Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of witness (Questions 300 - 316)

TUESDAY 8 JUNE 1999

MR MIKAEL BARFOD

  300. So this must be very frustrating for you?
  (Mr Barfod) Yes, it is.

Mr Khabra

  301. Does ECHO itself place any restrictions on the types of aid that are granted to targeted regimes and, if so, what are the reasons?
  (Mr Barfod) In principle we provide impartial humanitarian assistance directly to the people in need, to the victims. We do not have restrictions on humanitarian aid for political or economic reasons. This is the official answer if you like. If you look a bit more at the situation as it is there are, of course, some restrictions on humanitarian aid. One of the restrictions is the fact that we have to have access, our relief workers have to be safe, which is very important. We have to make sure that our items are not misused in the conflict and do not go straight to the black market. We have to make sure that our aid is not manipulated by the regime for political reasons. We have to make sure that we do not have a negative effect on the human rights situation, for instance with the Taliban regime and the way they treat women and girls. If they close the main hospital and want to open one specifically for women and girls without any facilities whatsoever we cannot go in and support such a hospital because that would have very negative effects on women and children. There are all kinds of, I do not know if you call them restrictions or considerations that we have to take into account in order for our humanitarian aid to be as smart as possible. I would like to make that quite clear. That also goes for countries that are affected by sanctions. Does that answer your question?

  302. Yes, I think so. Can I ask you another question. Should targeted states be provided with any special assistance once sanctions have been lifted to assist in the restoration of areas such as infrastructure and social services?
  (Mr Barfod) I think the answer to that is certainly yes. That is something that we have done on numerous occasions in ECHO. We mentioned Haiti before, ECHO actually stayed on there for a long time to make sure that the health sector would survive until the development people came in with all the long-term contracts. Development projects are slower, they are longer term, and they take a long while to mobilise. ECHO very often played the role of filling the gap in precisely that kind of situation there. We will be doing that again and again. Whenever a sanction is lifted you will probably find us trying to help with the humanitarian issues and filling gaps until others can come in and help. I would also say in general terms that it is not just humanitarian aid but also development aid. We certainly make an extra effort when sanctions have been lifted. This also goes for what I said before about the need for being very positive to build a future for these extremely vulnerable countries. There are a number of efforts going on at the moment that have been started by the World Bank and UNHCR and Mr Sogata and Mr Wolferson to fill the so-called gap so that the countries do not enter into something like a secondary conflict or humanitarian situation once they are out of crisis, once the sanctions have been lifted. I think this is a very exciting exercise which we participate in and I am personally involved in. However, it is difficult to get your own institution to move with it because in every aid organisation you have a development branch or department, you have a humanitarian branch, sometimes you have political aspects in a different place, all donors have that problem. In order to be effective when sanctions are lifted and the crisis is over you have to bring all instruments together in one goal very quickly with a plan. We are all struggling with that. The comments I made before about the new Commission I hope will help us. I know that the British Government has got a flexible approach to this issue and so have some other European governments and we would like to follow that trend.

  303. Can I ask you another question which is relevant to the end of sanctions in particular, that the greater consideration on the part of the donors is perhaps political, to achieve certain political objectives. Does it happen at any time that those political objectives are off the mark?
  (Mr Barfod) When you talk about political objectives, who—

  304. On the part of the donors.
  (Mr Barfod) When you say "off the mark", I am not quite sure what you mean by that.

  305. Sometimes those political considerations should not take precedence over humanitarian aid and sanctions.
  (Mr Barfod) Yes. I can agree with that in general but in order to be clear I would like to have an example because I am not 100 per cent sure what you are heading at.

  306. There are enough examples but I do not think this is the time.
  (Mr Barfod) Okay. In general terms I see what you mean but I think it is difficult to answer that question generally, it would be better to hook it on to an example.

Mr Rowe

  307. You have been very realistically talking about the ways in which ECHO's position vis a" vis sanctions could be improved but you started with a statement which made it very clear to me that you would prefer alternative ways of solving the world's problems. Are you saying to us that in a world run by you sanctions would not be an instrument of policy?
  (Mr Barfod) I did not actually say that.

  308. No, you did not.
  (Mr Barfod) I said that the sanctions I have seen so far from a humanitarian point of view have unacceptable consequences if they are not designed properly. Certainly that is a point that I am not going to divert from because I do acknowledge that sanctions for political reasons can be used but the catch-all, wholesale economic sanctions that almost work like blanket bombings in some cases vis a" vis vulnerable groups surely can be improved in the future world. If we target the elite, if we talk about freezing assets, if we talk about sanctions that specifically can limit an arms capability, then I think perhaps sanctions can play a role but that is not the immediate aim of my comments, of course.

  309. No. I am grateful.
  (Mr Barfod) There are lots of arms that I do not like either for humanitarian or all kinds of other purposes.

