Examination of witnesses (Questions 320
- 339)
THURSDAY 23 MARCH 2000
ROSS MOUNTAIN,
KATARINATOLL-VELASQUEZ
and GILBERT GREENALL
320. I am sorry the next question I am going
to ask may have been asked already. How long does this role in
the emergency last? As long as the emergency of food aid goes
on?
(Ross Mountain) Both directly and through the country
team (because for the sake of dealing with emergencies the resident
co-ordinater is also in fact our representative and he in this
case or she can call on additional support from us during that
period) we will maintain our firm interest for the six-month period
of this appeal and we are in fact fielding people who will be
there to support during that six-month period.
321. Now the question of the clearing house
was mentioned earlier shortly after I came in. What information
do you hold on emergency resources equipment availability in disaster
prone areas of the world? We mentioned helicopters which is obviously
a government responsibility but I wonder if you hold any information
on that sort of thing?
(Ross Mountain) As I think I was mentioning, we count
particularly on the logistics side on our other partners in the
UN system and in particular the World Food Programme has a particular
role in this regard. We do have knowledge of military and civil
defence assets that are available in different parts of the world
but notably in the industrialised countries that could potentially
be deployed for those kind of things but I go back to the comment
I made earlier, clearly helicopters are vitally important in such
countries and in such circumstances and we are going to review
with our partners to see if there are not other mechanisms we
should involve to try and see—and picking where disasters
are going to be is not always an exact science; North Afghanistan
was one we had last year—whether we can have regional mechanisms
or facilities that can move helicopters as quickly as possible.
That is something we will follow up.
322. You have a database giving information
where these assets, whatever they might be, are stored.
(Ross Mountain) We are not operational I have to point
out. This is not a question of buck-passing. This is why I say
we will do this with our partners to make sure that everybody
knows where they are and how they can be deployed in the shortest
period of time.
323. There has been a lot of talk about an international
standing force to deal with such emergencies. I have my own views
on that but what do you think about that idea?
(Ross Mountain) Are we talking about a military force?
324. You will have to ask the people who talk
about it. I am not quite sure. The idea is there is a task force
that will rush out and solve these problems.
(Ross Mountain) I am not right up to that debate but
I think the mechanisms we have are not bad at all. Unfortunately,
finance is an issue in the international arena even if there is
greater largesse available that you suggested.
Chairman
325. I think it was referring to the emergency
period. I think there is always trouble with money.
(Ross Mountain) One of the big problems of contingency
planning, for example, is that the best result is zero and if
you have laid out a lot of money to put on stand-by a military
force or people on the ground or stockpiling equipment or whatever
and nothing happens, which you can be very happy with, generally
people who give you the money think "Do we really need to
do that?" Unfortunately, one usually needs to see, as in
the case of Mozambique, the evidence of the problem before people
really wish to come forward. It is human nature. You can call
it the "CNN effect". Maybe in the United Kingdom it
is the "BBC effect" because, I repeat, I believe the
media played an extraordinarily positive role in getting the message
out. We would sometimes wish a similarly positive role was played
in countries one does not hear too much about like the Republic
of Congo and others. But there are mechanisms available in terms
of how we interact with the military. The UNDAC mechanism I would
suggest is a rather good cost-effective mechanism. It is one that
is tapped within 24 hours. We have expanded that not only to include
countries like the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries but
also now including UN staff members in areas like the Caribbean
and the Pacific that suffer from cyclones on a very regular basis.[5]
We are looking to do that in Africa. We are needing to find mechanisms
that get people with the necessary expertise to the sites very
quickly. We also of course are wishing to focus on training national
capacity in particular countries. In the case of Mozambique now
at the very strong suggestion of the Foreign Minister, he wanted
to see the military forces in Mozambique and the fire fighters
trained so that they would be more able to respond themselves,
obviously not to a disaster of this dimension, but on some of
the more normal things that happen. The boats that have gone down
from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and so on we need
to make sure they are retained by those who would use them in
a future emergency and the we go back into a longer-term response.
There are issues also of disaster mitigation and check dams and
all this sort of thing that we believe should be addressed and,
I was mentioning this before, the importance of regional co-operation
in this.
Mr Robathan
326. If I could state your position on the establishment
of a standing force. You want to have the data available, you
want to know where the assets are regionally and in the wider
international community, but you do not think much of having people
on stand by other than perhaps a few on notice to leave or on
call?
(Ross Mountain) I would like to see the details of
the proposition I think having people on stand-by who are available
to respond to different kinds of disasters is a good idea but
I think we already have mechanisms to do that.
Mr Robathan: That is excellent. Thank
you. We have discussed funding and the fact that funds are allegedly
not a problem. When we were in Maputo Dr Greenall and the ground
workers did bring co-ordination out of what could have been a
slightly chaotic position. It was well done but we had not reached
the worst situation then. One of the things that came up was South
African Airforce representatives saying they had helicopters but
no money to fund them after the week.
Chairman: We have been over that ground.
Mr Robathan
327. Were there problems of funding the emergency
response experienced at any point during the crisis?
(Ross Mountain) No, I do not think so. First of all,
our emergency response is the co-ordination side and we have not
had problems in funding that. There have been, indeed, shortages
as you have heard or your colleagues have heard, in terms of getting
some of the operational assets, which were helicopters and other
such things, but in terms of the resources we have stand-by mechanisms
which allow us to launch it. We did have early support. Again
I want to acknowledge a contribution that the British Government
have just announced to enable us to strengthen the co-ordination
mechanism on an on-going basis in Mozambique. I think we are under
reasonable control.
