House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Fifth Report

The Response of the UK

28. Media attention in the United Kingdom has focussed as much on the effectiveness of the UK Government's response to the crisis as on the actual predicament of Mozambique. We must make clear at the outset that DFID's response to the crisis in Mozambique has been exceptional. There is no controversy about the generosity of the British public — as at 31 March the Disasters Emergency Committee appeal had raised £28 million.[45] However, in the days immediately following 25 February, DFID was criticised for failing to deploy immediately UK helicopters. More recently there has been criticism of an apparent cut in DFID's planned expenditure in Mozambique.

29. These criticisms are not, however, shared by OCHA. Ross Mountain said, "I do want to pay particular tribute to the United Kingdom, to DFID, for the response they delivered, the rapidity of the response and the scope of the response. We have enjoyed the closest collaboration with DFID in a range of emergencies, have this on an on-going basis and find them to be an excellent, rapid partner, and Mozambique was no exception to this rule ...".[46] Similarly, Oxfam, in its memorandum, stated that "it is clear that, despite early confusion, the UK has done more than other donors and more quickly".[47]

30. DFID has provided £30 million in response to the crisis — £20 million in direct humanitarian assistance[48] and £10 million in budgetary support to the Government of Mozambique.[49] Details are provided in DFID's memorandum.[50] Attention has focussed on helicopters and the RFA Fort George. We would begin, however, by noting the initial rapidity of response — £1.1 million channelled on 11 February through a variety of agencies and NGOs to meet emergency needs including tents, clean drinking water, sanitation facilities, shelter, health and basic survival items.[51] This was followed by a series of further commitments throughout February and March.

31. The range of needs met by DFID funds should also be emphasised. The DFID memorandum lists the purpose of their humanitarian assistance to Mozambique:

expand relief provision, including more food, shelter, water supplies, and healthcare;
improve or establish emergency physical access, including through repairs of roads and bridges;
provide more information to the local population on how and where they can get help, through strengthening Radio Mozambique's capacity to broadcast special programmes;
promote the recovery of local livelihoods particularly through seeds and tools for restarting agriculture, and re-opening small businesses;
help the Mozambique Government to restart public services and local administration through repairs to public facilities and restocking of health centres and schools;
further strengthen in-country coordination arrangements including making an informed assessment of the damage and planning for reconstruction and resumed development; and
strengthen national capacity for early warning and search and rescue.

These objectives are to be pursued through cooperation with the Government of Mozambique, international agencies of the UN and Red Cross and NGOs.[52]

32. In addition to budgetary support, a wide variety of emergency and relief provision, and helicopters, DFID also "sponsored a joint team of 38 personnel and 100 boats and life rafts drawn from the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, UK Fire and Rescue Services, and the International Rescue Corps. They were the first such outside groups to arrive in theatre from outside [on 29 February] and succeeded in reaching marooned people along the Save and Buzi rivers with food and medical assistance".[53]

THE PROVISION OF HELICOPTERS AND COORDINATION WITH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (MOD)

33. The above summary of DFID's initial response to the floods in Mozambique is, we believe, an impressive context in which to place any discussion of the provision of helicopters and the supposed row between DFID and MoD. Nevertheless, the criticisms need to be addressed. There is no doubt always room for improvement and lessons to be learned in consideration of the United Kingdom response to humanitarian crises. Then there is the question of DFID's 'image' and reputation. Clare Short accepted that the appearance of a shambles in the media was regrettable but felt it was more important to do the right thing by Mozambique, "The media story always becomes a complication because then you get all sorts of political

pressure on the media story. You get it in every disaster. We try to hold our department focussing on the needs of the people and not chasing the media story, and it happens every time".[54] We agree with Secretary of State — saving lives comes before amour propre. But if the criticisms are unjust they must ultimately be rebutted. Not to do so is to undermine public support for humanitarian assistance, and perhaps development work, and engender either cynicism or a preference for the 'flashy' in aid rather than the truly effective.

