APPENDIX: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE'S
REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF SANCTIONS
The Government welcomes
the International Development Committee's Report on the Future
of Sanctions HC67(19992000) as a constructive and thoughtful
contribution to the ongoing international debate on the future
of sanctions, and has taken careful note of its conclusions.
The International Development Committee has
made a series of Conclusions and Recommendations. This response
addresses the issues raised in the same order as they are presented
in the Report. In certain cases the Government commentary applies
to more than one preceding recommendation.
1. The overall purpose of this Report is not to
comment on the merits of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy,
nor to justify or condemn their use against particular regimes,
but rather to assess the impact of sanctions on target regimes
in humanitarian/ developmental terms and to examine existing proposals
to reduce both unintended consequences and unwarranted harm (paragraph
4).
The Government shares the Committee's belief that
careful consideration must be paid to the humanitarian impact
of sanctions, and to ways to minimise any adverse consequences.
2. The fact that NGOs were not allowed the opportunity
formally to provide input into the Government's review of sanctions
must be regarded as a lost opportunity (paragraph 11).
We note the Committee's views. The Government welcomes,
and is at all times willing to give serious consideration to,
the views of NGOs with an interest in sanctions policy. We hold,
for example, regular consultations on Iraq with NGOs such as Save
the Children Fund. The Government notes that NGOs played a prominent
role in the seminar organised and hosted by the Overseas Development
Institute (ODI) in December 1998 at the request of the Department
for International Development (DFID). The seminar, funded by DFID,
was held in order to encourage a wide range of interested parties
to consider together the impact of sanctions and the prospects
for making sanctions "smarter". The report of that seminar
was published in May 1999.
3. We remain concerned that the Government has
published insufficient information to allow for an informed debate
on international sanctions policy both within domestic
civil society and within multilateral organisations of which the
UK is a member. There is still a need for a comprehensive statement
by the Government of its sanctions policy. We recommend that the
Government use the opportunity of its response to this Report
to make such a statement in a Command Paper (paragraph 12).
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs announced the conclusions of the Government's review of
sanctions policy to Parliament on 15 March 1999. Subsequently,
the Government has given a detailed explanation of its overall
policy on sanctions, and of the way in which work on the policy,
implementation and enforcement of sanctions is coordinated between
Government Departments, in the two Memoranda previously submitted
to the Committee by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The Government believes that the case for sanctions
remains compelling. They are the only coercive measure available
to the international community, other than the threat or use of
force, to respond to challenges to international peace and security.
As the UN SecretaryGeneral has noted in his Millennium report,
they are an integral element of the collective security provisions
of the UN Charter. We need them to bring into line those regimes
which breach the boundaries of acceptable behaviour, defy the
international community and ignore diplomatic efforts. UN sanctions
binding on all UN Member States, with clear and welldefined
objectives, can be expected to be the most effective.
The Government believes that to be as effective as
possible international sanctions should be carefully targeted
to have the maximum impact on the leadership of target regimes
or the capability of their armed forces, while minimising the
impact on ordinary people. They should be tailored to fit the
specific circumstances, and should have effective arrangements
for implementation, enforcement and monitoring. Humanitarian exemptions
and the mechanisms for them to be implemented effectively should
be built into sanctions regimes from the outset as appropriate,
and the international community should, as far as possible, monitor
and ensure the implementation of exemptions on the ground.
The Government is committed to promoting international
debate on sanctions policy and implementation. For that reason,
DFID decided to sponsor the abovementioned ODI seminar on
smarter sanctions in December 1998. The UK has since played an
active role in the seminars hosted by the Swiss Government at
Interlaken in 1998 and 1999 to formulate a policy of targeted
financial sanctions and in the seminar hosted by the German Government
in Bonn in November 1999 to consider how to enhance the role of
travel sanctions and arms embargoes as effective instruments of
UN policy. The conclusions of those seminars have since been published.
The UK strongly supported the Canadian proposal to establish a
working group on sanctions in the UN Security Council, and will
make it a priority to contribute constructively to the work of
this group. Our sanctions policy will remain under constant review
in the light of these and other international consultations and
of feedback received from UK civil society.
4. The Committee is concerned at the lack of reliable
information on the humanitarian impact of sanctions on Iraq. Relief
programmes will not be effective in the absence of such information
on the nature and causes of humanitarian distress in Iraq (paragraph
24).
5. UNICEF estimated that, if the substantial reductions
in child mortality achieved throughout Iraq in the 1980s had continued
into the 1990s, there would have been half a million fewer deaths
of children under five in the country as a whole in the eight
year period from 1991 to 1998 (paragraph 27).
6. The UN panel concluded that "the gravity
of the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people is indisputable
and cannot be overstated". Despite concerns about accurate
information, there can be no doubt that conditions inside Iraq
have declined appreciably since 1990. Evidence suggests that Iraqis
are lacking essential goods and services such as potable water,
nutrition and healthcare as well as longer term requirements such
as education and social stability (paragraph 32).
7. Jeremy Carver, Partner and Head of International
Law at Clifford Chance, argued that "It is not the imposition
or maintenance of international sanctions, but the policies of
the Iraqi Government which are the primary cause of this suffering
(paragraph 33).
8. There is a clear consensus that the humanitarian
and developmental situation in Iraq has deteriorated seriously
since the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions. Whilst
details are often difficult to come by or to verify, even those
who wish to maintain these sanctions accept that children, the
ill, the vulnerable in Iraqi society are suffering. It is obvious
that Saddam Hussein and his ruling elite continue to enjoy a privileged
existence. Sanctions have clearly failed to hurt those responsible
for past violations of international law. The deterioration of
infrastructure, the limited supply of food, the absence of drugs
all affect the poor to a disproportionate degree.
