Examination of witnesses (Questions 293
- 324)
TUESDAY 11 APRIL 2000
HIS EXCELLENCY
AMBASSADOR MR
NACER BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI,
HIS EXCELLENCY
AMBASSADOR MR
RANSFORD SMITH
and MR ABDUL
MANNAN
Ann Clwyd
293. Can I apologise, first of all, the Chairperson
is away and that is why I am sitting in this seat. Thank you very
much for coming to help us with this inquiry, which has been going
on for a few months now but we are coming towards the end; so
whatever you have to say to us I am sure will give us even more
information than we have already. Can I ask you to introduce yourselves,
so that we get your names properly pronounced, right at the beginning?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) Thank you. My name is Nacer
Benjelloun-Touimi. I am the Ambassador, Permanent Representative
of Morocco to the United Nations and to WTO, in Geneva.
(Mr Smith) I am Ransford Smith. I am the Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations and
the Specialised Agencies and to the WTO.
(Mr Mannan) I am Abdul Mannan. I am Minister for Economic
Matters to the Bangladesh Mission in Geneva.
294. Thank you very much. We are going to ask
you a variety of questions, as you know, and I will kick off by
asking you about your experiences at Seattle; we have heard various
other people's experiences, which have been very mixed, and of
the preparatory process to the Ministerial Meeting. What were
you hoping would be included in the agenda for a new Round?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) Thank you for giving me this
opportunity to give the views of my country on this issue. I think
Morocco was hoping that we would have a new Round, because we
were part of the friends of the new Round, to have, I think the
key word for us was "balanced", a balanced Round, which
meant that the implementation issues would be addressed, of course,
the built-in agenda, which is agriculture and services and also
maybe investment, because we think that investment is a subject
that should come to WTO in these coming years. But, obviously,
the process did not go the right way, whether it is the Geneva
process or the Seattle process, meaning by that the organisation
of the conference itself in Seattle. I can say some nice words
about that. Because, if we compare Seattle with Singapore, I think
that the membership and the Secretariat of WTO took into account
the fact that, the last day of the Ministerial Meeting in Singapore,
there were so many people complaining about the lack of transparency,
because, if you remember, at that time, we started the Green Room
on Monday and we finished the Green Room on Thursday and we had
the Plenary on Friday. So I think that we should give credit to
the membership and the DG and the Secretariat for having discussed
and got through the WTO General Council those five working groups
covering all the issues that are of interest to the membership.
Unfortunately, though, in Seattle there was a Green Room on Friday
at 6 o'clock in the morning, which does not make any sense, because
on all the subjects we did not make any progress that would warrant
some kind of Green Room to finish the job, and, actually, even
if we had come to some results, how are you going to sell it to
the wider membership; it is impossible, on Friday, at that time,
at 10 o'clock in the evening, to be able to do anything of that
sort. So it was really an act of desperation, in fact, a desperation
initiative from some to have that Green Room on Friday, before
the end of the conference. As far as the process in Geneva is
concerned, I think that there are no secrets, it is important
to keep in mind that the election of the DG took so much time
and was so divisive and it hurt a lot, the process, not only in
wasting time but also in the atmospherics, the relationship between
people. And I think that the lessons of the election were not
borne in mind going into the preparation of Seattle and the new
Round; some people still thought that they could impose their
views if they pushed it hard enough, and that was really what
did not happen. And, of course, I will come back maybe later on
some of what I call "the mystique" of the GATT mentality.
We are in WTO and we are trying to change the process and the
procedures, but, of course, the mentality, it will take more time
to change, with the change, roll-over of people. Because there
is a tendency to bring back to WTO the same people; they go to
back to capital but they come back five years later, and all of
them refer to what happened in the GATT during these past 30 years,
but, obviously, this is not GATT, this is WTO, and WTO, with 136
members, most of them developing and least-developed countries,
is not going to work like GATT, as a small club of people that
agreed on the essential elements but had to discuss the details.
(Mr Mannan) I will just add to what Ambassador Touimi
has said, but, of course, since I am from Bangladesh, and we are
known to be, and, of course, are the largest least-developed country,
our approach to the issue of Seattle and to the new Round generally
is based specifically on our own particular situation as a global
economic player. So, in that matter, as far as my country is concerned,
as far as other LDCs are concerned, for whom we speak, we are
for the new Round, more for the reason that we realise that we
have travelled quite far, we have travelled too far, as a matter
of fact, to be reversing now, or changing course. So that is a
foregone conclusion; we are in support of a new Round. What is
more important for us is that not only being a least-developed
member of the larger G77 developing countries group, and there
you know very well there are some differences of opinion as to
what has happened until now, and that basic work of implementation
and the reforms; those, again, more pronounced in their thinking
and being part of the larger group of 77, sometimes we are pulled
in both directions. But I am being very honest and frank in front
of my two colleagues, who are important players in the G77; there
are no clashes between. What we are seeking then, LDCs, all of
us are seeking, is that we will move into the new Round, but we
would like to see that we do get the benefit of that, because
promised benefits have not been coming for us, it has not happened
until now, that is for sure, not that we are saying it, WTO says
it, UNCTAD says it, other independent thinkers and think tanks
and organisations and private bodies also say the same thing.
Therefore, our whole strategy, LDC strategy, Bangladesh's strategy,
has been to be near the mainstream of thinking in WTO, to be supportive
of the furtherance of the liberalisation. But, at the same time,
saying that, something very special needs to be done for the poorer
countries, because it is true, it is correct that we have lost
out in that, but our own debt has happened until now, and until
and unless something specific and bold is done for the benefit
of the LDC, there will be more marginalisation, and the whole
system, that we are trying to keep up now, sustain, may come under
pressures from inside and it will lose in terms of credibility,
it will lose in terms of believability, and ultimately we will
all be losers. That is what our position has been until now.
(Mr Smith) Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. To
put it mildly, Jamaica was not anxious for a new Round, we were
not agitators for a new Round, we viewed a new Round as more of
a received event if one occurred rather than one which we had
sought. The reasons why we did not agitate for a new Round are
quite simple, we did not view the outcome of the Uruguay Round,
nor the performance of the multilateral trading system, since
the Uruguay Round, as having been beneficial for the vast majority
of developing countries, and particularly of a developing country
in our circumstance; we considered that there were major asymmetries
in the outcome of the Uruguay Round, and we had no assurance that
these would be addressed in a new Round. We did not have any basis
to believe that the outlook had changed significantly on the part
of our interlocutors in the developed world; as a result, we did
not seek a new Round. However, there were some elements which
we would have wished to see in a new Round, had one been successfully
launched; certainly we would have wished, first of all, to see
implementation issues addressed. We would wish to see that because
we consider that that would provide a basis for a higher level
of confidence amongst countries as we approach the substance of
the new Round. Implementation issues, we hoped, would have taken
care of some of the anomalies from the Uruguay Round, and therefore
would have been, as it were, a confidence-builder, in enabling
us to view with a degree of anticipation a new Round. We would
also wish to have seen Special and Differential Treatment treated
more fulsomely in a new Round. And, certainly, in terms of negotiating
mandates, taking into account the interests of developing countries,
whether those negotiating mandates pertain to agriculture, or
to services, or to anti-dumping, or to any other area in which
it was agreed that a new Round would be pursued. We would, of
course, have participated actively in the built-in agenda, because
that had been mandated in the Uruguay Round and we were bound
to that; and we also had certain interests of our country, as
a small, island, developing state, we would have wished to see
a work programme for small economies, to look at some of the problems
that may be particularly relevant to countries in our situation
and how these might be addressed within the framework of the WTO.
Those are some of the elements we would have wished to see, had
there been a new Round, but we did not seek one.
295. Thank you very much. Can I ask you how
actively you are being involved now in discussions with the WTO,
with other Member States, on the scope of the new Round, or are
you involved at all?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) We have tried, I think, to
divide a little bit, to assign each group of countries some of
the responsibilities, and, obviously, today, in WTO, the main
discussions are about confidence-building measures, not about
the new Round. Basically, we had entrusted the DG to go around
capitals, because there is that myth that, of course, capitals
and Geneva-based Ambassadors, they are somehow different, have
different positions, or that the Geneva-based people might have
some agenda that is different from their capitals. So I think
that the DG was entrusted with going to the different capitals,
to try to see what are the elements, we have a rolling text from
Seattle and all the elements are in there. Obviously, I think
that everybody can recognise that the compromises that can be
made to launch a new Round are already there, they are in the
text, the rolling text that was produced by the Secretariat following
all these consultations that were held before Seattle and up to
Seattle. But the problem is, of course, there is no political
will to compromise, and there is no political will to do so for
many reasons, one being that people are thinking about areas where
they do not want to make any move; and, frankly, of course, the
major trading partners have probably more responsibility than
others to move in some of the areas. So, for the moment, in Geneva,
it is mainly those elements of the package that the Director-General
spoke about that are discussed; we are not really yet going back
to the discussions of the new Round, if we except the built-in
agenda, because we started services and we started agriculture,
and that really is a good sign, if we are going to launch a new
Round rather sooner than later.
