House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Fifth Report

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Even if Mozambique did not receive much heavy rainfall as Cyclone Eline passed over the country, OCHA knew that Mozambique received not only its own rain but also the rain of countries upstream such as Zimbabwe and South Africa. Given these uncertainties, and the fact that Cyclone Eline did not exhaust itself over Mozambique but continued inland to rain over neighbouring countries, we consider that the departure of the OCHA team on 24 February was premature and a significant error of judgement (paragraph 15).

We are forced to conclude in this particular case that there was inadequate sharing of information between countries and experts in the region, both on rainfall and the rise in river levels. We recommend that, in the light of events in Mozambique, OCHA examine the standard of such information gathering and sharing in disaster-prone regions, and promote systems, in particular at a regional level, which improve the accuracy and timeliness of disaster warnings (paragraph 16).

The failure of OCHA in the days prior to 25 February to discuss with donors the availability of helicopters and their funding in the event of further flooding was a serious omission (paragraph 22).

We recommend that OCHA establish, with its partners, including the World Food Programme, its own call-down arrangements so that it can speedily ascertain the location and availability of emergency resources, such as helicopters, in the event of a humanitarian crisis. This is in our view a precondition of any effective international system to respond to such disasters (paragraph 23).

The Committee can only conclude that a lack of funding available to the OCHA team prior to 25 February meant that a sufficient number of helicopters were not available in Mozambique when they were required following the rise in the floodwaters (paragraph 25).

We support the principle that an increased proportion of OCHA's costs should be met from the regular UN budget (paragraph 26).

We trust that OCHA will conduct an assessment of its effectiveness in responding to the crisis in Mozambique. We look forward to receiving the results of this assessment (paragraph 27).

We must make clear at the outset that DFID's response to the crisis in Mozambique has been exceptional (paragraph 28).

We congratulate DFID for its funding from 26 February of the South African helicopters involved in search and rescue (paragraph 34).

We should also mention the provision by Malawi on 25 February of two helicopters, its entire fleet. This generosity and speedy response from a poor neighbouring country deserves praise (paragraph 35).

We agree with the Secretary of State that DFID's priority in a humanitarian crisis must be the saving of lives. To that end, DFID should not be tied to MoD resources but must be free to use the most appropriate, whatever their origin (paragraph 44).

The floodwaters rose overnight on Friday 25 February. On 26 February DFID contacted OCHA to impress on them the need to return to Mozambique immediately, ascertained that there were no MoD assets in the vicinity which could assist, provided US$1 million to ensure the South African helicopters in Mozambique kept flying, and activated their own emergency call-down arrangements. By any standard we consider this to be an impressively prompt response (paragraph 45).

DFID's response was, when judged against that of other agencies, speedy and effective (paragraph 46).

It is vital that effective links be established between international humanitarian organisations and international security organisations, such as NATO. A mechanism must be found to ensure that, for example, those heavy lift aircraft within NATO, including those of the USA, can be identified and deployed in humanitarian crises. We request a response from MoD on these issues (paragraph 50).

We have been assured that both the Pumas and the RFA Fort George played an important role in the relief effort. We would, however, reiterate our support for the Secretary of State when she stressed the need to deploy DFID assistance on the basis of need and in coordination with other donors, and not simply in response to domestic political and media pressure (paragraph 58).

Despite the official position that MoD is ready and willing to assist in humanitarian disasters, we consider that events in Mozambique demonstrate that MoD is not as yet flexible, speedy and cost-effective enough to be automatically and seriously considered for deployment by DFID. Given the skills of United Kingdom armed forces, the effectiveness they have displayed in previous emergencies, and the readiness of UK military personnel to assist in such disasters we consider this to be a sadly missed opportunity. We do not quarrel with the policy of MoD to charge DFID no loss costs for the deployment of its assets. These costs are, however, unnecessarily inflated by the excessive number of support staff insisted upon and by the tendency to offer a 'Rolls-Royce package' at the expense of flexibility and speedy deployment in theatre of essential equipment. Nor do we see why DFID should on every such occasion authorise and pay for a separate MoD recce team when they have their own personnel in the field. It is quite wrong that MoD should charge so much in a humanitarian emergency — there needs to be 'joined up government' on this issue (paragraph 59).

