Examination of witnesses (Questions 220
- 239)
THURSDAY 23 MARCH 2000
ROSS MOUNTAIN,
KATARINATOLL-VELASQUEZ
and GILBERT GREENALL
220. Sorry, what date was that? You said from
the day of your arrival.
(Katarina Toll-Velasquez) We arrived on the 12th and
we started reporting back our impressions on Sunday evening so
that was the 13th and then we had daily reports going back both
in written form and in the form of teleconferences. Of course
that information was taken and processed, issued in the form of
situation reports which OCHA Geneva makes available to the donor
communities and to all the humanitarian agencies. It also posts
these reports on Reliefweb. In addition OCHA has the Integrated
Regional Information Network in Africa (IRIN) which is an OCHA-managed
humanitarian information network with professional information,
staff based in three different locations in Africa, reporting
through a free e-mail subscription service and also these reports
are posted on Reliefweb. They report on a daily basis and we were
in contact with them. We were calling them, they were calling
us from their base in Johannesburg. I was looking at that over
the past few days and they sent out reports practically on a daily
basis from when we arrived.
221. So from what date would the United Kingdom,
for example, have known that you needed helicopters?
(Ross Mountain) I am not sure we have a particular
date on that but there was one signal of the need for helicopters
but in the dynamics of the situation, as Gilbert has suggested,
we arrived and the waters were declining steadily for two weeks
so it becomes less apparent, even when you are on the scene—including
by the donors who do not have money growing out of their pockets,
we need to find the funds—that this was a life-threatening
situation. The rescues had been made and the helicopters had been
used for that. It was a "it would be nice to have additional
air assets but by the time they are launched will they really
be needed?" kind of attitude. It is perhaps difficult to
see how this comes about at this distance but the way the dynamic
worked on the ground, as I mentioned, on the 23rd and 24th all
was under control, the skies were blue, the weather reports from
the neighbouring countries were not bad. If there was going to
be some rain presumably this was manageable within the structures
that had been established and in terms of the degree to which
the river had fallen, if it went back up a little bit, it would
not be a major catastrophe because the people had been evacuated
previously. Clearly something different happened, an unprecedented
flood. We are determined to see how one can indeed promote regional
co-ordination and work with those who should have been able to
give us more scientific advice. I am sorry, the facts are at the
moment that really was not available.
222. Scientific advice?
(Ross Mountain) The scientific basis for judging that
the little bit more rain that was going to happen next door would
provoke the floods of this nature which, as we have mentioned,
was nearly 1.5 metres in 24 hours. That did not immediately come
out of the sky in a 24-hour period. All of a sudden that came
down river. So the dynamics of the rivers, the supersaturation
of the soil must have played some role in that. We are most certainly
planning to see what lessens we can learn.
223. Can I just ask whether you were worried
at the time about using the predictions that you had, the data
that you were being supplied with? Were you conscious of the paucity
of the information that you are talking about now?
(Ross Mountain) Gilbert, I think you went on a recce
so perhaps you would like to speak on it.
(Gilbert Greenall) On the previous week I did an area
recce of the entire two provinces of Southern Mozambique and saw
the extent that the water had fallen with the United States Ambassador
and USAID team and it was a very significant drop in all the rivers
in those two provinces. We did expect crests but nobody expected
them of this magnitude. That was the difference. We were prepared
for new crests and we were suspicious of the weather and hydrological
data but it was the scale of it that was the real problem.
224. So when the Secretary of State told us
last week when she was giving evidence to the Committee that she
was getting confusing reports from the area, I do not know whether
they were from you or from somebody else, was she right? Were
the reports confused because it was a confused situation?
(Gilbert Greenall) She may have been referring to
the fact that the weather reports were very variable, one was
saying one thing, one another. I do not know. I have not seen
the reports but that may be an explanation.
225. Even so given that the flood waters did
go down over a couple of days you said, Katarina, on 12th February
you were anticipating a need for helicopters. Did it go any further
than anticipation? Were they actually lined up in case the waters
rose?
(Ross Mountain) We did actually mobilise the South
African helicopters.
226. On that date?
(Ross Mountain) The South African helicopters ran
out of resources to keep going and funds were raised locally first
of all in Maputo from two donors.