34. Public concern and media attention focussed on the search and rescue operation which lasted from 26 February to about 4 March. The world was transfixed by the tireless efforts of the South African helicopters to lift people to safety from trees and roofs. No doubt there were too few helicopters for the work, but it must be acknowledged that those which were flying were being funded by DFID. On 26 February it was DFID who ensured that the South African helicopters continued operating through a grant of £0.627 million (US$1 million) to the World Food Programme to pay the SANDF running costs. Ross Mountain recognised DFID's crucial role at this point in the crisis, "funding came through very quickly from DFID for US$1 million on that weekend and that was deployed through WFP very quickly ...".[55] Clare Short felt that "the most helpful thing we did at that stage was to provide funding for the helicopters to keep them in the air ... Something like 13,000 to 15,000 people were rescued in that way in the early days, and without helicopters about half would probably have perished".[56] We congratulate DFID for their funding from 26 February of the South African helicopters involved in search and rescue.

35. We should also mention the provision by Malawi on 25 February of two helicopters, its entire fleet. This generosity and speedy response from a poor neighbouring country deserves praise.

THE SEARCH FOR HELICOPTERS

36. Given the scale of the emergency in the days following 25 February, additional helicopters were obviously needed for search and rescue. The following paragraphs outline DFID's attempts to locate and send further helicopters [See also Table 2 below].

Table 2: Helicopters Used for Search and Rescue/Evacuation Operations[57]

Helicopter
Quantity
Donor
Arrival
With winch capacity

Oryx
5
SANDF*
11 Feb
3

BK117
2
SANDF
11 Feb
2

Oryx
1
Malawi
25 Feb
1

Bell
1
Malawi
25 Feb
1

Puma
2
UNICEF/NGOs*
26 Feb
1

Sea King
1
DFID
3 March
1

Puma
1
DFID
4 March
1

* Operational costs funded in part by DFID

37. As mentioned above, at the time the floodwaters rose on 25 February, the only helicopters in operation in Mozambique were those provided by the South African National Defence Force and funded by DFID. However, in response to the rapidly deteriorating situation, DFID sought to locate and hire further helicopters for use in Mozambique. On Saturday 26 February, Rob Holden, of DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) telephoned the resident Clerk at the MoD to ascertain whether the UK had any military assets in the region inquiring, in particular, as to the location of HMS Ocean (which had been successfully deployed to Honduras following Hurricane Mitch). In response to the inquiry, DFID was told that the nearest assets were 3,000 miles away. DFID did not, however, at this stage, enquire about the nature of the assets or the potential for the deployment of other assets, such as helicopters, from the UK. DFID then put its own "call down". arrangements into place and, on Tuesday 29 February, contracted five further helicopters for use in Mozambique: two that were already working in Mozambique for UNICEF and various NGOs, and a further three from South Africa. The three additional helicopters were not deployed until 4 March.

38. On Tuesday 29 February, DFID was contacted by the MoD (at 9.00 am) to ask if it required the use of MoD assets. In view of the deteriorating situation in Mozambique, DFID inquired what assets were available and, at the same time, authorised the deployment of a 'recce team' to Mozambique (which it had been made clear was a pre-requisite to any eventual deployment). Later that afternoon, the MoD provided DFID with a list of assets available for immediate deployment together with approximate costings. The estimated cost of the deployment of these assets amounted to some £2.34 million.[58] The MoD also mentioned that the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Fort George could be made available at an approximate cost of £500,000. On the basis of this information, a decision was taken by DFID not to deploy UK military assets as "it was too expensive and we had alternatives".[59] The Secretary of State for International Development was keen to point out, however, that "if we had not had alternatives we would have paid, because our duty is to get help to the people in Mozambique but, also, to use our budget well".[60]

39. On Wednesday 1 March the MoD submitted a revised costing to DFID, as the Secretary of State for Defence explained, "the reduction was, first of all, an elimination of the requirement for Marines ... The second change which we were able to make after consultations with the Treasury, was that we were able to ... reduce the price by £0.6 million offsetting the cost of the deployment against a planned exercise in Norway".[61] The revised estimate totalled some £1.15 million. The MoD also provided a revised estimate for the deployment of the RFA Fort George totalling £1.4 million.