Events in Mozambique should prompt a reassessment of MoD availability for such humanitarian interventions and of communications between MoD and DFID. We recommend that there be a reconsideration of staffing requirements for MoD equipment in such emergencies. We also recommend that there be a sharing of expertise between DFID and MoD which will result in more predictable costs; more joint training in the field which will enable either MoD or DFID staff to ascertain the requirement for MoD assets; and greater agreement on necessary provision in such crises (paragraph 60).

We consider transparency to be an important aspect of DFID's accountability to Parliament and the taxpayer, and commend the inclusion of country-specific planning figures in the Departmental Report (paragraph 62).

DFID should of course take account of domestic deposits, the commitments of other donors, and capacity of the Government of Mozambique to spend in its consideration of its own expenditure. We welcome, however, the Secretary of State's willingness to consider increases to current expenditure plans in Mozambique and recommend that DFID reassess these plans, and inform the Committee of its conclusions, having taken into account the advice of the IMF on the use of Government of Mozambique deposits, the analysis from the World Bank of the economic impact of the floods, and the discussions at the donors' meeting in Rome. Given recent events, it would be useful for DFID to bring forward its review of the Mozambique Country Strategy Paper, currently scheduled for October 2001 (paragraph 65).

We do not see anything to criticise in the use of underspends to relieve distress, particularly when this involves keeping in Mozambique money previously allocated to its longer term development programme (paragraph 67).

Whether through planned budgeting or through the reallocation of underspends, we would be concerned if a necessary increase in humanitarian spending was at the expense of DFID's overall expenditure on long term development. Additional funds for DFID's emergency work and for DFID contingency reserves should be included in future planning figures and such increases met by additional Treasury funds to those initially announced (paragraph 67).

Events in Mozambique have, once again, called into question the ability of ECHO to react quickly and effectively to emergency situations. The fact that, two months after the first floods in Mozambique and two weeks after the serious flooding on 25 February, ECHO had failed to disburse a single penny to implementing partners sadly reflects the Committee's experience of ECHO in previous humanitarian disasters. Whilst we acknowledge the administrative constraints imposed on ECHO, we reiterate our concern that the EU should have a procedure for the speedy disbursement of funds. A key responsibility of any humanitarian organisation is the ability to react rapidly to a crisis — a responsibility that, it appears to us, ECHO continually fails to meet. The conclusions of a recent assessment of EC humanitarian activities are due to be discussed at the forthcoming Development Council in May. We recommend that this would be a suitable opportunity to review the activities, role and objectives of ECHO in response to humanitarian disasters, including means by which the disbursement of funds could be streamlined (paragraph 71).

We commend the efforts of the crews manning the South African helicopters and the South African Government for making the helicopters available (paragraph 72).

Whilst we have some criticisms of OCHA's response to the crisis in Mozambique we nonetheless still believe that the UN is the most appropriate international mechanism to respond to humanitarian crises. The challenge facing the UN is to improve its capacity to react to disasters (paragraph 76).

The Committee agrees that disaster preparedness on the part of relevant developing countries is of paramount importance. We would encourage DFID in its work of promoting an effective international system of disaster preparedness (paragraph 78).

We are particularly concerned that assistance to Mozambique be effectively coordinated with the anti-poverty strategy of the Government of Mozambique, that it provide sustainable interventions which can contribute to the development programmes of donors in the country, and that adequate funds not only be committed to the country but that there also be efficient disbursement (paragraph 80).

We welcome the additional debt relief provided to Mozambique by bilateral creditors, including the UK, and the front-loading of debt relief by the World Bank. We call on the UK Government to press its partners to honour their pledges fully, to apply them to bilateral debts accrued both before and after Mozambique's cut-off date of 1984, and at the earliest opportunity (paragraph 83).

We fail to see why Mozambique should be required to produce yet another poverty strategy paper before receiving debt relief. Mozambique has a strong track record of economic reform and poverty-focussed policies. This must be fully recognised in the conditions attached to its debt relief under the HIPC Initiative (paragraph 86).

The floods in Mozambique, already an extremely poor country, demanded a coordinated and effective response from the international community. In examining in detail what took place in February and March this year we have seen much to commend. There was the brave and tireless work of the South African helicopter crews. There was the courage of the Mozambicans themselves as they coped with the floods and now rebuild their country. There was the response of DFID, which was speedy, appropriate, effective and generous. But we have also seen failures and inadequacies, all too familiar from previous emergencies. There are lessons for OCHA and the international community, and for DFID/MoD relations. It is time for some evidence that such lessons can be learned (paragraph 87).