Examination of Witness (Questions 360
- 377)
TUESDAY 29 JUNE 1999
MR CLAUDE BRUDERLEIN
360. In terms of dual use, there has been
evidence given in the case, for example, of Iraq, what is considered
as a dual use good if, for example, it is plant or equipment for
rebuilding a hospital. Does there have to be something like a
site visit to ascertain whether that really is a dual use good
or not? What is the actual process for this dual use equipment?
It is very cumbersome from what I understand.
(Mr Bruderlein) The
cumbersome character of the process is linked to political will
making it cumbersome. The clearance process is an additional way
of putting pressure on the targeted state which is using humanitarian
agencies as a proxy in many cases. It is difficult to explain
why we have to go and check on site that it is not a dual use
good. In some cases there are serious and legitimate concerns
about the dual use of some goods, in particular fertilizer and
so on which could be degraded and made into goods of security
interest. However, in other cases, and there are cases of lead
in pencils for Iraq which are well known that have been blocked
as dual goods, these decisions seem to be aimed at exerting additional
pressure through this process. It is one of the weaknesses of
the Sanctions Committee that are driven by political concerns
more than humanitarian ones. It should simply be driven by technical
concerns, deciding for once what are humanitarian goods in the
case of Iraq or in the case of Yugoslavia or Haiti—and this
list can be revised from time to time. We should not be asking
each time a request comes in "do we consider this request
as humanitarian" which becomes a more moral and political
question than a technical one. 361. You have said that the Sanctions
Committee is made up mainly of diplomats who obviously have a
political agenda to follow in addition to their role on the Committee.
How would you streamline the process to make it more effective
and to perhaps include professionals who are more relevant, perhaps
people who have a humanitarian aid background or who have an expert
knowledge of the area? How would you redefine the existing organs
of the UN and streamline the process to make it more effective
in terms of delivery of humanitarian goods?
(Mr Bruderlein) I
would start with the Council. The Council, while getting serious
about sanctions, should enable the Sanctions Committee to get
more technical; that is why they are there. Therefore, Council
members should provide the Sanctions Committees with the necessary
resources and expertise, that make them technical committees more
than political ones. In addition, especially the Chairman of the
Committee should have the capacity to drive the process within
the Sanctions Committee in a way that is not so consensual as
it is now where everybody has a veto. These procedures are currently
too political and linked to political tensions or political activities
of the Council rather than the sanctions technical aspect. In
addition, I would say there is a need for the Secretariat to be
more helpful in assisting the Sanctions Committee on guidelines
and technical points, for example what are the specific humanitarian
goods for the targeted country? UN agencies have this information,
NGOs have this information. They are willing to provide this information
to the Secretary to OCHA—the Office for the Co-ordination
of Humanitarian Affairs—to make this information available
to the Sanctions Committee but the Committee has to request it.
There is a clear need for it to become more systematic in terms
of lists, in terms of procedures, to make them workable.
Chairman: We need to go on to regional sanctions
now and I think Ann Clwyd is going to lead us in this area.
Ann Clwyd
362. Some of these things you have touched on previously
but I wonder if you could expand on them. In your memorandum you
make the point that regional embargoes supported by the Security
Council, as in the case of Sierra Leone, have created new obstacles
to UN operations in humanitarian crisis situations. You say specifically
that in Sierra Leone despite considerable support from the UN
Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Economic
Committee of the West African States was unable to clear urgently
needed food shipments for five months. Is that not absolutely
ridiculous?
(Mr Bruderlein) The
statement or what happened? 363. What happened?
(Mr Bruderlein) I
was myself sent as the head of a team to assess the situation
in the region by the Security Council in February 1998 and we
issued a report to the Council at the end of February and we hope
that this report drew the attention of the Council to the limitation
of these kind of arrangements of simply supporting a regional
organisation's efforts. However, those efforts are valid. When
a regional organisation wants to tackle a crisis like in Sierra
Leone and has the courage to do so, it should be encouraged rather
than simply discouraged, but these regional organisations may
not have the administrative capacity and knowledge of how to implement
some of the tools they want to use, be it peace-keeping or sanctions.