40. On the basis of the revised estimate, DFID requested on Wednesday 1 March the deployment of the four Puma helicopters. On Thursday 2 March, because of "the fear of further flooding in the North and the availability of a substantial amount of aviation fuel on board the ship",[62] DFID requested the deployment of the RFA Fort George from the Gulf.

41. By the time the Puma helicopters deployed from the UK commenced operation on 5 March the floodwaters had begun to recede and the search and rescue operation had largely been completed so the helicopters were used primarily for the movement of relief supplies. The Pumas were the first helicopters to arrive from outside the region. The RFA Fort George arrived off Mozambique on Saturday 11 March. The Pumas were eventually withdrawn on Wednesday 19 March. The RFA Fort George departed on Friday 24 March.

THE USE BY DFID OF MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ASSETS

42. The role of the military in humanitarian disasters and the relationship between the MoD and DFID are longstanding issues of debate. The Strategic Defence Review [SDR], published in July 1998, sought to clarify matters. The purpose of the Review was "to consider how the roles, missions and capabilities of our armed forces should be adjusted to meet the new strategic realities". The review was 'foreign policy led', with a view to assessing likely overseas commitments and interests and to establish how UK forces should be deployed to meet them[63]. The Review starts from the point that Britain "has a responsibility to act as a force for good in the world". It further states that "the British public does not expect us to turn our back on poverty, inequality and human suffering in poorer countries. We will respond to such problems as necessary drawing on the range of civil, diplomatic, economic and military means at our disposal ... We anticipate continuing and perhaps growing calls for contributions to international peace support and humanitarian operations, some of which could be militarily very demanding".[64]

43. There is some discrepancy, however, between these official Government statements and Clare Short's assessment of the value of MoD assets when giving evidence to the Committee. It is clear that DFID considers the deployment of MoD assets to be too slow and expensive, with unnecessary staffing costs.[65] In humanitarian crises involving conflict and peace-keeping, such as Kosovo, where the military are in any event deployed, they have proved invaluable in the relief of suffering. However, in purely natural disasters it is clear that DFID does not automatically call on MoD to assist. Clare Short referred to Hurricane Mitch, which devastated much of Nicaragua and Honduras in 1998, "it just so happened that we had that new ship full of brand new helicopters steaming past — just a wonderful coincidence".[66] This is the context to Rob Holden's telephone call of 26 February — it was simply to ascertain whether, as had been the case with Hurricane Mitch, there happened to be MoD assets so near Mozambique that they could be rapidly deployed. When he discovered there were none, he turned to DFID's own call-down arrangements, as he explained, "We have an emergency route response team that has links into the UK fire service, air charity organisations and then we speak to all the agencies you would expect in the UN, Red Cross and the NGOs".[67]

44. There is an issue of principle here which should be considered. Ross Mountain made the point, "Not every government seeks to employ third country assets in responding to these crises for whatever reason that might be and, therefore, some prefer to use their own assets because it is a sign of solidarity with the country, some believe they should use their own assets as a matter of economics or whatever".[68] To put it another way, many governments 'tie' their emergency relief. DFID does not do so, but considers the speed with which assets can be deployed. Clare Short told us, "although we should have an understanding with MoD, it is secondary to our freedom to deploy our resources and our capacity as rapidly as possible to get help to the people in need. That must be our top priority".[69] She added, "If you are on top of a tree you do not mind whose flag is on the helicopter, as long as it comes".[70] We agree with the Secretary of State that DFID's priority in a humanitarian crisis must be the saving of lives. To that end, DFID should not be tied to MoD resources but must be free to use the most appropriate, whatever their origin.

45. The question then arises whether, in this case, DFID's call-down arrangements proved speedier than any MoD alternative. The floodwaters rose overnight on Friday 25 February. On 26 February DFID contacted OCHA to impress on them the need to return to Mozambique immediately,[71] ascertained that there were no MoD assets in the vicinity which could assist, provided US$1 million to ensure the South African helicopters in Mozambique kept flying, and activated their own emergency call-down arrangements. By any standard we consider this to be an impressively prompt response.