(Gilbert Greenall) I initiated that and when I spoke
to you at the time I was busy trying to mobilise resources for
those helicopters and it was not easy with the international donors
at that time because they saw the same picture as everybody else,
the waters falling and talk in Xai-Xai that one or two of the
roads would be re-opened down to Maputo.
227. I remember the conversation with you and
you were concerned about how you were going to fund the helicopters
for the following week. The funding was coming to an end on the
Tuesday of the following week.
(Gilbert Greenall) That is right.
228. Because the waters had gone down again
and you were not anticipating them to rise were the donors showing
no interest in pledging the money?
(Gilbert Greenall) The Mozambique Government was managing
the logistics at the time and the donors were worried about the
capacity of the Government to handle these very expensive assets
if the numbers were increased. In fact, there was an intervention
and the Mozambique logistics management was supported after that
by the WFP and it was changed but at that time there was concern
by the donors about this constraint.
229. So did you approach the United Kingdom
at that time in the period up to the 25th?
(Gilbert Greenall) The subject was broached at donors'
meetings in Maputo.
230. Right, so the United Kingdom would have
been aware?
(Gilbert Greenall) Yes, they would have been aware.
231. Could you tell me a bit about how your
UNDAC team liaised with the Government of Mozambique National
Institute of Disaster Management? Was there effective communication
and requests from the Government of Mozambique?
(Gilbert Greenall) Could you say the question again.
232. I wondered how you liaised with the department
of the Government of Mozambique responsible for disaster management.
(Ross Mountain) Can I just note that what we did in
fact even from the first team is at the suggestion and proposal
of the resident co-ordinater who we sent our people down to support,
that team went into the very offices of the INGC and with them
created this disaster co-ordination centre to ensure that the
information was shared and coming together, including from the
sectors, and that was not an automatic process, but that was the
way it worked and I think it would be fair to say that that became
much stronger as events developed particularly after the floods
on the 26th and 27th and in particular when the Foreign Minister
took personal charge of the management of the arrangements in
the light of that major disaster.
233. What was the division of responsibility
between OCHA and the Government of Mozambique in co-ordinating
and organising the humanitarian response?
(Ross Mountain) We see our role as supporting the
Government to do that. If they therefore in INGC felt that they
did not have sufficient line people themselves to handle it then
my colleagues went in and said, "We see ourselves supporting
you. We will help you reach out and strengthen and support the
central groups, the linkage with NGOs, the resources mobilisation
through putting together the appeals and so on." So it was
an interactive process where our role was to support them and
provide them with the basis of making decisions.
234. This is pure hearsay but in the week we
were there we were told there had been a row between OCHA and
the Government of Mozambique. I do not know whether there was
or was not.
(Katarina Toll-Velasquez) Can I answer this. During
the second week of the mission of the first UNDAC team we were
supporting the Government in preparing an international appeal
and in particular we as the UNDAC team were concerned to help
the UN in-country team define their requirements together with
the different line ministries and the rest of the aid community
so that the UN could come out and say as part of the global requirement
of the Government to respond to this emergency the United Nations
will have programmes for whatever amount it was they ended up
appealing for 13.6 million. This is the UN agencies. And so I
think the discussion we had with the Government was whether the
UN could appeal itself for the full amount the Government required.
It was really a semantic distinction in the sense that the appeal
was really the Government's appeal and out of that there was a
small amount that was appealed for by the United Nations to carry
on with their programmes and that is exactly the way it was presented
on 23rd February when the Government launched the international
appeal for a total amount of $65 million to cover both emergency
activities and sectors such as food, non-food, shelter, water,
sanitation, etcetera, but also that amount of the $65 million
included requirements such as emergency repairs of infrastructure
which at that time they were hoping to be able to get on with
quite quickly but that was not an area where the UN had the capacity
to appeal for itself. When we launched together the international
appeal for assistance on 23rd February the Government appealed
for the total amount of $65 million and the United Nations was
there to say that out of that amount 13.6 million was what the
UN had capacity to undertake in terms of emergency programmes—
(Ross Mountain) I think it would be over-stating it
to say there was a row, it was a working out of the procedures.
235. Clare Short, the Secretary of State, criticised
UNDAC for leaving Mozambique on 24th February which was in her
view too early and she said she regretted that fact. Why did the
team pull out on 24th February and should you have known that
it was too early to leave? Why were there three teams employed
over the whole crisis period? Why was it not a continuous arrangement?
