Examination of Witness (Questions 317
- 339)
TUESDAY 29 JUNE 1999
MR CLAUDE BRUDERLEIN
Chairman
317. May I welcome you very much, Mr Bruderlein,
to our Committee this morning, and thank you also for the submission
of your papers which we have been reading from your Harvard Centre
for Population and Development Studies. We understand you have
been taking a very close interest and have been advisor on the
Interlaken Process. This Committee is very delighted to be able
to talk to you about these things this morning in detail, because
obviously they form the centre of our interest in how sanctions
can be used without damaging the civilian population and, amongst
the civilian population, usually the poorest of that civilian
population in the countries targeted by sanctions. Thank you very
much. Since you have given us your submissions, I think the best
way is to go straight into questions and answers, if that is alright
with you?
(Mr Bruderlein) If
I may, I would like simply to make a very short presentation.
First of all, Mr Chairman, I would like to thank you and the Committee
for inviting me; it is a great privilege for me to be able to
present some of the points that have attracted most of my interest
over the last three years. To help in this discussion, I would
like to underline my area of expertise in what I have been doing
for the last few years with regard to the targeting of sanctions.
As a Special Advisor to the United Nations on this topic I have
been working on developing methodologies to better assess the
humanitarian impact of sanctions, especially to provide objective
information to the Security Council as this information is perceived
within the Council as being politically sensitive. The first step
of my work three years ago was to develop clear methodology to
convince the Council members that, indeed, to assess the humanitarian
impact of sanctions was really feasible. I have been advising
the UN Secretariat on how to proceed with exempting humanitarian
goods. As you know, it has been quite difficult, especially in
the case of the former Yugoslavia, to clear goods quickly in order
that the UN humanitarian programme can be maintained. The third
area of my work was to assist directly the UN Security Council
in assessing or evaluating the potential humanitarian impact of
sanctions and the actual humanitarian impact of sanctions. I have
worked on two cases: the case of Sudan in January 1997, and the
case of Sierra Leone in 1998. More recently, as you mentioned,
I have been working on targeting financial sanctions; and also
I have been advising the UN Secretariat on the institutional implications
that the targeting of sanctions means; because we do talk a lot
about new methods, new technique to target sanctions, yet not
much has been done on how these techniques can be integrated in
current processes within the Security Council or within regional
sanctions authorities. These are the points I wanted to raise. 318.
Thank you very much indeed. What do you think are the essential
preconditions for a successful targeted sanctions regime? Presumably
by "successful" we mean that the objectives of those
who put the sanctions in place are actually realised.
(Mr Bruderlein) I
think that the success of the targeting of sanctions depends largely
on a new sense of realism of what sanctions are supposed to bring.
When we mean targeted sanctions, we mean new efforts to understand
the vulnerabilities of the targeted country; vulnerabilities in
the sense of the potential humanitarian impact of the sanctions;
that is, vulnerabilities to the negative impact of the sanctions,
as well as vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the positive impact
of the sanctions; that is, in what sectors of the regime of the
targeted country, the Government of the targeted country, are
damages considered to be more costly for them as an incentive,
as an incitement to bring political changes. In the planning of
a sanctions regime there are clear requirements for analysis to
better understand the situation of the targeted country. There
is a requirement to take the time to undertake this analysis.
I come back to my point about the processes to adopt sanction
regimes—at this stage sanction regimes are adopted in a
matter of days. In the case of Iraq sanctions were imposed in
six days, and in the case of Sierra Leone three days; so there
is clearly not the time to analyse the situation in the targeted
country and to better understand to better target the sanctions.
Afterwards, when we aim at targeting the regime, we need also
to have the flexibility to evolve with the targeted country. The
targeting of sanctions is a dynamic process. As it stands, if
the resolution of the Security Council is the only operative text
on how sanctions will be implemented, the Security Council will
need to renegotiate each time it wants to adapt the targeting
to the situation in the targeted country. This cannot be the case.