296. Are those the key priorities for your countries,
to improve their capacity to negotiate it as a new Round?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) Of course. Basically, I think
that the problem that we are facing in a more complex negotiation
is to make sure that the positions that we are going to defend
are not really generic positions, one size fits all; what we need
is really to look for the interest of Morocco, as such. Obviously,
in the preliminaries, as I call them, everybody can address the
issue of Special and Differential Treatment, and there are some
common positions that can be taken by the developing countries,
by the G77, by the African group, that I represent for a few months,
but when you come to the real negotiation then you have to have
your own position, and for that you need capacity to do so at
different levels. First of all, I think, we need at this stage
to identify which are the areas that you want to negotiate on
because you expect to derive some benefits, and this is called,
in UNCTAD, the `positive agenda', to help you identify, before
even starting a new Round, which of the areas you want to negotiate
and to trade off. And then, of course, there is the capacity to
negotiate issues that are already on the table, and for that most
of the developing countries, I cannot speak for others, do not
have a process by which there is an interaction with the economic
actors; you have to talk to business, you have to talk to labour,
you have to talk to everybody who is interested in the issue and
make up your mind on where you want to go. And, of course, if
we do it, we do not do it in a systematic way. Morocco is fortunate
to be only two and a half hours from Geneva, so we can bring some
people over from the capital to deal with the issue, or to expose
them to the issues, hoping they go back and consult; but many
countries, including your country, have a systematic way of dealing
with those issues, to prepare briefs and negotiation briefs which
take into account all the constituencies. And that is really what
is missing, and what I hope we can do before we get to those very
intrusive issues on our sovereignty, because now it is not tariffs
any more that we are talking about, it is much more complicated,
and you cannot go by what was said by another country that used
to lead the developing countries in the cold war era, you cannot
just say, "If that country is having that position, I can
safely just join in with that country," because it is not
the case any more. And that is really what we are trying to do,
in WTO: of course to have some positions that are common to the
larger number of developing countries, but yet, when we come to
the nitty-gritty things, to have our own positions and to co-ordinate
among those that can defend those same interests for reasons that
are practical and not ideological.
Ann Clwyd: Thank you. Can I ask Andrew
Robathan to take up the questioning.
Mr Robathan
297. To a certain extent, you have already stated
some of the things you would like to see happen, but I would like
to focus in, if I could, please, on the future and on the reform
of the WTO. Mr Mannan, I think we met in Geneva?
(Mr Mannan) In Geneva, yes.
298. You particularly raised with us the problems
the developing countries had in the Green Room, and, Ambassador
Benjelloun-Touimi, you have also raised the question of the Green
Room. How would you like to see the WTO reformed, in particular
with reference to the whole sort of Green Room process, which
we found, from what you and your colleagues said, Mr Mannan, was
slightly difficult in Seattle; also, what would you like to say
about the proposals for representative groupings at the moment?
(Mr Mannan) At present, now that what Ambassador Touimi
has also said, we are into discussions in Geneva about the whole
new process of confidence-building and transparency and the speed
of decision-making vis-a"-vis the democratic element,
these have been discussed by all delegations at various stages,
and the Green Room process keeps on coming up in our discussions,
almost every day. We know that even in the GATT days, prior to
the birth of WTO, there used to be non-formal groups of senior
Ambassadors who sometimes make decisions and bring them later
to the General Council; we know it but we have no definite papers
or no definite institutional framework for that. In the days prior
to Seattle, if I remember correctly, and he would correct me,
since about July, August of last year, when these five sub-committees
were formed, to speed up the preparation of the Seattle papers,
a kind of Green Room process started, instead of one large Green
Room which was seen in Seattle, there were four smaller Green
Rooms in Geneva, which were functioning to refine that paper from
various elements of the whole bunch.
299. And were the people in those Green Rooms
from like-minded and similar countries?
(Mr Mannan) These were picked up, I do not know how
good the mechanism was, suddenly I would get a telephone call
or a letter from DG's office, saying that "Your country is
invited to be present in the committee for a Green Room discussion."
And I would go there. Maybe at the same time there were two other
Green Rooms in two other places, but I am not aware, I was not
called. So, in this way, more or less, to my knowledge, almost
every member, India, in Geneva found a place either in this or
that Green Room, on this day or on the other day; but the final
Green Room, the menacing one, under criticism now, the Seattle
one and the third, as Ambassador Touimi was saying, in that only
30 were called, Bangladesh, fortunately, for some special reason,
was included in the 30. So, as far as we are concerned, we are
quite happy being in the spotlight, but we knew, in the verandahs,
in the lobbies, there were lots of other delegations, more important
than mine, to be very honest, who had been left out and who were
feeling angry and frustrated, and they did not know how this came
up, because no-one knew how the 30 were selected, we did not know
how we were selected. That is why this question of who had done
it, why it was done, and at that moment there was sort of a discussion,
saying that "This room is going to fix up the whole paper
by this evening, there has to be a sort of declaration,"
Charlene Bershefsky was under pressure to bring out something,
and she had depended on these 30 people to do it. So, naturally,
it was doomed to failure, because with 30 inside and 100 outside
it was a mismatch, and there was no flow of information between
the larger group and the smaller group. Therefore, I thought that
is our opinion that it did not function. Now, this idea of a Green
Room, coming up now for discussion for future negotiations in
WTO, is dangerous, I would use the word, because, from our position,—
300. It is dangerous, is it?
(Mr Mannan) Dangerous in the sense, from our delegation's
point of view, or delegations like ours, who now, in Geneva, we
feel comfortable that we know that if we want to we can go to
any meeting, at any time, sit and participate, but if there is
a fixed 20, 25, 30, 35-member sort of a Security Council, or a
super-body, or an in-house, we would feel sort of left out; and
even though the speed will be gained, in terms of decision-making,
it will lose in terms of participation, in terms of trust. Therefore,
from our point of view, even a slight slowness in process, even
taking more time, even being tardy, we would accept that rather
than being faster, secretive and taking decisions beyond the knowledge
of everybody. So these are the two options that lie before my
country; we would prefer a slow WTO which is more democratic,
we would not like a fast WTO which is less democratic.
301. Would you agree with that, in general,
or do you have different positions?
(Mr Smith) I am not sure if it is a different position,
but I know that my own view is that Seattle failed for reasons
of process and substance, and process has to do with what we are
discussing at this point, in terms of the transparency and the
methodology of decision-making. But also I do not believe that
Seattle was a unique event. I believe it is entirely consistent
with how the WTO, and before the GATT, had done business, and
therefore Seattle was, in that sense, predictable. I also believe,
as a result, that the decisions that were taken at the Uruguay
Round and the agreements, which when scrutinised are, in many
respects, agreements that have significant elements of, and one
says this with hesitancy because we were all parties to them,
they have many anomalies, in terms of the interests of parties,
and that also is the result of a process that occurred during
the Uruguay Round, which is a similar process to what happened
at Seattle and which must be changed, or else the organisation
will not have learned anything from its recent history. The Green
Room is a methodology that allows a select number of countries,
usually by the Secretariat itself, to participate in decision-making.
Some countries are able to participate effectively in the Green
Room, others often do not; that is perhaps not a tenable situation,
over time, as the organisation's composition has changed, and,
more importantly, as countries have discerned with clarity the
importance of the decisions that are taken in the WTO, and the
consequences of those decisions for their concrete interests.
That is no longer tenable. It means, therefore, that a methodology
has to be found that is more transparent, that is more participatory,
or else countries will not accept the decisions that are made,
because they have a profound impact on their real economic interest,
and this is very clear now, everyone is quite clear on that. What
methodology can be implemented? Jamaica certainly does not believe
that there should be an institutionalised group, select group,
that makes decisions, but perhaps it will be possible to have
some representative grouping that exists not in a decision-making
capacity but as a forum in which issues can be discussed at a
particular time, and in which effort is made to ensure that countries
that do not participate in that group are kept informed. And,
secondly, that any country that wishes to participate in the issue
under discussion is free to do so, which means that there must
be full information as to the time of the meeting, the location
of the meeting, the agenda of the meeting, the issue that will
be taken up, and all parties are aware; if Jamaica has a keen
interest in that subject, Jamaica will participate. It may be
that one might need some organisational decision as to the composition
of such a group. We know, and we cannot ignore the fact, that
there are countries with a preponderance of weight in the multilateral
trading system, and that maybe would participate in that group
on a regular basis. We know, for example, there are regional groupings
that often articulate in a coherent way the interest of the parties
to that grouping, although that is not always possible, perhaps
representation from such groupings would be there. We know that
countries have dominant interests in a particular issue at hand;
even though they may not be dominant traders in the multilateral
system, the particular issue is one of particular interest to
them. So it is perhaps possible to put together a grouping that
is more or less institutionalised, that allows participation of
all countries that have an interest, that is not based upon the
arbitrary or the particular decision of a particular individual
or particular group at a particular time, as to who participates,
and, if that is accepted as a legitimate mechanism by the membership
as a whole, it then has a certain legitimacy. But it is possible,
I think, to think in those terms, but we have no specific ideas
as yet, but we do recognise that it is difficult for 135 countries
to meet in a room and discuss extensively trade policy issues
and come to a decision within a time frame that we would perhaps
all wish to see. We accept that difficulty, but we do not believe
that it can be solved by arbitrariness, by exclusion, at all.
