Examination of witnesses (Questions 140
- 159)
TUESDAY 14 MARCH 2000
THE RT
HON GEOFFREY
HOON, AIR
COMMODORE PAUL
LUKER and MR
ROGER PAXTON
140. Can I say that you do not need heavy lift
aircraft to drop some dinghies and some basic lifebuoys and floats
and so on to those people.
(Mr Hoon) I agree with you entirely.
141. So was that not considered at all?
(Mr Hoon) On the Monday morning I have indicated that
the Department identified three options. One of those options
was in fact a team of Marines with inflatable dinghies, with hovercraft
that could have been deployed if those with the policy lead judged
it appropriate. But it is important in this situation, as is beginning
to be clear in Mozambique, that there is a degree of co-ordination.
It would not be right for any one government department to simply
act on its own initiative where another government department
had the policy responsibility and, again, I am sure this Committee
would have been critical if we had simply decided without any
reference to the Secretary of State for International Development
at all that we were going to do our own thing irrespective of
what she judged to be right and proper in the circumstances.
Chairman: Then I think we would have
had a row. Andrew Robathan?
Mr Robathan
142. Looking to the future in terms of heavy
lift, how many Pumas could one get into the FLA should we buy
it—the Future Large Aircraft—now called the A400?
(Mr Hoon) It is a slightly separate debate but I am
perfectly willing to enter into it.
143. One, two, four, nil?
(Mr Hoon) The answer is that it does depend on how
much you strip them down. We could have flown a C130 aircraft
with a stripped down Puma inside but the problem with that if
you strip them down is you then have to put them back together
again. That takes seven to eight days with favourable equipment
on site in the region and we simply judged in the planning that
that would not have been much use to anyone both in terms of the
delay that it would take to get them into service and into operation
together with the fact that we could not absolutely guarantee
when we got to northern South Africa or Mozambique that there
were going to be the facilities to put them back together again.
So these things do depend. One of the advantages of the Antonov
undoubtedly is that with modest change in the equipment, although
it still requires some change, you can get four of them into a
commercially available aircraft.
144. Right so the future is not looking good
if we buy the future large aircraft?
(Mr Hoon) I did not say that at all.
Chairman
145. The point being in this matter, Secretary
of State, that if we are to have a rapid reaction force in humanitarian
situations we have got to be able to have a method of getting
the equipment and the personnel necessary to the crisis point,
the emergency point, quickly and economically. That seems to me
where the co-ordination between your Department and the Department
for International Development needs to take place.
(Mr Hoon) That is absolutely right. Let me make it
clear that there are overriding defence requirements over and
above the humanitarian concerns—
146. Yes.
(Mr Hoon)—which mean also that we require this
heavy lift capacity. If I simply mention the fact that one C17,
which is the modern US aircraft that many governments would like
to purchase, costs in the order of 200 million dollars—one
of them—you will see the difficultly which successive governments
have faced in trying to buy sufficient number to make a difference.
We would all like to be able to have a fleet of heavy lift aircraft
available, the last Government would have done, this Government
would have done, but they come with a very expensive price tag.
147. Yes, well what we are suggesting is a reordering
of your priorities.
(Mr Hoon) It is one of our priorities, let me make
it clear.
Chairman: Right.
Mr Worthington
148. The point is that more and more of your
work in defence is multi-national and is peacekeeping, it is not
war.
(Mr Hoon) Yes.
149. What puzzles me about this is that we have
all the resources of NATO and yet we are responding on a single
nation basis where there will be within NATO, I assume, C17s,
or something equivalent, that ought to be made available in a
situation like this, surely?
(Mr Hoon) I did ask the question, since I am somewhat
preoccupied with heavy lift these days, and it is one of our priorities,
whether there were any C17s available and unfortunately on that
day there were not. The C17s, the ones which are deployed at the
moment are American owned and operated aircraft. I believe that
the Americans did use C17s eventually to fly in some equipment.
There is a degree of co-ordination but that co-ordination inevitably
between countries does take time. There is not a standing force
available anywhere in the world and we would have to have discussions
as to where that might be to be able to respond to, say, a crisis
one month in, say, Honduras where you might want to locate one
standing force as opposed to Sub-Saharan Africa as opposed to
Southern Africa. Where would you make such equipment available?
I think it is an extraordinarily difficult question, it is a question
we face militarily in terms of where do you locate a rapid reaction
force because whilst those people are waiting for the crisis to
arise, frankly they are not doing a great deal. They would not
be doing a great deal in humanitarian terms as opposed to defence
terms, you have got to have people training, exercising, you want
to use them. They want to do things. You cannot expect them to
be sitting around waiting for a crisis which means that they have
to be somewhere. What you then have to do is to have the planning
that allows you to say, for example in this context, "These
people should have been on a NATO training exercise in Norway,
we held them back, we did not allow them to go because we anticipated
that there might be a need for them to go to Mozambique. They
actually waited for a couple of days, not doing a great deal,
before the decision then was taken to allow them to go to Mozambique".
