Select Committee on International Development Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 2

Memorandum submitted by Dr Joseph Mullen, Director, Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester[1]

WHO SUFFERS? INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND POVERTY AGGRAVATION IN BURUNDI

1.  INTRODUCTION

  The objective of sanctions is to register bilateral or multilateral disapproval of a particular policy or political action because it is perceived as infringing international agreements, conventions or legislation. The nature of the punitive action is a form of international isolation by restricting international market transactions in the inward and outward flow of goods and services, reducing international transfers of capital from the major international institutions and aid agencies and pronouncing a judgement of moral reprehension on the country's political and economic system.

  The effectiveness of sanctions may be judged in terms of achieving international isolation and creating a hostile environment to a point where the strategic interests of the country in question are better served by a settlement than in continuing its morally objectionable policies. However, as with all policy decisions, more attention is given to the effectiveness of sanctions in changing the government's position of the affected country rather than on how the same sanctions impact on the livelihoods of the poor, the vulnerable and the population at large. Furthermore, there is little forward planning relating to the macro-micro effects of destabilisation of sanctions which creates an environment inimical to risk averse investments, thereby lowering the overall level of resources available to productive activities, human resource programmes and safety nets.

2.  OUTLINE OF SUBMISSION

  This submission will focus specifically on the case of Burundi and the effects of imposition of sanctions by neighbouring states upon the levels of poverty, population dislocation, flows of aid, food security, malnutrition, and primary health services. It will outline the political circumstances leading to sanctions, the tortuous process of democratisation in Burundi and the knock-on effects of genocide in neighbouring Rwanda which contributed to a situation where a military takeover was arguably the only way out of an impasse which threatened the cloning of the genocide of Rwanda in Burundi. However, the nuances of the specific situation in Burundi were overlooked in an exaggerated belief in the values of Western style democracy ill-equipped to cope with entrenched ethnic prejudice. The end result was a reversal of the economic liberalisation reforms first initiated in 1985, increased intervention by the state, substantial population dislocation, and a breakdown of rural livelihoods leading to increased poverty, vulnerability and social deprivation. The level of international development aid declined substantially and the major donors (with the exception of IFAD) virtually ceased all investment portfolio activities. Ultimately, the poor have borne the brunt of sanctions, typified by the presence of the largest therapeutic child feeding centre in Africa, located in Bubanza, Burundi. Since Burundi is a small landlocked economy it is particularly vulnerable to international sanctions.

  Sanctions on Burundi were called for at the 31 July 1996 Arusha Regional Summit on Burundi and shortly afterwards were unilaterally imposed by Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Zaire, Rwanda, Zambia and Cameroon. The sanctions were imposed at the behest of the countries of the region and not by the UN Security Council nor the OAU. However, the sanctions received direct or indirect support from the Commonwealth Secretary General, the UN Security Council, the European Union and the vast majority of DAC member countries. The sanctions were imposed initially without exemptions for humanitarian supplies, which undermined the operational capacity of both international organisations and NGOs. Being landlocked and all surface and air routes were blocked, and a threat of secondary sanctions hung over any sanction-infringing country, these sanctions stand out in modern "sanction" history as being both singularly effective and draconian. They also came at a time when the population of Burundi, 90 per cent of whom are subsistence farmers and largely dependent upon income from exported coffee for basic purchases, was at its most vulnerable. A political crisis had racked the country for two years, population regrouping and internal displacement of populations were under way, and external support provided hope for a beleaguered people which sanctions dashed.

3.  POVERTY AND THE ECONOMY OF BURUNDI DURING SANCTIONS

  Over the period, Burundi has also experienced serious public expenditure constraints. The development aid budget has declined from the 1990 level of USD 288 million to USD 39 million in 1997, reflecting similar downward trends as a proportion of public expenditure. By contrast, military expenditure increased in relation to social expenditures. The crisis also led to the reversal of economic legislation measures such as the re-introduction of exchange rate controls and an administered pricing regime for the country's major export revenue generating crops. The level of per capita income declined from USD 180 in 1992 to USD 134 in 1997. There has also been a substantial increase in poverty, which now affects over 60 per cent of the population as opposed to 32 per cent in 1990.

