APPENDIX 13
Memorandum submitted by the Democratic
Burmese Students' Organisation (UK)
We hope you will take the following points concerning
sanctions into account in your International Development Select
Committee report. We feel that the case of Burma warrants special
attention, particularly since it's elected representatives have
called for the free world to sanction Burma. As Parliament is
now in recess we are sending this directly to each of the International
Development Select Committee members, and can be reached at the
above numbers for further discussion.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
HURTS THE
POOREST PEOPLE
IN BURMA
We find that it is, in fact, foreign direct
investment (FDI) that hurts the poorest people in Burma. It maintains
the military's hold on power, hence allowing it to continue it's
grotesque and relentless human rights violations against the populace.
Moreover individual projects directly worsen the lives of those
living in the vicinity of the investment, particularly the minor
ethnic groups who have suffered forced relocation, forced labour
and major military offensives preceding or in conjunction with
FDI.
A NOTE ON
TRADE AND
INVESTMENT SANCTIONS
Herein we are concerned with financial sanctions
rather than trade sanctions, primarily due to the small value
of exports from Burma compared to the value of FDI in Burma (for
example in 1997-98 the UK invested US $47.54 million in Burma,
while total exports from Burma in the same period were 6,022 million
kyat, approximately US $16.72 million). [6]Secondly,
from the perspective of an EU Member State acting unilaterally,
Article 73g(2) Treaty of Rome allows Member States to pursue financial
sanctions unilaterally, [7]while
EU and WTO legislation makes trade sanctions far harder to implement.
THE WISH
OF THE
DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED
GOVERNMENT OF
BURMA
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's elected leader
yet never allowed to take up office, has called upon the free
world to sanction Burma. "We now endorse the idea of international
sanctions because we have come to the conclusion that investments
in Burma have not in anyway helped the people in general nor has
it helped the course of democracy . . . There are a few people
who have benefited from those investments. In fact, it has only
made the privileged elite even wealthier." [8]
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
HAS MAINTAINED
A CORRUPT
AND CRUEL
DICTATORSHIP THAT
WAS ON
THE VERGE
OF BANKRUPTCY
Economic engagement with the military has enabled
the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to entrench it's
grip on power despite catastrophic economic mismanagement. Without
such capital inflows from overseas the SPDC could well have been
forced into dialogue with the opposition due to bankruptcy, cutting
the funds to the massive military machine. The uprising of 1988,
when thousands of peaceful protesters were massacred in the streets
at the hands of the junta, was sparked by economic hardship. Following
the demonstrations the SPDC (then named SLORC) abandoned it's
isolationist policies and opened it's doors to foreign investments.
Among the first victims were the teak forests and fish stocks,
later expanding to oil and gas concessions, notably Premier Oil
(UK) and Total (France) and Unocal (USA). Yet despite the US $7.089
billion that has been invested in Burma since then[9]
the situation for the countries' poor has worsened.
HOW THE
SITUATION HAS
WORSENED FOR
THE PEOPLE
OF BURMA:
THE RICE
ECONOMY
As a crude measure of development, primary industry
has increased as a percentage of GDP relative to both secondary
and tertiary industry[10],
the converse of what one would expect of a developing nation,
and symptomatic of the persistent economic mismanagement which
has witnessed the export of resources to arm the junta. The single
most important determinant in the living standard of a Burmese
family and the economic performance of Burma has been paddy or
rice. The price of rice has continued to rise, with the gap between
the official and market prices continuing to widen, the gap in
1997 being 123 kyat, from a gap of 13.7 kyat in 1988[11]
while wages in the public sector have been held almost constant
(with two pay increases between 1988 and 1997) reducing workers
to poverty, unable to afford protein foods and basic foodstuffs.