46. How effective were the call-down arrangements? On Tuesday 29 February the Emergency Rescue Team was deployed, with "two large transporter aircraft carrying 69 inflatable boats, 39 self inflating rafts, two land rovers with satellite equipment, shelter material and sheeting and a UK team".[72] As mentioned previously, this was the first outside team to arrive in Mozambique after 25 February. Also on 29 February DFID located and chartered five further helicopters from South Africa and Mozambique. Two of the helicopters were deployed on Friday 3 March, the other three on Thursday 4 March. Four of the helicopters were involved in the last stages of the search and rescue operation. They were the first additional helicopters to arrive in Mozambique after 25 February. This fact itself must suggest that DFID's response was, when judged against that of other agencies, speedy and effective.

47. In our earlier consideration of OCHA's contingency planning we regretted the failure to have at least identified possible extra helicopters should the situation deteriorate. The Secretary of State emphasised that without such pre-planning it had been more or less impossible to get further helicopters to Mozambique in time to assist those already there in search and rescue. We note, however, that DFID decided to deploy the four Puma helicopters from the United Kingdom on Wednesday 1 March, they were despatched on Friday 3 March, the first two Pumas commencing operation on Sunday 5 March and the second two on Monday 6 March.[73] In other words, the time from decision to deploy to commencement of operations was roughly the same for the locally chartered helicopters and for the four Pumas from the United Kingdom. The locally chartered helicopters had first to be located by DFID through its own call-down arrangements. The four Pumas, by contrast, were readily available in the UK, identifiable by MoD. Yet on 26 February no inquiry was made by DFID of what equipment might be available in the UK. It was the Ministry of Defence, at the instigation of Mr John Spellar MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, which prepared contingency plans on Monday 28 February[74] and which contacted DFID on Tuesday 29 February with details of UK-based military assets at a total cost of £2.337 million.[75] Why did DFID not pursue immediately the possibility of deploying UK-based military assets? If they had done so, could the four Pumas have arrived earlier in Mozambique and also have participated in search and rescue?

48. The Secretary of State made clear to the Committee DFID's reservations over the use of MoD assets, "From our point of view, it is often a bit slower and it comes with very, very, very heavy staffing resources behind it, because, of course, the Ministry of Defence have to be highly organised like that. I think there are 100 people servicing the four Pumas, and the five helicopters that we got out of Southern Africa have less than ten".[76] Although in fact the four Pumas were deployed as speedily as those contracted locally, DFID had originally been told that it would take four days for the Pumas to reach Mozambique.[77] Departure itself could not be immediate but depended on the availability of an Antonov aircraft to take the four Pumas there. Geoff Hoon recalled being told on Monday 28 February that no Antonov would be available until Thursday. He did not know if an Antonov might have been made available if requested on Saturday 26 February.[78] In addition to the four-day estimate to reach Mozambique and the need to wait for an Antonov to be available, DFID had first to authorise and pay for an MoD recce team to go to Mozambique before they could use any MoD assets.[79]

49. Taking these facts into account, Clare Short's point about the slowness of deploying UK-based assets becomes clearer. Rob Holden did not ask MoD on 26 February about what UK-based assets were available. Given that in the end such assets were deployed, it might have been useful to have made inquiries at the outset. Rob Holden obviously assumed from past experience that the deployment of UK-based assets would be slower, or at least no quicker, than those available locally. In fact he was right, given the requirement to send out an MoD recce team and agree costs, the earliest a decision could realistically have been taken was on Monday 28 February. We were told by the Secretary of State for Defence, however, that by that Monday no Antonov was available until Thursday. Thus the four Pumas would not have reached Mozambique any earlier.

50. We note that a speedy response from MoD was constrained by availability of an Antonov and we know that the problem of the shortage of heavy lift aircraft in Europe is one which occupies both MoD and the Defence Committee.[80] It is our beyond our remit to make recommendations on the purchase of such aircraft. We confine ourselves to pointing out the difficulties that such a shortage may cause for an effective response to humanitarian crises. It is vital that effective links be established between international humanitarian organisations

and international security organisations, such as NATO. A mechanism must be found to ensure that, for example, those heavy lift aircraft within NATO, including those of the USA, can be identified and deployed in humanitarian crises. We request a response from MoD on these issues.