  On the basis of an extrapolation of population and income data of the 1990 Household Expenditure Survey, income related poverty in Burundi has substantially deepened. When the displaced population living in camps are included, the head count poverty index of populations living below an imputed poverty line, has advanced from 35 per cent in rural areas in 1990 to 58 per cent in 1997 or has increased by a factor of 60 per cent over five years. Based on evidence emerging from Participatory Poverty Appraisals[2], there was a general perception that livelihood security had deteriorated in terms of household assets, income from cash crops and animal herd sizes. On the composite Human Development Index, based upon aggregation of life expectancy, adult literacy, school enrolment and real GDP per capita, Burundi now ranks 169 out of a selection of 175 countries. Together with its neighbour Rwanda, (which is five places below it) Burundi figures among the world's ten most deprived countries.

4.  DETERIORATION OF LIVELIHOOD SECURITY IN BURUNDI DURING THE CRISIS AND SANCTIONS

  Key characteristics of poverty in Burundi have been based on income criteria (per capita income has declined from $180 in 1992 to $134 in 1997) but also is manifest in the breakdown of aspects of civil governance; ethnic strife; inadequate social service provision; there is a virtual disappearance of the agricultural delivery system, and a crisis in food production[3]; massive transfers of population; economic sanctions; balance of payments problems and the withdrawal of donor support for development aid.

  One may legitimately ask, how useful is the concept of poverty alone to describe the complexity of inter-related phenomena leading to failures of entitlement, lack of access and a substantially traumatised population. In Burundi there is a collapse of rural livelihoods/social systems which can only be remedied through economic and social rehabilitation, reconciliation, community cohesion building, restoration of agro-ecological systems to build up food security, and a patient increase in bio-mass production to build up an eco-friendly land husbandry embedded in social processes of kinship, religion, and history. Perhaps sustainable rural livelihoods is a more inclusive explanatory concept than poverty alleviation to meet the challenge ahead.

  However, poverty is not only a state of deprivation, it is equally a state of vulnerability. For women in particular, vulnerability constitutes a key element in the poverty experience. The sources of vulnerability often lie in the specific nature of the social and constitutional environment in which households live, particularly from the standpoint of the security of the person and property of household members. The fear of ethnic violence—or genocide in certain instances—or the exposure to such threats and the realisation of one's defencelessness constitute a key communal concern. [4]The attitude of the state and of civil society are central to these concerns, as are their remedial capacities to address vulnerability.

  Here there are complementary roles for the state and civil society. Only national government possesses the mandate and power to formulate policy, to establish a regulatory framework within which private sector and civil society initiatives may operate and be supported. While the Burundi state may be operating within a context of scarce human and financial resources, it should concentrate on a limited number of areas. These could include: creation of an enabling environment which could encourage a more proactive civil society, that the poor could be more ready to participate in the decision-making processes which affect them; that partnerships be developed between civil society and the public sector, which could also include NGOs. Besides creating an enabling environment the state is also responsible for the promotion of broad-based economic growth, the assurance of justice and public safety, and the provision of basic social services. It is at the State level that many of the key decisions affecting participation and empowerment in civil society are taken: one of the critical elements of complementarity between State and civil society.

  On the basis of our preceding analysis; three central elements could be said to make up livelihood security in the current situation in Burundi. These are: level of displacement, level of agricultural production and the proportion of population below the poverty line. Two related indicators give a perspective on social capital relating to education and health: the percentage of school enrolments and the population by health centre.

  In terms of identifying the provinces in which the livelihood fabric has deteriorated the most, Table 1 below analyses the percentage of displaced population living in camps, the percentage of the total population that have been disrupted and adversely affected by the crisis, the percentage of decline of agricultural production within the province, the level of school enrolment and the total population by functioning health centre. In Table 1 the provinces are ranked ascending to two sets of criteria: the first the level of livelihood productivity decline which is based on displacement, production loss and level of poverty (head count). Investment priorities for this particular category would focus on the re-establishment of productive capacity, through people-led initiatives of community reconciliation, restoration of food production capacity and rehabilitation of state and private sector agricultural services. The re-integration of returnees into their communities would be facilitated by production incentives directed towards reconstituting community solidarity, reducing vulnerability and poverty and regenerating local economic activity.