Bribery is rife among government employees as a means of coping
with such poverty. Energy prices have increased, while blackouts
remain common, and the cost of fuelwood for the urban dweller
has increased by a factor of five (1998 figures), meaning that
those on the minimum daily wage would spend 71 per cent of their
wage on fuelwood alone. [12]
Two-thirds of the population are paddy farmers.
The state not only controls rice exports, but through a system
of state procurement at below market rates, implicitly taxes the
farmers. "Though the Karenni farmers had a very low production
on crops due to the lack of rain in the year 1998, they were forced
to sell five baskets per acre to the troops at a very low price.
The troops only gave 150 kyat for a basket of paddy while the
price of a basket of paddy was 400 kyat in central Burma. In addition,
the farmers need to pay 35 kyat per acre as a tax to the SPDC."
[13]Advancing
loans to farmers has established a system of quotas which farmers
must sell to the state at a predetermined price, radically below
the market price of rice. If they cannot meet the quota they must
sell their possessions to buy the rice, at the higher price, and
risk losing their land. Professor Mya Maung finds that "
. . . the implicit tax rate imposed on the farmers by the government
was 1,081.4 per cent".[14]
The result has been a huge increase in landlessness, indebtedness
and poverty. " . . . more than 40 per cent of the population
supported by agriculture in 1993 had no land or livestock holdings
at allover and above 4.4 million people living in households
with land holdings of less than three acres, generally too small
for subsistence even for a small household." [15]Much
rice is, in fact, seized by troops in military "black zones"
(ethnic "insurgent" controlled areas, deemed free-fire
areas by the SPDC) to support the SPDC troops. Spending on health
has dwindled to a mere per capita 6.9 kyat 1995-96, from a figure
of 18.7 kyat in 1985-86[16],
meanwhile the universities remain closed as the junta attempts
to breed ignorance and apathy. The reality is that the inflow
of FDI has merely prevented Burma from plunging into worse crisis
as the situation for the average urban and rural dwellers has
deteriorated considerably since the opening of Burma to FDI in
1988.
Financial gains from FDI go straight to the military
Full foreign ownership of companies operating
in Burma is forbidden and almost all large investment is carried
out through joint ventures with the junta. The Union of Myanmar
Economic Holdings, through which much FDI is channelled, is owned
and operated by the Ministry of Defence and their families. Premier
Oil's investment in a US$ 700 million project in the Yetagun gas
field in the Andaman Sea is in partnership with Petronas (Malaysia)
Nippon (Japan) and Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), a state
enterprise. Pacrim Energy (Australia) paid US$ 3 million for the
commencement fee for it's two oil blocks in Burma[17],
funds that flowed directly to the junta. According to IHC Caland's
director Bax "the money is of course going to the colonels"
(IHC Caland is a Dutch company investing in Burma's gasfields).
The junta spends some 60 per cent of government
funds on the military
The money that does reach the state and is not
siphoned off by corrupt state officials is spent largely on the
military. Military expenditure as a percentage of combined education
and health expenditure was an exorbitant 222 per cent in Burma,
compared to 49 per cent in Indonesia and 65 per cent in India
pre 1997[18].
According to its own figures, the regime spent 50 per cent of
it's annual income on defence, compared to 24 per cent on social
services, and 14 per cent on education (1996) figures). [19]The
military has doubled in size since 1988, and they hope to expand
it by a further 100,000 to a total of 500,000 by the end of the
year, despite being at war with no-one but itself. The poor are
already impoverished under the regime, and FDI merely prolongs
their misery by financing military purchases.
Increased militarisation precedes foreign investment
There are obvious links between military offensives
in ethnic minority areas that precede the granting of concessions,
particularly in the onshore oilwells. This was reported as early
as 1992 in the Mya Yadana[20]
noting the brutal offensive against the Kachin Independence Organisation
in the Hukawng Valley of Kachin State, the site of oil concession
Block A. Block A, one of the first areas to be offered, was not
taken up despite great potential, due to the renowned military
skills of the Kachin that were operating in the area. The opposition
has since been brutally crushed. Similar tales can be told elsewhere,
such as the Naga tribespeople whose land was granted to Amoco.
