a peace clause or an extension clause, that those countries have not been given enough time to implement intellectual property rights as laid down by Uruguay. Does the Government agree with that?
  (Mr Batt) Can I just add one point of detail on the expiry before turning to the question? The developing countries, as you say, have until January 2000. The one exemption to that is that they have until January 2005 with respect to agro-chemical and pharmaceutical innovations not previously granted patent protection and the least developed have until 2006. This was one of the parts of the implementation package which was being worked on at Seattle and the specific proposal there was for the extension of Article 64 of the TRIPs Agreement which relates to a moratorium on the use of dispute settlement procedures. That moratorium had been applied for the first five years. The Government recognises the genuine problems of a number of developing countries meeting the obligations and the requirements of TRIPs. I understand there is a proposed Community position that the moratorium should be extended for a further period and the Government supports that proposed Community position.

  52. It is a very important issue in terms of people's access to goods like drugs and seeds. If the impact of TRIPs is to make such essential goods inaccessible to poor people then we would be concerned about that. What monitoring is going on to see what the general impact of the Uruguay Round and TRIPs is upon poorer people?
  (Mr Batt) Can I deal with one or two general points about the provisions of TRIPs, if I may, before asking Mr Roberts to elaborate and, in particular, to pick up anything that we can say about the monitoring point. On pharmaceuticals, there are two areas that I would draw out: the issues of compulsory licensing and parallel importing. The existing provisions in TRIPs do give governments the scope to go ahead with compulsory licensing to require the holders of patent to grant licences on commercial terms for local manufacturer and they define the circumstances in which that can happen quite carefully and one of those circumstances is national emergency. The provisions are silent on parallel importing which means they do not preclude developing countries going on to the world market and obtaining those drugs wherever they can and what they do in that respect is actually a matter for their national legislation rather than for TRIPs. Seeds—traditional varieties can not be patented, as I think is in the memorandum. I wanted to give that broad background because this is actually one of the most complex areas in the whole of these agreements and one which does create a lot of concern.

  53. Monitoring the impact?
  (Mr Roberts) It is obviously very early to have monitored the impact of an agreement which is only now coming into force and for which an extension of the transitional period is likely to be agreed. Obviously we should be doing this in the future and to a great extent civil society in developing countries, the farmers for example, will complain if they feel that they are being unfairly treated. However, there are perhaps two important considerations. Firstly, in connection with pharmaceuticals, the prices of pharmaceuticals are never very transparent. The pharmaceutical companies vary their prices from country to country and as far as patented pharmaceuticals are concerned they try to ensure that there is very limited trade because of the terms which they use for licensing people to manufacture their patented products in different countries in different parts of the world. But we are given to understand that some 95 per cent of the drugs on the World Health Organisation's list of essential drugs are in fact not patented. These therefore can be manufactured by generic producers. The prices of generic drugs are known to be very much lower than those of the branded drugs of the companies which invented them in the first place, even after the expiry of patent. So there is a wide spectrum of prices which are in fact practised for essential drugs in the world market. A very important practical consideration therefore for developing countries is to ensure that they are getting the best available bargain when they purchase these drugs and I would like to mention in that context an interesting initiative which UNICEF, and organisations other than UNICEF that we know about, have taken, namely that of purchasing drugs in bulk from pharmaceutical companies on behalf of their clients in developing countries, thereby making these drugs available at the best possible price for the end user or for the donor if they are to be donated.

  54. In fact, if I understood you correctly, there is no systematic monitoring of the impact of the TRIPs agreement in Uruguay. Are there no plans for it to be systematically monitored to ensure that in poor countries both drugs and seeds are available at prices that do not increase poverty? That is the issue, is it not?
  (Mr Roberts) There are no current plans that we know of.

  55. Who should do that?
  (Mr Batt) I think that my initial instinct is to look to the right point in the multi-lateral system to do it. If we cannot find the right point then clearly it would be important for us to come in and think about whether this is something that we ought to be doing ourselves. So this might be WTO.

  56. This is a very controversial area, is it not? In South Africa with regard to the production of anti-AIDS drugs there is a feeling that the pharmaceutical companies are imposing false prices which will deny access to a country riddled with the problem HIV/AIDS and will deny access to alleviating, if not curative, drugs. This is a very substantial issue. It is not just this area; it is the question of seeds as well. What do you feel about this?
  (Mr Batt) I agree with you that it is an extremely substantial issue. My understanding of the South African case is that this relates more to provisions of South African domestic legislation than to the provisions of TRIPs. If I can return to my earlier point, in the relevant article, Article 31, of TRIPs, there is scope for compulsory licensing under certain circumstances and TRIPs as a whole is silent on parallel importing and through that silence does not preclude it. So my reaction to your point is, yes, it is important but we need to disentangle within this what the effect of TRIPs is and what is going on more generally, what other factors are creating this problem.

  57. But there is no one really with the responsibility for monitoring this. If you take the South African instance, where I assume mainly American pharmaceutical firms preventing the manufacturers producing lower cost drugs. What is the means of dealing with that issue?
  (Mr Bridge) Is it not in part for the national Government concerned to pick it up and to, for example, push that in a future WTO Round where some of this needs to be looked at?

Chairman

  58. Is there not another aspect of this? These drugs are extremely costly to produce and to undertake the research and development, and the cost of the drug is normally patented (in this country anyway) for a period of 16 years and thereafter it can be manufactured out of patent because the patent runs out and then of course developing countries can come in. Surely, we owe it to the pharmaceutical companies, if they are going to carry on this very detailed and expensive research, to protect their position?
  (Mr Batt) And the patenting rules and inclusion of minimum patenting standards in TRIPs is designed to strike that balance between, if you like, the duty which is owed on the one side and, indeed, the interests of all and the interests of developing countries in ensuring that that further research goes ahead and, on the other hand, the needs which developing countries may have in certain circumstances to proceed with the compulsory licensing with adequate remuneration for local production. I accept completely that there is that balance.

Mr Worthington

  59. But given some of the health problems being faced by poorer countries, the standard mechanism of the WTO Round seems a little inadequate.
  (Mr Roberts) May I respond with reference to some of the collaborative experiences between local governments between donors and between pharmaceutical companies which are currently being conducted in different parts of the world, but particularly in Africa, to combat well-known scourges such as malaria where pharmaceutical companies under particular programmes provide material either cost-free or at low prices within the ambit of campaigns of vaccination to deal with these particular scourges. I think that is probably one of the better ways of squaring this circle of reconciling the need for incentive for innovation with accessibility. I think we do depend, as the Chairman said, on the pharmaceutical companies to innovate in these areas and to find novel solutions to the health problems of developing countries and the need to make these products available and affordable to the health authorities and to the populations of these countries.


6  The Institute of Development Studies (1999), The WTO Agreement on Agriculture and Food Security. Back

 
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