Improving the Response of the International
Community to Humanitarian Disasters
74. Following the
flooding in Mozambique, questions have once again been raised
about the capacity of the international community to respond to
humanitarian crises, particularly to what some NGOs have termed
"rapid onset emergencies", a point made by Christian
Aid, "The slow, hesitant and uncoordinated response to the
catastrophic flooding that engulfed southern Africa, and particularly
Mozambique, in February 2000 demonstrates (yet again) that current
institutions and response mechanisms remain inadequate to address
what are likely to be increasing numbers of similar sorts of emergencies
in the coming decades".[123]
The need for an improved mechanism by which the international
community reacts to humanitarian disasters is all the more important
given that "With global warming there are going to be more
and more of these terrible disasters".[124]
75. Clare Short told the Committee,
"What we need is a worldwide system that can respond to emergencies
wherever they arise ... We have got the beginnings of an international
system which should be able to respond to emergencies ... but
it is weak and it needs strengthening and we have been trying
to work with the United Nations at getting that strength in the
system right across the world".[125]
76. We have already outlined some of
the shortcomings in the international response to the crisis in
Mozambique: the inadequate nature of meteorological and river-level
information in the region; the failure of donors to provide funding
for additional helicopters in mid-February when they were requested,
prior to the floods; OCHA's lack of a regular budget to procure
helicopters itself and its failure, given the lack of response
by donors, to locate additional helicopters and ensure their availability
on a "draw down basis" should the need for them have
arisen; and the lack of judgement on the part of OCHA when the
OCHA team withdrew two days after Cyclone Eline had hit the region.
However the Committee also agrees with the Secretary of State
for International Development when she stated, "I understand
the frustration that goes into the system, but the UN is the only
UN we have got and it is a completely precious instrument. It
is the only thing that can do, with real moral authority and respect
by the governments concerned, this co-ordinating job, and we have
to strengthen the capacity of the governments that are subject
to these disasters to cope themselves ... the real test is to
get the UN working, get regional systems and get governments more
prepared to cope with disasters".[126]
We agree with the Secretary of State —
unilateral responses from donors could well be resented by sovereign
governments. Whilst we have some criticisms of OCHA's response
to the crisis in Mozambique we nonetheless still believe that
the UN is the most appropriate international mechanism to respond
to humanitarian crises. The challenge facing the UN is to improve
its capacity to react to disasters.
77. Equally important, however, is preparedness on
the part of countries likely to be affected by future humanitarian
crises. This is particularly important for developing countries.
Christian Aid, in its memorandum to the Committee stated that
"poverty plays a key role in exacerbating natural disasters,
in increasing the number of people vulnerable to risk, and in
inhibiting a state's ability to be prepared for emergencies and
to deploy resources to respond. Major advances in disaster management
have been concentrated in the world's richer countries and in
those with high and sustained growth rates. It is 25 years since
a hurricane claimed more than 100 lives in North America, but
over 15,000 died in Honduras, the Western hemisphere's second
poorest country, after Hurricane Mitch in 1998, through poverty's
dual impact".[127]
78. Clare Short was keen to stress the importance
of preparedness in mitigating the effects of natural disasters,
"Remember this. They had the worst floods since independence
in Bangladesh, but because of Bangladesh's preparedness there
was a very tiny loss of life. Hurricane Mitch, complete lack of
preparedness, terrible loss of life. So even in the face of natural
disaster, if you have got good, efficient capacity, you can massively
save life and restore and then learn where to put houses and not
to have them on places that are vulnerable to flooding and mud
slides. It is a very urgent matter now and, in the face of global
warming and more instability and therefore more disasters, it
is important that we move this whole thing forward internationally".[128]
DFID was, therefore, "trying to build an international system
that has a much higher level of disaster preparedness" by
supporting the capacity of governments of countries likely to
be affected by natural disasters to respond.[129]
The Committee agrees that disaster preparedness on the part
of relevant developing countries is of paramount importance. We
would encourage DFID in its work of promoting an effective international
system of disaster-preparedness.
Future Priorities for
Mozambique
79. An International Donor Conference on reconstruction
in Mozambique is scheduled for 26 to 27 April in Rome, and will
have taken place bythe time this Report is published. In advance
of the conference the World Bank has produced 'A Preliminary Assessment
of Damage from the Flood and Cyclone Emergency'. This document
estimates that replacement of losses resulting from the recent
floods will range from about US$270 million to US$430 million,
depending on the standards used for reconstruction. Both Clare
Short and the representatives from OCHA stressed the importance
of continued funding for Mozambique. Ross Mountain said, "Please
do not forget Mozambique. Just because, alas, the TV cameras have
now left, it does not mean Mozambique does not need help; it does.