302. I accept that. Can I pursue slightly the
representative groupings that you mentioned. For instance, following
what you said, would Jamaica be happy, in general, to go along
with a representative grouping such as, for instance, CARICOM,
and one representative speaking for several countries? I am not
asking you to commit yourself too far.
(Mr Smith) I would like to make the point, we would
not accept that that proposed grouping would actually make decisions,
binding decisions. We would accept the participation of a representative
in terms of clarifying issues, in terms of coming to what could
be a basis for a consensus on an issue, but we would not accept
that a limited WTO group could take binding decisions on our part.
303. Do you want to add anything, Ambassador?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) Yes. I really wanted just to
say that, on that issue, the African group was very vocal in Seattle,
and we do have a position of all the African group of WTO. We
really think that we need only some practical measures, "If
it aint broke, don't fix it," and we do not think that the
WTO process is so flawed completely that we need to change it,
to reform it; we need some practicalities and fine-tuning, and
that is the paper that we have submitted to the General Council
a few days ago. Basically, to answer your question about whether
we need a geographic representation or not, I think we need both,
because you can have co-ordinators of groups in Green Rooms to
report back to the groups in transparency what is happening, and,
of course, you can have interests in those subjects, a group of
interests, and, countries can choose themselves; actually it is
easy because you are not going to find, even if it is an open
meeting, more than 30 people in those open meetings. And in the
run-up to Bangkok we tried something that was quite interesting,
to have a Green Room in a large room, which meant that we had
a table where you had 20, or so, delegations, and around it all
the membership, and those who were round the table were getting
some papers with questions, or clarifications, asked and the discussion
was conducted in the open, with a screen, where we had the text,
where people can follow the proceedings in that way. And I wonder
whether it can work in WTO, but at least in UNCTAD I think it
worked, because we went from Geneva to Bangkok with 15 brackets,
as opposed to 400, or so, when we went to South Africa four years
ago, and 500, or so, when it was, eight years ago, the Eighth
Conference. So what we need really is small fixes, because, obviously,
we are not going to have negotiations with 130 members. Somebody
said that the Secretariat was choosing the members. I can tell
you, Morocco has always been, as far as I can remember, in all
of the Green Rooms, but in the run-up to Seattle we did not attend
some of them because we had no immediate interest to follow those
Green Rooms, and we did not go there. The idea was, as I remember
it, when I came to Geneva, some five years ago, that the Secretariat
establish a list that would be influenced mostly by the debate
in the General Council; when agriculture was discussed, they will
take the whole list of speakers and, except for those who say,
"I agree with what is said," most of the others were
included in that Green Room, and, as I said, the size is never
more than 30, it is around 25. And, of course, the majors were
always there, because they have something to say about anything
that we have in WTO, but, others, it depended on the subject.
And, of course, there are some active members that have something
to say about everything and they are included in those Green Rooms,
and actually some members, I remember, in 1995-96, came and said,
"We heard you have a Green Room, could we join?" And
they were allowed to join, anybody who wanted to; it was, in a
way, open-ended, and it was not such a secret. But the problem
is, of course, that some of the smaller countries, that were not
active in the past, are now more active and want to join in, and
that is what I call the GATT mentality; they were not known, in
GATT times, as people who were active and wanted to participate.
So some of the Secretariat, with some of the Ambassadors, I have
to say, were really very reluctant, if not against the idea of
including them in some Green Rooms, and we had some difficulties,
we have to face it. But if we try to channel some ideas about
how it is to be done practically, in a very open manner, I think
that the Green Room is there to stay, and this is the only way
you can proceed; it has to be transparent, but the restricted
group is going to be the only way to work in the future.
Ann Clwyd
304. Can you let us have a copy of the report
that you mentioned?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) Yes, absolutely.[1]
Ann Clwyd: Thank you.
Mr Robathan
305. It seems to me that you are all saying
that it was the actual practical workings that were wrong, rather
than the system as a whole, and that the Green Room might have
worked if it had been better organised, with agendas, and whatever,
in different ways. Looking at the reform, and perhaps reforms
just in practical workings, have you been invited to be involved
in initiatives for looking at reform, have your countries been
involved at all, and particularly has the `Eminent Persons' group,
of which we have heard, been involved in that at all; no?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) We heard about it, but I have
to tell you, very frankly, that my country and many others are
against it, because we think that if WTO has to be fixed it has
to be fixed by the WTO people, by those who work in WTO, and not
by somebody who is going to theorise about the WTO. We know what
is wrong with WTO, we might not say everything, because in an
informal setting we have not to go into too many details, but
we all know what needs to be fixed; and, I think, these practical
problems were compounded by very difficult circumstances —
having a divisive election, having a new DG, with no DDGs, with
some people hearing some rumours about going to be fired, because,
of course, the Secretariat was not neutral in that election, so
it was really compounded. Seattle is exceptional, in this WTO
process.
Mr Worthington
306. One of the things that has surprised me
about this investigation is the sheer size of the delegations
by the developed countries, and Christian Aid, for example, said
that the United States delegation on the intellectual property
aspect, which was just one of the aspects that was being dealt
with at Seattle, that they had a delegation of 111 on that area,
96 of whom were from the private sector. What are your views on
this issue, about the size of delegations, about whether, as was
reported, you should be able to pay for your place on the delegation,
and about what that does to the negotiating process of the WTO;
what are your views on the size of delegations?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) I think that, on that one,
I will be very liberal, actually, because Seattle-type events
are only set in terms of reference for negotiations, and, of course,
there is a lot of politicking in that; so bringing the people
who want to be there so that they support the WTO activities,
in my view, is not such a bad idea, because if you bring 100 people
from the private sector they might not agree among themselves
on what they want; we get visits in Geneva of different organisations
of private business and they do not seem to agree on many things.
In my own delegation, we are a small country, we had a delegation
of 30, and we made sure that the private sector was represented,
so that they know what is going on and how difficult it is to
negotiate things that they think we take for granted. So, obviously,
we can think about some maximum size, maybe; but, frankly, in
this type of event, like Seattle, or any Ministerial, it should
not be a real problem, because we are simply negotiating some
terms of reference. And, basically, one of the flaws of the process,
going to Seattle, was that people were trying to pre-negotiate,
trying to remember what happened in the Uruguay Round, saying
that, "After we negotiated the Uruguay Round, it took us
so many years to understand some of the things that were put there."
So they tried to be crystal-clear in the terms of reference so
that the negotiations can start; I am thinking particularly about
agriculture — to start and to hit the ground running on
1 January, that was their idea, and, obviously, they pushed it
too hard, and it did not happen. So, in normal circumstances,
for the Singapore-type negotiation, you do not need really all
those specialists around you to figure out what is going to be
your position, there are some basic things that you have to have
in there, and whether you have 20 or 30 does not make a lot of
difference. So I am not really that bothered with it, it be a
problem of perception, but I do not think that it is a real problem.
(Mr Smith) I think we have to be realistic, I think
countries have to be free to determine the size and composition
of their delegations, and the United States accounts for some
16 per cent of world trade and probably believes it needs that
larger delegation. I do not see what practically can be done about
that matter. What really is important is that, for countries who
do not have that large a delegation, really to find some way of
identifying clearly their interests and developing the capacity
to negotiate on the issues that are of specific interest to them;
some countries may have much broader-ranging interests and will
perhaps need much larger delegations. So, I think, on balance,
we just have to be practical on a matter such as that.
