MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
INTRODUCTION 1. The
Government recently completed a wide-ranging review of sanctions
policy, details of which were announced to Parliament on 15 March. 2.
The review noted that sanctions have long been an important tool
of the UK's foreign policy and concluded that they were likely
to remain so. Sanctions are the only coercive measure available
to the international community, other than the threat or use of
force, to respond to challenges to international peace and security.
If diplomacy fails there needs to be a third choice between doing
nothing and military intervention. 3. The review also noted that
sanctions, particularly comprehensive ones, could be a blunt instrument.
They could take a long time to achieve their objectives; and,
in the absence of appropriate humanitarian exemptions, could cause
human suffering. The review's main conclusion therefore was that
there was a need for better targeted "smarter sanctions".
POTENTIAL FOR
"SMARTER" SANCTIONS 4.
The Government's review concluded that comprehensive sanctions
should be reserved for occasions when the behaviour of the target
regime justifies the toughest measures. Otherwise a targeted package
of measures should be preferred. 5. The review concluded that although
the circumstances in which sanctions are imposed vary from case
to case, there are a number of broad principles that should normally
be followed. Sanctions should: — be targeted to hit
the regime rather than the people; — include exemptions
to minimise the humanitarian impact on innocent civilians; —
have clear objectives, including well-defined and realistic demands
against which compliance can be judged, and a clear exit strategy; —
have effective arrangements for implementation and enforcement
by all states, especially by neighbouring countries; —
avoid unnecessary adverse impact on UK economic and commercial
interests. 6. The Government supports the work being done under
the auspices of the Swiss Government (the Interlaken process)
on the targeting of financial sanctions. It welcomes too the proposal
of the German Government to hold a conference on the targeting
of small-arms sanctions, travel sanctions and other non-financial
sanctions. In a related initiative the Department for International
Development intends to follow up the seminar it recently sponsored
on the search for smarter sanctions by commissioning studies on
how to maximise the benefit of humanitarian exemptions in sanctions
regimes.
HUMANITARIAN IMPACT
OF SANCTIONS 7.
Targeted sanctions, designed to hit the regime rather than ordinary
people, should minimise the humanitarian impact and reduce the
need for humanitarian exemptions. The Government believes that
the humanitarian impact of all sanctions must be taken into account
before sanctions are undertaken; and that sanctions should only
be introduced where there is a reasonable prospect of success
in achieving the international community's objectives without
disproportionate humanitarian cost. Account should also be taken
of both the short-term and long-term consequences of sanctions
on the population, including on their economic and development
prospects. 8. The Government notes that it has been the practice
of the United Nations Security Council for some years to agree
humanitarian exemptions when new sanctions regimes are introduced,
even when the sanctions imposed are carefully targeted. For example
United Nations Security Council resolutions 748 and 883 imposed
a range of sanctions against Libya including an arms embargo,
a flight ban and prohibition on aviation goods and services, a
ban on certain oil-export equipment, and a freeze on Libyan Government
funds. The freeze on funds did not however apply to revenue from
the sale of oil or agricultural products, thus minimising the
humanitarian impact of the measure. And the flight ban provided
for humanitarian exemptions ("medevacs"). The Government
supports this trend. The Government also supports the recent note
by the President of the Security Council which included recommendations
on ways to improve the working of humanitarian exemptions. 9. The
only comprehensive sanctions regime in operation is that against
Iraq. Humanitarian exemptions allowing for the export of medicine
and food were included from the outset. Exemptions for essential
civilian need were soon added. The UN's "oil for food"
programme under which Iraq is permitted to sell set amounts of
oil to fund the purchase of food, medicines, other humanitarian
goods and equipment and spare parts to repair the civilian infrastructure
has been in place since 1996, although a similar scheme was offered
to the Iraqis as early as 1991. Since mid-1998 Iraq has also been
allowed to purchase equipment and spare parts for the rehabilitation
of its oil industry. Britain has taken the lead since l991 in
piloting the oil for food programme through the Security Council,
initially by drafting Resolutions 706 and 712 which first proposed
the programme,and then by drafting SCR 986 and its successors
which set up the programme and expanded it. 10. The oil for food
programme has improved nutrition and the availability of medical
supplies in Iraq and helped to slow the deterioration of the Iraqi
infrastructure. It would have been more successful but for the
failure of the Iraqi government to maximise the benefits of the
programme. The government of Iraq refuses, despite constant encouragement
from the UN, to properly prioritise what it purchases for the
humanitarian programme, to target the programme towards the most
vulnerable, or to improve the distribution system for humanitarian
goods inside Baghdad-controlled Iraq. Over half the medicines
and medical supplies which have arrived in Iraq since the start
of the oil for food programme (worth $275m) remain in warehouses
undelivered. Meanwhile the Iraqi leadership seeks to blame the
sanctions for the shortage of medicines. 11. The Government accepts
that the oil for food programme is not fully meeting the humanitarian
needs of the Iraqi people (though it was only ever supposed to
supplement the Government of Iraq's provision). Britain is therefore
spearheading efforts at the UN to identify ways that it can be
improved. Ideas we have put forward in proposals to the UN Humanitarian
Panel and now in a draft Resolution include: — increasing
the money in the programme, by removing the limit on the value
of oil which Iraq is allowed to produce and bringing Iraq's illegal
oil exports into the programme; — ensuring more effective
use of funds in the programme, and better distribution arrangements,
to meet Iraq's priority humanitarian needs; — temporary
diversion of funds from the Compensation Commission to the oil
for food programme; — speeding up procedures at the
UN by delegating authority to approve food and basic medical contracts
from the Sanctions Committee to the Secretariat; —
increasing value for money from the programme and stimulating
the local economy by allowing 986 money to be used to purchase
locally produced goods rather than import them from abroad as
at present; and — allowing local expenditure to repair
infrastructure. 12. The Government review of sanctions recognised
that there was a danger that target regimes might inhibit the
effectiveness of humanitarian exemptions for propaganda purposes,
or manipulate and divert them to their own advantage to undermine
the sanctions regime as a whole. The review also concluded that
the international community should, where possible, monitor and
ensure the implementation of exemptions on the ground.