We have got through the spectacular piece of the disaster but
not the heavy piece. The heavy piece is the relief effort and
the rehabilitation effort and the reconstruction effort and a
lot more help is going to be required by the government and the
people of Mozambique in getting back to normalcy for those people
in those areas who have suffered more than they expected to this
year".[130]
80. The assessment gives details of reconstruction
costs in a number of sectors, including agriculture, health, education,
housing and private property, water supply and sanitation, energy,
roads, railways, private sector, and the environment (including
landmines). DFID has already provided support for the resumption
of agricultural production after the floods[131]
and in many of the other sectors, such as demining, education,
health and roads, DFID has been active as part of its long-term
development strategy in the country. It would be tragic if the
international community did not respond decisively and generously
to a country which has made real efforts to combat poverty and
which has in recent years known significant progress. We are
particularly concerned that assistance to Mozambique be effectively
coordinated with the anti-poverty strategy of the Government of
Mozambique, that it provide sustainable interventions which can
contribute to the development programmes of donors in the country,
and that adequate funds not only be committed to the country but
that there also be efficient disbursement.
Debt
81. Mozambique owes a total of US$8.2 billion in
external debt. Of this, US$5.7 billion is public or publicly guaranteed
(ie it is covered by the Paris Club and the HIPC Initiative).[132]
Mozambique is a heavily indebted poor country (HIPC), and is therefore
eligible for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative.[133]
We have, in three previous reports, discussed the terms both of
the original HIPC Initiative and the enhanced HIPC Initiative.[134]
Our broad conclusion in our most recent Report on the subject
was that the enhanced HIPC Initiative provides a satisfactory
mechanism for a permanent and sustainable exit from unpayable
debt.
82. In June 1999 Mozambique reached its Decision
Point under the original HIPC Initiative framework, and the net
present value[135]
of its public and publicly-guaranteed external debt was reduced
by 63 per cent, or US$1.7 billion.[136]
As a result, debt service payments were reduced from an average
of US$112 million per year (from 1993-98) to around US$73 million
per year (from 1999-2000).[137]
The projection of payments falling due during the period 2000-2008
was reduced from between US$70 and US$80 million per year before
any HIPC Initiative relief, to between US$40 and US$50 million
after relief under the original terms of the HIPC Initiative.[138]
Mozambique's debt burden has now been reduced further in accordance
with the terms of the enhanced HIPC Initiative. Mozambique's debt
will be reduced by a further nine per cent (by US$254 million
in net present value terms), to a level equivalent to one and
a half times its export earnings. Mozambique's debt payments will,
as a result, be reduced to around US$45 million per year.[139]
83. In the aftermath of the floods, there were widespread
calls for a 100 per cent write-off of all Mozambique's remaining
official external debts. The fundamental question raised by these
calls for total debt cancellation is whether the floods in Mozambique
necessitate a fundamental revision of the purpose of the HIPC
Initiative, so as to allow for total debt cancellation instead
of the current objective of debt sustainability. The answer to
this question must be no. There are obviously increased needs
for resources in reconstruction effort following the floods. There
is already some flexibility to allow for additional debt relief
to be provided beyond that required by the terms of the Initiative.
Some bilateral creditors, including the UK, have provided or pledged
further relief of bilateral debts for all HIPCs as they progress
through the Initiative (although we note that the timing and extent
of these pledges, and whether they will apply to all debts or
only those accrued before the cut-off date of 1984,[140]
is unclear). The World Bank, unable to increase the total amount
of debt relief to be provided beyond the levels agreed within
the HIPC framework, has responded to the disaster by front-loading
their share of debt relief in order to provide a moratorium on
all debt payments from Mozambique for the next twelve months.
We welcome the additional debt relief provided to Mozambique
by bilateral creditors, including the UK, and the front-loading
of debt relief by the World Bank. We call on the UK Government
to press its partners to honour their pledges fully, to apply
them to bilateral debts accrued both before and after Mozambique's
cut-off date of 1984, and at the earliest opportunity.
84. Additional debt relief, however, is irrelevant
to the problems caused by Mozambique's floods. We have noted elsewhere
in this Report the lack of capacity to spend those resources which
are already available to the Government of Mozambique. This brings
into question the value of a total debt write-off as an effective
way of channelling donor assistance in the reconstruction effort.