51. Speed is not, however, the only issue for DFID. The cost is also important. The relationship between the two criteria was explained by the Secretary of State, "it was never the case that we did not purchase the MoD offer because it was too expensive and we had no alternative. As I say, I would have purchased them, even though I thought it was a high price, if that was our only option".[81] Even though, as the extent and duration of the crisis became apparent, the Secretary of State later authorised the sending of the four Pumas, her initial position appears justified by the fact that the five locally chartered helicopters cost £0.87 million whereas she was quoted on 29 February £2.337 million for MoD's package.

52. After the MoD recce team's visit to Mozambique the cost was reduced on Wednesday 1 March to £1.15 million. As mentioned above, this reduction was a result of removing the hovercraft and marines which were part of the original package, and also offsetting the cost of a planned exercise in Norway.[82] The halving of the cost of the Pumas over a two-day period explains DFID's reluctance to accept immediately the offer of MoD assets

53. The Minister of State for Defence, Dr Lewis Moonie MP, in response to a written question, refused to provide details of the cost of the hire of the Antonov used to transport the four MoD Puma helicopters to and from Mozambique, withholding the information under Exemption 13 (Third party's commercial confidence) of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information[83]. DFID was more forthcoming, however, providing the Committee with MoD's breakdown of the costs for the deployment of UK-based assets both before and after the cost was reduced on 1 March.

Table 3: MoD Cost Estimates Provided to DFID on 29 February[84]

4 x Puma helicopters: 14 days/350 hours flying

£1,050,000

Antonov 124 to provide airlift there and back

£500,000

100 person Puma support attachment: 14 days

£210,000

2 x Hovercraft & 10 rigid raiders & 30 crewmen (Royal Marines): 14 days

3 x C130 aircraft to deploy and recover above

£63,000

£215,000

40 person HQ: 14 days

3 x C130 aircraft to deploy and recover above

£84,000

£215,000

Total

£2.337 million

Table 4: Revised MoD Cost Estimates Provided to DFID on 1 March[85]

Item	Approximate Cost
Puma flying hours (350 flying hours @ £2,721 per hour)	£950,000
Antonov 124 to provide airlift	£480,000
Personnel and equipment deployment	£260,000
Personnel subsistence	£70,000
Total	£1.76 million
Reduced price, taking into account money offset in lieu of a planned exercise in Norway	£1.15 million

54. The basis for MoD charges to DFID was outlined in evidence. DFID are charged "no-loss cost", also known as "marginal cost", which "is the amount that would not have been incurred had the activity not taken place. A prime purpose of charging is to give the customer department a greater incentive to use the assets involved efficiently and economically. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) accordingly charges the additional cost of providing equipment and personnel for relief operations".[86] The memorandum went on to explain, "For equipment such as a helicopter, it includes the cost of transport to the required location and hourly rates for usage. These rates cover fuel and oil consumption and the cost of increasing the servicing requirements and reducing the equipment's life".[87]

55. The Secretary of State for Defence told us, "This is the standard way in which different government departments, which have people and equipment which might be required by another government department, calculate the likely cost and then later work out the precise cost".[88] He went on, "I am sure that you would be extremely concerned if, for example, the Secretary of State for International Development decided simply to spend unlimited amounts of money on getting helicopters into a situation where that could not be justified".[89]