Republic of Burundi


Table 1: Analysis of Vulnerability by Province 1992-1998

1

% of Displaced Population in Camps

Rank2

% of Total Population Affected by displacement

Rank3

Loss of Food Production

Rank4

% of Population Below Poverty

Line

Rank5

% of School Enrolment

Rank6

Pop by functioning Health Centre (000)

RankRank 2+3+4Rank 2+3+4+5+6
Bubanza531 471-28 16349 1267 11
Bujumbura Ru223 9.27-10 44312 5611249 55
Bururi214 11.26-5 9567 65131810 57
Cankuzo015 21415 15331542 91810 1515
Cibitoko292 15.33-28 1605 213651 21
Gitege311 411-5 9521058 12354 1210
Kanizi116 21.22-11 3881 172373 33
Kayanza68 13.65-9 5683 337402 44
Kirundo68 68-9 5421425 4267 85
Makamba135 14.54-1 14567 59131513 79
Mutangvya68 5.610-7 84811 6615267 1013
Nuyinga97 5.89-2 13431228 5295 128
Ngozi311 3.412-4 11559 408286 1410
Rutana113 1.615-9 5722 50101812 810
Ruyizi113 2.313-3 12605 2961415 1414

Computations by author


  When the element of social capital is added to the three indicators above and additional weight is given to school enrolment and health provision, a more comprehensive package of investments would focus on rehabilitating these key social sectors. This integrated approach is more consistent with spatially and community-based social protection and would be more conducive to the restoration of the social fabric, community reconciliation and long term civil society empowerment and reconstruction.

5.  IMPACT OF SANCTIONS UPON POVERTY AND LIVELIHOOD SECURITY

(a)   Deteriorating Terms of Trade

  The direct impact of sanctions on the poor was particularly felt in the area of the deterioration of terms of trade. This was manifest in the disproportionate price increases in the prices of manufactured goods in relation to the weaker producer prices for agricultural products; the increase in input prices and the reduction of informal cross border trading opportunities. The increase in prices of the following consumer goods particularly affected the rural poor: kerosene for oil lamps (koroboi), second hand clothing, school copy books and soap. The Retail Price Index for Bujumbura Town increased from 112 in 1993 to 275 in 1997.

  The effect of sanctions was partly cushioned by coping strategies adopted by the poor. The consumption patterns of the poor relied more heavily on home production, particularly in relation to food, which assumed a higher proportion of the household budget. The increase in food prices, while having a negative impact on food deficit households, particularly in urban areas, favoured those few smallholders who produced food surpluses. The landless agricultural labourers and the displaced were however disadvantaged as net purchasers of foodstuffs.

(b)   Decline in Aid

  Levels of external aid declined substantially in the wake of the political crisis and the imposition of sanctions; by as much as 75 per cent overall. Agriculture was particularly affected by the withdrawal of donor support as aid resources plummeted from their 1992 level of USD 43.7 million to 3.1 million in 1996. The table below illustrates the level of reduction of donor support by sector.

Table 2:  External Aid by Sector 1990-1996 (USD in millions)
Sector
199019911992 19931994 19951996
Agriculture
37.2 47.043.723.4 70.717.23.1
Education
34.033.0 36.628.023.0 9.35.6
Health
14.813.8 11.317.213.0 11.75.7
Social Development
26.8 16.223.028.8 20.622.02.0
Infrastructure
46.6 44.340.142.6 24.715.76.3
Other Sectors
110.0 128.2159.978.0 34.237.919.9
Total
269.4282.5 314.6218.0186.2 113.852.6


  Source: World Bank (1998)

  On the basis of the above, there is compelling evidence that a combination of political crisis and economic sanctions has seriously damaged the economic fabric of Burundi; that rural livelihoods, ecosystems, agricultural and food production levels, health and education provision have all been adversely affected in a serious way. In terms of human and institutional capital, the crisis and sanctions have undermined the productive potential and it is only the resilience of persons and institutions that ensures their continued survival.

(c)   Sanctions and Economic Decline

  The impact of sanctions has resulted in an economic decline. The rate of inflation increased from 4.5 per cent in 1992 to 26.4 per cent in 1996 and 31.1 per cent in 1997. The agricultural sector has borne the brunt of the decline in productivity, with negative "growth" of¸ 4.3 per cent in 1993 reaching ¸19.8 per cent in 1997. The sanctions have affected particularly the importation of inputs; production of quality seed and fertilisers and the export of cash crops. Burundi effectively has been transformed from being self sufficient in food to being a net importer during the period of the crisis and sanctions. Growth rates of GDP have been similarly affected, moving from a growth rate of 2.02 per cent in 1992 to ¸5.3 per cent in 1993, ¸3 per cent in 1995 and a further decline to ¸7.6 per cent in 1996. 1997 has indicated a modest growth rate of 1.4 percent which could be explained by the partial lifting of sanctions and improved security. Two conditions appear essential to increased livelihood security and reduction of poverty: the lifting of sanctions and a form of democratic participation that will provide the basis for national reconciliation and ethnic harmony.