Furthermore, the calls for a cancellation of Mozambique's remaining
debts are not based on any analysis of debt sustainability, and
ignore the fact that, as we have discussed in previous Reports,
not all debt is burdensome, and some debt is in fact necessary.
The Government stated in written evidence that "[it] does
not believe it is necessary for all of Mozambique's external debt
to be written off. With the [reconstruction assistance] measures
described above and substantial development assistance to help
with reconstruction and long-term development Mozambique should
be able to sustain a high rate of growth and reduce poverty".[141]
We agree with this assessment.
85. Jubilee 2000 argued in written evidence that
"Governments hoping to qualify for debt relief are required
to produce a detailed poverty reduction strategy plan. Mozambique's
extra debt relief was delayed until such a plan had been completed.
However, Mozambique had already proven it would spend the money
on poverty reduction (as well as jumping numerous economic and
social hurdles) as a condition for completing the HIPC process.
Jubilee 2000 called it a bureaucratic nonsense that they had to
provide this again in order to get the extra relief".[142]
Oxfam also argued in written evidence that Mozambique's Decision
Point had been delayed 'because the World Bank and IMF were unsatisfied
with the standard of Mozambique's national plan to reduce poverty".[143]
DFID implied such delays in its written evidence, where it stated
that Mozambique's Completion Point "will probably be set
for early next year — to allow the Government of Mozambique
sufficient time to consult on their draft poverty reduction strategy".[144]
In a press release on 12th April 2000, the World Bank confirmed
that "Mozambique will receive the full amount of assistance
under the enhanced HIPC Initiative when it satisfies the requirements
for a floating Completion Point, including adoption of a participatory
poverty reduction strategy paper".[145]
86. The Government of Mozambique produced its first
Strategy for Poverty Reduction in 1995. This has been followed
by sector strategic plans in health and education, and more recently
the Council of Ministers' Lines of Action for the Eradication
of Absolute Poverty, which itself is based on a number of reviews
and studies. The Government has now been required to produce a
Poverty Action Plan, which will form the basis for its Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper. We fail to see why Mozambique should
be required to produce yet another poverty strategy paper before
receiving debt relief. Mozambique has a strong track record of
economic reform and poverty-focussed policies. This must be fully
recognised in the conditions attached to its debt relief under
the HIPC Initiative.
Conclusion
87. The floods in Mozambique, already an extremely
poor country, demanded a coordinated and effective response from
the international community. In examining in detail what took
place in February and March this year we have seen much to commend.
There was the brave and tireless work of the South African helicopter
crews. There was the courage of the Mozambicans themselves as
they coped with the floods and now rebuild their country. There
was the response of DFID, which was speedy, appropriate, effective
and generous. But we have also seen failures and inadequacies,
all too familiar from previous emergencies. There are lessons
for OCHA and the international community, and for DFID/MoD relations.
It is time for some evidence that such lessons can be learned.
123 Ev.p.63 Back
124
Q.67 Back
125
Q.23 Back
126
Q.104 Back
127
Ev.p.63 Back
128
Q.67 Back
129
Q.67 Back
130
Q339 Back
131
Q.14 Back
132 The
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, Table 4.18, p.
249 Back
133 The
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, Table 4.19, p.
253 Back
134 Third
Report from the Committee, Session 1997-98, 'Debt Relief' (HC
563), Fourth Report from the Committee, Session 1998-99, 'Debt
Relief and the Cologne G8 Summit' (HC 470), and Fourth Report
from the Committee, Session 1999-2000, 'Debt Relief - Further
Developments' (HC 251). Back
135 For
an explanation of Net Present Value, see Fourth Report from the
Committee, Session 1999-2000, 'Debt Relief - Further Developments'
(HC 251), Glossary, p. xvii Back
136 IMF
Factsheet, 7 April 2000, 'Debt Initiative for the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries, p. 6 (see www. imf.org/external/np/hipc/hipc.htm) Back
137 Evidence
from Jubilee 2000, p. 66. Back
138 Evidence
from DFID, p. 22 Back
139 Evidence
from Jubilee 2000, p. 67 Back
140 Evidence
from DFID, p. 22 Back
141 Evidence
from DFID, p. 22 Back
142 Evidence
from Jubilee 2000, p. 66 Back
143 Evidence
from Oxfam, p. 69 Back
144 Evidence
from DFID, p. 22 Back
145 World
Bank News Release No. 2000/297/S, 12 April 2000, 'Mozambique
Qualifies for an Additional US$600 million in debt relief under
Enhanced HIPC initiative, bringing its total debt reduction to
US$4.3 billion'. Back
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