Not all this humanitarian distress is the direct
result of the sanctions regime. There is a tendency to blame all
such distress on sanctions in the absence of clear evidence. Moreover,
it appears that Saddam Hussein is quite prepared to manipulate
the sanctions regime and the exemptions scheme to his own ends,
even if that involves hurting ordinary Iraqi people. The responsibility
for the plight of the Iraqi people must ultimately lie with the
Iraqi leadership.
This does not, however, entirely excuse the international
community from a part in the suffering of the Iraqis. The reasons
sanctions were imposed in the first place were precisely the untrustworthiness
of Saddam Hussein, his well documented willingness to oppress
his own people and neighbours, his contempt for humanitarian law.
The international community cannot condemn Saddam Hussein for
such behaviour and then complain that he is not allowing humanitarian
exemptions to relieve suffering. What else could be expected?
A sanctions regime which relies on the good faith of Saddam Hussein
is fundamentally flawed.
We do not intend to set out a foreign policy agenda
for our relations with Iraq. It is clear from the resolution recently
presented to the UN by the United Kingdom Government that there
is a desire to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people. Whatever
the wisdom of the original imposition of sanctions, careful thought
must now be given as to how to move from the current impasse without
giving succour to Saddam Hussein and his friends. Any move away
from comprehensive sanctions should go hand in hand with measures
designed to target the real culprits, not the poor of Iraq but
their leadership. Possibilities include a concerted attempt to
target and either freeze or sequester the assets of Saddam Hussein
and those connected to him, and the indictment of Saddam Hussein
and his close associates as war criminals. To bring to justice
Saddam Hussein is also a humanitarian imperative and this should
be done without delay. We find it difficult, however, to believe
that there will be a case in the future where the UN would be
justified in imposing comprehensive economic sanctions on a country.
In an increasingly interdependent world such sanctions cause significant
suffering. However carefully exemptions are planned, the fact
is the comprehensive economic sanctions only further concentrate
power in the hands of the ruling elite. The UN will lose credibility
if it advocates the rights of the poor whilst at the same time
causing, if only indirectly, their further impoverishment (paragraphs
38 to 42).
The Government fully agrees with the conclusion of
the Committee that the responsibility for the plight of the Iraqi
people must ultimately lie with the Iraqi leadership. When sanctions
were imposed in 1990 in response to Iraq's illegal invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, it was envisaged that they would last for
only a matter of months, and even then there were humanitarian
exemptions for food and medicine built into the sanctions regime
from the outset. Since then, it has been the Iraqi Government
which has prolonged sanctions by refusing to comply with its obligations
to give up its weapons of mass destruction.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi Government has hindered the
provision of humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people. A scheme
to allow oils sales by Iraq to finance humanitarian goods was
agreed by the Security Council as early as August 1991, but was
never accepted by Iraq. A further scheme, the "oil for food"
programme, was agreed by the Security Council in 1995; the Iraqi
Government has persistently obstructed and manipulated the programme
ever since it finally allowed it to start in December 1996. It
is the Iraqi Government which sets the spending priorities under
"oil for food". These have never reflected the most
pressing needs of the Iraqi people. For example, the Iraqi Government
alone decides what goes into the daily food basket. The average
daily food ration at present is just 1993 calories, well below
the figure of 2463 kcal recommended by the UN Secretary-General
in 1998. Iraq has ignored UN recommendations to increase the protein
element in the basket and has been criticised by the UN for failing
to order enough basic foodstuffs to make up the food ration. It
has ignored calls to give greater attention to the provision of
basic pharmaceuticals, primary and preventive healthcare
services and material support for more effective distribution.
Over one quarter of all medical supplies delivered to Iraq since
the start of "oil for food" have not been distributed.
The Government of Iraq has never acted on the SecretaryGeneral's
recommendation to introduce supplementary feeding programmes for
those most in need. The Government of Iraq also denies access
to NGOs and other agencies who are concerned to help bring relief
to the Iraqi people.
The Government does not accept the claim that sanctions
do not impact on the Iraqi regime, which remains beyond the pale
for most of the international community. While there is evidence
of the regime using resources for the benefit of the elite and
not the majority, the effort which Saddam Hussein and his allies
put into having sanctions lifted clearly disproves any suggestion
that the regime is content with the present situation or finds
it to its advantage.
The Government fully shares the Committee's concerns
about the humanitarian situation in Iraq and agrees that the international
community has a responsibility to the Iraqi people. Our most recent
initiative aimed at improving that situation, UN Security Council
resolution 1284, reflected our longterm commitment to helping
the Iraqi people and created a new approach to the whole Iraq
issue. SCR 1284 unconditionally lifted the ceiling on the amount
of oil Iraq can export under "oil for food". With Iraq's
oil revenues at current prices back to if not above
their peak historical level of around $15 bn per annum, seen only
briefly in 1980, this means a potential $10 billion a year is
available for the humanitarian programme. In addition, the Security
Council has adopted a new resolution doubling the amount of revenue
available for spare parts for Iraq's oil industry to $600 million
over a six month period. The Iraqi Oil Minister has just announced
that Iraq will further increase its exports over a matter of weeks
by about 700,000 barrels a day, taking its overall production
to over 3 million barrels a day.
The "oil for food" programme allows Iraq
to import, in addition to food and medicine, spare parts to rehabilitate
parts of the civilian infrastructure, including the water and
electricity sectors and goods for the education sector. SCR 1284
provides for more and more timely provision of humanitarian goods.