Since the targeting implies a larger loopholes as we narrow down
the sanctions; the targeted country may adapts its behaviour or
its activities to still function under the regime. For example,
when the Security Council wants to impose travel restriction it
has to say against whom it wants to impose this restriction; therefore,
there is the question of having a list of individuals that will
be considered as targets, and this list can evolve. Fortunately,
the Council decided to delegate its authority of establishing
the list to the Sanctions Committee, and therefore the operative
text is a decision of the Sanctions Committee by consensus and
not under the current rules of the Security Council with regard
to the negotiation process which is the subject to the veto of
the permanent members. I would say the second most important requirement
for targeting sanctions is really the ability to evolve with the
sanctions, to evolve with the targeted country, and possibly show
signs of satisfaction when the target country starts to adopt
measures and policy that are in compliance with the request of
the Security Council. Therefore, it also opens the door for incitement
policy and, I would say, to relieve some of the pressure that
is exerted as part of the primary instrument. 319. Does this mean
that the sanctions resolutions in front of the Security Council
needs to be an enabling resolution; that is to say, applying those
sanctions that will most effectively induce the result the Security Council
is pushing to achieve? Is that the sort of resolution you would
like to see the Security Council taking, thus enabling the Sanctions Committee
in charge of actually implementing this resolution to adopt such
measures and such restrictions as it thinks fit and when it thinks
fit?
(Mr Bruderlein) I
think it is a very good term. It is enabling the Sanctions Committee
to adapt the sanctions to the humanitarian impact of the sanctions,
as well as to maximise the political impact of the sanctions.
The Council should give the parameters under which the Sanctions
Committee could exert its authority in adjusting specific sanctions
that have been adopted by the Council, being travel restrictions
or specific embargoes. 320. Should it therefore also contain a
paragraph or sentence in which it says something like, "These
sanctions should be implied minimising the impact on the provision
of educational health", or whatever are thought to be the
necessary safeguards for the poorest and most vulnerable civilian
populations in the country; would you like to see that as well?
(Mr Bruderlein) Absolutely.
Since the Council should take the time to evaluate the vulnerability
of the target country, if it thinks that education for primary
health care or the basic education sector are highly vulnerable
to trade embargo, for example—since, let us say, educational
material is largely imported—it should tell the Sanctions
Committee that the Council members consider this point of being
of particular relevance to the sanction, and then proceed to ensure
that agencies and organisations are able to import such goods
or services into the country to maintain whatever the Council
consider to be of primary interest. 321. Has such a resolution
ever been passed by the Security Council? Is there any resistance
in the United Nations to this concept?
(Mr Bruderlein) I
must say that over the last two years the targeting of sanctions
is becoming a more and more attractive issue for the Council.
It is now agreed that the Council could hardly impose something
else than the targeted sanctions as in the case of Sierra Leone.
The case of Sierra Leone is the most recent case, except for the
arms embargo against Serbia earlier this year. The case of Sierra
Leone is a case of targeted sanctions that include travel restrictions,
an arms embargo and an oil embargo. In the case of the oil embargo
it was clearly stated that the Council considered the importation
of oil, for the purpose of humanitarian operation, had to be exempted.
It was for the Sanctions Committee to see how it could ensure
that this activity could take place. In the case of Sierra Leone,
the additional difficulty was that ECOWAS (the West African Economic
and Cooperation Organisation) was in charge of implementing the
sanctions, and that was another area of difficulty I would say.
At least in terms of the UN system it was clearly a delegation
of authority towards the Sanctions Committee to ensure that humanitarian
organisation, being UN or other major organisations, would have
sufficient reserves of fuel to function in Sierra Leone. Indeed
there is a practice I would say now for having a more targeted
approach of sanctions. To the second part of your question about
the resistance with the UN system, I would not say there is resistance.
There is common will to develop these mechanisms. However, there
is a serious lack of capacity, especially as the targeting of
sanctions requires much more technical expertise. For example,
if you mention an arms embargo you need the technical expertise
to know what you are talking about when it comes down to specify
which weapons should be prohibited and on what basis arms trade
is taking place. This expertise is not available within the Secretariat.