307. Do you agree with that?
(Mr Mannan) I would agree with what Ambassador Smith
was saying. It is largely a matter for the country to decide,
depending on its own internal economic structure; the United States
is quite different from ours. Speaking for my country, Bangladesh,
which is very large but very poor at the same time, even then
to Seattle we had a delegation of 21, of whom 12 were from the
private sector. And what was special about our delegation was
that these 12 were private sector, very eminent persons, educated
business people, who on a regular basis are in touch with the
Government in the country, this Government, being politically
linked also. But we are careful, to what I would like to say,
we had contrived in the sense that it is only the head of the
delegation who spoke for the delegation as a whole, and in the
other, larger bodies it was the second man, who was a bureaucrat,
Permanent Secretary , who spoke, so that business people, who
were there with us all the time, had contributed in-house, in
the hotel discussions, in the lobby discussions, but had not participated
in the representation of the country in various meetings, that
was done by the bureaucrats and by the Minister himself in the
Green Room. In that sense, this mechanism for our country has
been, in practice, the Singapore Ministerial; in every Ministerial
in Singapore, in Geneva, we have had about 20 people coming, with
a very large private sector participation, who had done a very
big job behind the scenes on the Ministerial to the political
agenda, but it was the bureaucrat and the political masters who
were doing the front job, and that probably works very well for
us. I would not know about other countries.
308. There is a problem of perception, is there
not? I do not know, but I would like your views on whether it
is a real problem, that the WTO is a gathering of nation states,
of governments negotiating, but there is a perception in the rest
of the world that, basically, power now rests with multinational
corporations, and, if you assemble your team on the basis that
big private sector operatives buy their way onto the negotiating
team, is that not furthering that perception?
(Mr Mannan) Sir, you used the words "buy their
way", so I do not know what exactly will be buying their
way, but, in the case of my country, I cannot use the word "buy"
because I am not aware of any sort of buying process. What I said
is that in my country the private sector have their own bodies,
like you have CBI in this country, we have the Federation of Bangladesh
Chambers of various commerce and industry, they are elected bodies
for terms, for two-year, three-year terms, they are as much elected
as the Government are but in a different sort of setting altogether.
In that sense, they are democratic institutions, they have charters,
they have statutes, they have their terms of reference, and there
are established government regulations, laying down from the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry that the Government is bound in such
and such matters to be on a regular consultative basis with these
people. In that light, their participation in our delegation is
perfectly legal and perfectly in order also. In our country, in
Bangladesh, TNCs are not that powerful as yet, we do not have
large TNCs working in our capital, we have a very few at rudimentary
level but they also have their Chamber, which is called Foreign
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. And that Chamber is, again,
a member of our national Federation, so, in that sense, their
feeling comes to us also, but through our national federating
body; therefore, even the Foreign Chamber, even though small,
in my country, is finding its voice, through our own businessmen,
into the process, and I think that works very well. We are not
concerned, and we do not think it is unfair, we think it very
correct, given that new situation that is evolving, with the private
sector continuously becoming more and more important, with the
privatisation process, the Government folding-out of various industries
and businesses, etc., we think that it is only proper that the
private sector should have its voice in the process. But, as I
said earlier, in my intervention, we are very clear for this thing
that the front slot remains with the political leadership, and
that, until now, Bangladesh has been satisfactorily doing it,
I can say that.
309. What is behind my question, I suppose,
is the perception that there is an imbalance, I think someone
used the expression, an asymmetry, earlier, that you have the
big boys and the little boys and that what has happened, over
the years, is that the big boys have won, and that, within the
WTO, we need to balance things up; but you do not see the delegations
and the capacity of the delegations as a major issue in bringing
that about?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) If I may give you an ironical
answer to that. Really, if some of the major delegations have
their position too much influenced by those multinationals, first
of all, their margin of manoeuvre is going to be so limited —
and I think it has played already a role — that there will
not be consensus, because I do not think that those multinationals
are going to control the 130, or so, countries in WTO. So the
problem is, we will have a situation where there is no flexibility,
and that is going to look bad for the WTO. The processes in some
of the countries take so much into account. This is a governance
problem. Some people would say, "Politically, this is lack
of leadership, because you are too much influenced by small constituencies,
small or big constituencies, that you don't have a sense of where
we should take this organisation and where we should take the
trade liberalisation and where we should take the WTO agenda."
And maybe that is where we are today. So that is why we are not
too much worried about it, and we do not want to dictate to the
others; we try to be real, in the sense that we want our delegation
to reflect the interests of our country, which happen to lie in
the actors, because the enterprises give work to people and generate
development for our country, so you have to take into account
that side of your constituencies. So that is how we look at it.
Tess Kingham
310. The Committee was told by Sheila Page,
an academic at the Institute for Development Studies, that developing
countries were capable of speaking for themselves, at the WTO,
because they had prepared themselves for it, and that they did
not need to be told by people dressed up as turtles what their
attitude towards the environment should be. I would like to ask
you two questions on this. The first is, do you agree with that
sentiment, or did you find the peaceful demonstrations by some
NGOs to be helpful; and, secondly, what do you feel the appropriate
role for NGOs in international negotiations on trade and the environment
should be, should it be advice or should it be for advocacy, on
behalf of developing countries?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) As far as the Seattle experience
was concerned, actually, we were prevented from going into the
Conference Centre, and I personally took the advantage of that
to discuss with those dressed as turtles, and some other outfits.
And, frankly, I was struck particularly by those who came from
universities, not students; basically, they were really simply
against WTO per se, everything coming from WTO was evil,
and that was it; and we had a long discussion and you could not
convince them, because they say, "What you are telling me
is that I should trust my Government, which I don't, and I want
to see for myself." That was their position. And, of course,
later on, in Bangkok, it was organised, the discussions with the
NGOs, we had a forum for the NGOs, and we went to that forum and
we had private discussions. And you can see that the problem is
that sometimes the NGOs have their own view of what should be
the situation of the developing countries, most of the time without
consulting with those developing countries, and this is a real
problem. As far as the role of the NGOs, in WTO in particular,
is concerned, I think that it is a genuine constituency that you
have to take into account, and I think that although we do not
know to whom they are accountable, that is not a problem because
what we should have is as many opinions as people that can draw
your attention to issues. But, obviously, as long as WTO is an
intergovernmental body, it has to stay that way until we change
it. And, obviously, if you think about it, the Government is accountable;
if it is in a democratic system or country, then the Government
is accountable to the Parliament and to the people at large, and,
of course, those NGOs are part of that; and this is the way it
is argued in WTO, for external transparency. And sometimes it
is forgotten that WTO is in Geneva, and Geneva has 20 different
specialised and other agencies where the same countries (we are
not going to name them) are against any participation of NGOs
in the intergovernmental work that we are doing in some areas;
and all of us here, the three of us, are representative of our
countries in all the institutions that are Geneva-based, and sometimes
even others, in Berne, like the Postal Union. But we know what
is happening in each of those institutions and the contradictions
of the same Governments on NGO participation and advocacy; and
you will see that it depends on the issue, it depends on the interest,
it depends on many things which are political and not based on
anything else. So in WTO people resist more participation in WTO
for objective reasons but also for political reasons.
(Mr Mannan) For the NGOs, this question of what Ms
Page has said about developing countries, they can speak for themselves,
and probably she meant that they needed no assistance from NGOs
or turtles or butterflies; well, of course, we can speak for ourselves,
we are speaking, but more or less at a different level from different
countries. But I think NGO's work, which is our work, in a sense,
speaking for my country again, and for my delegation, we learn
a lot from the NGO's work, we see papers from various groups,
like Oxfam, Christian Aid, ActionAid, and others, to name a few,
and we read their papers, we talk to them, we interact with them,
and in that way we are also in this train, and we prepare ourselves
better to face situations in WTO and elsewhere. In Seattle, what
was wrong about the NGO team was the violence in the streets,
the fact that we were allowed to go to their meetings and hold
meetings, that is what we did not enjoy, we did not like, but
the dressing as butterflies, or doing these kinds of pranks in
the streets, that is perfectly okay in this modern-day world,
and we allow all sorts of opinions to prosper. Again, for Bangladesh
again, you might be aware, pursuing also Bangladesh, could be
almost a capital of NGOs in the world, in that sense, we have
the largest number of NGOs in that part of the world, and our
people, our society, our Government, through a process of the
last 20 years, have come to a stage now we are perfectly comfortable
at all times with NGOs in my country, and they are continuously
contributing. As you used the word advocacy, there are very strong
advocacy groups, in human rights, in children's education, elsewhere,
and just picking up the press, and then just took it up, continuously,
you know, banging on a gong, and various issues, which the Government
has to listen to. In that way, I think they are a very enriching
sort of an influence, and we would like to support that and would
like to interact with them more. But, again, before I conclude,
there are one or two things about NGOs which again come up in
the mind of people in my country: who funds them, that people
continuously ask, where do they get all the money to spend around
and do the research and go around; that is number one, we cannot
really answer that. And, number two, who are they accountable
to, who the chief executives are, what is their permanent constituency.
