Select Committee on International Development Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence
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1 % of Displaced Population in Camps | Rank | 2 % of Total Population Affected by displacement | Rank | 3 Loss of Food Production | Rank | 4 % of Population Below Poverty Line | Rank | 5 % of School Enrolment | Rank | 6 Pop by functioning Health Centre (000) | Rank | Rank 2+3+4 | Rank 2+3+4+5+6 | |
Bubanza | 53 | 1 | 47 | 1 | -28 | 1 | 63 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 26 | 7 | 1 | 1 |
Bujumbura Ru | 22 | 3 | 9.2 | 7 | -10 | 4 | 43 | 12 | 56 | 11 | 24 | 9 | 5 | 5 |
Bururi | 21 | 4 | 11.2 | 6 | -5 | 9 | 56 | 7 | 65 | 13 | 18 | 10 | 5 | 7 |
Cankuzo | 0 | 15 | 2 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 33 | 15 | 42 | 9 | 18 | 10 | 15 | 15 |
Cibitoko | 29 | 2 | 15.3 | 3 | -28 | 1 | 60 | 5 | 21 | 3 | 65 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
Gitege | 3 | 11 | 4 | 11 | -5 | 9 | 52 | 10 | 58 | 12 | 35 | 4 | 12 | 10 |
Kanizi | 11 | 6 | 21.2 | 2 | -11 | 3 | 88 | 1 | 17 | 2 | 37 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
Kayanza | 6 | 8 | 13.6 | 5 | -9 | 5 | 68 | 3 | 33 | 7 | 40 | 2 | 4 | 4 |
Kirundo | 6 | 8 | 6 | 8 | -9 | 5 | 42 | 14 | 25 | 4 | 26 | 7 | 8 | 5 |
Makamba | 13 | 5 | 14.5 | 4 | -1 | 14 | 56 | 7 | 59 | 13 | 15 | 13 | 7 | 9 |
Mutangvya | 6 | 8 | 5.6 | 10 | -7 | 8 | 48 | 11 | 66 | 15 | 26 | 7 | 10 | 13 |
Nuyinga | 9 | 7 | 5.8 | 9 | -2 | 13 | 43 | 12 | 28 | 5 | 29 | 5 | 12 | 8 |
Ngozi | 3 | 11 | 3.4 | 12 | -4 | 11 | 55 | 9 | 40 | 8 | 28 | 6 | 14 | 10 |
Rutana | 1 | 13 | 1.6 | 15 | -9 | 5 | 72 | 2 | 50 | 10 | 18 | 12 | 8 | 10 |
Ruyizi | 1 | 13 | 2.3 | 13 | -3 | 12 | 60 | 5 | 29 | 6 | 14 | 15 | 14 | 14 |
Sector |
1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 |
Agriculture | 37.2 | 47.0 | 43.7 | 23.4 | 70.7 | 17.2 | 3.1 |
Education | 34.0 | 33.0 | 36.6 | 28.0 | 23.0 | 9.3 | 5.6 |
Health | 14.8 | 13.8 | 11.3 | 17.2 | 13.0 | 11.7 | 5.7 |
Social Development | 26.8 | 16.2 | 23.0 | 28.8 | 20.6 | 22.0 | 2.0 |
Infrastructure | 46.6 | 44.3 | 40.1 | 42.6 | 24.7 | 15.7 | 6.3 |
Other Sectors | 110.0 | 128.2 | 159.9 | 78.0 | 34.2 | 37.9 | 19.9 |
Total | 269.4 | 282.5 | 314.6 | 218.0 | 186.2 | 113.8 | 52.6 |
Source: World Bank (1998)
On the basis of the above, there is compelling evidence that
a combination of political crisis and economic sanctions has seriously
damaged the economic fabric of Burundi; that rural livelihoods,
ecosystems, agricultural and food production levels, health and
education provision have all been adversely affected in a serious
way. In terms of human and institutional capital, the crisis and
sanctions have undermined the productive potential and it is only
the resilience of persons and institutions that ensures their
continued survival.
(c) Sanctions and Economic Decline
The impact of sanctions has resulted in an economic decline.