The case of financial sanctions has been acknowledged by the Secretariat,
that in no way the Secretariat is in a position at this stage
to assist whatever committee, or even the Council, in designing
financial sanctions. Member states should be fully aware that
it has to develop new expertise and establish new institutional
arrangements to be able to implement the sanctions as it wishes
to do. 322. This is changing the underlying philosophy behind sanctions,
is it not? As I understand the underlying assumption on sanctions,
if you deprive the population of imports of all kinds it will
make them starve or lose their jobs and thus bring pressure to
bear on their Government to change the policies so as to enable
them not to lose their jobs and not to starve. It seems to me
if you are going to move away from that you are saying, "Right,
that doesn't actually work", or those people who it affects
must have got no power to affect the Government's decision-making,
and therefore there is no point in doing it so we really ought,
in humanitarian terms anyway, to prevent that happening. So there
is a big change in the philosophy involved here, is there not?
(Mr Bruderlein) Indeed.
There has been a big change over recent years considering the
greater use of sanctions, particularly because of the case of
Iraq. The case of Iraq demonstrates the failure of this policy,
of imposing an economic embargo. 323. You see the effect?
(Mr Bruderlein) It
is seen by almost everybody I am working with as being a failure,
in terms of this classical objective of imposing hardship on the
population to create discontent and further political change.
There are a number of reports and studies about evaluating the
extent to which this classical approach of the use of sanctions
in itself is biased, since most of the targets are not democratic
regimes. There are signs that these sanctions are strengthening
the authority of these undemocratic regimes, since they have the
capacity to control black markets and take advantage of the smuggling.
Another point which should be mentioned is that there is a greater
awareness about the accountability of the UN system, and in particular
of the Security Council, to legal standards. When the Security
policies are deadlocked, there is a greater will and greater sensitivity
to human rights standards and humanitarian principles; and these
standards and principles say not only that the humanitarian impact
of sanctions should be minimised, but it should be avoided. There
is a growing concern to be consistent. If we want to bring back
the democratic regime we can hardly violate international law
by imposing sanctions and hurting the wrong people.
Ms Oona King
324. On the previous point of regional involvement
with sanctions, I wondered how regional implementation and regional
bodies implementing sanctions dovetailed with the UN approach
and vice versa, for instance in Burundi where it came the other
way round. With ECOWAS, were there a lot of problems trying to
coordinate the regional and the UN approach?
(Mr Bruderlein) Yes,
indeed, there have been a lot of problems to coordinate these
approaches. There is a growing tendency to delegate to region
the management of security policies or decisions, being peacekeeping
forces, sanctions, negotiations and so on. In the cases of Burundi
and Sierra Leone they are a very good example. The difficulties
encountered on the sanctions part can also be reflected in other
sectors, such as peacekeeping. In terms of standards there are
frequently not the mechanisms or the capacity at the regional
level to ensure that political authorities will stick to standards
and procedures developed at the multilateral level. In the case
of Sierra Leone (and I will talk later about the case of Burundi),
when ECOWAS decided to impose a full embargo on Sierra Leone it
did not consult very much with the UN in the first place, and
the Security Council only expressed its support to ECOWAS, which
is the same formula as in the case of Burundi; but in this case
the Secretariat engaged in discussion with ECOWAS about what standards
should be applied, and there was serious concern (especially following
Burundi) that the humanitarian operation in Sierra Leone could
come to a stop if this embargo was effective in preventing humanitarian
goods from crossing into Sierra Leone; and that is what happened
despite agreements and a memorandum of understanding and so on
on standards, because of the lack of political will. In the case
of Burundi it was even worse because there was the issue of to
which extent the sanctions were legal under international law.