It also approves the use of "oil for food" revenue to
meet local costs including those relating to training. It also
calls on the Government of Iraq to address effectively the needs
of vulnerable groups, including children, something we and others
including the UN SecretaryGeneral have been calling for
since the start of "oil for food". The resolution also
offers Iraq the prospect of the suspension of sanctions if it
cooperates. Iraq and its allies often claim that Iraq has nothing
to hide. If that is so, then Iraq has everything to gain by accepting
resolution 1284.
The Government shares the Committee's concerns over
the high rates of child and maternal mortality which are being
reported, although we note that any statistics are dependent on
Government of Iraq input and that UNICEF's figure is based on
the considerable assumption that, were it not for sanctions, the
substantial reduction in death rates in under fives in the 1980s
would have continued throughout the next 10 years. The UK has
always advocated and supported initiatives aimed at better targeting
of humanitarian efforts to help the most vulnerable.
On the issue of information on the humanitarian situation
in Iraq, there is regular reporting from the UN on implementation
of the "oil for food" programme. The Government is also
in regular contact with those NGOs who still operate in Iraq.
But we share the Committee's desire for information from other
reliable sources. This would enable us and other donors better
to direct assistance to ensure that the most vulnerable receive
it. The effectiveness of these relief programmes remains severely
constrained by the behaviour of the Government of Iraq. We call
on that Government to allow greater access by NGOs and other agencies
to increase the volume of aid and to enable it to be delivered
more effectively. We also support the SecretaryGeneral's
call to the Iraqi Government to improve cooperation and access
for UN observers in Iraq. This would improve the implementation
of "oil for food" and help ensure that this programme
brings maximum benefit to the Iraqi people.
We support the Committee's recommendation that targeted
states must be adequately integrated once sanctions have been
lifted. Each case will of course have its own particular characteristics.
When sanctions are lifted in Iraq, the initial need for outside
assistance and investment will be partly offset by the country's
large oil resources.
Regarding the human rights situation, the UN Special
Rapporteur concluded in his most recent report that he had observed
no improvement in the situation of human rights in Iraq. In fact
the overall human rights situation was worsening. The prevailing
regime of systematic human rights violations was contrary to Iraq's
many international obligations, and remained a threat to peace
and security in the region.
The Government shares the view that Saddam Hussein
and other members of his regime should be brought to account for
the atrocities they have committed over the years. The Government
supports INDICT and other organisations which seek to bring them
to justice. On the question of frozen assets, the UK already makes
concerted efforts to target and freeze the assets of the Iraqi
regime. We have followed up all leads, and as of December 1999
746 million US dollars in Iraqi assets in the UK had been frozen,
in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 661.
The Government believes that every effort should
be made by the international community, when imposing future sanctions
regimes, to ensure that these are carefully designed to have the
maximum impact on the target regime, while minimising the risk
of harm to ordinary people. We give full weight to such considerations
when negotiating on sanctions in the UN Security Council, the
EU and other international organisations imposing sanctions of
which the UK is a member. Comprehensive economic sanctions should
be reserved for the most exceptional cases, such as Iraq, where
the objective is to contain and isolate a very serious transgressor.
In the case of Iraq, comprehensive economic sanctions have, for
the past nine years, significantly reduced the threat from Saddam
Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction.
9. We criticise the United Nations for not protesting
immediately on the imposition of draconian sanctions against Burundi.
The UN has a duty to monitor regional sanctions regimes and intervene
when human rights are ignored or humanitarian needs neglected.
We recommend that such a mechanism be implemented as soon as possible
(paragraph 46).
10. It is essential that no sanctions regime should
be imposed without accompanying measures to ensure that humanitarian
goods and services are exempted from its provisions (paragraph
47).
11. The experience of Sierra Leone raises questions
about the delegation of authority to police UN or other sanctions
regimes or regional or subregional bodies. The UK, as a
leading member of a number of sanctioning organisations, should
ensure that whenever responsibility for the enforcement of sanctions
is delegated to regional or subregional authorities, that
those authorities should respect the provisions of the resolution
and international human rights, including provisions for the exemption
of humanitarian goods and services. If they fail to do so, then
their authority to enforce sanctions should be rescinded. The
Government should not support any sanctions regime UN,
EU or regional that does not make adequate provision for
the exemption of humanitarian goods and services(paragraph 49).
The Government notes the Committee's views on the
impact of regional sanctions regimes. We will make representations
to those responsible in any case where we see reason for concern
that, as a result of sanctions, human rights are being ignored
or humanitarian needs neglected. Where necessary, we will bring
the matter to the attention of the UN Security Council. This includes,
of course, those rare cases where responsibility for implementation
of UN sanctions may have been delegated by the Security Council
to a regional organisation. The Government supports the development
of closer links on sanctionsrelated issues between the UN
and regional organisations imposing sanctions.
The Government agrees that no sanctions regime should
ever be imposed without the inclusion from the outset of humanitarian
exemptions as appropriate. The Government will do its utmost to
ensure that all organisations of which the UK is a member give
priority, when imposing sanctions, to targeting those sanctions
effectively. We will urge other regional organisations imposing
sanctions to do likewise.
The Government notes the Committee's concern at the
humanitarian impact of the regional sanctions regime imposed on
Burundi in 1996, but recalls that UN Security Council Resolution
1072, adopted within a month of the imposition of sanctions, encouraged
the Secretary-General, in consultation with the neighbouring States,
other Member States, the OAU and international humanitarian organisations,
to establish mechanisms to ensure the safe and timely delivery
of humanitarian relief throughout Burundi. Humanitarian exemptions
to the sanctions regime were eventually made in response to intensive
lobbying by the UK and the rest of the international community.