(Ross Mountain) First of all, I think it is important
to go back to what was known, as we have been discussing now,
on the eve of the floods. The projection, the understanding, the
prediction, the verification and at that stage after water had
been flowing for two weeks with a co-ordination mechanism in place
the threat to life had passed, the appeal had gone out, the situation
had stabilised, road access in most areas had improved. As we
have heard, the expected cyclone Eline had passed through during
that week and had not had the effect that one had expected. It
was seen at that stage that the need for an outside emergency
team was at an end. The UNDAC team comes in for a very limited
period of time in order to help the in-country team, and in this
case also the Government, to deal with a spike in the normal life
that cannot be dealt with by the UN working together with the
Government. That was the background of the situation when it left
and indeed it left with the goodwill and wishes of not only the
country team but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and so on. As
we have discussed, unprecedented events of that weekend occurred
and therefore of course we would wish that we had the insight
and the scientific knowledge to know, contrary to all evidence,
that this was going to happen but that was not the situation,
so it is on that basis the team left. I would point out that as
soon as we heard that this had happened we turned around and were
back within 48 hours, including three of the same people who were
on that team, and with additional resources I might add from DFID,
who provided two people in support again as they had in the first
round, separate from the UNDAC team but being supportive. I am
afraid those are the facts of the case. Katarina, is there anything
you particularly wanted to say?
236. Can I ask who actually takes the decision
to withdraw a team from an area in which it has been working?
(Ross Mountain) First of all, the teams are fielded
for a limited period of time and they on the ground discuss with
those with whom they work and come back to us indicating whether
or not they feel it is appropriate for them to leave at that time.
Chairman
237. Can I just ask, in this period of the first
UNDAC's team presence from 12th of February, in your team were
people under contract for a certain length of time? Did that determine
the period which you would spend in Mozambique?
(Ross Mountain) That comes back to the basis of the
UNDAC team. As I tried to explain earlier, most of the members
of our teams are made available short term by governments that
we collaborate with, including in this case the British Government,
the Zambian Government, the Austrians and so on. Normally this
is for a two or three-week period. It can be extended exceptionally
but it is not a question of contract. In fact, these people generally
get a UN pass, a UN certificate on the basis of a dollar a year
contract. He is not going to get rich on that. Maybe his medical
practice! They are short-term interventions which I think is the
question you are asking, and they did not leave because their
contract was up and we were not going to extend them. They are
foreseen on those terms and it was the situation on the ground
at that stage that determined that from all evidence at the time
that the job had been done. Could I ask Katarina if she wants
to add anything to that as the leader of that first team? Would
you permit?
(Katarina Toll-Velasquez) In addition to that on the
basis of how things were evolving over the first week we had started
at the end of the first week to enter into discussions with the
UN in-country team about how co-ordination could be set up and
the Government be supported after we left so we were working on
the basis of departure at the end of that week. The UN in-country
team was very forthcoming and we had identified who was going
to support what area, which agency was going to support the daily
running of the co-ordination meetings which agency was going to
look particularly at logistics. So really I think because there
was nothing that indicated by the time we left that there was
a major change in the situation that would strain that capacity
that we had made the effort of helping put in place, it was clear
that the UN in-country team was prepared to take over supporting
the Government in this co-ordination we had set up and we had
a meeting on the 24th, the same morning as we departed, with the
Foreign Minister and the Director of the National Institute for
Disaster Management followed by a meeting with the UN Disaster
Management Team, the in-country team, at which we finalised the
organisational structure and the support structure for this co-ordination
centre so we were very confident that the in-country team wanted
to handle it and I think they would have if there had not have
been this unforeseen change in the situation which again was straining
their capacity just as it had two weeks earlier.
238. So it was just a question therefore that
you had done the job which you had come to do, the Mozambique
Government was coping together with its in-country assistance
and there was no need for your continued presence? Would that
be a summary of the situation on the 4th, the day you left?
(Katarina Toll-Velasquez) Absolutely.
239. There is another thing I am not quite clear
about, I am afraid, about the number of helicopters and when the
South African helicopters arrived. We understood there were five
helicopters operating and those five were South African Air Force
helicopters hired by OCHA to assist for the purpose.
(Ross Mountain) Through the World Food Programme.
When they ran out of resources to continue. The South African
Government was paying initially to keep them on and when they
ran out of resources to keep them on the UN system talked to donors
who made funds available to extend.
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