In the case of Sierra Leone, since the UN Security Council imposed
additional sanctions on Sierra Leone, travel restrictions, an
arms embargo and oil embargo, it has helped to legitimise the
ECOWAS economic embargo. In the case of Burundi these were only
regional sanctions, and UN agencies were caught in between the
Burundi authorities saying, "You should not get engaged in
discussing with the regional sanction authorities in finding ways
to facilitate importation of goods. Rather you should stand strong
for international law", and on the other side the border
was close. In addition, one of the problems of the UN under regional
embargo, especially in Africa, is that the UN has to go through
official channels compared to NGOs. African borders are quite
porous. Even when they impose an economic embargo you can see
truckloads crossing the border if you have the time and flexibility
to negotiate your passage with the border guard. A UN agency cannot
do that (they have to be accountable for any expense they have),
compared with NGOs; where some NGOs, with the understanding or
the acknowledgement of the donors, engaged in negotiating the
passage of their goods because they were vital for the survival
for the population in the country. Interestingly, it came to a
point where some donors, rather than giving their money to the
UN, gave their money to NGOs in order that the NGOs would bring,
let us say, baby food through the border and then the donation
was given to UNICEF in the capital of the target country, like
in Burundi, simply to get through this problem. In terms of recommendation,
we are trying to bring more awareness to the Security Council
about this problem; but the Council cannot simply open a grey
area and say, "We support the effort but we don't really
authorise it"; because if they authorise it they become accountable,
and have a subsidiary responsibility regarding the implementation
of these standards. The Council should be much stricter in the
way sanctions will be imposed at the regional level.
Tess Kingham
325. Could I turn to your concerns about the capacity
of the UN to implement sanction regimes, and in particular to
Angola. I think there have been something like 12 separate sanction
resolutions between 1993 and 1998 and it does not appear they
have been very effective. It does give the impression that because
the UN is not able to stop the flow of diamonds or arms and prevent
the kind of trading still going on with UNITA in Angola that just
another resolution is brought about. Could you give some indication
of whether you feel the UN does have the capacity to implement
these sanctions, or does it go back to the Sanctions Committee
and yet another sanction is brought out to top up the ones that
already exist, and how effective are they?
(Mr Bruderlein) The
case of Angola is a very good case. I believe for the first time
the UN is getting serious about imposing a targeted embargo, on
diamonds in this case and on UNITA. For years the UN has not been
very serious in imposing an arms embargo in Africa, not serious
at all. In this case, thanks to the Chairman of the Sanctions
Committee, Canadian Ambassador Fowler of Canada, they decided
we have to make our best to ensure that the trade in diamonds
is better controlled; but you have to realise that they were starting
from scratch since nobody knew how this trade was taking place;
nobody knows how to control such a trade. 326. People have done
quite a lot of studies. There is clear evidence where the diamonds
are going to. They are finding their way to the Netherlands, they
are finding their way to places like De Beers. The routes have
been quite clearly found out.
(Mr Bruderlein) Absolutely,
but from the point of regulating the diamonds trade it is something
else. The Security Council or the Sanctions Committee does not
have the authority to regulate the diamond trade; it has to go
through the member state; and the member state needs the enabling
law to do so, and then you need the cooperation of the different
actors involved in such a trade. Here we come to the whole challenge
of targeting sanctions, which is to build the right knowledge
about these mechanisms and the cooperation required to make the
targeting effective; and the regulation, to have a process from
the Security Council to the Sanctions Committee to the national
state to the local authority that will implement and eventually
sanction those who violate the resolution. When the Council decided
simply to impose sanctions against UNITA diamonds trade, it did
not know much about it, and there we have a demonstration of ineffectiveness.
The targeting of sanctions and the lessons start to be learnt
now. There are clear requirements for imposing targeted sanctions.
In New York members of the Security Council have understood that
they can no longer impose sanctions like the arms embargo against
Somalia. There is the need to understand what is the structure
of the arms trade in Somalia; how can we affect it; how can we
interfere with the arms trade in Africa, where these weapons come
from; what regulation is required to be serious about it, about
sanctioning violations; which member state's cooperation should
be enhanced to ensure the arms trade is better regulated and so
on. It is a whole new ball game, if I may say. The Council is
just starting to engage into it. In the case of Angola, to my
knowledge it is the first time member states are taking it seriously
and studying and being accountable for the weaknesses and failure
of the regime.
Ann Clwyd
327. You may not want to address this particular
question. In the aftermath of the Kosovo war sanctions will be
continuing against Serbia, but at the same time the United Kingdom
and the United States have said they will give humanitarian assistance
to Serbia and not give assistance to rebuild the infrastructure.