On Sierra Leone, the Government notes that the UK
is at the forefront of efforts to secure lasting peace and stability
after over eight years of brutal conflict. We have committed over
65 million pounds to Sierra Leone since March 1998 when the democratically
elected Government was restored, and British MoD teams have helped
the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world to deploy. Britain
is helping to restore effective government, and is playing the
leading role in the disarmament of former combatants. And British
Ministry of Defence teams have helped the largest UN peacekeeping
force in the world to deploy.
12. We recommend that, in its response to this
Report, the Government give an account of its policy towards regional
sanctions regimes, including means by which the Government could
provide assistance to developing countries to build their capacity
to design, implement and monitor regional sanctions regimes in
accordance with humanitarian principles (paragraph 50).
The Government urges all regional organisations imposing
sanctions to consider carefully how those sanctions can most effectively
be targeted, implemented and enforced. Developing countries may
indeed benefit from assistance in building their capacity to manage
sanctions in accordance with humanitarian principles and to implement
them effectively. The Government believes that the UN Secretariat
can potentially be a valuable source of advice to developing countries
in this regard. We will explore on a multilateral basis within
the UN the options for the provision of such assistance.
13. The Committee recognises that sanctions, unless
carefully targeted, have the capacity to kill more children than
armed warfare (paragraph 54).
14. International human rights instruments provide
widely accepted principles of conduct in international affairs
against which decisions to impose sanctions should be measured
and justified (paragraph 56).
The Government notes the Committee's comments, and
agrees that sanctions regimes should always be designed to be
in conformity with international human rights instruments.
15. The Committee is concerned at the disproportionate
impact of sanctions on certain groups in society (paragraph 59).
16. The Committee recommends that all sanctions
regimes should be accompanied by regular independent impact assessments.
Sanctioning states and organisations should, as a matter of policy
in the course of resolutions, affirm that vulnerable populations
should be spared the adverse consequences of sanctions (paragraph
59).
The Government notes the Committee's recommendations
and agrees that sanctions regimes should be designed, implemented
and monitored as carefully as possible to minimise any adverse
impact on vulnerable groups in society who have no connection
to the target regime. This underscores the importance of having
good quality baseline data in order to track impact.
17. We recommend that, in its response to this
Report, the Government provide the Committee with details of existing
measures taken to implement financial sanctions and a strategy
for the relevant government departments to improve the effectiveness
of such implementation, including the potential for the use of
interdiction software. We are not convinced that enough effort
is being expended by the United Kingdom Government to introduce
effective procedures to implement financial sanctions. The United
Kingdom is a world financial centre and a permanent member of
the UN Security Council. If the United Kingdom does not take financial
sanctions seriously, this fatally weakens the prospects for effective
international action (paragraph 71).
The UK currently implements financial sanctions against
four targets: Iraq, Angola (UNITA), Afghanistan (the Taliban)
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In respect of Iraq, UK
financial institutions are required to freeze all Iraqi accounts
and gold bullion in the UK. In respect of Angola, Afghanistan
and Serbia/FRY, institutions are required to freeze the funds
of named targets.
The Government takes financial sanctions very seriously,
and expends considerable effort in implementing them. Standards
of implementation are already high, but we are nonetheless constantly
reviewing how its effectiveness might be enhanced. The fact that
the UK is a world financial centre does not necessarily mean that
targeted accounts are held here. On the contrary, the high standard
of regulation in the UK is likely to lead sanctions targets looking
for a safe haven for their money to avoid any contact with UK
financial institutions.
The Committee asked about the potential for the use
of interdiction software. Interdiction software is used by US
financial institutions to detect transactions which might violate
sanctions. In the UK, it is the responsibility of financial institutions
to ensure that targeted accounts are frozen, and up to them to
decide which systems they wish to use to achieve this end. The
Government is committed to ensuring compliance with financial
sanctions. Failure to comply with financial sanctions is a criminal
offence. Any suggestion of a sanctions breach will be investigated,
and referred for prosecution as appropriate.
18. The Committee recognises the importance of
information gathering in the implementation of sanctions. Financial
sanctions will not be viable in the absence of timely and accurate
information on the targeted states and individuals. In its review
of sanctions, the Government fails to address the issue of information
gathering. We believe that the most appropriate level at which
to coordinate and direct financial sanctions is at the international
level (paragraph 77).
The Government agrees that information gathering
and exchange is vital to the successful implementation of financial
sanctions. We believe that sanctions work best at the multilateral
level, and that national action to implement and enforce UN sanctions
should be coordinated internationally to be as effective and consistent
as possible. It is important for Member States to seek information
on target accounts proactively and share that information internationally
as appropriate to ensure that as many target accounts as possible
can be frozen. UK experts have regular contact with their overseas
counterparts. Information is regularly exchanged between the UK
and other UN and EU Member States, and international meetings
on sanctions are held regularly.
19. At present, the UN Secretariat lacks the ability
to gather the necessary information and the quality of national
reporting to individual sanctions committees is poor. We consider
it totally unacceptable that there is no individual or organisation
within the United Nations with overall responsibility for targeting
financial sanctions, for example against those who continue to
enrich themselves while their people suffer. We recommend that
the United Kingdom argue and gather support for the establishment
of a properly staffed and financed sanctions unit within the United
Nations to receive and coordinate information on financial sanctions
enforcement and to press national governments to implement such
financial sanctions promptly and effectively, in line with UN
resolutions. In addition, an Office of Foreign Assets Control,
on similar lines to that in the USA, should be set up in the United
Kingdom (paragraph 78).