These limitations have a technical aspect but there is also a
political one. Collective security and multi-lateral action offers
the guarantee of objectivity that we cannot find necessarily at
the regional level. This is not only applicable to Africa; it
could be to Europe or to NATO. When you have a regional response
you have also a much stronger profile of regional interests involved
in this response and the difficulty therefore is to develop objective
methodologies to respond to some of the concerns that would go
against these interests. Therefore, there is a need at the multi-lateral
level to ensure, especially with regard to the humanitarian impact
of whatever response is made at the regional level, be it peace-keeping,
use of armed forces or sanctions, that there are standards and
procedures that have to be respected. How to do this is the question.
If we look at the UN Charter it is fairly clear. It says that
regional actions should be authorised by the Security Council.
Authorisation means a sense of accountability and it also means
a review mechanism to ensure that the parameters of this authorisation
are respected. What we are telling the Council is that it should
include in its authorisation standards regarding the provision
of humanitarian goods under sanctions. Since it is part of the
authorisation, the Council should make sure that these standards
are respected so there is a need for monitoring and reviewing
regularly this authorisation. Behind this formal aspect, this
formal language based on the Charter, there is a whole political
process of negotiation inevitably between the regional organisation
and members of the Security Council, particularly those members
sponsoring regional efforts. These members should be particularly
aware of the humanitarian implications of such efforts. So I would
say in the case of Sierra Leone, unfortunately, whilst every effort
was made to bring in the necessary know-how at technical level
it was at the technical level, but when it came to the political
level there have been weaknesses that have been acknowledged.
When the Council decided to send this team that I headed to the
region it was an acknowledgement that there were serious difficulties
there and, indeed, despite the commitment of ECOWAS, despite the
availability of standards, despite the availability of food at
the border, World Food Programme trucks were stopped for five
months. It brought to a stop critical programmes of feeding malnourished
children. People died because of that and that was entirely unnecessary
loss of life. I do not think there is any necessary loss of life
but the humanitarian impact could have been addressed if there
was some Council involvement to ensure that the applicable standards
would have been respected. 364. Given the evidence that you have
talked about, why is it that the Security Council seems so reluctant
to reform its traditional approach to sanctions?
(Mr Bruderlein) The
Security Council is, I would say, the most traditional and historic
institution of the UN in terms of political spectrum as it comes
from 1945. I think the need for reform of the Security Council
has been well acknowledged and it is a political process that
I am sure will take place and is taking place, but it will take
time. Sanctions are, I would say, one of the best platforms to
show why reform is needed so much. We are not simply talking about
membership. I think it is really inappropriate to look simply
in terms of membership or voting procedures. It is a matter of
what do we mean by "collective security"? The concept
of collective security in the early 1950s was one of the Permanent
Five's projection of their own foreign policy into the Security
Council. The ultimate threat of the use of force would ensure
international peace and security. Now we know that this is clearly
not sufficient in an increasingly complex world order. If we want
to maintain international peace and security we need strategic
tools to respond to much less important threats and to manage
regional stability in a way that is not only coercive but also
uses incitement tools to maintain such stability. The meaning
of stability also includes other factors such as human rights,
good governance, sustainable development and so on, so sanctions
in this realm is a very good illustration of the challenges and
the potential for Council reform and prospects and I would say
it is one of the most interesting aspects because we know that
the effectiveness of sanctions will be put in doubt. Sanctions
in themselves cannot bring much in terms of effectiveness. However,
sanctions in the process of elaboration and thinking that is attached
to it has significant and almost historical implications in terms
of the functioning of the collective security system. 365. Would
you say therefore that it is particularly incumbent upon the politicians
in the countries of the Member states of the Security Council
to put pressure on their own governments to bring about these
reforms?
(Mr Bruderlein) I
would say yes but it is up to the domestic constituency to see
what the priorities of their foreign policy are. Certainly for
the members of the Security Council and particularly for Permanent
Members of the Security Council, I would say it is seeing the
potential of collective security in today's world and the importance
of such mechanisms compared to ad hoc initiatives and regionalism.
It would appear as a priority to me to see that such a process
of reform and development takes place very quickly. 366. Can I
ask you a bit about prolonged sanctions regimes. To what extent,
in your experience, are the effects of sanctions such as increased
black market activity, dilapidated infrastructure and weakened
political opposition reversible?
