Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80
- 99)
THURSDAY 4 MAY 2000
MR PETER
HAIN MP, MR
PAUL HARE
AND MR
IAN BAILEY
Mr Berry
80. Is not the reason that the Government has—what
shall I describe it as—an ambiguous policy on arms exports
to Pakistan, not the fluidity of the domestic political situation
but the real fear that if there was to be an arms embargo the
substantial British economic interests in arms exports to Pakistan
would be completely put at risk by competition from France and
other competitors? Is that not the reason that the policy appears
to be somewhat ambiguous? We are not actually encouraging arms
sales, but we are not discouraging them. There is not an arms
embargo, it is just that we do not agree any licences. Is that
not the reason essentially?
(Mr Hain) When you look at a decision like this and
when you assess an application individually as we do against the
criteria, you bear in mind a lot of things and those considerations
might be one of them. I would have thought that more important
in this case, however, is what effect our policy will have on
the security situation and the tension in the country and how
it might react. Those matters are all taken in the round. I do
not think, however, it would be fair to say that the points that
you alluded to or described were the dominant ones, not at all.
Chairman
81. Just to confirm from the figures we quoted
in our report, and they come out of your reports, Minister, in
1997 the actual sales to Pakistan were worth £6.5 million
and in 1998 it was down to three quarters of a million pounds.
They are actual exports.
(Mr Hain) You quoted from our annual report?
82. Yes.
(Mr Hain) Yes, indeed.
83. Unless anybody else has anything on this
shall we move on? The third area we left over from our last report
was the situation in China. Again, this relates to our relations
within the context of the European Union arms embargo. In the
case of China there is a European Union arms embargo, unlike the
situation previously described there is an embargo agreed and
operated. We understand that in the absence of agreement on a
common interpretation it has been left to national governments
to interpret what is covered by this embargo and that inevitably
could lead to very considerable discrepancies in policy between
one government and another within the European Union even under
the cover of an arms embargo. The ban covers lethal weapons, machine
guns, large calibre weapons, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, specially
designed components relating to the above, military aircraft and
helicopters, vessels of war, any equipment which might be used
for internal repression. From your knowledge and understanding
and tracking of our fellow European Union partners, how does our
interpretation of that embargo differ from European Union partners,
such as France, Germany, Italy or Sweden? Are we more or less
strict than our European Union partners in defining the equipment
that is covered by the European Union arms embargo?
(Mr Hain) I think we are normally more strict than
France.
84. On the Richter scale.
(Mr Hain) I think in general terms.
85. France is nine on the Richter scale, is
it, assuming that nought is—
(Mr Hain) I do not think I should be tempted down
the road of figures on the Richter scale, Chairman, although it
is tempting. You will understand that it is not a full scale embargo,
the European Union embargo, therefore each Member State interprets
it on a case by case basis. I think that our policy actually stands
up quite well in terms of a comparable defence exporter.
86. Presumably we monitor these things because
it is a matter of concern as to the degree to which the embargo
is being enforced. You are saying that you think we are more strict
than France, what about Germany, Italy and Sweden and other active
marketeers?
(Mr Hain) I think I said generally we are tougher
than France. One of the problems is we do not know exactly what
France or Germany or anybody else actually sells to China because
their reports are not transparent. We are out on the lead in this.
All they do is tell us which licence they have refused, they do
not tell us what they have sold. Until they have the same kind
of national transparency, as we deserve credit for having, then
we will not be able to make that kind of comparison.
87. We track these things. We have got quite
an elaborate arrangement, defence attachés all over the
place, and we should therefore know what is being sold by others.
Since the European arms embargo have we any particular reason
to believe that any of our major European partners have breached
the spirit of this embargo?
(Mr Hain) I do not have that information to hand,
Chairman, so the answer is I will have to leave it at that.
88. Do any of your officials have that?
(Mr Hain) I do not think so.
89. We do not mind if anybody else offers the
information.
(Mr Hain) I think Mr Hare is reinforcing the point
I made that we are out in front on transparency, we have set an
example on our report. I get the impression that others are increasingly
being pressured by their own NGOs and their own parliamentarians
and others to copy us. When that happens, if it happens in France's
case, for example, we will be able to make that comparison much
more strictly. Obviously we keep an eye on things and our defence
attachés do know what is going on but I cannot give you
the kind of answer that you are seeking.
(Mr Hare) If I might just add to that. There is an
annual review of the operation of the Code of Conduct, of course,
and the fact that we have published these two annual reports is
fed into that. We report on our operation of the Code and other
countries are aware of the extent of information, the detail that
we obtain, and it is an objective to encourage them to match the
transparency which we have led on.
90. We published the review of the Code with
our report in February. Do other members of the European Union
notify us of what they sell to China, for example, despite the
embargo?
(Mr Hare) They do not strictly speaking under that,
no, but our example of the annual report, the information we give,
is fed into the review of the Code. As the Minister said, there
is no obligation in the Code to give partners the information
on what you are actually selling, it only comes into operation
on the harmonisation of the criteria. They are supposed to, and
they do, operate the same criteria as we do in relation to sales
but the actual operational features of the Code are on denial
notices.
91. While I can see the value of harmonising
the criteria, which is obviously an important feature and part
of the whole of the success of the European Code of Conduct, should
we not make greater efforts for the standardised interpretation
of a European arms embargo of this kind, a standard interpretation
of what is going to be allowed and not allowed?
(Mr Hain) Chairman, I would actually welcome the Committees'
advice on this. I think if the Committees looked into this matter
and came up with any advice or recommendations I would be interested
in looking at them.
Dr Godman
92. You seem to suggest that the monitoring
is less than effective, that governments have to rely to some
extent on NGOs and others, so you are not spying on each other,
the Member States, in relation to adherence to the Code. What
role has the European Commission to play in all of this? If you
are given information from governments of other Member States
are you allowed to go back and question them or do you leave this
to the NGOs and other bodies?
(Mr Hain) Of course, Dr Godman, you would not expect
me to say that Britain spies on anyone.
93. Of course not, no. You monitor.
(Mr Hain) I think this area deserves your consideration
and I would be interested in what you have to say about it.
94. What role has the European Commission in
this matter?
(Mr Hain) Export licensing is a national matter and,
therefore, in the end it is a Member State decision. It is up
to the Member States to seek to collectively enforce it.
95. If you have a European Union embargo, who
polices it? Is it individual Member States?
(Mr Hain) Yes. Unless I am not correct, I do not think
the Commission has a unit that is policing this Code. It is a
Code really and if there is an embargo then it is in line with
that Code.
96. You can literally drive a coach and horses
through this embargo.
(Mr Hain) No.
97. A government keen to secure big orders.
. . .
(Mr Hain) No, I do not think you could literally do
that in the way you describe. For example, if we found that a
fellow member was literally driving a coach and horses through
the arms embargo we would get pretty ratty about that.
98. But what would you do, apart from getting
ratty? To whom would you complain?
(Mr Hain) To them directly for a start.
99. And if they tell you to get lost, you would
go to the European Commission and raise it in the Council of Ministers,
would you not?
(Mr Hain) Indeed, we could do that. There could be
all sorts of options for us.
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