House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Fifth Report

The Response of the International Community

The Response of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

9. OCHA is the UN body with the task of developing coherent approaches to humanitarian crises, including setting up and managing arrangements which enable agencies to contribute effectively to the overall humanitarian assistance effort. The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Team has been established as the immediate response arm of OCHA. Ross Mountain described the concept to the Committee, "it is a mechanism which consists of over 100 people who have been trained in disaster assessment and co-ordination... we normally have these people mobilised within 12 hours to go to disaster sites... When we have instances of serious disaster, we mobilise the team very quickly... It is a mechanism which responds very quickly".[15] Rob Holden explained their responsibility, "When you get a situation that goes beyond the capability [of the UN country team], ie a situation like Mozambique, you bring in extra expertise, ie the UNDAC team. Their usual length of deployment is two to three weeks. They go in, they help support, they set mechanisms up, they do rapid assessments, they bring information together. One of their key roles is resource mobilisation. Then they withdraw once the systems are in place and things are stabilised, which they usually have done in an emergency within three weeks".[16] Rob Holden stated that "the first five-person team that went in did a good job though there was some confusion over their role. What they did do was put the systems in place, as they should have done, to ensure that relief supplies as they were arriving from outside Mozambique were well coordinated and well deployed to those people who needed it".[17]

THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE OCHA TEAM[18]

10. The UN's OCHA team left Mozambique on 24 February. There was thus no specialist team in situ during the worst days of the crisis. We must first address why the OCHA team left on 24 February, the day before the floods got so catastrophically worse, without first ascertaining the full impact of Cyclone Eline on river levels in the region.

11. DFID was particularly critical of the decision by the OCHA team to withdraw on 24 February. Rob Holden told the Committee that ordinarily "they withdraw once the systems are in place and things are stabilised, which they usually have done in an emergency within three weeks. Obviously in this situation it was somewhat different... They did withdraw too fast and I think that was a poor call on the United Nations' behalf. They re-deployed very quickly again after intervention by my head of department on the Saturday evening, the 26th... [but] because you had three to four days getting into country... they were constantly playing catch-up, which in a situation like Mozambique, which was still evolving, was extremely difficult".[19]

12. The Committee put this criticism to OCHA representatives, two of whom had been part of that original team. OCHA were keen to underline the unpredictability of events in Mozambique that had produced the worst floods in living memory. Ross Mountain said "This was not brought about by rain that fell in Mozambique. Out of the clear blue skies of Mozambique the floods came from the neighbouring countries ... No one, but no one, either had the local capacity to deal with it or indeed expected it at that time[20]." He was adamant that "the rapid rise of the flood waters on the 25th and the 26th was not expected by anyone, including the Government of Mozambique and unfortunately us. That was not just because we were not paying attention to the weather forecasts, [it came at a time when everybody in the country was in fact scanning weather forecasts, looking to neighbouring countries [21]] ... I must submit to you that no weather forecaster — and my colleagues were there at the time — indicated we were going to get what was I think 1.4 metres come down in a 24 hour period".[22] Gilbert Greenall, a member of the OCHA team stated, "Each day the weather reports coming in were different and contradictory and as far as Eline was concerned we heard it was going south, we heard it was going west, it was strengthening, it was weakening. It was expected just north of Inhambane Town; in fact it came in 200 miles further north in the Save area. We were expecting rain in South Africa; we got rain in Zimbabwe".[23] The OCHA team had included the Deputy Director of the Zambia Met Office,[24] however, as Gilbert Greenall acknowledged, "the correlation between rainfall and river regimes is very uncertain and I was enormously surprised at the speed which the river goes up ... There were sudden rises in less than 12 hours at times. It is very difficult to predict".[25] He admitted that they were "suspicious of the weather and hydrological data".[26]

13. A further consideration was that "the areas that we expected to get a new crest down the river had already been flooded and the population was already displaced so our concern was not as great as it might have been if the floods had never happened. This was an area where the waters had gone down significantly over the last two weeks. There had been two weeks of the rivers going down on a daily basis. We were expecting the crests but nothing as extensive as what actually happened".[27]

14. Ross Mountain explained the reasons behind the decision of the team to leave the country, "at that stage after water had been flowing for two weeks with a coordination mechanism in place the threat to life had passed, the appeal had gone out, the situation had stabilised, road access in most areas had improved .... the expected Cyclone Eline had passed through during that week and had not had the effect that one had expected. It was seen at that stage that the need for an outside emergency team was at an end".[28]

15. Much of what OCHA told us mirrors the experience of the Committee during our visit to Mozambique. Certainly at the OCHA briefing meeting we attended during our visit there was no inkling of the catastrophic increase in river levels and consequent flooding which were only three days away. The deterioration in the situation was not forecast. Nevertheless, OCHA itself admits that weather reports were different and contradictory, that the correlation between rainfall and the river regimes was very uncertain. Even if Mozambique did not receive much heavy rainfall as Cyclone Eline passed over the country, OCHA knew that Mozambique received not only its own rain but also the rain of countries upstream such as Zimbabwe and South Africa. Given these uncertainties, and the fact that Cyclone Eline did not exhaust itself over Mozambique but continued inland to rain over neighbouring countries, we consider that the departure of the OCHA team on 24 February was premature and a significant error of judgement.