(Mr Bruderlein) We
hope this impact will be reversible because sanctions should not
have a long-term impact. The case of Haiti worries us in many
ways because sanctions were lifted four years ago and in many
aspects we could see indicators like education, health, the morbidity
rate of children under five and so on, plummet during the sanctions
and they did not recover. Many would argue that it is not linked
to the sanctions, it is linked to the political environment and
the economic environment of the post-sanctions area of Haiti.
Others are saying, and I think it is a good point, the comprehensive
aspect of long-term economic sanctions, still affects the life
of people beyond the lifting of sanctions. It may take a lot of
time for countries to recover, which is a stronger indicator of
targeting sanctions. We are targeting sanctions not only to minimise
the humanitarian impact of sanctions but also to maximise the
capacity of the country to recover from sanctions once its Government
has decided to comply with the demands of the Security Council.
The case of Iraq will be one of major interest to see to what
extent Iraq can recover from sanctions once these sanctions are
lifted. Iraq has the resources, particularly oil. We know it will
take years before they can rebuild their capacity to export and
then to earn the revenues to rebuild but it is not to be compared
with Haiti which does not have much resources to base its recovery
on. 367. According to a recent article in one of our newspapers
Saddam Hussein is said to have massed up to £4 billion, making
him the world's forty-seventh richest man. Therefore, can sanctions
really be said to have their desired effect on Iraq?
(Mr Bruderlein) If
the desired effect on Iraq was disarmament, it has had some effect,
the extent of which is being debated at the council. As was mentioned
by the Chairman, the classic approach in the case of Iraq has
shown its limitations. I think the simple fact that we have long-term
sanctions, comprehensive embargoes as in the case of Iraq, is
a demonstration that it does not work in the long run. Now we
have to cope with all the bias and all the side effects that are
simply taking over the spectrum of the sanctions. Politically
the Council did not find a way of getting out of the deadlock.
I take note here of the efforts of your Government to pave a way
out of the deadlock, we really appreciated it in New York. Evidently
one of the side effects has been the strengthening of the Baghdad
regime. Some argue that it is not linked but clearly from UN agencies,
officers and workers in Baghdad, it is evident that the ruling
elite is benefiting from the black market and the black market
is taking place unhindered.
Chairman
368. What else could they expect? You are putting
sanctions across one of the most ancient human trade routes in
the world. How was it expected that it would do anything other
than strengthen Saddam Hussein's hand?
(Mr Bruderlein) You
ask the question "was it expected", but did they have
the time to expect this when they imposed the sanctions in August
1990? 369. They are citizens of the world, they know their history
and their geography, they know that is an ancient trade route,
come on.
(Mr Bruderlein) If
we put ourselves in their position on 2 August 1990, Kuwait had
just been invaded and they were looking for a response. They thought
that an economic embargo was a good one, "let us put Iraq
under siege". Not much thought was given to how sustainable
and how effective could such a regime be for nine years. What
we are saying is in whatever circumstances, whatever pressure,
when an international crisis is taking place we cannot impose
sanctions overnight. We really have to look at those implications.
To do so resources must be there. Governments, especially permanent
members, must refrain from reacting quickly to pressure from the
domestic constituency, from international pressure, to take rapid
action. It is the doctrine of the Council to respond quickly,
to show "we are in charge because we are reacting to an international
crisis." In the case of sanctions, the effectiveness of sanctions
and their usefulness in political terms depends not so much on
the rapidity of the reaction compared to the understanding of
the vulnerabilities and the co-operation of all Member states
to ensure compliance. The case of Iraq is an excellent one. They
could have better managed the compliance of neighbouring states
if they took the time to understand these points that you mention,
but the time was not given and I wonder the extent to which, if
a similar crisis were to happen again, the Council would take
such time to analyse the vulnerability and dialogue with neighbouring
states to see if really they could ensure respect for the sanctions. 370.
The problem there, is it not, Mr Bruderlein, is that if they did
take the time and they gave notice of what they were doing—and
they would have to do so, it seems to me—the targeted state
or those in charge of it would make certain that they began to
move assets and other matters around so they would not be effectively
targeted. Time is a weapon, is it not, and an opportunity?