Ann Clwyd

  310. Can I ask you, Mr Barfod, whether you feel that sanctions can ever be at odds with international humanitarian law?
  (Mr Barfod) Yes. I think they can. I saw in the papers that others have said the same thing. You have to distinguish, of course, in humanitarian law between civilians and the military and that can be problematic in some cases. Also, the proportionality in humanitarian law is affected because to hit a legitimate target, how many civilians can you accept as a "side effect". So, on both accounts, proportionality and the distinguishment between civilian and military, I think they can have unfortunate consequences for humanitarian law. Again I believe Iraq is an example where probably international humanitarian law has been negatively affected because of the volume of children that have suffered there. I think that was more or less the same statement I read which a British NGO made here in this Committee as well.

  311. Yes, Save the Children Fund.
  (Mr Barfod) Save the Children Fund, yes.

  312. Again, specifically with reference to Iraq, what was ECHO's involvement in providing humanitarian relief to Iraq both before the Oil for Food Programme started and afterwards?
  (Mr Barfod) Our involvement goes quite far back, it goes back before ECHO was created in fact. We have provided humanitarian aid since 1991 and ECHO was created the following year. The humanitarian response has been targeted at all vulnerable groups, both before and after the oil embargo. After the Oil for Food Programme was agreed upon, ECHO tried to concentrate on sectors where this programme, as I said before, did not reach in the initial stages. Our idea was all along that the Oil for Food Programme would eventually reach all the humanitarian victims and we could pull out. However, the Oil for Food Programme has never managed to stabilise the humanitarian situation and ECHO has been forced to stay. Whereas ECHO originally operated mostly in Kurdistan, our resources have gradually been balanced now between the north, the south and the centre; the south being the marsh Arabs, the north the Kurds and in the centre the rest of the Iraqis. In 1992 to 1993 we focused on northern Iraq, in 1994/1995 we redoubled efforts in the south and the centre, in 1997 our funding gradually became limited to medical supplies and equipment, demining and the treatment of landmine victims and war wounded. I visited most of the projects in Kurdistan myself in connection with the visit of Mrs Bonino two years ago and it is obvious that there are lots of war related victims in that region still, if you include landmines as a leftover war. For 1998 and this year indeed we have allocated a total of 16 million ecu to water, hospitals, specialised institutions for children, medicine anddisplaced persons. DG1B, which is responsible for that region within the Commission, has also provided smaller amounts of aid for agriculture and drinking water and food aid has been provided by—No, sorry, NGO projects have been provided by DG8, that is the NGO profiling programme. Compared to ECHO's programme it is relatively small. Eight million and five million ecu respectively. The rest of the 250 million ecu that I talked about earlier has been provided by ECHO. It is a major programme. We are, as always, very frustrated when we have been in a country for a long time because the idea of humanitarian aid is to pull out so that we can concentrate your resources on other countries that need our aid.

  313. Thank you.
  (Mr Barfod) Does that help to give you an overview of what we are doing?

  Ann Clwyd: Yes, it does.

Mr Worthington

  314. I think you have answered some of the questions that I was going to put forward but there is this emphasis upon smarter sanctions. You talked earlier about how organisationally you hope that the European Union will get smarter but could you give us some indication of where you see improvements actually occurring in the future in terms of obviously protecting the vulnerable and in particular where sanctions will hurt those who have caused the particular problems? Are there areas which you or others are working on to which you would like to draw our attention?
  (Mr Barfod) Yes. Apart from all of the general factors I mentioned I think that smart sanctions must certainly include well enforced humanitarian exemptions. That was the issue we talked about before. I believe that we should also try as much as possible to use our influence to make sanctions targeted at the elite. If you look at the empirical data that is available, many sources actually claim that the success rate of sanctions over the past seven years, for instance, has been as low as 20 per cent in some cases but in those cases where you have specifically targeted the elite, which means that you totally exempt a lot of the humanitarian problems, the success rate has been doubled to 41 per cent. I think that is a figure that is worth paying attention to in my opinion.

  315. Could you say a little bit more about what you mean by that? What were those elite targetings that have worked and how might they be improved?
  (Mr Barfod) It is something I got from a study by a gentleman by the name of Hufbauer who suggested that the average success rate of sanctions is a lot higher when financial restrictions targeted at the economic elite are implemented. He compares that with all the cases where we have used a broad brush trade sanction and there he finds that the success rate is only 20 per cent. I can give you the full reference for this study. I have a copy of an extract of it with me and the full study I can send to you later.

  Mr Worthington: That would be very helpful.

Ann Clwyd

  316. Thank you very much. We have finished five minute early, which is amazing. I thank you very much for giving such useful and succinct answers and stimulating our views on this issue. We are very grateful to you, Mr Barfod, for coming.
  (Mr Barfod) Thank you. I have found it very interesting as well. I hope I have been able to say something you have not heard before.


 
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