16. There were clearly problems in the quality of information received by OCHA both on rainfall and river levels. Lessons should be learned by the international community for the response to future natural disasters. Of course these sciences are not exact. Gilbert Greenall told us, however, that "One of the lessons learned would be that water management and regional cooperation on these matters to try and get more predictable information is terribly important".[29] We are forced to conclude in this particular case that there was inadequate sharing of information between countries and experts in the region, both on rainfall and the rise in river levels. We recommend that, in the light of events in Mozambique, OCHA examine the standard of such information gathering and sharing in disaster-prone regions, and promote systems, in particular at a regional level, which improve the accuracy and timeliness of disaster warnings.

THE PROVISION OF HELICOPTERS PRIOR TO 25 FEBRUARY

17. The second question to consider is whether in the period up to 25 February OCHA had considered that the number of helicopters operating in Mozambique was sufficient or whether requests were being made for more helicopter transport. From 11 February seven helicopters were involved in relief work, provided by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Katarina Toll-Velasquez told the Committee, "we were flagging from the second day of our arrival [the 13 February] the need for adequate transportation by air, in particular helicopters, since heavy aircraft could not land because of the wetness of the ground up country".[30] However, at that time, OCHA were having difficulty finding funds to keep the helicopters provided by South Africa on 11 February in the air. Katarina Toll-Velasquez explained, "on 15th February there was a donor meeting in Maputo ... and the South African mission at that meeting informed us they would be running out of funds on 20th February, that they were looking for financial support, that otherwise they would have to leave and stop the operation. They said that they could get more helicopters into the country but of course that was also a problem of funding so the first priority was to let those helicopters that were working at that time continue to do the work and the related priority was that if there was more funding forthcoming they would be able to get more helicopters into the country".[31] The Committee met with members of the OCHA team in Mozambique on 22 February who were, at the time, concerned about the continued funding of the South African helicopters. Gilbert Greenall recalled, "when I spoke to you at the time I was busy trying to mobilise resources for those helicopters and it was not easy with the international donors at that time because they saw the same picture as everybody else, the waters falling and talks in Xai-Xai that one or two of the roads would be reopened down to Maputo".[32]

18. With OCHA experiencing difficulties maintaining the operation of the existing SANDF helicopters, there seemed little prospect of securing funding for additional helicopters, as Ross Mountain explained, "It was a 'it would be nice to have additional air assets but by the time they are launched will they really be needed?' kind of attitude ... on the 23rd and 24th all was under control, the skies were blue, the weather reports from the neighbouring countries were not bad".[33] He later added, "I understand that the word had gone out that additional helicopter assets were needed — we were focussing on keeping the essential core going but with the waters going down, with the expectation that soon more roads would be open, we do not seek to keep going on expensive air assets ... I am afraid it is not unusual that we are operating at stretch point. That is the norm. Just because we could use another five or ten helicopters, that would be super, but if we have got five operating, we are often ahead of the game by five".[34]

19. A further reason for the reluctance of donors to provide more helicopters during this period was given by Gilbert Greenall, "The Mozambique Government was managing the logistics at the time and the donors were worried about the capacity of the Government to handle these very expensive assets if the numbers were increased. In fact, there was an intervention and the Mozambique logistics management was supported after that by the [World Food Programme] and it was changed, but at that time there was concern by the donors about this constraint".[35]

20. OCHA, in summary, argues that an appeal was made for more helicopters. It is evident, however, that the request was neither emphasised nor repeated. We cannot, moreover, find any request for additional helicopters in the OCHA situation reports from these weeks. With weather conditions improving, concerns over the logistical effectiveness of the operation, and a reluctance to deploy expensive resources unnecessarily, donors were unenthusiastic even to continue to fund the helicopters already flying. OCHA concentrated on keeping the South African helicopters operating, and did not consider the provision of further helicopters to be a matter of urgency.