We agree that the UN Secretariat has an active role
to play in amassing and analysing as much information as possible
to identify the targets of financial sanctions. Target accounts
need to be identified and frozen swiftly before the funds are
spirited away elsewhere. There is scope for the Secretariat to
be more active in this area, and the UK will continue to lobby
for this in New York.
The Government believes that there is a need for
a dedicated and properly resourced capacity within the Secretariat
to provide advice and support to the Security Council, the Sanctions
Committees, Member States and regional organisations on all aspects
of sanctions, including the targeting, implementation and enforcement
of financial sanctions (see our response to Paragraph 28 below).
We do not share the Committee's view that an Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on US lines should be established
in the UK. The bulk of OFAC's time and resources is devoted to
unilateral US sanctions (notably against Cuba and Iran) and to
action against drugs and illegal drug proceeds. The UK has never
imposed unilateral financial sanctions. We consider that financial
sanctions need to be multilateral to be effective.
In the UK, policy on financial sanctions rests with
HM Treasury, whose agents, the Bank of England, are responsible
for their implementation. There is a fully resourced unit at the
Bank dedicated to work on financial sanctions, who carry out work
similar to that of OFAC's licensing and compliance divisions.
They have a strong track record, and the Government is satisfied
with their operation.
20. The Committee recommends that the Government,
in its response, include an assessment of the implication of offshore
financial centres for the implementation of financial sanctions
regimes (paragraph 81).
Financial centres, such as some offshore centres,
that operate strict banking secrecy, or whose regulatory regimes
fail to enable authorities to identify account holders or beneficial
owners, are cause for concern. Their activities can reduce the
effectiveness of the implementation of sanctions. Several international
bodies are currently promoting initiatives to improve standards
of regulation and international cooperation.
The UK implements UN financial sanctions in its Overseas
Territories and Crown Dependencies by means of Orders in Council
under the UN Act 1946. We have, in addition, implemented the EU
financial sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in the Overseas Territories (with the exception of Bermuda, which
is in the process of putting its own legislation in place) by
means of Orders under the Royal Prerogative. These sanctions have
also been implemented by the Crown Dependencies under their own
legislation. These jurisdictions are all committed to complying
with accepted international standards of financial regulation,
and international standards to combat money laundering. This will
boost their ability to implement financial sanctions effectively.
21. The Committee has heard very little of any
efforts being made to identify and seize hidden Iraqi assets such
as those described by the Iraqi opposition groups (paragraph 83).
The Government has no powers to sequestrate or to
seize Iraqi assets; we only have powers to freeze them. The Bank
of England has acted promptly upon all information received in
its quest to freeze the funds of the Iraqi regime, and as of December
1999 746 million US dollars in Iraqi assets in the UK had been
frozen.
22. The Committee welcomes the work of the Interlaken
Seminars in elaborating a model law for the implementation of
UN financial sanctions. In its response, we recommend that the
Government give details of what, if any, aspects of United Kingdom
law need to be changed to bring it into line with the Interlaken
model law on the implementation of UN financial sanctions (paragraph
86).
The substance of the Interlaken model law is already
reflected in UK law by virtue of the United Nations Act 1946,
although there are some technical differences. The 1946 Act, like
the Interlaken model law, enables the effective implementation
of all UN sanctions, not only financial sanctions.
Jeremy Carver (who chaired the relevant Interlaken
working group) said in his evidence to the Committee "We
have a United Nations Act, the 1946 Act, which is very good, clean,
simple and it works...". Indeed, the model law, which is
aimed at States with no effective enabling legislation, was drawn
up after consideration of the UK legislation and of the enabling
legislation already in place in other States.
23. We recommend that there be a concerted international
effort, sponsored by the United Nations, to introduce by a target
date in all countries the necessary legislation for the implementation
of UN sanctions regimes, including financial legislation. For
developing countries, donors should consider how they can assist
in this important aspect of capacity building (paragraph 89).
All UN Member States have a binding obligation to
put in place the necessary legislation to implement UN sanctions
as soon as possible after they have been agreed. Many Security
Council resolutions imposing sanctions require Member States to
notify the Sanctions Committee by a set date of the steps they
have taken to implement those sanctions. The Government agrees
that the UN should actively encourage Member States to fulfil
these obligations. We will consider with the other members of
the Security Council what steps might help ensure that all Member
States fulfil their obligations in this regard, and will put forward
the idea of a target date for discussion in the new Security Council
working group on sanctions.
The Government notes the Committee's call for donors
to consider how they can assist developing countries to put implementing
legislation in place. We consider that the UN Secretariat can
play a valuable role in this regard, as a centre of expertise
on sanctions.
24. The Committee believes that although serious
difficulties remain in the tracking of financial transactions
and location of financial assets, targeted financial sanctions
appear to be workable. It is apparent that major efforts will
need to be expended to ensure that the international community
as a whole, and individual member states in particular, acquire
the necessary technical expertise to implement and enforce such
sanctions (paragraph 91).
The Government shares the Committee's view that targeted
financial sanctions are workable. Effective implementation and
enforcement at international level will require a concerted effort
to pierce the client confidentiality and banking secrecy laws
which exist in a number of jurisdictions. The UK is already tackling
these issues, in the context of the fight against financial crime
and money laundering.
25. We reiterate our recommendations made in previous
reports that the Government tighten controls on arms brokers and
introduce enduse controls and push for similar measures
to be adopted throughout the EU (paragraph 97).