56. What is worrying is how expensive MoD assets are when compared to other sources, even when marginal cost is being charged. Without the costs of accompanying personnel, the Pumas from MoD worked out at £2,721 per hour. This compares, we understand, with a cost of £1,922 per hour (excluding fuel) for those locally deployed. Moreover, to these figures must be added the cost of support personnel. As Clare Short pointed out, those contracted from the region by DFID required only about ten support staff. The initial MoD quote for the Pumas included the cost of deploying a 100-strong "Puma support attachment" at £210,000 plus a 40-strong HQ at £84,000. Air Commodore Luker told the Committee that eventually the whole four Puma package required in the order of 60 people to be sent.[90] He explained this included "the crew, the engineers, an element of life support personnel and other ground technical support, a package of load handlers and also a contingency package which includes the ability to transport and manage fuel out of the ground".[91] He went on to recall, "we deployed environmental health technicians and medical staff down there as well".[92] This was described as "the holistic approach of dealing with a problem of this sort",[93] which is one way to put it. Geoff Hoon said that MoD offered "a complete solution. We would be offering a team that could go into almost any situation irrespective of what was available on the ground, irrespective of the mechanical facilities available, irrespective of the kind of equipment that would be available locally".[94]

57. The problem with such a "complete solution", which is put together almost regardless of context, is that it is insufficiently flexible and much more expensive than similar assets sourced elsewhere. We simply do not believe that the Pumas require such vast numbers of support staff, particularly given the urgency of the situation and the fact that support teams for other helicopters are significantly smaller. Despite the protestations of the Strategic Defence Review, this suggests that MoD has not as yet reexamined its customary procedures so as to consider whether natural disasters require a distinct and more pared-down approach when compared with other operations.

58. Brief mention should be made of the decision of MoD to offset some of the cost of a planned exercise in Norway, reducing the cost by a further £610,000.[95] The principle was explained by MoD, "In deciding whether any offset is appropriate, MoD takes account of whether the military activity forgone would still need to be carried out later, and whether the relief operation offers training of real value to future military operations".[96] This significant cost reduction was on the assumption that the training that would have taken place in Norway was effectively replaced for the relevant personnel by their experience in Mozambique. Thus the training funds which would have been allocated to the Norway exercise could now be used to offset Mozambique costs. MoD had had to get Treasury agreement to such an offset.[97] No doubt MoD put forward a convincing case. By the time Geoff Hoon appeared before us he seemed less certain of the training value of Mozambique for MoD personnel, "it will depend. It will depend both on what precisely they are doing, their own level of expertise as well as how long the situation lasts for".[98] Of course we welcome the offset. We are also confident that the exercise will be of training value to MoD personnel. We suspect, however, that as convincing as any argument about training was the public and media pressure for the United Kingdom to send helicopters. We have been assured that both the Pumas and the RFA Fort George played an important role in the relief effort. We would, however, reiterate our support for the Secretary of State when she stressed the need to deploy DFID assistance on the basis of need and in coordination with other donors, and not simply in response to domestic political and media pressure.

59. Despite the official position that MoD is ready and willing to assist in humanitarian disasters, we consider that events in Mozambique demonstrate that MoD is not as yet flexible, speedy and cost-effective enough to be automatically and seriously considered for deployment by DFID. Given the skills of United Kingdom armed forces, the effectiveness they have displayed in previous emergencies, and the readiness of UK military personnel to assist in such disasters we consider this to be a sadly missed opportunity. We do not quarrel with the policy of MoD to charge DFID no loss costs for the deployment of its assets. These costs are, however, unnecessarily inflated by the excessive number of support staff insisted upon and by the tendency to offer a 'Rolls-Royce package' at the expense of flexibility and speedy deployment in theatre of essential equipment. Nor do we see why DFID should on every such occasion authorise and pay for a separate MoD recce team when they have their own personnel in the field. It is quite wrong that MoD should charge so much in a humanitarian emergency — there needs to be 'joined up government' on this issue.

60. It may be the case that DFID could have made more effort over the weekend of 25/26 February to ascertain whether UK-based MoD assets could be deployed. This should not, however, detract from the quality of DFID's overall response to the crisis. It would not have made any difference to when additional helicopters appeared on the scene. Events in Mozambique should prompt a reassessment of MoD availability for such humanitarian interventions and of communications between MoD and DFID. We recommend that there be a reconsideration of staffing requirements for MoD equipment in such emergencies. We also recommend that there be a sharing of expertise between DFID and MoD which will

result in more predictable costs; more joint training in the field which will enable either MoD or DFID staff to ascertain the requirement for MoD assets; and greater agreement on necessary provision in such crises.

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