You, as a member, you represent a part of an area, I, as a bureaucrat,
represent a part of a set of rules and regulations, I am contracted;
but these people have no such things. So these are two very major
questions they have to answer and we also, in turn, have to answer.
On the ground, at working level, we are perfectly happy.
(Mr Smith) I would answer that by saying that the
leadership in our societies face conflicting demands, conflicting
interests, and NGOs are part of the elements of a plural society,
and the leadership task is, essentially, to try to balance those
interests in the interest of society as a whole, as they see it,
that is the essence of good leadership. And, certainly, in the
case of Jamaica, we try to do that, and that is reflected in policy,
as best we can articulate it, at the WTO or in other international
organisations, and we encourage the NGOs and other interest groups
to participate in that process at the national level; the private
sector is integral to that process, in the context of the WTO.
One concern certainly I would have is, of course, that, insofar
as there are concerns that the WTO is a supernational organisation,
which it is not, it is an organisation of Member States, but insofar
as there is that concern, one almost gets the view sometimes,
or gets a feeling sometimes, that they are organisations which
seek or wish to do an end-run around national governments or a
national consensus to influence the process at another level.
And then the outcome will, of course, have a bearing on the interests
of national societies, and in that sense the question of participating
in the process, in a build-up of the process, so that it can then
be articulated at the level of the intergovernmental organisation,
I think, is really perhaps the best way to go, because that way
it ensures that all the various conflicting interests can be balanced,
they can be assessed and they can come to an outcome that society
really may then perceive is reflective of where we may wish to
go on an issue.
311. So what you all three seem to be saying
is that one of the best routes is to work through home-grown,
local NGOs, who are bolted into the accountable structures of
your own states, to contribute to that process; is that what I
am picking up?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) I think that we made an appeal
in Bangkok, to the international NGOs, to work more closely with
us and to take our views into account, if they are going to talk
on our behalf. That was really the message, and, of course, to
work with our own national NGOs and develop them, too.
Mr Robathan
312. Could I now turn to the perceived costs
and benefits of WTO membership. I think most of us would agree
that international trade has a key role to play in development
in general, and Mike Moore particularly made this case and he
cited the example of Bangladesh, where he said that, following
the agreements at Uruguay, textile exports increased from a few
million dollars to over four billion dollars. Now how are your
countries benefiting, or will they benefit, from WTO membership,
and how is that balanced, or outweighed, if it is outweighed,
by the costs of WTO membership, for example, implementing agreements
or the restrictions on the use of certain trade measures?
(Mr Mannan) I think it would be quite, a very complex
study, to see the cost benefits of being in the Uruguay Round
and being in WTO and gaining from the trade. But we are able to
see Mr Moore's assertion about we are gaining in trade and doing
very well, of course, it is true, we have done, but if there had
been no WTO we might well have done as much as we have done. What
WTO has done, in directly promoting that kind of upswing in our
exports, that would be for the specialist, for the economic study
to find out, but one can feel, by being inside the system, that,
yes, all globalised freer trade and more intensive sort of trading
with larger and more developed countries has benefited us well,
and having a system in WTO, a super sort of a system, which is
transparent, which is predictable, which provides the background
of rules and regulations which one could follow up on, in terms
of—
313. Which rules and regulations, sorry?
(Mr Mannan) Yes, a rule-based organisation, which
is their background, which is a sort of super-body, which we can
turn to in the case of intensive difficulty, that gives us a kind
of sense of confidence in the new globalised world, which probably
has an indirect bearing on our export trade. But I have a feeling
myself that we might have done as well, even if there had not
been a WTO, but with WTO probably the speed has been faster, and
in the next few years probably it will be even better, if we continue
to have a predictable, dependable and very clear WTO, which is
equity-based and which has a dispute settlement mechanism, which
is fair and enforceable to all, big and small; that is what our
feelings are of the WTO. The cost of being in WTO, of course,
there are many opinions, there are stratas in my country which
say that by coming into WTO we have signed our own death warrant,
in the sense of our small industries have been wiped out, because
of better and cheaper imports from various countries, including
from our neighbour, which is a very large economy; that is, in
the short term, the feeling of many people in my country. But,
at the same time, other groups are saying that our export basket,
although we have lost in some sectors, in some other sectors we
have gained more and we are compensated, we have a wider access
to a larger market, in the sense we have wider choice in our market
now, and we are going into new areas, into overseas trade, where
we have not gone before. So there is an internal shift, in terms
of movement, within our own economy, from classic jute and tea
and leather, into new areas of textiles, software, into other
areas, which has come because of this globalised, newer internal
pressure in the world system where WTO is also at work. So this
kind of complex situation one can probably grope and feel, but
it would require a lot of study by specialists to really give
you a measured, quantitative answer to the question.
(Mr Smith) I would make two points, firstly, perhaps;
and one is that small countries, like my own, should have an abiding
interest in trade liberalisation. We are unlikely to enjoy the
economies of scale in a population of two million, two and a half
million, people that will guarantee efficiency in a wide range
of production, therefore market access is critical to us, and
market access hinges on trade liberalisation. The other aspect
of that coin also is, of course, that our industries, our enterprises,
tend to be small and vulnerable, and, therefore, the question
of pace of liberalisation, sequence of liberalisation, are the
critical components for a country in our situation. Insofar as
the WTO can respond to both of those necessities, trade liberalisation,
pace and sequencing that takes into account the particular situation
of our economy, then, of course, the WTO is an organisation that
we would find amenable. The second aspect is the predictability
of rules, which is important, the security that those rules confer.
Again, a small economy, such as our own, we account for 0.057
per cent of world trade, which is really, of course, minuscule.
As you can well imagine, we are not able to command any clout,
in terms of retaliation, in terms of economic leverage. We therefore
must depend on a predictable system of trade rules, and those
are best fashioned within a multilateral context, even for negotiating
purposes, as even in a bilateral context we would be worse off
trying to negotiate those rules. So, for those two reasons, we
would, of course, see the WTO as being, in principle, an institution
that should meet our interests; we are not convinced that in practice
that has occurred, but that is an issue that we will have to address.
But the principle is quite clearly there and we will seek to address
that insofar as we are members of the organisation and we continue
to participate in its activities. We have done no detailed calculus
of the costs and benefits of participating in the WTO since the
Uruguay Round. We believe that if one looks at trade data globally
one can see certain indications that, generally, for developing
countries, it has not necessarily been the best of times. We have
seen data from, for example, UNCTAD, which has indicated that
the current account deficits of developing countries has been,
on average, larger than during previous periods, and growth has
been, on average, about two percentage points lower than in the
seventies. In the case of Jamaica, since 1995, our current account
deficit has doubled, and our exports have fallen by about 11 per
cent; our imports have remained static, because we have exercised
a great deal of constraint in trying to control our imports. So,
in terms of the macroeconomic data, we see no clear evidence that
we have embarked on a spurt of export growth since the Uruguay
Round has been in place; that is fact. I do not know what we can
read into it, since we have not as yet done some of the studies,
but we certainly can say that there are sectors of the domestic
economy that have come under a considerable degree of pressure,
primarily in agriculture, for example, since the Uruguay Round;
and we recognise that, for one thing. We also recognise that certain
elements of the rules that were fashioned, and I have alluded
to this, are rules that we are uncomfortable with and which we
would wish to see changed.
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) I wanted to say that, as far
as my country is concerned, like many others, it is complicated
and the jury is still out on that, because you cannot easily determine
the impact of the Uruguay Round knowing that we have also this
Agreement of Association with the European Union, and what is
attributed to that and what is attributed to the regional agreements
you do not know, and, of course, I think our enemy is generalisation.
We would be better off if we had studies on each of the sectors
that are involved, and really something that can give you some
indications on how we are doing and why, and I think in evidence
I read before this Committee there is a lot of explanations that
are really something that I would agree with. But let me just
say that really one of our problems, and here I can speak for
many more than my own country, is that there is a good perception
that being part of WTO is good for you, good for your country,
because you belong to a set of rules, and that in the future you
will derive more benefit. But recently I have been in a Berlin
seminar about investment, to try to get this on the agenda of
WTO, and I was really amazed that nobody from the private sector
or from university was able to say that, if we have a multilateral
agreement on investment, that will make countries benefit more
from investment, get more, the flow of investment would increase,
nobody could say that, whether it was small enterprises or multinationals,
and they were all in that seminar. And the question was asked,
begged to be asked, "Do you think that if my country is part
of a multilateral agreement that means that you will come and
invest in my country more than if we are not part of that agreement?"