The rate of inflation increased from 4.5 per cent in 1992 to 26.4
per cent in 1996 and 31.1 per cent in 1997. The agricultural sector
has borne the brunt of the decline in productivity, with negative
"growth" of¸ 4.3 per cent in 1993 reaching ¸19.8
per cent in 1997. The sanctions have affected particularly the
importation of inputs; production of quality seed and fertilisers
and the export of cash crops. Burundi effectively has been transformed
from being self sufficient in food to being a net importer during
the period of the crisis and sanctions. Growth rates of GDP have
been similarly affected, moving from a growth rate of 2.02 per
cent in 1992 to ¸5.3 per cent in 1993, ¸3 per cent in
1995 and a further decline to ¸7.6 per cent in 1996. 1997
has indicated a modest growth rate of 1.4 percent which could
be explained by the partial lifting of sanctions and improved
security. Two conditions appear essential to increased livelihood
security and reduction of poverty: the lifting of sanctions and
a form of democratic participation that will provide the basis
for national reconciliation and ethnic harmony.
(d) Social Effects of Sanctions
The social effects of sanctions have been particularly damaging
to the vulnerable sections of society. While the rural subsistence
economy has shielded rural families from some of the negative
effects of sanctions, acute shortages of medicines, spare parts,
fuel fertilisers and raw materials have led to spiralling inflation,
substantial decline in health service delivery systems and an
exacerbation of the consequences of ethnic unrest. Despite exemptions
for certain health goods, in practise the main providers of health
care ie, the government and NGOs were prohibited from importing
essential medicines. Typical examples of the consequences of these
measures are: suspension of water and sanitation programmes, inability
to respond to the largest outbreak of typhus recorded in modern
times, lack of disposable syringes, fuel for sterilisation, and
kerosene for fridges. UNICEF estimated that only half of a targeted
190,000 children will receive vaccinations, mainly due to sanctions.
Furthermore, a combination of higher food costs, reduced harvests
and weakened purchasing power has led to inadequate diets.
6. CONCLUSION
Detailed studies of the potentially deleterious effects of
sanctions upon the livelihoods of the very poor should be commissioned
prior to endorsing sanctions. Political regimes are seldom representative
of the vulnerable groups and therefore highly selective measures
should be adopted which do not directly affect innocent populations
in terms of basic human needs, services and human rights. Furthermore,
clear provisions should be made for the exemption of pharmaceuticals
and general medical supplies, educational materials, food, agricultural
inputs, second-hand clothing, temporary shelter materials, water
and sanitation equipment and such goods used by local communities
in the sustenance of their social fabric. More fundamentally however,
can one justify morally the use of sanctions that creates human
suffering of the innocent, the potential risk of internal destabilisation
and communal conflict? The experience of Burundi would suggest
that sanctions have been disproportionately biased against the
poor while strategic military procurement has rather effectively
circumvented these in any case, the escalated cost of which has
been indirectly debited against public spending on social services.
Sanctions remain a blunt instrument, the human costs of which,
have seldom been given adequate attention by military, judicial[5]
and political strategists.
In this respect, UN Dispute Settlement procedures, as outlined
in Article 33 of the UN Charter, are more conducive to the protection
of the poor and vulnerable.
The imposition of sanctions, economically coercive measures
which severely exacerbated humanitarian hardship, were the means
adopted to achieve poltical change. While exemptions were gradually
accorded for humanitarian supplies and political changes were
made, it was not until January 1999 that the sanctions were formally
lifted. There is also little evidence to suggest that the political
initiatives of restoring democratic institutions were ultimately
in response to sanctions, but rather a strategy to abate and isolate
internal armed conflict.
While there is a complex web of causes and effects contributing
to the outbreak of ethnic violence and subsequently a genocide,
the particular social history and the political economy of power
and wealth in the Central African states of Rwanda and Burundi
suggests that ethnic violence may also be linked to a breakdown
of rural production systems and livelihoods, environmental degradation,
and population pressures on limited resources. There is compelling
evidence that a combination of the political and economic crises
have seriously damaged the economic fabric of Burundi and rural
livelihoods. Health and education provision have all been adversely
affected in a substantial way. In terms of human and institutional
capital, the crisis and sanctions have undermined productive potential
and it is only the resilience of persons and institutions that
has ensured their continued survival.
Dr Joseph Mullen,
Director, Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme, Institute for
Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester
15 April 1999
2
Undertaken by World Bank/UNICEF and IFAD 1997-98. Back
3
Based on personal observation 1998. Back
4
See J Mullen (1996) "The Roots of Conflict: the implosion
of ethnic tolerance in Rwanda" in Ethnic Hatred: Genocide
in Rwanda, Obi Igwara (ed), ASEN/London School of Economics. Back
5
Personal interview with legal consultant of the OAU responsible
for drawing up the legal framework of Burundese sanctions at International
Criminal Court for Crimes against Humanity, Rome, 1998. Back
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© Parliamentary copyright 2000 | Prepared 10 February 2000 |