Foreign investment has caused further human rights
violations
Unocal Corporation is currently facing two lawsuits
in the USA over human rights violations for its investments in
the Yadana project. "The lawsuit has been brought by Burmese
villagers who have suffered human rights abuses as a direct result
of the pipeline projects. As part of the project, forced labour
has been used on the surrounding infrastructure of the project,
and the Burmese military has secured the `pipeline corridor' for
the project." [21]Twenty-five
thousand people were forcibly relocated to make way for the pipeline[22],
and increased military operations in the area, ostensibly to protect
foreign investment, has resulted in increased human rights violations
perpetrated by the military against the local Karen and Mon people.
Refugees fleeing the area tell of forced labour in construction
of the pipeline infrastructure, infrastructure which Premier Oil
(UK) is using to construct it's own pipeline, parallel to the
Unocal/Total pipeline, notably the airstrip and roads. Unocal
President John Imle has admitted under oath that porters were
conscripted by the military to work on the project. [23]A
French all-party delegation, recently returned from investigations
of human rights violations in conjunction with the Total/Unocal
project has already recognised that at least at the start of the
project there was forced labour and forced relocation in the preparation
of the pipeline. [24]Undercover
investigations have found that Total not only employed Western
mercenaries but also paid the SPDC to protect the pipeline.
Foreign Investment is going into unsound development
The case of the Salween dam, currently in pre-feasibility
study stage in Shan State, NE Burma, will starve downstream farmers
of water, cause a massive increase in disease, forced relocation
and human rights violations in the dam area, and devastate the
environment, as far south as the delta. The brunt of the loss
of land, income and threat from earthquakes and disease will be
borne by the ethnic hilltribes peoples that the SPDC is so desperate
to subjugate. [25]In
the past three years some 300,000 people have been relocated out
of the dam area, in January and February alone over 2,000 Shan
people sought refuge in Thailand. Originating as a hydro-electric
power project, the true objectives became clear in 1998 when the
dam was billed to divert water to Thailand, as the "Salween
Water Diversion Project." Currently Japanese (MDX development)
and Thai (Italian-Thai Development Plc) companies are involved
as well as the Thai government, who are thought to be planning
to approach the Japanese Myazawa Fund to finance this project.
The detrimental impacts will be immense, yet those who will be
affected have no voice.
The presence of foreign firms legitimises the
dictatorship
While the European Union and other countries
denounce the atrocities committed by the SPDC, European firms
continue to operate and invest there, claiming that the profit
motive clears them of all political considerations. How can such
investment be free of any responsibility when it directly supports
a genocidal regime? While the British Government does "not
encourage trade with Burma"[26]
it neither discourages it, nor takes a stand on British companies
investing in Burma. Even Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has spoken out against
such studied ignorance of companies. "Premier Oil and other
companies like it which deal with the military government give
it not only financial support, but moral support as well. It makes
this government think that it is all right for them to violate
human rights as long as there are big companies which will deal
with them."
Conclusion
Investment in Burma hurts the poorest, particularly
through loss of land and human rights violations perpetrated by
the military in conjunction with foreign projects. But on a more
general level, foreign investment is supporting a corrupt, cruel
and illegitimate dictatorship that is committing genocide but
remains unrecognised as such. The ethnic cleansing that occurs
in the ethnic minority areas is well documented, and the persistent
flow of refugees to Thailand testify to this, although the world
seems deaf to their words. Even the democratically elected leader
of Burma has called for sanctions to be imposed on Burma. Yet
Britain remains one of the biggest investors. Second only to Singapore,
Britain has US£1,353 million invested in Burma in 33 projects.
[27]Singapore
tops the list with US$1,490 million, and Thailand is a close third
with US$1,242 million.