And they were saying, basically, all of them, there was a consensus
on that, that provided all the rest was okay then it was a plus,
but not otherwise. And that is a problem that you have to see
in the context of all the WTO agreements; all those other elements
are very important. One other element that I wanted really to
flag is the fact that most developing countries see the WTO agreements
from a bureaucratic standpoint and not from the opportunity standpoint,
which means that they feel happy if they have fulfilled their
obligations deriving from the agreements and are not looking at
what kind of opportunities are offered to you once you sign, ratify
and implement the agreements. And that is something that we have
to work on from the capacity side, and the initiative taken by
the ITC and your own Government on that one is really good; updating
that Business Guide to the Uruguay Round is really one of the
things that is very welcome in my country, as in many others.
Mr Worthington
314. Can I just stick with the costs associated
with the WTO, and specifically the costs associated with the implementation
of agreements. There was a recent World Bank study which showed
that the cost of implementing just three aspects of the Uruguay
Round was more than the development budget of many developing
countries, just to put those agreements into effect was a heavy
cost drain on developing countries. Has that been your experience?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) I would say, maybe not, in
my country, because it depends on the level of your administrative
situation before the agreement. I do not think it was the case
in Morocco, but I believe it is the case in some other countries,
because I have to tell you, from experience, that many, for instance,
African countries came and signed in Marrakesh, because it was
in an African setting and it was like a festival, and the people
who signed did not know what they were up to when signing those
agreements and what are the consequences of those agreements.
So once you have nothing and you have to build the whole administration,
obviously, the cost is going to be outrageous, if you compare
it with what the benefit. If you have already a system in place
and you have to adjust it to the agreements then the cost is marginal,
and I think I would put my country in that situation. But for
many others it was really maybe not warranted to become a member
of WTO, as I can see today that some of the developing countries
want to accede WTO, but if they make an evaluation of whether
they should be, there is no reason why they should be in WTO because
90 per cent of their business is not covered by the agreements,
for instance; but still this mystique of being a member of WTO
is so appealing that they want to take that risk. And I think
that you have to read your data through this kind of prism.
(Mr Mannan) For my country, of course, we have not
had any special study of the cost, but we can say that being at
least a least-developed country we have started phasing in concessions,
in terms of time, we are having longer time to adjust and make
our own internal notification procedure seen conforming to WTO,
and we have enjoyed that kind of aid, or special sort of shelter
under these various Special and Differential Treatment provisions,
being both an LDC and a poor country. In that sense, I do not
think our cost has been high or has been more than what would
be normally expected, even in terms of having a delegation in
Geneva which is directly concerned, since the establishment of
WTO in the beginning of 1995 and prior to that, there has been
an increase of only one diplomat in that Mission, there were four
before and there are five after, so in terms of even a delegation
the cost has been very marginal. And in capital I would not say
there has been much cost, but during the same time we have gained
a fair amount of money, in terms of technical assistance programmes,
there have been a lot of officers travelling to Geneva getting
training, there has been a lot of training back in my own country
and there has been some other incidence also. So, on balance,
I think we have been gainers in this particular area.
(Mr Smith) In my view, the cost has been high, I think,
of the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements. First of
all, the notification requirements are quite onerous, especially
in administrations that were not geared up to do that before.
Secondly, of course, a single undertaking left you no option,
you were either a part of everything or you were a part of nothing;
it meant, therefore, that many agreements, that perhaps are not
necessarily important and critical to some countries at the particular
stage of their development, they have had to sign on to and they
have had to attempt to service. Some of the agreements, such as
anti-dumping, to put into place a commission, for example, we
did not have an anti-dumping commission, such legislation had
to be updated, the commission had to be put in place, staff had
to be trained how to carry out investigations, some of these investigations
have to be carried out even overseas. It is very difficult for
a small country to do all of that and to develop the expertise
that can do that. So when one takes into account the infrastructure,
the human resource requirements that have changed in respect of
matters such as anti-dumping, in respect of matters such as TRIPs,
even in respect of customs valuation, and we were one of the countries
that had to seek an extension of a year to try to put in place
the customs valuation agreement, I think it has been significant,
and resources have had to be diverted from elsewhere. I cannot
say how much that cost is, frankly I do not know that we have
quantified it, but I think the burden on the administration has
been significant.
Barbara Follett
315. Given all that you have just said, perhaps
you could tell us how much progress you have made in your countries
in implementing your obligations under the Uruguay Round; will
you be seeking to roll over any of the implementation deadlines?
(Mr Mannan) In terms of notifications and in terms
of changes in various other rules and regulations to come in conformity
with WTO, my country, I can say, is not behind. We have notified
to the extent that we were required to; we were assisted in the
process by the WTO office here, in giving us some technical assistance,
by sending experts to our capitals, in helping us to make those
legislations, but we have been in some cases slow, because legislation
everywhere is a little slow because it has to go to the Law Ministry
and come to the whole grind-mill of the processing, and all that.
But, on balance, our notification procedures have been on track,
and we have done fairly well, we would say. In terms of whether
we would like this special sort of phasing-in period to continue,
yes, those laws particularly which allow us kind of a market access
benefit, directly or indirectly, in terms of allowing us larger
quotas, in terms of allowing us softer non-tariff barriers, in
terms of making it easier for us in terms of access to the retail
markets, in those areas, I can say, in areas of textiles and garments,
in leather standards, in other things, yes, we would like that
a longer period be granted to all the least-developed countries,
to come into total conformity with the requirements of the WTO
rules and regulations. We would seek that, we sought it in Seattle
also, in the package that all the other LDCs also placed and we
will keep seeking it in the new Round, if it comes around.
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) As far as Morocco is concerned,
I think we are in pretty much the same situation. We do not have
any particular problems, I would say, in implementing those agreements;
maybe in customs valuation we have asked for a few months more
to put in place complicated legislation. But I think, by and large,
we do not have those problems that are related to simply being
in conformity with the legislation, which does not mean that we
would not like to have these S&D provisions extended to us;
that would be another subject altogether.
(Mr Smith) As I indicated, we sought an extension
of the customs valuation agreement transition period, because
we were unable to meet the deadline; we have been getting very
valuable technical assistance from the WTO and from friendly Member
States, and we expect to meet the deadline, which was extended
for a year. We also sought an extension in respect of the application
of minimum values, which is part of the annex to that agreement,
which allows countries to continue to value a limited number of
imports that they may have identified on the basis of minimum
values, and that was agreed to. We are still endeavouring to meet
the TRIPs legislative requirements, however.
316. Thank you. What do you think the major
impediments to the implementation of WTO agreements are; is it
cost, as suggested by the World Bank study, capacity, or other
factors? Shall I say that again. What are the major impediments
to the implementation of World Trade Organisation agreements;
the World Bank study suggested it is the cost of these WTO agreements,
or is it the capacity within the country, or do you think there
are any other factors?
(Mr Mannan) I can say that in my country a primary
difficulty, or a primary impediment, would be our capital city,
in terms of our people, who are in those areas of the Government
which deals with WTO matters. I am being frank with you, that
we do not have a very large pool, or a very large working pool,
of people who would know all the details of WTO matters, and,
at the same time, the Ministry of Commerce, which interfaces the
WTO, has, in turn, to co-ordinate with other Ministries of the
Government, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Law, and
those Ministries who are not in the immediate sort of arrangement
do not always react as quickly or as fast as the Ministry of Commerce
would have to in the situation in WTO. As a result, back in the
country, we do face an internal co-ordination problem, which adds
to the cost in terms of time, in terms of money, in terms of delays,
but it is improving and we think that, if we are given a longer
phase-in period in the new Round, another ten years, another seven
years, nine years, depending on various areas, probably we will
be able to make it on schedule. The schedule that we are on now,
we would probably speed up and do better in the future.
317. So you would say that lack of capacity
can be addressed by a longer phase-in schedule?
(Mr Mannan) Absolutely.
318. And have you had any assistance to help
you increase your capacity?
(Mr Mannan) Madam, in terms of technical assistance,
what is called technical assistance, a very large rubric of activities,
there is a tremendous unmet demand in my country. From WTO twice
a year there is a trade policy course of about two months, two
in English, I think, also one in French, where we do send in our
officers, but for lack of funds the number of officers that we
are able to send is far fewer than we would like to send. It is
a very valuable course, it is a very helpful course, but WTO does
not have the money, and therefore an item that is now currently
under discussion in WTO, raising its technical assistance capabilities,
and Mr Moore has been seeking ten million Swiss francs, and he
has not got the money as yet. We think this is one area where
the international community can give a lot of help, by helping
WTO to help us, in turn.
319. So cost, indirectly, is a problem, because
it prevents you from increasing your capacity, because you cannot
send people on these courses. Thank you very much.