328. Thank you very much. Could I apologise
again for being late. Could I ask a final question which is for
my own personal interest. Did you find that the journalists got
in way at all in the helicopters? There has been quite a lot of
comment in the newspapers about this.
(Gilbert Greenall) I think in the end that the coverage
was overwhelmingly positive because if it had not been for that
fact we would not have got the overwhelming support we got from
around the world.
Chairman
329. From 25th February over how many days were
the flood waters rising?
(Gilbert Greenall) From the 25th?
330. Yes and until when?
(Gilbert Greenall) My feeling is that they went up
extremely rapidly and stayed up because we arrived on the ground
on Tuesday 29th and the waters were extremely high at that period
and I think after that they began to fall but not significantly.
This is on the Limpopo.
331. And when did they begin to stabilise and
recede?
(Gilbert Greenall) I think I must qualify this because
there was some inaccuracy that I spotted in the transcripts. The
Incomati did not rise on the 25th. That is very important because
that was the river that originally cut the main Maputo-Beira highway.
When we came back on the 29th the water was very much lower than
it had been the week before. It was the Limpopo, Save and Buzi
rivers. The two rivers up in the north, the Beira operation, already
by the Tuesday there were reports that those two rivers had dropped
significantly. It was the Limpopo that remained high generally
all week.
332. Save and Buzi had dropped by Tuesday 29th?
(Katarina Toll-Velasquez) I actually have the situation
report from 29th of February pretty much confirming what you just
said. According to this report there was a considerable drop observed
in the level of the Incomati River as at the 29th so it had dropped
89 centimetres from the 27th to the 28th February. The Save River
levels were said to be subsiding.
333. On the 29th?
(Katarina Toll-Velasquez) On the 29th. As far as the
Limpopo River basin was concerned that remained a serious situation.
The level of water at Xai-Xai was still at that time at a critical
level and this was recorded as having been 8.10 metres as of 7:00
hrs on 29th February. In the Buzi basin the situation was being
monitored and set to be becoming critical as a result of discharges
from the Chicamba Dam. The Zambeze and Pungo«e Rivers up
north showed no signs of flooding at that time. That was what
we had on 29th February.
334. When did the Limpopo begin to go down?
(Katarina Toll-Velasquez) Actually it reached its
highest peak in mid-February.
335. I see.
(Katarina Toll-Velasquez) Since then it was lower.
It never reached the level that it was on 15th February.
336. I am confused.
(Ross Mountain) So actually am I. In this respect
we have received some data that indicates that but logic, I am
afraid, does not tend to support the accuracy of that data because
clearly the levels were dramatically higher over that weekend.
(Gilbert Greenall) I am afraid I have to agree with
that. These bits of information reflect the position I mentioned
earlier.
337. I suppose it illustrates a lot of what
you have been telling us.
(Ross Mountain) We have this beautiful chart which
shows a peak but it does not make sense, I am sorry—
338. Because the real crisis was that week starting
on the 25th and going on to March 4th. Was the Limpopo going down
on March 4th do we know?
(Gilbert Greenall) Absolutely but the Limpopo stayed
high and did not reduce at the same speed as the other two rivers
because the second flood emergency was very much the three river
basin, the Limpopo, the Save, and the Buzi, and the northern rivers
reduced significantly very rapidly but the Limpopo stayed high.
339. I understand that you have got to catch
a plane and we should not keep you here any longer but I think
we have finished anyway. It has been a very long session and you
have been extremely patient with us but we did want to report
accurately and understand fully before we begin making suggestions
as to how things might be done differently in the future. Can
we thank you very much indeed all three of you for coming. You
obviously had other things in your diaries which you have changed.
Thank you very much for coming and helping us to find our way
through this difficult problem.
(Ross Mountain) May I just say a couple of remarks
in conclusion. I thank you for the opportunity to come here and
interact with you on these issues. There is a focus on what might
have gone wrong at that time. I would like ask you to focus on
what went right because a lot more went right than might have
gone wrong and we happen to believe that the international response,
if you look at that weekend being the baseline, was very quick
both in terms of getting in air assets and getting in other resources
and getting the co-ordination mechanism together for what has
been a dramatic occurrence in the life of Mozambique. I really
would like to underline that if I may at the end of this. Secondly,
please do not forget Mozambique. Just because, alas, the TV cameras
have now left it does not mean Mozambique does not need help;
it does. We have got through the spectacular piece of the disaster
but not the heavy piece. The heavy piece is the relief effort
and the rehabilitation effort and the reconstruction effort and
a lot more help is going to be required by the Government and
the people of Mozambique in getting back to normalcy for those
people in those areas who have suffered more than they expected
to this year.
Chairman: I could not agree with you
more. The fact is you need 101 million in order to reconstruct
Mozambique and for the farmers to be getting back onto their fields,
draining them and planting them because if they do not, as you
have said, Mozambique is subject very seriously to drought, and
if they do not get their crops in in the next three or four weeks,
I imagine there will be no food. I could not agree with you more.
I was surprised by the figures you gave this morning about how
few deaths there have been really. One is too many but we had
been led to believe that it was in the thousands so a lot of good
work and enormously hard work has been done in this crisis and
we should not forget it. Thank you very much.
5 Note by Witness: For information, regarding
regional membership in the UNDAC system, please note that in addition
to UN staff members in the regions mentioned, the UNDAC system
also includes non-UN nationals of countries in the Carribean and
the South Pacific, as well as Latin America and Africa. A list
of Governments and organisations who are members of the UNDAC
system is attached (see Evidence p. 60), as well as a list of
missions completed since the UNDAC system was created in 1993
(not printed). Back
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