We hope you will agree that in the case of Burma,
sanctions would push the military into a dialogue that would result
in the improvement of the living standards of the populace. Potentially,
they are an invaluable tool in the struggle for democracy. Please
recommend the use of financial sanctions against Burma until a
democratic government is formed, at the unilateral and multilateral
levels. As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has asked, "Please use your
liberty to promote ours."
Ko Aung*
Co-ordinator
Rachel Goldwyn, Researcher
Democratic Burmese Students' Organisation (UK)
1 August 1999
*Ko Aung (Kyaw Soe Aung) is a Burmese dissident
living in London. He served five years seven months as a political
prisoner in Burma's notorious Insein prison, having played a leading
role in the uprising of 1988.
End Note: The current status of sanctions against
Burma
European Union
1990 Arms embargo.
1991 Suspension of defence co-operation and
bilateral aid other than strictly humanitarian.
1996 Visa ban on State Peace and Development
(SPDC) members, government, senior military and security officers
and their families, suspension of high level governmental visits
to Burma.
1997 Generalised System of Preferences privileges
withdrawn.
1998 Visa ban widened to include transit visas
and tourism officials.
USA
May 1997 Ban on new investment by American companies.
Numerous selective purchasing laws passed by
municipal and local government and New York City.
June 1999 Massachusetts State selective purchasing
law overturned.
Australia
May 1998 Marrickville Local Council of New South
Wales the first of several Australian Councils to enact selective
purchasing ordinances.
6 Source: Government of the Union of Myanmar, Salient
Economic and Social Indicators, Ministry of National Planning
and Economic Development March 1998. NB these were provisional
figures at the time of print. The kyat is the Burmese currency. Back
7
Article 73g(2) EC (treaty of Rome) "Without prejudice to
Article 224 and as long as the Council has not taken measures
pursuant to paragraph 1, a Member State may, for serious political
reasons and on the grounds of urgency, take unilateral measures
against a third country with regard to capital movements and payments.
The Commission and other Member States shall be informed of such
measures by the date of their entry into force at the latest." Back
8
Speech of 10 December 1998. Back
9
October 1998 figure, Xinhua News Agency 5 February 1999. Back
10
Agriculture, livestock fisheries & forestry: 57 per cent of
GDP in financial year 1989-90, rising to 62.6 per cent in 1994-95,
compared to Industry, falling from 11 per cent 1989-90 to 9.3
per cent in 1994-95, and services falling from 32 per cent to
28.1 per cent in the same period. Source: Foreign Economic Trends
Report: Burma, US Embassy in Burma 1996 p. 108. Back
11
Mya Muang: The Burma Road to Capitalism 1998 p. 111. Back
12
Ibid p. 115. Back
13
Karenni News Agency for Human Rights May 1999. Back
14
Ibid p. 120. Back
15
US Embassy, Burma Country Commercial Guide 1998. Back
16
Human Development in Myanmar An Internal Report, United Nations
Working Group July 1998. Back
17
Pacrim Energy Annual Report and Accounts 1997. Back
18
Human Development Report, United Nations, 1997. Back
19
As quoted in The Irrawaddy, Vol 7 No 5 June 1999. NB official
figures are known to be inaccurate, one can assume a much higher
figure in reality. Back
20
Published by Green November 32, an environmental organisation
set up by ethnic minority refugees in Thailand. Back
21
Tyler Giannini, a US lawyer and director of EarthRights International
quoted in The Irrawaddy June 1999. Back
22
Burma Campaign figures. Back
23
In a deposition in one of the two Unocal trials underway in the
USA. Back
24
The full report has not yet been released. Back
25
Plans to build the Salween Dam at Ta Sang in Southern Shan State,
South East Asian Rivers Network, 8 March 1999. Back
26
Letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth office, 24 June 1999. Back
27
As at 31 August 1998. Myanmar Business: Trade and Investment Digest,
vol No 2, 10 February 1999. Back
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