That seems to me to be a sensible way in which we plan these things.
Ann Clwyd
150. Four of us were in Mozambique in the period
20 to 24 February. It was already very clear to us that—and
we were lay people but it was extremely clear to us—there
was already an emergency, that they did not have enough helicopters
to fly at that time food relief to the people who had already
been affected by the flooding. Now, looking at the diary of events,
it seems to me extraordinary that there was not joined up thinking
between government departments during that period, or even before
that. You were not contacted until 26 February.
(Mr Hoon) Yes.
151. Now if the helicopters had been asked for
on 26 February, when would they have got there?
(Mr Hoon) I do not know whether I can easily answer
the question because on 26 February it was two o'clock on a Saturday
afternoon and, to be fair, I doubt that the kind of planning people
were necessarily available. I am sure we would have made them
available if a specific request had been received and people would
then have looked at it. One of the key factors we faced—I
am afraid it is back to heavy lift—is the availability of
one of these Antonov aircraft. Even by Monday, when we were planning
this, my recollection is—although you may be able to confirm
this—that an Antonov was not going to be available I think
until Thursday. Because we are chartering these aircraft commercially
it does depend on when one is available. The reason I cannot properly
answer your question is I do not know whether if on Saturday we
had asked for one, one might have been available on Monday but
I cannot honestly answer that question.
152. I have been in disaster situations many
times over the last 15 years and every time I have seen when the
military got there some order was put into the situation. I think
the most recent time we saw it was in Macedonia and Albania and
the military got to grips with the situation very quickly. I have
always believed the UK forces should have an immediate role in
emergency disaster relief and I wonder if you agree with that
because it has been put forward by defence analysts such as Paul
Beaver, he was asking that should happen. What is your own view
as Secretary of State on that?
(Mr Hoon) Could I say certainly that I think there
is a perception in the country that where there is a crisis of
this kind that they want to see British forces and British equipment
used if at all possible. That sometimes is reinforced by speculation
in the media as to what should and should not be done. I think
it is only right to say, consistent with what I said earlier on,
that when the cost of that is considerably more than the cost
say of hiring a helicopter locally, in this case say in South
Africa, that is a factor that inevitably has to be take into account
by the Department that is responsible. As I said earlier, if by
Tuesday or Wednesday of that week the water was receding and there
was less need for—Bernie has gone—saving people from
trees then it might well have been that the Department for International
Development would have said "Frankly we no longer need the
helicopters to perform that particular function, we might look
elsewhere". It was the combination of factors and the fact,
as you say, that the crisis was getting worse that then justified
what is still a very large amount of money to fly four helicopters
down to Southern Africa. I do not think I can give you a prescriptive
answer to that question, it is always going to depend on the circumstances
but I do recognise that there is a great deal of public feeling
that when the country responds in the way that it has at the individual
level, they also want to see the country responding through the
use of its military personnel and its military assets. Certainly
I would want to play my part and certainly the Ministry of Defence
would play its part in that process but without unduly occurring
expenditure that would otherwise be unnecessary.
153. Paul Beaver in his memorandum to us made
a few interesting points which I think you have seen. He said
that he thought there had been a delay and that the UK could provide
three immediate sources of aid. He talked about men and equipment
from the Royal Marines.
(Mr Hoon) That was the second option, that was the
option of a marine contingent.
154. Because they have craft which are ideal
for work on floodwater. Then he mentioned personnel and equipment
of the UK Joint Helicopter Command. Then he talked about HMS Illustrious
air group. Now if you had been asked, would you have pitched those
resources into the crisis?
(Mr Hoon) There is not a great deal of difference
between us in the sense that the three options that I set out
that were worked on on the Monday were in effect not quite the
three options you have described but they were pretty near to
it. Four Puma helicopters, a Marine contingent with boats and
potentially hovercraft, plus instead of HMS Illustrious an auxiliary
vessel which is the Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel Fort George which
I judged was appropriate rather than perhaps an aircraft carrier
for two reasons. Partly it is capable and is carrying five Sea
King helicopters, so we get the benefit of the aircraft, plus
it is a supply ship and it carries fuel, fresh water, it stopped
off actually to pick up medicines on the way to Southern Africa.
Normally when we are dealing with crises of this kind we are—if
I can use this phrase—behind the curve, we are always reacting
to events that are unfolding and, frankly, I suspect that most
people would say we are reacting too slowly. My judgment in the
course of that week as far as the auxiliary vessel was concerned,
was that we were going to face different sorts of problems once
the water started to recede, particularly problems with disease
and malnutrition. It did seem to me that although it was going
to take, and I was quoted initially nine days for it to get it
there, that at least was a useful piece of equipment once the
water started to go down and we faced different kinds of problems.