The Government notes the Committee's support for
tighter controls on trafficking and brokering and for international
action on this matter. The Government's White Paper on Strategic
Export Controls contained proposals for tighter controls, and
those proposals are currently under review in the light of responses
received. The Government will announce proposals for new export
control legislation, including on trafficking and brokering, following
its review of the White Paper proposals. We also remain committed
to constructive participation in international discussions on
trafficking and brokering, and have made clear to EU partners
that the UK would in principle be in favour of uniform EU controls.
The Government is already committed to ensuring that
we do not license the export of strategic goods which might be
diverted to endusers in embargoed destinations, and is considering
what further steps, including at international level, might be
taken to minimise the risk of diversion to these and other undesirable
endusers. In addition, EU Member States are currently considering
the possible inclusion in a new EC Regulation on DualUse
Goods of a "military enduse" control, under which
goods not otherwise subject to export control would become so
if they were intended for certain types of military enduse
in destinations subject to UN and EU arms embargoes.
26. The failure to enforce effectively the sanctions
regime against UNITA is a scandal which must be urgently addressed
by the international community (paragraph 98).
The Government agrees that there is an urgent need
for a concerted effort by the international community to ensure
that sanctions against UNITA are implemented and enforced effectively,
in order to bring them back to the negotiating table. For too
long, Angola has been ravaged by conflict. We cannot allow the
misery to continue. In this regard, we welcome the work of UN
Angola Sanctions Committee Chairman Robert Fowler, and the report
of the Panel of Experts, presented to the Security Council on
15 March. The UK has worked closely with Ambassador Fowler, Chairman
of the UN Sanctions Committee, and has supported the work of the
Expert Panel both financially and operationally. The Government
will give serious consideration to the Panel's recommendations
on how these sanctions can be made to bite, and will support decisive
action by the Security Council. The UK will continue to enforce
sanctions against UNITA rigorously and to urge other Member States
to do likewise. We will continue to pass as much information as
possible on suspected violations of sanctions to the UN Angola
Sanctions Committee.
27. We are concerned that, as a whole, the quality
of national reporting to sanctions committees remains low, thereby
reducing the effectiveness of sanctions regimes. We welcome the
Minister's assurances that the Government will be giving an extra
priority to intelligence gathering in regard to sanctions regimes
imposed by organisations of which the UK is a member. We request
details of the further action, procedures and resources dedicated
to intelligence gathering with regard to sanctions regimes. The
UK, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has an important
role to play in encouraging other member states to be more active
in the monitoring and enforcement of UN sanctions regimes (paragraph
100).
The UK takes very seriously its obligation to pass
information on violations of sanctions to the UN Sanctions Committees,
and does so frequently. We will continue to take every opportunity
to urge other Member States to do likewise. The Government can
confirm that extra priority has been given to ways in which the
UK can contribute to improving the effectiveness of sanctions
regimes. In accordance with longstanding practice, we do
not comment on intelligence activity.
28. The Committee very much welcomes the initiative
of Ambassador Fowler in establishing the expert studies and commends
the Government for supporting the initiative. This does not address,
however, the more general problem of the lack of capacity of the
sanctions committees to monitor and enforce sanctions effectively.
The UN must provide the human and financial resources necessary
for the sanctions committees to do their jobs properly. We also
ask the Government, in its response, to spell out what proposals
it is putting to the UN to improve the capacity of sanctions committees.
In addition to improving the capacity of sanctions committees,
there is also a need to improve the capacity of countries surrounding
a targeted state to monitor and restrict cross border trade in
prohibited goods and services (paragraph 101).
The Government shares the Committee's view that the
UN Sanctions Committees need more support from the UN Secretariat
in order to carry out their responsibilities more effectively.
An FCO/DFID fact finding mission visited New York at the end of
March to explore the scope for strengthening the capacity of the
Secretariat to provide advice on all aspects of sanctions to the
Security Council, the Sanctions Committees and Member States.
The mission met with the Secretariat, Security Council sanctions
experts and other interested parties, including NGOs. We will
be considering how to take this work forward in the light of their
report. In formulating our proposals, we will also want to take
account of the views of other Security Council members, and look
forward to a productive dialogue on the way ahead in the new Security
Council working group on sanctions established under the Canadian
Presidency.
The Government notes, however, that the ultimate
responsibility for implementation and enforcement of UN sanctions
lies with individual Member States. We urge all States to conscientiously
fulfil their obligations in this regard.
29. We trust that the Government will actively
support and participate in the German Government's attempt to
elaborate what has been described as "the next step"
of smarter sanctions: arms embargoes and travel sanctions (paragraph
102).
The Government will continue to play an active role
in the follow up to the conference hosted by the German Government
in Bonn last December on arms embargoes and travel sanctions.
Representatives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and HM
Customs participated in the initial Bonn conference, a sanctions
expert from the UK Mission to the UN took part in the subsequent
working group meeting on travel sanctions held in New York in
February and the Government intends to participate in future working
group activity.
30. We welcome the publication of the draft Bill
to ratify the United Kingdom's commitment to the international
criminal court. We trust that the Bill will be included in the
legislative programme of the next session to ensure that the United
Kingdom is one of the first 60 states to ratify the agreement
so as to bring it into force (paragraph 103).
We note the Committee's support for the draft Bill
to ratify the UK's commitment to the International Criminal Court.
We are committed to introducing the Bill as soon as the Parliamentary
timetable allows.
31. The sudden withdrawal of development assistance
can often have a similar or greater impact to the use of traditional
sanctions. Full consideration should be given to the humanitarian/developmental
impact of withdrawing governmenttogovernment development
assistance (paragraph 109).
