Select Committee on International Development Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 5

Memorandum submitted by the World Development Movement (WDM)

  Decisions taken at the World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings last month present us with an exciting opportunity. At the meetings the IMF agreed that poverty reduction should be an objective of all its lending to the poorest countries. With Gordon Brown as the recently appointed Chair of the IMF's Interim Committee, the UK have a key role in ensuring that the opportunities offered by this commitment are realised. As the UK's representative, the Executive Director has an important function in helping the Fund to move away from its traditional approach, and in finding new solutions to the challenge of poverty reduction to which the IMF have now committed themselves.

  As a founder member of the Jubilee 2000 coalition, debt relief is an issue of fundamental importance to WDM members, and one of which we have campaigned for more than 15 years. We welcome the progress made at the annual meetings in securing funding to provide wider, faster and deeper debt relief to some of the world's most impoverished nations under the so called "enhanced" Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). However, of more fundamental importance was the central role given in the annual meeting discussions of how to ensure that debt relief delivers poverty reduction.

LINKING DEBT RELIEF TO POVERTY REDUCTION

  WDM believe that it is not just debt repayments themselves that are undermining poor countries' attempts to secure poverty reduction, and are deeply concerned that the conditions attached to debt relief have been at least as problematic as the drain on resources from the repayment of debts.

  The granting of debt relief is conditional on countries first implementing stringent economic conditions known as structural adjustment policies (SAPs). These policies, designed by the IMF, have a poor track rcord on poverty reduction. For many years NGOs and leading commentators from both North and South have argued that IMF structural adjustment policies, designed by the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), should be judged against the objective of poverty reduction. The IMF has remained intransigent, arguing that its job is macroeconomic stability, and that poverty is the prerogative of the World Bank.

POVERTY REDUCTION MADE A CORE OBJECTIVE FOR THE IMF AT THE RECENT ANNUAL MEETINGS

  The IMF's commitment at the annual meetings to make poverty reduction a central objective of their lending to poor countries was therefore a surprisingly welcome sign of progress. While arguing that the Fund had always considered social dimensions, IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus acknowledged that: "the voices of the poor around the world are telling us in no uncertain terms that this is not enough. The time has come for a new and more decisive start."

  In recognition of the IMF's apparent shift in focus, a change in name of ESAF to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) was announced at the annual meetings. However, the potentially more substantive changes are to be found in a paper prepared jointly by World Bank and IMF staff as part of the review of HIPC on the link between poverty reduction and debt relief in advance of the annual meetings. The paper proposed that countries should design their own Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) which, once approved by the World Bank and IMF, should become the basis for all lending including structural adjustment programmes.

  The paper makes three important points:

    —  Poverty reduction should now be a key objective for Fund lending to low income countries.

    —  Borrower countries should have more ownership over their reform programmes. A poverty reduction strategy should be developed by governments with the participation of civil society. The resultant Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) should then be approved by the Fund and Bank and should form the framework for their future lending.

    —  The Bank and Fund should work more closely together.

  This marks a potentially significant change from the previous position of the IMF. The Board, the Interim Committee, and the UK in particular, will have a major role to play both in holding the IMF to its commitment and in helping the institution learn how to put it into practice.

PUTTING THE POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPERS INTO PRACTICE

  This is a major challenge. The potential shift in policies is very welcome. But the difficulty the institution will have in making the real necessary changes should not be underestimated. While there appears to be a genuine commitment from some IMF staff to the Fund's new rhetoric, it is unclear whether the Fund will ultimately be prepared to adapt its core economic policies in the light of its new objective of poverty reduction.

  The IMF will need to adapt in two areas: Ownership and Economic analysis. First, the Fund will need to educate itself on the implications of government "ownership" of its programmes and, in particular, of the complexity of ensuring civil society participation. Second, while the Fund has stated that governments should have more ownership of economic reforms, it is clear that the Fund still expects to retain the right to judge whether government plans are "sound". This will require some changes in economic analysis to accord with the new objective of poverty reduction.