(Mr Bruderlein) Time
is an opportunity but it can play on two sides and the case of
Sudan is a very good one. The Council in the case of Sudan took
the decision in August 1996 to impose a UN flight ban against
Sudan but postponed the enforcement or the implementation of the
sanctions for 90 days and then for another 90 days, so for six
months afterwards the sanctions were was postponed. So you had
a UN flight ban imposed and politically decided but it was not
planned to be implemented for six months. Then the Security Council
requested experts to analyse some of the implications in terms
of civil aviation, humanitarian impact and so on. The UN flight
ban on Sudan started to exert pressure on the day of the political
decision and was in retrospect perceived as being much more effective
than if the sanction would have been imposed. Sudan Airways, which
was the main target of the sanctions, and some of the subsidiaries
of Sudan Airways were preparing to adapt themselves to the sanction
by registering their aircraft in Bulgaria, in Uganda to charter
them back to Sudan. In many ways you can escape the sanctions
regime but to do that you need to know what the exact modalities
of the sanctions will be. The fact that the Council refrained
from establishing the exact modalities of the flight ban sent
so much uncertainty on the side of the civil aviation industry
in Sudan that they really exerted pressure on the Government to
abide by the demands of the Council and now the Council does not
consider the sanctions to be needed in Sudan and the effect of
the sanctions took place. So if we found ourselves in a situation
where we had to analyse the vulnerabilities of the country and
so on, the Council could decide to impose the sanctions as a sign
of determination and let the experts look into the best ways to
exert the pressure not only over the next month but over six months,
over 12 months in reviewing and keeping the flexibility in the
hands of the Council. Uncertainty is the key objective of targeted
sanctions. As it stands, there is absolutely no uncertainty on
the target. In a couple of days you have a sanctions regime that
is put into the concrete of a sanctions resolution and all the
flexibility is left on the side of the target. They have all the
time to find the best way to escape from the sanctions and the
Council is unable to renegotiate any aspect of the sanctions resolution.
So the Council must give itself the flexibility and the technical
mechanisms to use it and to exert pressure on the target, to maintain
uncertainty. Uncertainty is the best tool of the sanctions because
they do not know what is going to happen next. 371. That is a very
important suggestion I think, the uncertainty element. You and
I know we have seen countries adapt very quickly to sanctions
and, in fact, they provide for manufacturers and others the perfect
conditions under which they can develop products which they would
not otherwise have been able to do because there is no competition.
So they quickly develop substitutes, like the South African arms
trade. That developed hugely, including nuclear weapons, when
sanctions were comprehensively employed, they found their way
round it. Do you not think, therefore, that what we have seen
with Saddam Hussein and what you are now talking about, smarter
sanctions, is a reflection of our realisation that comprehensive
sanctions are ineffective and they are much less concerned with
humanitarian objectives but much more concerned with finding out
how do we actually make smarter sanctions more effective? It is
not humanitarian driven, is it?
(Mr Bruderlein) I
would disagree with that. 372. Ah, good.
(Mr Bruderlein) From
the perspective of the debate in New York we can see that the
interests of members states in the development of targeted sanctions
is mostly driven by the humanitarian impact of sanctions more
than the effectiveness of the tool per se. We would like them
to be more interested in the effectiveness of the tool and giving
themselves the mechanisms to make these tools work feasibly, viably
in the long run, especially in institutional terms. They are more
interested in the reward of saying "we have been smart against
Sierra Leone because we are imposing targeted sanctions so the
Sierra Leonese people do not suffer" and really there is
no mechanism to make sure that these tools (travel bans or the
arms embargo) are effective. The main concern of the Council at
this stage is to minimise the human cost of the sanctions, I would
say, because of the situation in Iraq. One of the very important
features of the debate for a new sanctions regime is to impose
a new sanctions regime the Council needs not only the permanent
five but also the majority of all the members of the Council and
in political terms that is most of the non-permanent members.