The scale of governmenttogovernment development
assistance is based on a careful analysis of a range of factors,
including levels of poverty, on government economic and social
policies and on the quality of governance. The impact on the poor
is a major factor in considering whether to suspend governmenttogovernment
development assistance.
32. The Committee requests that the Government
provides the Committee with details of all countries to whom it
has suspended development assistance for political reasons. This
list should be updated annually in the Department for International
Development's Departmental Annual Report (paragraph 110).
Since the present Government came to office in May
1997, governmenttogovernment development assistance
has been suspended on two occasions. Our bilateral cooperation
programme with the Government of Pakistan was suspended on 15
October 1999 in response to the military coup of 12 October. We
continue to provide assistance to poor people through nongovernmental
channels. Our bilateral cooperation programme with the Government
of Sierra Leone was suspended on 27 May 1997, in response to the
military coup. This programme recommenced in July 1999 following
the Lome peace agreement.
The Government has continued the suspension of governmenttogovernment
development assistance where it was imposed by previous administrations
to countries such as Sudan and Afghanistan.
Future DFID Departmental Reports will comment on
any changes in the status of a governmenttogovernment
programme.
33. The Committee welcomes DFID's use of development
partnerships to encourage good governance, respect for human rights
and the elimination of corruption (paragraph 112).
The Government notes the Committee's endorsement
of its approach.
34. We believe that the provision of oil
described as humanitarian by the Minister solely to municipalities
controlled by opponents of Milosevic serves to undermine fatally
the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian assistance. It
is one thing to support principled humanitarian aid but quite
another to use the risk of diversion as an excuse to supply such
assistance solely to one's political allies (paragraph 117).
A humanitarian exemption was written into the EU
oil embargo on the FRY from the very outset, and still applies.
The Energy for Democracy programme, under which the EU donates
heating oil to certain oppositioncontrolled municipalities
in Serbia, has obvious humanitarian effects, as Mr Hain noted
in his evidence to the Committee. But it is also political in
intention, as he similarly made clear. It is a way in which the
EU expresses its solidarity with the Serbian people as
opposed to the regime. For that reason, it is being resourced
not from the humanitarian budget of the European Community Humanitarian
Office (ECHO), but from the general European Community programme
for the area (OBNOVA).
The Government agrees entirely with the Committee
that humanitarian aid should be directed at those in greatest
humanitarian need: this is one of DFID's "Principles for
a New Humanitarianism". ECHO have made humanitarian assistance
allocations where they see the greatest needs. However, largescale
reconstruction assistance to Serbia is out of the question while
a man indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) for war crimes is President of the FRY, and while his corrupt
regime controls the economy of the country.
35. More generally, we agree with the views of
Dennis MacNamara and others on the danger that the definition
of humanitarian, as opposed to developmental, assistance is too
tightly drawn. The result is an effective embargo on what are
in fact humanitarian requirements (paragraph 118).
In its general provision of assistance, the Government
does not take a rigid view of the boundaries which categorise
humanitarian and developmental assistance. There is close cooperation
between the DFID departments responsible for humanitarian and
for developmental assistance.
In the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
to which Mr McNamara referred, EU sanctions are in place, but
we have been monitoring the assessment of the humanitarian situation
by OCHA (the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).
In the case of Iraq, as the response to para 6 above makes clear,
spare parts for the rehabilitation of Iraq's water, electricity
and oil sectors are permissible under the "oil for food"
programme.
36. The "dumping" of humanitarian assistance
which undermines local production, is unacceptable and should
have been avoided through prior impact assessments (paragraph
120).
37. The humanitarian response to the imposition
of sanctions must take account of local procurement and of the
local economy in the provision of humanitarian assistance (paragraph
120).
Humanitarian assistance should be provided on the
basis of a rigorous assessment of need. DFID's analysis includes
consideration of how the provision of such assistance may impact
on the local economy, including its production and supply chains.
In the case of Iraq, the Government has always been concerned
about the effect of the "oil for food" programme on
agriculture and on farmers' livelihoods. We ensured that resolution
1284 included provision to allow local procurement and for payment
of local costs, including payment for services and training, to
be met from "oil for food" revenues.
38. Sanctions regimes must take account of issues
such as the level of economic development in the country targeted
and groups that are likely to be disproportionately affected by
the imposition of sanctions. Furthermore, sanctions regimes should
be sufficiently flexible so as to allow for finetuning in
response to any unforeseen adverse humanitarian consequences (paragraph
121).
The Government agrees with this recommendation. That
is why, before the UK signs up to any new sanctions regime, an
interdepartmental meeting is held to consider all the possible
implications. DFID's assessment of any potential humanitarian
impact is taken fully into account, and is instrumental in formulating
the Government's negotiating position. The Government also agrees
that, where appropriate humanitarian exemptions have not been
put in place from the outset, sanctions regimes should be finetuned
as necessary to provide for these.
39. The Committee endorses the findings of the
Note by the President of the Security Council on the Work of the
Sanctions Committees and recommends that a standing list of lifesaving
supplies be agreed, in consultation with national, international
and nongovernmental providers of humanitarian aid, for exemption
from sanctions regimes (paragraph 127).
The Government endorses the finding of the Note that
there should be exemptions from UN sanctions regimes for foodstuffs,
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, and that basic or standard
medical and agricultural equipment and basic or standard educational
items should also be exempted. At present, this recommendation
only applies to the UN sanctions against Iraq. Exemption lists
of agricultural items, educational items, medical items and foodstuffs
have already been approved by the UN Iraq Sanctions Committee.
The Committee will continue to review the lists and add items
to them on a regular basis.