THE IMPACT
OF SANCTIONS
ON THIRD
COUNTRIES 13. The Government recognises
that sanctions may affect "third countries" in addition
to the target state. The seriousness of the impact will depend
on a number of factors. Neighbouring states are often the hardest
hit, but major trading partners of the sanctioned regime will
also be affected. In some cases the international community may
consider it appropriate to compensate countries for the negative
impact on them of sanctions imposed on another country. The Government
believes that the international community should consider requests
from affected countries for support on a case by case basis. 14.
The Government does not support, however, proposals for the establishment
of an automatic compensation mechanism under Article 50 of the
Charter. The Government adheres to the principle that there should
be no right to compensation for discharging mandatory UN obligations.
Instead the Government considers that the International Financial
Institutions are best placed to assess the exact needs of countries
which have been hit by the imposition of sanctions against a third
party. With the assistance of the IMF and World Bank a number
of states neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia received
substantial assistance tailored to their needs as a result of
the impact of the sanctions imposed on the FRY in 1993-95. Egypt,
Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries have also received substantial
bilateral aid in recognition of the impact on their economies
of sanctions against Iraq.
MEASURES TO
IMPROVE MONITORING
AND ENFORCEMENT 15.
The Government believes that the effectiveness of a sanctions
regime will be enhanced by effective arrangements for implementation
and enforcement by all states, especially by neighbouring countries.
The Government welcomes the emphasis on implementation and enforcement
in the recent paper note by the President of the Security Council
on the work of the Sanctions Committees. The UK is playing a leading
role in the work being undertaken by the Angola Sanctions Committee
to tighten the enforcement of the measures imposed by the Security
Council against UNITA in its resolutions 864, 1127 and 1173. The
Security Council recently endorsed a report by the Committee which
contained a series of recommendations. These included inviting
neighbouring countries to give their views on how the embargo
could be tightened and urging potential donors to consider assisting
them in their implementation of sanctions against UNITA. The UK
will work through the Committee, and will contribute to the funding
of expert studies, to ensure that these recommendations are implemented. 16.
The Government also considers it essential for humanitarian exemptions
to be monitored and effectively implemented. The Department for
International Development is ready to contribute, in collaboration
with the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
to strengthening the analytical capacity of the UN Secretariat
so that it can provide better advice to the Security Council on
humanitarian exemptions when new sanctions regimes or modifications
to existing ones, are under consideration. To improve the enforcement
of humanitarian exemptions it can help build up local understanding
of, and capacity to implement, humanitarian exemptions. The importance
of taking account of the impact of sanctions on especially vulnerable
groups, such as women and children, argues for strengthening collaboration
with, and being prepared to assist, relevant UN agencies such
as UNICEF. 17. The Government believes that particular care should
be taken in the drafting of UN Security Council resolutions (and
other texts imposing sanctions, eg EC Regulations) to seek to
ensure common agreement on the precise scope of the sanctions,
including—if relevant—a tight definition of any goods
or services subject to sanctions. This will make it easier for
national authorities to draft appropriate legislation—and
for national enforcement authorities to enforce them—and
will promote consistent application across all countries. 18. In
some cases it may be necessary for the international community
to set up an international enforcement mechanism, as happened
in the case of the comprehensive sanctions imposed on the Federal
Republic of Yugoslav in 1993. The activities of the Maritime Interdiction
Force in the Gulf, in which the UK participates, are authorised
by a Security Council resolution.
EFFECT ON
DEVELOPMENT OF
A BAN
ON TRADE
IN DUAL-USE
GOODS AS
PART OF
AN ARMS
EMBARGO 19. The UK generally interprets
international arms embargoes to apply to all goods and technology
listed in Part III of Schedule 1 to the Export of Goods (Control)
Order (1994) as amended, generally known as the Military list.
Applications to export dual-use goods to a destination subject
to an international arms embargo continue to be considered on
a case by case basis unless, as in the case of Iraq, wider sanctions
are in force or HMG has made some wider commitment. The effect
on development of a ban on trade in dual-use goods as part of
an arms embargo is therefore unlikely to be significant.
DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 20.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office leads within Whitehall on
sanctions policy. But many other Government Departments also have
an interest in sanctions issues, including Customs and Excise,
the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions,
the Department for International Development, the Department of
Trade and Industry, the Export Credits Guarantee Department, the
Home Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury (for whom
the Bank of England act as agents on financial sanctions). The
FCO is responsible for consulting other Departments as appropriate
on issues relating to sanctions against specific countries. The
Cabinet Office has a role in coordinating inter-Departmental consideration
of wider sanctions issues when required.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
May 1999
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