As I understand it from your paper, you are saying that humanitarian
assistance should be interpreted much more broadly than simply
food and medicines. I wondered if you had thought about this in
the context of Serbia and the aftermath of the war?
(Mr Bruderlein) I
think you are right, the humanitarian impact of sanctions has
such a narrow perspective on the needs of the people and the difficulty
it may bring in development issues and simple economic life, especially
in long-term sanctions like the case of Africa. Many efforts have
been made to see how we can better understand the longer term
impact of sanctions that will help us to address the humanitarian
impact of sanctions, or the humanitarian effect of sanctions on
the population. In the case of Serbia, there are no UN economic
sanctions against Serbia. I am not fully aware of the European
sanctions; I know there is an oil embargo, but I am not aware
that there is an economic embargo against Serbia. There are certainly
restrictions of bilateral aid towards Serbia; but the restriction
of bilateral aid is not a sanction per se. Every country is free
to decide to whom it will give its assistance and aid. Therefore
it is not clearly under the sanctions or the collective response
to the threat to international peace and security. However, I
follow your point about the fact that when we develop sanction
policies we should also be consistent with regard to aid. If we
are lifting sanctions or careful of not imposing an economic embargo
against Serbia, we should also be careful of not restricting aid;
but this is a political point and not linked to my expertise.
Barbara Follett
328. Mr Bruderlein, do you think financial sanctions
should be regarded as a useful policy tool in themselves, or should
they merely be used in addition to traditional economic sanctions?
(Mr Bruderlein) I
think targeted financial sanctions cannot be in any way effective
tools by themselves to make policy change in the targeted country.
I mean by that, threats to international peace and security are
not made out of greed. Therefore, even if you control financial
assets of the dictators it may not change much, especially if
the sanctions are only freezing their assets for a given period.
Therefore, by themselves and standing alone they are not going
to have much impact. However, as a matter of consistency and legitimacy
it is extremely important that targeted financial sanctions are
integrated to not only sanctions but in response to threats to
international peace and security. In my view it is difficult to
imagine how we have been in the position to impose an economic
embargo for eight or nine years against Iraq without imposing
targeted financial sanctions against the ruling elite in Baghdad. 329.
You make this point extremely well in your paper, but the most
effective method of targeting is actually to target the ruling
elite pockets. In the case of Iraq, in the case of Milosevic,
their accounts in fact have not suffered at all.
(Mr Bruderlein) During
the two months bombing against Serbia the assets of Mr Milosevic,
I believe I heard from the press, they were in Switzerland and
were unhindered. We are especially looking at these leaders as
not only those responsible but those in charge of changing the
policy.
330. I want to come back to this point. You said earlier the purpose
of sanctions was to cause dissatisfaction and unrest with the
leaders. It seems if that is the purpose of sanctions, and Iraq
is a very good illustration of how that does not happen, what
you have actually got to do is hit the ruling elite. I would like
to suggest that in South Africa for many years there were forms
of sanctions which hit the underclass and did not touch the ruling
elite; but once you targeted the computers, computer parts and
gold a change began to occur.
(Mr Bruderlein) I
do not know much about the case of South Africa, but I think you
are making a very good point. In addition I would say the targeting
of the elite is a new concept in international relations. It pierces
the veil of the nation state. We are going inside and we are screening
to see who can respond to the Security Council's demands, what
entities, UNITA, Saddam Hussein, MrMilosevic and so on, and this
is new in terms of international relations. 331. I think the point
you make is very valid and it also shows, in a way, we have changed
the way we go into conflicts. We also pierce the veil of the nation
state there. I wonder if this had been taken into account in the
Interlaken Process, this differential targeting within the state
you are targeting?
(Mr Bruderlein) It
is still a point of debate. Under the issue of targeting you have
to narrow the sanctions against the specific trade activities,
from economic sanctions to oil embargoes, or financial sanctions
and so on. There is the targeting of individuals or political
entities. At this stage we have two fish in the same bowl: some,
talk about targeting sanctions as narrowing down economic embargo
to specific oil embargo or financial sanctions; and the other
talks about targeted sanctions as sanctions against the leaders.