40. The Committee further recommends that other
means of expediting the delivery of humanitarian goods and services
be considered including institutional exemptions for members of
the UN system, their nongovernmental implementing partners,
and international members of the ICRC and IFRC, coupled with increased
enduse monitoring (paragraph 131).
The Government notes this recommendation and will
give it careful consideration in negotiating future sanctions
regimes.
41. The Committee agrees that whenever sanctions
are imposed, serious thought must also be given to, and preparations
made for, a future in which they have been lifted (paragraph 133).
42. The Committee believes that sanctioning organisations
have an obligation to ensure that targeted states are adequately
reintegrated into the international community once sanctions have
been lifted to ensure that the long term humanitarian impact on
the population is minimised. We recommend that once sanctions
have been lifted donors bilateral and multilateral
should agree a coordinated strategy for postsanctions reconstruction.
We invite the Government, in its response to this Report, to provide
the Committee with details of any preparations it is making for
the eventual lifting of existing sanctions regimes such as those
imposed against Iraq (paragraph 136).
The Government agrees that, when imposing sanctions,
thought must be given to the exit strategy. This is particularly
important where comprehensive economic sanctions have been imposed.
The Government supports the Committee's recommendation that targeted
states must be adequately reintegrated into the international
community once sanctions have been lifted. Each case will of course
have its own particular characteristics. A coordinated approach
between bilateral and multilateral donors is desirable. When sanctions
on Iraq are lifted, the initial need for outside assistance will
be partly offset by the country's large oil resources. The international
community will want to ensure at that time that adequate humanitarian
supplies are reaching those who need them. The Government of Iraq
will need to allow greater access to Iraq by NGOs for a comprehensive
reconstruction programme to operate effectively.
In the case of Yugoslavia, a democratic postMilosevic
FRY would be eligible to join the processes of supporting peace
and stability in the Balkans currently being developed between
the international community and other countries in the region.
Many of the sanctions imposed on Serbia would be lifted quickly
and Serbia would begin to enjoy the normal benefits of running
an open market economy: foreign direct investment, an improved
trading relationship with regional countries and the EU, and reconstruction
programmes. A closer relationship with the EU and the Stability
Pact would also bring longlasting economic benefits. Work
is already taking place to help independent Serb economists, experts
and policymakers to formulate their ideas for the transition,
and to develop close regional and international links in anticipation
of the eventual end of Serbia's political isolation. A democratic
government, which had demonstrated its commitment to economic
and social reform, would be able to initiate discussions with
multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF and the
EU, as well as with a range of bilateral donors.
43. The Committee is concerned that, in many cases,
existing mechanisms for monitoring the humanitarian/developmental
impact of sanctions are inadequate. We recommend that all sanctions
regimes should have provision for an ongoing system of monitoring
their impact. To this end, use should be made of existing expertise
in the field from UN organisations, ECHO and other governmental
and nongovernmental organisations (paragraph 138).
The Government agrees that all sanctions regimes
should be objectively monitored both for their humanitarian
impact and for their effectiveness. With regard to Iraq, we pay
careful attention to UN reporting on the humanitarian situation.
With regard to sanctions against the FRY, we have been making
regular reference to OCHA's assessments of the humanitarian situation.
As outlined in the response to paragraph 28 above,
the Government is discussing with Security Council members and
with the UN Secretariat ways in which a dedicated capacity might
be developed within the Secretariat to provide advice on all aspects
of sanctions, drawing on as wide as possible an array of existing
expertise in this field.
44. The Committee agrees that serious thought
must be given to exit strategies from sanctions regimes. The Committee
requests that, in its response to this Report, the Government
provides an assessment of the merits of placing a time limit on
the application of sanctions regimes (paragraph 141).
In certain circumstances, the Government would not
rule out the policy option of timelimited sanctions. But
in general, we believe that these are unlikely to be effective.
The main argument against them is that target governments (or
rebel groups) are likely to sit tight and wait for the sanctions
to expire, rather than complying with the criteria for lift. A
more effective option, in our view, would be to build into a sanctions
regime a provision for formal review at regular intervals. This
would ensure that attention would be focussed regularly on the
impact of sanctions, which could then be finetuned accordingly.
45. The current debate on the future of sanctions
is a welcome product of the renewed international commitment to
the political, economic and social rights of the poor. We are
convinced that these rights are infringed by the blunt instrument
of comprehensive economic sanctions. To target sanctions against
those truly responsible, to gather the necessary intelligence
and invest in the required technology, require an internationally
coordinated investment of both money and effort. The United Kingdom
must take a lead by putting in place a system which can target
and monitor sanctions effectively, instead of the present, somewhat
casual approach. As importantly, the United Nations should convene
an international conference to ensure a global commitment to a
fairer and more effective sanctions policy (paragraph 142).
The Government takes its responsibilities to implement
and enforce international sanctions very seriously indeed, and
invests a great deal of effort in this regard. That is why, since
July 1998, there has been a dedicated Sanctions Unit in the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office. This Unit has responsibility for coordinating
all aspects of Government work on sanctions, including negotiations
on new sanctions regimes, implementation, enforcement and sanctions
policy in general. To the best of our knowledge, the UK is the
only UN Member State to have such a system in place. We are constantly
reviewing and upgrading our approach to implementation.
The Government fully recognises the urgent need for
a concerted approach to targeting and monitoring targeted sanctions
at the international level. We note the Committee's recommendation
that the UN should convene an international conference on sanctions.
The UK will play an active role in the new UN Security Council
working group looking at generic sanctions issues, and will consider
various ways in which we can promote international work to enhance
the design and implementation of targeted sanctions.
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