21. DFID was, however, more critical of OCHA's performance. Clare Short made clear what she expected from the OCHA system, "What we need from the very beginning from the United Nations is people on the ground being authoritative and using the information that is available and making the call back to people like Rob Holden who is sitting in London ... you need someone authoritatively making those demands and calls".[36] Rob Holden, however, found the information emerging from Mozambique to be inadequate, "... they did not give us information. More importantly, it is the analysis of that information on the ground that is extremely important ... any operation will fall down if you do not have good logistics and you do not have good communications".[37] He went on to state, "They did not give us specific details about whether they wanted boats, helicopters and so on. What they did present back was quite a confused picture ... it was not clear at that time what assets were needed and how the disaster was unfolding, so it was confused".[38] In contrast to OCHA's evidence, he said, "There was not a clear recommendation that came back from the field that helicopters were their ultimate priority at that time".[39] Clare Short added, "What we sent first was not helicopters. It was emergency needs, tents, clean drinking water, sanitation facilities, shelter, health and basic survival items. On the first phase that is what we were being told was needed".[40] Our observation, however, when we were in Mozambique prior to 25 February, was that further helicopters would have been a welcome addition to humanitarian efforts.

22. We have already made the point that OCHA should have prepared for the possibility of a deterioration in conditions. This applies as much to the provision of helicopters as it does to the decision as to when to withdraw. There were obvious problems in securing donor provision of further helicopters at a time when the situation seemed to be improving and under control. If, however, OCHA had planned for a possible deterioration, then the team could at least have identified available helicopters around the world and donors willing to support them, on a "draw down". basis, should they have become necessary. This would not have involved any costs for donors in the event of no further flooding. Ross Mountain went some way to acknowledging this in evidence, "we are very keen to draw lessons from all of the circumstances that we have in this disaster and in other ones. One is that, indeed, we need to be clear on where there are such assets and how we can get at them as quickly as possible ... The mechanism that DFID was able to mobilise with the World Food Programme made it happen, but clearly the availability of helicopter assets, be it in Mozambique, be it in Northern Afghanistan, be it in the Caribbean is something that we need with our partners to try and see how we can mobilise them as quickly as possible".[41] The failure of OCHA in the days prior to 25 February to discuss with donors the availability of helicopters and their funding in the event of further flooding was a serious omission.

23. The story of this crisis raises a fundamental question — why was it DFID telephoning round the world trying to locate helicopters to hire? How many other agencies and donors were engaged at the same time in a duplicating exercise? Surely such call-down procedures should be the responsibility of the central UN body concerned with the coordination of humanitarian affairs, OCHA. If properly organised, it would then be for donors such as DFID simply to offer funds on the one hand, and give details of available resources on the other. It would not necessarily be the case that DFID funds were spent on the UK resources they reported as available. In the absence of such UN-organised arrangements, we commend DFID for their own call-down procedures. However, we recommend that OCHA establish, with its partners, including the World Food Programme, its own call-down arrangements so that it can speedily ascertain the location and availability of emergency resources, such as helicopters, in the event of a humanitarian crisis. This is in our view a precondition of any effective international system to respond to such disasters.

24. The story of the days preceding 25 February is one in which OCHA tailored its messages to donors to meet their willingness to provide funds. OCHA concentrated on what increasingly appeared to be those resources which could realistically expect funding. Unfortunately they were also the bare minimum necessary to cope with the current emergency, with no slack for the unexpected.

25. Despite the Secretary of State's assurances to the Committee that resources were not a problem in the international response to the crisis in Mozambique, the Committee can only conclude that a lack of funding available to the OCHA team prior to 25 February meant that a sufficient number of helicopters were not available in Mozambique when they were required following the rise in the floodwaters. Had OCHA more funds of its own it could have paid for the additional helicopters which South Africa had reported as available, without first touting for donor support. There was clearly some failures in communication between OCHA and DFID (and we thus assume with other donors). But frank communication of essential needs, of useful additional provision, and of necessary contingency plans is, we expect, hindered by OCHA having always to second-guess the willingness of donors to contribute.

26. DFID raised the matter of OCHA financing in its Institutional Strategy Paper on OCHA. The point was made that OCHA was extremely reliant on the provision of discretionary resources from UN member states, "As OCHA is heavily dependent on extra-budgetary resources even for its core functions, it continues to remain vulnerable to donor preferences".[42] OCHA's budget for the 1998-99 biennium was US$101.4 million, of which only US$18.4 million was sourced from the UN Regular Budget, the remainder US$83 million being required as voluntary contributions.[43] Whilst OCHA has established a reserve fund arrangement to enable the immediate allocation of cash grants to assist affected populations, DFID, in its Strategy Paper, supports the objective agreed by the UN to obtain a progressive increase in the proportion of OCHA's costs met from the regular UN budget. We support the principle that an increased proportion of OCHA's costs should be met from the regular UN budget.

27. One of DFID's recommendations in its Institutional Strategy Paper on OCHA was that the organisation should seek to learn lessons from experiences in humanitarian field programmes.[44] We trust that OCHA will conduct an assessment of its effectiveness in responding to the crisis in Mozambique. We look forward to receiving the results of this assessment.

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18 FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS REPORT, WE USUALLY REFER TO THE UNDAC TEAM IN MOZAMBIQUE SIMPLY AS "THE OCHA TEAM". Back

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