There is still some conservatism with regard to the targeting
of specific individuals or entities. 332. Or elite.
(Mr Bruderlein) It
becomes quite difficult. It is already difficult to have the regulations
and the methodology to really freeze financial assets worldwide
of, let us say, Yugoslavia. When we say it has to be against individuals
and to be able to counter activities of concealment or false names
or whatever is used to cover the ownership of these assets, it
is quite a challenge. In the case of Angola it is a very good
illustration of these difficulties, where you have a list of potential
members of UNITA who are supposed to walk around with suitcases
full of diamonds. It becomes quite difficult to imagine this is
really how it is taking place. So I would say we are still at
a preliminary stage of defining what will be the format of these
targeted sanctions. Is it going to be, as you said, more comprehensive
sanctions and we are trying to add on to these comprehensive sanctions
more targeted ones so that when we have located a bank account
of Mr Milosevic, bang, we impose additional sanctions to enhance
the effectiveness of the financial sanctions against Yugoslavia,
for example, or are we going to go really chasing assets of leaders
based on state of the art technology and leave general financial
operations out? 333. I would suggest that the answer to that question
probably lies in how effective and how quickly and what you want
to achieve and obviously what you want to achieve is a change
in regime. Can I just move on to another point. From what you
have said possibly the answer to this is no but I am going to
ask it anyway. Do you believe that targeting financial sanctions
will ultimately replace traditional full-scope financial sanctions
of the kind we have seen imposed by the United Nations, European
Union and other groups within the 20th century?
(Mr Bruderlein) I
think that targeted sanctions and targeted financial sanctions
are a response to a decision not to impose any more economic embargoes.
Targeted sanctions are more a response to the humanitarian crises
that have been created by these economic embargoes than a will
to be more effective on the side of sanctions authorities. It
is very interesting to see the landscape of this sanctions debate.
The case of economic sanctions against Iraq is an important reminder
of how things can go wrong. This case generated a consistent will
of getting out of this wrong-doing but not really knowing where
we are going and how to make these sanctions more effective. In
political terms it is apparent that member states will probably
not impose such sanctions again, (as we have in the case of Iraq)
as it is hardly manageable and it seems not to be so effective. 334.
I was glad to see in your paper that you paid a great deal of
attention to the technical problems. You mentioned the offshore
centres which I think could benefit from some of the regulation
that you suggest. How big a problem do you see those offshore
centres in the United Nations' ability to impose targeted sanctions?
(Mr Bruderlein) I
am not an expert in offshore financial activities but from what
I could hear from these experts in the Interlaken process and
elsewhere it does not appear to be a major issue. Offshore centres,
on the one hand, are handling activities that are in the margins
of major financial trade activities. In addition, offshore centres
hold most financial assets through corresponding banks in dollars
in New York or Swiss francs in Zurich or British pounds in London
that will hold the financial assets for them and the relationship
they have with the corresponding bank is a relationship that can
be regulated by the corresponding bank, therefore the argument
that the experts made to defend the viability or the feasibility
of financial sanctions with regard to offshore banking centres
was that if we can manage to regulate most of the major financial
centres and the major hard currency centres the offshore centres
will have to follow. Of course, we may find some offshore centres
that want to stick to deregulation. Such behaviour will clearly
identify them as being one of that kind and will draw attention
to whose accounts are there and their corresponding banks. Therefore,
any activities made against these banks in these offshore centres
will raise doubts, will raise suspicion from regulatory authorities
in the major financial centres. 335. I would say that they would
probably make your tracking and monitoring much more difficult
but you could use the individual countries like Antigua, for example,
in which they are situated and put pressure on them. Do you think
loans and grant-in-aid should be included in the new so-called
"smart" sanctions regimes?
(Mr Bruderlein) In
the larger understanding of Smart sanctions, which include better
strategies to incite or to encourage compliance, here again I
underline not to reward compliance but to encourage compliance,
it is certainly a valid point that once a member state and regional
organisations want to develop a strategy to bring a country back
into compliance they should use whatever tools they have, not
only targeted sanctions because we know that will not be sufficient.