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) Really, the word "implementation"
can mean many things to many people in Geneva, and, of course,
it means also that some people feel that if they implement it
becomes unfair because it is inherently the result of the negotiations;
they did not know enough about those new subjects, like TRIPs,
and they did not negotiate well, and they want to renegotiate,
but it is still under the rubric of implementation. If you are
talking about conformity, changing the legislation, just doing
what it takes to be legally in conformity with the texts of the
agreements, I think that it is not as major a problem as it might
appear, and, actually, for my country, it is not that big a problem
because we had some capacity; we need more capacity-building to
do it all, but it is not insurmountable. But if we address the
other part of the issue, which is do we want to look at some agreements
and see how do we assess them and whether they should be adjusted,
that is another story.
(Mr Smith) I suppose a point I would like to make,
on the question of the cost, because the cost, of course, is in
terms of the need for human resources, training, and so forth,
in terms of, in some cases, infrastructure, and all these costs
may not be exorbitant, in terms of infrastructure. Because of
the simple fact that budgets are under exceeding pressure, in
many of our countries, and these resources have to be diverted
to other areas, whether it is to set up an anti-dumping commission,
to house it, to equip it, sometimes these things can be problematic.
But, very important, I think it must also be borne in mind that,
insofar as we lag behind in putting in place both the human and
the physical infrastructure, therefore it creates the situation
in which it precludes us from defending our interests perhaps
as adequately as we might. For example, if one does not have a
functioning anti-dumping commission and modern legislation then
one finds it difficult to take anti-dumping action; if one does
not have in place safeguards legislation, modernised, and the
people who can handle it then one finds it difficult to take safeguards
action. So it links into real, concrete implications for the defence
of your interest in the organisation, and I would like to make
that point.
Ann Clwyd
320. Thank you. We heard from NGOs and academics
that they felt there ought to be a review of Special and Differential
Treatment. I know that you went to a conference in March where
this was discussed. How would you like to see Special and Differential
Treatment applied?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) I think that in the group of
developing countries there are some words that are usually used,
but I am not sure that they are thought through completely, in
terms of practicalities and what we want to see; of course, you
hear about modernisation of the S&D you need, about operationalisation,
making it more efficient, and I think that there is a problem
that we have to face, and that problem is the following. This
Special and Differential Treatment should get you the adjustments
that are needed to compete, because the liberal system, per
se, once you are equipped and you have the capacity, should
be good for you, you must do better then. So the problem is, should
we prolong S&D for such a long, long, long time that you never
get to that plateau where the majors are, the major league, and
you have to take that into account while thinking about the S&D
provisions. If it is the transition period, of course, you have
to take that into account; you have to take the capacity of the
country to implement those provisions and to get ready for the
liberalised system, and you have to tailor-make things and to
adjust S&D Treatment to the different categories of countries;
this is not geographical, it is based on practicalities, and you
have to get some like-minded countries on what are their problems
and try to adjust those S&D provisions to those countries.
That is the only way I can see it in the future. And I think that
seminar in WTO was very helpful on that account, because people
were able to voice their problems and see what kind of solutions
they need, and it is not really a case of one size fits all for
everything, because those blanket extensions, or blanket S&D
provisions, are not going to be provided any more. I can tell
you, from experience, I had the honour to chair the Committee
on Trade and Development of WTO in 1996, and, of course, the plan
of action for all the LDCs that was adopted in Singapore was negotiated
in the Committee. And, at the end of the day, as a Chair of that
Committee, which is also the Chair of the Sub-Committee on LDCs,
you wll find yourself meeting with all the developed countries,
with only one or two least-developed countries with you, Bangladesh
and maybe some others, but not all the rest of them, so you do
not know what are their interests. And I gather, from those who
attended the Uruguay Round, that at the end, when they wanted
to have an agreement, they just added something that was called
S&D at the last minute to say "Well, we'll take into
account the needs of the developing countries." Sometimes
we were able to make it effective and to make some mechanism out
of it, sometimes it was just politically sound to have that phrase
at the end of the text, or even the whole decision about that,
but we all knew that it would never be implemented. So now things
are going to be different, and this is the time to say that we
have to bear some responsibility, as developing countries, we
want to be more active, but we have to look into how do we get
those things that fit us better to equip ourselves to compete
in the liberalised WTO.
(Mr Mannan) Madam, these Special and Differential
Treatment provisions are widely available all across the Marrakesh
agreement, in every agreement there is an area where it speaks
for Special and Differential Treatment, and the WTO also may have
an impression that it is something which is a great blessing for
the developing countries, particularly the least-developed, but,
in fact, it is not. That is what the records say until now. S&DTs
have been, at best, honest, sort of the pious wishes, like you
say the road to hell is paved with good intentions; a lot of good
intentions are in this S&DT but none have been implemented
to the benefit of the developing countries, particularly to the
poorer ones. As a result, there is a lot of feeling that S&DT
provisions need to be revamped, they need to be reviewed, in the
new implementation process, and particularly for those countries
at the bottom of the scale, like ours, a new package of Special
and Differential measures which is implementable, which is meaningful,
which is not autonomous and which is binding, which can be brought
up in this dispute settlement mechanism if it is not followed.
That kind of a smaller package, but in fact a package, would be
necessary in the new Round, and we would be seeking that, although
Ambassador Touimi has said the environment has changed, it would
no longer be available; but we have a feeling, if it is made only
for those countries at the bottom of the scale, like ours, probably
there could be a saving to the whole community, but if it is meant
for the entire developing countries, a group of 80 or so, there
it may be difficult.
(Mr Smith) Call it what you wish, our view is that
multilateral trade rules must take into account the different
stages and levels of development of countries. We believe that
that, in fact, has been what has been the case, in terms of developed
countries, over many years, from the formation of the GATT itself,
through the treatment of agriculture, through the treatment of
textiles, and, indeed, even the focus on new issues and the knowledge
industry now has resulted in new areas of priority, and these
are being reflected in how the rules are now being structured.
So I think that there is no doubt about the fact that countries,
the levels of their development, have been taken into account,
and that should be the case for developing countries, through
technical assistance, through capacity-building, but through adjustment
in the legal rules to take account of the fact of their development,
and to provide sufficient time, to provide sufficient phase-in
of measures, to provide a pace that national economies can live
with. I think that that has been, to some extent, underplayed
in the fashioning of multilateral trade rules in the WTO in respect
of developing countries, and that is really the problem. Special
and Differential Treatment, call it that if you will, but that
is what we believe, this must reflect the different stages and
levels of development, and that can be done, so that we reach
the ultimate objective. But Jamaica can hardly entertain a pace
of liberalisation that is akin to that which a country with a
much stronger domestic infrastructure, in terms of enterprises,
size, in terms of efficiency and productivity, can entertain,
in much the same way that we are, quite frankly, unable to take
account of liberalised markets at the same pace that some other
countries can; it works on both sides, and this must be taken
into account.
Mr Khabra
321. My question is about capacity-building.
Many witnesses, including DFID, have stressed the importance of
capacity-building for developing countries, both in the implementation
of WTO agreements and in trade negotiations. What do you consider
are your priorities for improving your capacity to implement WTO
agreements and in any other areas; that is my first question?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) We, in Morocco, think that
we have really to make an effort to adjust to the new subjects
that are going to be negotiated in the WTO, and, for instance,
I give you one example, we are trying to enact competition laws
in our country, because we know that this is one of the frameworks
that you have to have in this kind of international situation
if you are going to be able to compete in a way that is fair to
you. So we are trying to get expertise in those areas that are
needed to tackle the new negotiations, new issues, which are not
really new but which are maybe going to be on the agenda of the
WTO. And, obviously, we want also to get some expertise on those
agreements that are already signed and ratified and for which
there are obviously no dispute settlements so far, because the
interest of those who might use the dispute settlement is not
there, because the fraction of what your trade represents for
those countries is not that important, so that there are so many
developing countries that have not really complied with the WTO
agreements but are not subjected to any pressure, because people
are not that interested, and sometime, I have to tell you that,
even themselves, they do not know whether they have complied or
not. So there is a great amount of capacity-building and technical
co-operation that has to be put in place if we are going to avoid
the marginalisation of many countries, and, frankly, you can include
mine, for instance, which would be an intermediate in the scale
of developing countries, because if we get to some new subjects,
we are unable to discuss, we are unable to give you any views
on that, because we do not have the capacity to do so. So capacity-building
is the only way that you are going to have a truly world trade
organisation and not some major countries deciding and the others
just following and being further marginalised as we go along.
(Mr Mannan) For capacity-building, of course, technical
assistance is one area we have tested, which we understand, which
has been in use for a number of decades now, and despite some
failures, on the whole, overall, technical assistance has been
useful, and it is something that the donors, developed countries,
understand, we in the field also understand. Therefore, my country
feels that this is one area, although not ideally the best one,
but really until now one of the best channels through which capacity-building
will work and take place. And there are three areas we think that
capacity-building can sort of target, in a country like Bangladesh.