In addition to the fresh water and the fuel and the helicopters
it has also a six bed medical bay on board and two medical staff.
There was an opportunity there, it seemed to me, perhaps to get
ahead of the curve in terms of trying to provide equipment that
would address the problems we were likely to face in Mozambique
once the water started to go down.
155. In fact you are saying that if you had
been asked earlier you might have been able to provide those things.
I think people who saw the television pictures will have said
"Well the help came too late". If you were in charge
of a rapid reaction force you could make that decision on your
own much earlier presumably on the basis of what people were telling
you about the weather, about the needs and so on.
(Mr Hoon) The request came on the Saturday, we began
our planning on the Monday morning and the three options were
identified in the course of Monday as options that we judged might
make a difference and might help. As I understand it, the specific
reason for the request on the Saturday was the surge of water
that made the situation still worse on the Saturday. Certainly
those three options I am sure have proved, certainly in two of
the three that have been deployed, to have made a difference and
to have been useful.
156. The Fort George and the five Sea King helicopters
were to arrive in Mozambique on 9 March. Clare Short told us that
there are now 50 helicopters in Mozambique as a result of the
international community's belated response, some are now being
withdrawn as unnecessary. Do the Sea Kings now really have a useful
job to do or are they already too late?
(Mr Hoon) Again I think Bernie, before he left, made
a reference to picking people out of trees and a great deal of
the initial publicity and concern, understandably, was people
who were waiting to be rescued from precarious and dangerous positions.
The priority rightly was to get helicopters in to do that work.
It is difficult to imagine any other vehicle doing that as successfully.
What has changed is obviously the kind of work that the helicopters
are now doing. There is not the same necessity for search and
rescue as there might have been very early on in the particular
phase of the crisis but certainly helicopters are now providing
a very useful function of carrying food, medical supplies, carrying
people, we have carried quite a lot of people from one part of
the country to another in order to make sure they have access
to food and medicines. So there is still a great deal that helicopters
can do. You have seen it, and I have not, but it does seem to
me that a helicopter is a particularly helpful vehicle given the
circumstances on the ground and given what needs to be done.
Chairman: Oona King?
Ms King
157. Thank you, Secretary of State. I recognise
the fluidity of the situation that you were describing but on
the premise that any situation can always be managed better and
there can be improvements, and given your experience of that week,
is there any improvement in the way that yourself and the Department
for International Development used to deal with such disasters,
so that when one occurs next week or next year British military
personnel will be there more quickly?
(Mr Hoon) One of the great benefits to me of having
available such a large group of talented military minds is that
they always try and learn lessons from the activities that we
engage upon and that process will certainly be undertaken once
the deployment has been completed and we are able to analyse what
has occurred. Given the information I have to date, the two areas
of concern understandably both for the public and for this Committee,
I am sure, are the question of the time taken to respond and the
question of whether discussions about the cost had an impact on
that and I have looked very carefully at that and I can assure
the Committee that there was absolutely no delay caused by any
discussion about cost. I hope I have satisfied the Chairman at
least that it is absolutely crucial that some indication of cost
is given to a department in order that it can make the appropriate
policy judgment as to whether in the circumstance that is necessary.
But as to the wider lessons, we will certainly be examining very
carefully these factors. Some of these lessons we know. Tony has
made the point repeatedly, rightly, about heavy lift. That is
something you would not need to remind Secretaries of State for
Defence about because it appears clearly in the Strategic Defence
Review. It is a problem which not only the United Kingdom faces
but also our European allies and partners and it is something
that we are seeking to address. I have given the Committee some
indication of the essential problem. I would be delighted to take
delivery of a large number of heavy lift aircraft; unfortunately,
someone has to pay for them.
Mr Worthington
158. Is this part of what you are trying to
solve with your European defence co-operation, particularly with
the French that you are planning a response that will be better
in the future?
(Mr Hoon) Certainly the most recent agreement that
I was able to sign in November with my French counterpart is concerned
with logistical support. In every day language what that means
is assisting each other with transport, with equipment, with sharing
the assets that we have available, but for the moment unfortunately
we are not sharing very much because the problem is a common one.
Andrew made reference to a future large aircraft and, not surprisingly,
the reason why the future large aircraft project is a joint European
project is because there are lots of Europeans that have very
similar problems to the ones that we have.
159. Could you send us the formula[7]
which has now been worked out with regard to DFID. As I understood
it, you are not charging for salaries, you are charging what I
would call marginal costs. Is that right?
(Mr Hoon) That is correct.
7 See Evidence p. 36. Back
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