So whatever strategy can be used in terms of loans, in terms of
aid, in terms of diplomatic representation or participation in
technical fora and so on should be used. 336. Do you think financial
sanctions regimes face any legal impediment such as breach of
contract? Was this flagged up in the Interlaken discussions?
(Mr Bruderlein) Yes
it has been raised frequently by the banks. The banking sector
was well represented in Interlaken as well as in most of the fora
and conferences in which I participated. The banking sector is
quite keen to abide by the rules and demands of the member states
and of the Security Council, however there is an important need
for clarity and what the banking sector or representatives of
the banking sector were consistently saying in these technical
meetings is that they are liable for defending the interests of
their customers unless there are clear instructions from national
regulatory authorities to do otherwise. There is a need for clear
rules and regulations that will state the conduct expected from
the banks. This is, I would say, the main gap in the process at
this stage, the lack of clear regulation at the national level
to define, for example, what is a financial asset? What does it
include? Does it include property interests of all kinds? Does
it include interest in real estate, trusts and so on? There is
a need to really develop the regulations to send a clear message
to the banks so when they face their customers they can say, "This
is possible, this is not and therefore we have to follow the rule."
At this stage in most of the countries there are no such regulations.
When the Council is trying to freeze the assets of Libya it does
not go very far since most countries do not have the law to apply
the sanctions. So efforts should be made. I know in Great Britain
there is such a law and it has been very useful as a model to
develop enabling laws but in many other countries there is no
such law yet. 337. Do you think there could be any problems in
trying to ensure compliance when the UN does pass a resolution
that there will be targeted sanctions against a country? Have
you looked at this non-compliance by other countries?
(Mr Bruderlein) Non-compliance
is a political issue and it comes down to this new requirement
of the targeted sanctions that make the whole subject so interesting.
The Security Council wants to impose targeted sanctions because
the Security Council it wants to be more effective and wants to
be more relevant in addressing threats to international peace
and security. Therefore there is the will also to ensure compliance
because targeted sanctions could be so easy to avoid or to escape
if you do not have with it all the necessary regulations and monitoring
of implementation. It does require new and stronger commitment
from the member states. I am waiting to see how the Council will
ensure compliance, for example in the case of Angola and the diamond
trade. It is going to be very interesting. But certainly the situation
of the Council at this stage is that it is really working to regain
some of its relevance in terms of international peace and security
which is linked to the results of its effort to ensure compliance
to its sanctions.
Ms Follett: Thank you very much, Mr Bruderlein.
Mr Worthington
338. I do not think there would be any disagreement
that it would be desirable to target financial assets but can
it be done? Has it been done? Are there good examples of where
this targeting has actually worked?
(Mr Bruderlein) There
is the case of Libya where up to a certain date the assets of
the Libyan Government were targeted and targeted compared to the
private assets, so it was not the assets of the leader of Libya
but the assets of the state and it was up to a certain date and
future assets were not targeted. This targeting was quite effective
in freezing assets for a period. Sanctions have now been suspended
so the case of Libya is a good example. There is the case now
of the European Union that has decided to impose targeted financial
sanctions against the ruling elite in Belgrade. This is an entirely
new case so we will have to see. Otherwise there are not so many
cases. It really remains to be seen how these sanctions can be
deployed but it has not been really used because for the time
being much of the regulation to implement these sanctions is not
in place. 339. So it would be right to say that in notorious cases
such as the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Iraq there has been
no one at all working on targeted financial sanctions. No work
has been done despite the desirability of that by any UN organisation?
(Mr Bruderlein) There
has been work at the Member state level. There have been unilateral
sanctions against assets of leaders, be it the United States or
the European Union and so on, so there has been regulation and
techniques developed to target the financial assets of individual
entities and states. At the UN level at the multi-lateral level
not much has been done at this stage and the whole effort of the
Interlaken process was to see how feasible it would be to develop
these tools at the multi-lateral level.
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