Number one, obviously, will be personnel training, training of
the officers, training of the private sector people, training
of the other related bureaucrats who are in the job of sort of
reacting to WTO activities. And then there is another kind of
training we would need, in terms of institution-building, in terms
of setting up, improving our infrastructure in the offices, putting
up a computer, training in computer, linking us with the worldwide
web and sending us more information, linking us with the integrated
new globalised world. So that would be our second area. And another
area that we would also seek is technological, having advanced
technology, we lack that, we lack not only the training and personnel
to handle those but we lack the machinery itself also. So a good
technical assistance programme would be able to identify those
technologies which are appropriate for us, which we can use, supply
it to us and also train us in using it and maintaining it. So
these are the three areas we think that technical assistance can
help build capacity in our country, and the laws relating to capacity-building
in this globalised world.
(Mr Smith) I would perhaps identify three areas that
the needs are quite significant. One is in trade remedy laws,
which I have cited before. We need to train people to administer
the trade remedy laws, especially as tariffs go down and as the
economy becomes liberalised. We also need training in the area
of intellectual property, and, in fact, we are getting significant
levels of assistance from WIPO, in terms of training our persons.
And then a third area is on the question of technical standards,
SPS, TBT, which are areas that many countries, not only ours,
as developing countries, perhaps have neglected in the past, and
which we need to bring into conformity so as to facilitate our
external trade and also, as well, our own, the imports that come
into our countries. So I think that, in those three areas, those
areas are areas of high priority for Jamaica.
322. Thank you very much. My second question
is, to what extent do calls by NGOs and developed countries for
capacity-building mask the more fundamental issue that inequalities
in the global trading system are, to some extent, inevitable?
Putting aside capacity-building, in what other ways should the
interests of developing countries be protected?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) I really think that, of course,
it is inevitable that some countries will do better than others,
but, obviously, if, as a delegation, you make sure, that when
you start a negotiation like today, we are trying to embark on
a new Round, you choose the subjects and make sure that those
subjects that you want to put on the table of the negotiations
are those that you have assurances that you are going to derive
some benefit, if it is liberalised, if it is negotiated and liberalised,
and, of course, if you have the capacity to negotiate them and
to negotiate also the other subjects that are put by other members
of the WTO, you are going to end up with a package that is balanced,
where compromises are not going to hurt your country, and, of
course, you add to that the Special and Differential Treatment
that you have to have in those negotiations. That is part of your
strategy to make sure that, whatever is negotiated, you get some
measure that will take into account your level of development,
that you have the capacity to do so, and, of course, that you
introduce into the negotiations the subjects where you play on
your home turf, if I may say so. So those elements are going to
allow you, obviously, to fare well in those negotiations, and
to do well afterwards. But it is also important to do your homework,
and really I am one of those who believe that, no matter how much
you are going to get in terms of help, of technical assistance,
you have to do it yourself first; that is the idea of ownership
in the general theory of technical co-operation, you have to believe
yourself that you can do it, otherwise no amount of help is going
to get you there. So having the human resources is really number
one on the list, and those human resources have to be used and
utilised to have a delegation in Geneva; there is no way you are
going to have a good negotiating position if you are not, in Geneva,
present and active in the WTO, because there are so many things
happening there, there are so many programmes that you can get,
there is so much expertise out there in Geneva, whether it is
in the NGO community or the specialised agencies, that you can
benefit from and make your authorities benefit from, send people
over to discuss with them. And, of course, you have to have the
teams, and, as I was alluding to it when we started this discussion,
you need to have an assessment mechanism internally to define
what would be your position in the negotiations, which means that
you have to have some kind of mechanism where you talk to all
those who are interested, who benefit, or who would be hurt by
the subjects being negotiated, and bring some coherent negotiation,
then try to find people that have the same kind of profile and
working with them and work with the NGOs to negotiate that position
and to be active in that negotiation. I do not see anything really
too fancy, it has to be very practical and it has to start from
very sound actions taken by authorities, and this means that trade
has to be a priority, you cannot do otherwise, you have to take
it as a priority. And maybe here there is a problem. I have read
a lot about the Integrated Framework and how we go about it, and
this same Integrated Framework was launched during that same year
of 1996, basically by two countries, Canada and my own country,
at a high-level meeting, and the whole idea was to make sure that
trade is put also as one of the priorities with the other big
items that are covered by other institutions. In addition to WTO
I am thinking particularly about the World Bank and the IMF, or
any other of the six agencies to have WTO there and to have compatibility.
One of the keys to development is enterprises. An enterprise is
like a small engine that produces development, in fact sustainable
development, and if you have an enterprise that is thriving, that
is competing on the international market, that is doing well,
then you do not need to do anything more for that enterprise,
and if you have many of those small and medium-size enterprises
then you are going to be doing much better than others.
(Mr Mannan) This question of inequality. At a pragmatic
level, we are practical, we realise there will be inequality,
at the end of the day, there will be always; but what we do not
want to live comfortably with is the question of marginalisation,
the question of impoverishment through systemic transfers, through
unfair trading system; that has to be addressed. And that subject
you have alluded to, that you and others are saying can be addressed
through capacity-building, probably will not do, because capacity-building,
or technical assistance conveys my capacity to talk better, or
know better, but to undo the systemic unfairness which effectively
transfers wealth from country to country, which effectively binds
some people permanently in a poverty trap; that has to be addressed.
And that can be addressed only through a fair, predictable balance
to WTO, where rules are applied, where rules are enforced, and
where rules are clear and where rules are equal; that is the ideal
that we are all working towards.
(Mr Smith) I think, if I understand the question properly,
it is a very important question for my country, because it gets
to a point that I think we wish to emphasise. Often, when Special
and Differential Treatment is raised, the response is, technical
assistance, capacity-building, that is a response, and one would
not gainsay that is a legitimate response. But the question of
the structure of world trade we all know, the Quad countries account
for about 40 per cent of world trade. I had occasion to point
out that for 54 ACP countries, they account for 1.1 per cent of
world trade. World trade is inherently iniquitous, and insofar
as that iniquitous nature carries over into the structure of rules
it will pose a problem; therefore, we need to look not only at
capacity-building, we need to ensure that the rules take into
account the interests of developing countries, particularly taking
into account as well the structure of world trade which we know
to be iniquitous, or iniquitous is not perhaps a correct word
in this sense because countries cannot be faulted for their success
as world traders, but the structure of world trade is not one
that is egalitarian, I might say.
323. Can I ask you one final question. It appears
that you have some difference of opinion based on the experience
of your own country, and is it not necessary that you reach a
broader agreement between the developing countries, to negotiate
with the developed countries better trade terms?
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) From experience, it is always
better, and I will tell you about another setting, which is UNCTAD.
UNCTAD 10 was negotiated basically by the group of developing
countries called the G77, with the European Union, the US and
two or three others, and all the group of G77 had the same position
on most of the issues, and even on WTO issues, as far as we can
have common positions. As I said, it has to stay to a certain
level; and, of course, we have to remember that UNCTAD is not
a negotiating forum, binding. But, in the WTO setting, it is a
good premise to have some common positions on some principled
questions, but when you get to the practicalities you have to
fend for your own country, because you have different profiles
from your neighbour. Of course, you try not to hurt or try to
have some solidarity, which is quite necessary if we are going
to have a multilateral trading system that is equitable, that
is fair; some solidarity is necessary from the stronger towards
the weaker. And I regret that one of the elements of the failure
of Seattle is really that, people were not giving an inch on anything.
Now sometimes in that Green Room, on that particular Friday, we
had stopped discussion on agriculture, without any agreement,
then we moved to industrial tariffs, and we had a consensus minus
one, and, of course, on an issue that everybody knew about for
20 years, which is tariff peak and escalations. And it was only
one delegation, and that delegation, as you mentioned, had some
constituency out there that they could not go out and tell that
they have to make some compromise maybe to give a chance, at that
eleventh hour, which was 3 pm, or 4 pm, in the afternoon, on Friday,
and knowing that we could not go over into the weekend and stay;
but even at that time nobody did that, which meant to me that
really we were not ready to launch anything. And, actually, can
I say, you know, for these five working groups that were established,
many, many Ministers did not want to take the chairmanship of
those, and you know why, because everybody knew that our chance
of launching anything from Seattle was dim, was really not there.
Ann Clwyd
324. Thank you very much indeed for coming here
from Geneva to share your thoughts and concerns and your hope
for the future with us this morning. I am sure it will help us
when we write our report.
(Mr Benjelloun-Touimi) It was a great pleasure; thank
you.
Ann Clwyd: Thank you very much, the three
of you.
1 See evidence pp. 143-5. Back
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