 (d) Social Effects of Sanctions

  The social effects of sanctions have been particularly damaging to the vulnerable sections of society. While the rural subsistence economy has shielded rural families from some of the negative effects of sanctions, acute shortages of medicines, spare parts, fuel fertilisers and raw materials have led to spiralling inflation, substantial decline in health service delivery systems and an exacerbation of the consequences of ethnic unrest. Despite exemptions for certain health goods, in practise the main providers of health care ie, the government and NGOs were prohibited from importing essential medicines. Typical examples of the consequences of these measures are: suspension of water and sanitation programmes, inability to respond to the largest outbreak of typhus recorded in modern times, lack of disposable syringes, fuel for sterilisation, and kerosene for fridges. UNICEF estimated that only half of a targeted 190,000 children will receive vaccinations, mainly due to sanctions. Furthermore, a combination of higher food costs, reduced harvests and weakened purchasing power has led to inadequate diets.

6.  CONCLUSION

  Detailed studies of the potentially deleterious effects of sanctions upon the livelihoods of the very poor should be commissioned prior to endorsing sanctions. Political regimes are seldom representative of the vulnerable groups and therefore highly selective measures should be adopted which do not directly affect innocent populations in terms of basic human needs, services and human rights. Furthermore, clear provisions should be made for the exemption of pharmaceuticals and general medical supplies, educational materials, food, agricultural inputs, second-hand clothing, temporary shelter materials, water and sanitation equipment and such goods used by local communities in the sustenance of their social fabric. More fundamentally however, can one justify morally the use of sanctions that creates human suffering of the innocent, the potential risk of internal destabilisation and communal conflict? The experience of Burundi would suggest that sanctions have been disproportionately biased against the poor while strategic military procurement has rather effectively circumvented these in any case, the escalated cost of which has been indirectly debited against public spending on social services. Sanctions remain a blunt instrument, the human costs of which, have seldom been given adequate attention by military, judicial[5] and political strategists.

  In this respect, UN Dispute Settlement procedures, as outlined in Article 33 of the UN Charter, are more conducive to the protection of the poor and vulnerable.

  The imposition of sanctions, economically coercive measures which severely exacerbated humanitarian hardship, were the means adopted to achieve poltical change. While exemptions were gradually accorded for humanitarian supplies and political changes were made, it was not until January 1999 that the sanctions were formally lifted. There is also little evidence to suggest that the political initiatives of restoring democratic institutions were ultimately in response to sanctions, but rather a strategy to abate and isolate internal armed conflict.

  While there is a complex web of causes and effects contributing to the outbreak of ethnic violence and subsequently a genocide, the particular social history and the political economy of power and wealth in the Central African states of Rwanda and Burundi suggests that ethnic violence may also be linked to a breakdown of rural production systems and livelihoods, environmental degradation, and population pressures on limited resources. There is compelling evidence that a combination of the political and economic crises have seriously damaged the economic fabric of Burundi and rural livelihoods. Health and education provision have all been adversely affected in a substantial way. In terms of human and institutional capital, the crisis and sanctions have undermined productive potential and it is only the resilience of persons and institutions that has ensured their continued survival.

Dr Joseph Mullen,

Director, Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester

15 April 1999


1   Former UN-IFAD Country Portfolio Manager for Burundi/Rwanda 1990-1992 and post-conflict reconstruction consultant 1998. Back

2   Undertaken by World Bank/UNICEF and IFAD 1997-98. Back

3   Based on personal observation 1998. Back

4   See J Mullen (1996) "The Roots of Conflict: the implosion of ethnic tolerance in Rwanda" in Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in Rwanda, Obi Igwara (ed), ASEN/London School of Economics. Back

5   Personal interview with legal consultant of the OAU responsible for drawing up the legal framework of Burundese sanctions at International Criminal Court for Crimes against Humanity, Rome, 1998. Back


 
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