OWNERSHIP

  It is a step forward for the IMF to recognise that governments need to own their own economic programmes, not least because they simply will not implement them otherwise. It is an even greater step forward for the IMF to recognise that civil society should also participate in their design.

  It is, however, unclear what will happen in the event of a potential conflict between debtor country government priorities as set out in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and IMF core economic policies. The evidence at this stage is mixed. Leading IMF staff still speak of immutable "economic laws"—suggesting that there will in fact be little flexibility when it comes to allowing governments to design their own strategies. There is a real danger that the Fund will welcome nationally-owned plans for poverty reduction, and then explain, regrettably, that they are unworkable and continue with "business as usual". Guidelines are apparently to be prepared outlining the framework for an acceptable PRSP. The balance between those areas of policy which are open for debate and those which are fixed will be key.

  We welcome the IMF's focus on civil society participation. However, for civil society to be prepared to participate in formulating their PSRP there must be a genuine guarantee that their input and the resulting paper is taken seriously. If the Fund is serious about securing a truly participatory approach, it is crucial that civil society recognises the process as being one of integrity, rather than simply a way for the IMF to legitimise the imposition of the same old-style adjustment reforms by paying lip-service to the inclusion of civil society's views. This takes substantial time, expertise and resources.

  Key questions will be:

    —  What happens when the government's proposals conflict with traditionally held IMF beliefs?

    —  How will the Fund adapt its procedures to accommodate civil society participation?

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

  Hither to, it has been the role of the IMF to advise countries on how to maximise economic growth. They now have a new role, that of advising countries on how to achieve poverty reduction. While there is little doubt that growth is key for the poorest countries, the type of growth is also crucial.

  The fear is that the IMF may simply continue to pursue rapid economic growth, while arguing more firmly that this will lead to poverty reduction through the process of "trickle down". The challenge is for Fund staff to listen to economists outside the institution about the benefits of high quality growth, where jobs and investment in people are given as much priority as inflation rates. There is a growing body of analysis on pro-poor growth, not least within the United Nations family, which the IMF has so far remained distant from.

  This new objective also presents new challenges of evaluation. Assessments so far have been against the objective of economic growth. New evaluation will have to take place against the objective of poverty reduction.

  Learning can take place as a process. Lessons from the first PRSPs can be incorporated into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) lending for other countries rather than having to wait until all PRSPs are concluded.

  A new relationship will also have to be developed between the World Bank and IMF. The IMF is not, and does not claim to be, an expert in poverty reduction. It will need to rely heavily on the World Bank for expertise. It is not clear how this new relationship will develop and whether there will be any compunction on IMF staff to adjust programmes in accordance with World Bank advice.

  Key questions will be:

    —  How will the IMF develop indicators to enable them to assess the impact of their programmes on poverty reduction?

    —  What changes in macro-economic and sectoral analysis are perceived necessary in order to meet this new mandate?

TIMING OF DEBT RELIEF

  Amongst these new opportunities is one danger. It is critical that the new requirement for countries to set out their poverty reduction plans in PRSPs must not simply add another layer of conditionality onto poor countries, and does not in any way delay the provision of urgently needed debt relief.

  WDM welcome the proposal that nationally-owned poverty reduction plans, formulated through consultation with civil-society, should form the basis of IMF lending. However, we are concerned that true participation will need time and resources. Many HIPC countries awaiting debt relief have neither, and there may be a conflict here with the IMF's need for quick results.

  We seek clarification as to the requirements on HIPC countries with regards drawing up their national PRSPs as they approach their decision and completion points. We seek reassurance that in no case will the provision of debt relief under HIPC be delayed by the IMF's new proposals for linking debt relief more closely to poverty reduction.

World Development Movement

October 1999


 
previous page contents

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries

© Parliamentary copyright 2000
Prepared 7 March 2000