If it is to revise an existing regime, such ad the one in Iraq,
it merely needs the five permanent ones to agree to revise. In
these terms non-permanent members are really keen to minimise
whatever negative impact there is of future sanctions because
they may not be in a position to cope with the fact that we cannot
really address the sanctions regime against Iraq or the humanitarian
consequences afterwards. There is a trade-off. Any future sanctions
regime has to be almost perfect in humanitarian terms because
until now sanctions against Iraq have not been tackled satisfactorily
regarding the humanitarian implications.
Ann Clwyd
373. Surely in the case of Iraq the evidence has
been there for the Security Council for a long time that the trade
embargoes have been broken day after day after day, mainly through
Turkey, over the border between Turkey and Iraq? You only have
to look at the hundreds of lorries that cross over laden to the
roof every day and come back with oil. Yet there has been no effective
policing on that border. To any observer it seems almost deliberate
negligence. What is the reason for that? Given the evidence, particularly
over that boarder, that the embargo is being broken day after
day, why has the UN refused to police it, or put any pressure
on Turkey?
(Mr Bruderlein) There
are certainly political reasons attached to it that I am not aware
of and I would say that although it may appear as important in
terms of number of lorries, it is still marginal compared to the
trading activity that could take place without the sanctions.
The embargo against Iraq has a huge humanitarian impact because
it has an impact on trade activities. If there are smuggling activities
fuelled by the black market or whatever interest of trading partners
in that field it does not imply that the sanctions are ineffective
for the purpose of blocking trade. To some extent this smuggling
is still of minimal consequence on the overall purpose of the
sanctions. 374. But how do we know that some of that smuggling
does not contain components for the kind of weapons that we are
trying to stop the Iraqi regime making, given that at the moment
we have got no trace going on as far as weapons control is concerned?
(Mr Bruderlein) You
have a good point. It should be addressed to the Council that
if this smuggling activity is taking place it implies security
risk and maybe find ways to address the security risk attached
to this. This is the problem of these most protracted sanctions.
It is almost impossible to manage over such a period of time all
the interests that are raised through it and at the same time
it is almost impossible to get out of it, so it is up to the Council
members to find a path to get out of it and here again the efforts
of your Government in this field should be encouraged because—
Chairman
375. What has the UK Government been doing?
(Mr Bruderlein) The
United Kingdom has proposed for discussion a draft resolution
to redefine the sanctions regime, especially its objectives and
how to address the overall humanitarian situation in Iraq following
the review of the three panels that took place in February, March
and April. In my personal view, it is a courageous initiative.
The situation of the Council is so deadlocked, so overtaken by
political antagonism between the members that any initiative of
the Council is heavily criticised before reaching the table and
the fact that your Government took this initiative and negotiated
with members to find a way out (with others, Canada took the initiative
too) I think your Government is playing a critical role in finding
a way out of the deadlock by having innovative views on ESCROW
accounts, on disarmament, on inspection and I think the United
Kingdom, especially because of the political spectrum of the Council,
can play a very important role in the development of these collective
tools being also a part of the EU and having the experience of
EU sanctions. There is strong potential for the role of your Government
in this regard. 376. Thank you. Do you think that the international
community can use incentives in addition to sanctions to encourage
targeted states to conform to international norms and conventions?
(Mr Bruderlein) The
targeting of sanctions includes a series of options, it includes
the possibility of being flexible in the implementation, it allows
the possibility of offering incentives. Within the Security Council
one of the main obstacles for incentive policies is the idea that
we cannot offer rewards for compliance. At the same time, since
the Council has not given itself the flexibility in exerting pressure
it cannot offer incentives in relieving some of the pressure.
In my view the effectiveness of targeted sanctions relies much
more on this aspect of relieving some of the pressure, of some
of the uncertainties than on the impact of having frozen the assets
of targeted leaders in a distant financial centre. Relieving the
uncertainty, saying the Security Council will refrain from hunting
down the assets of Mr So-and-so all over Singapore, Zurich, Paris
and London has much more to offer than freezing his assets. So
incitement should be part of it within the sanctions regime or
it could be added with loans, aid and so on, but the problem with
these aspects is that it may look like a reward. If we stay within
the sanctions regime it is really about lifting in a gradual and
incremental manner the sanctions, keeping the possibility of reimposing
these measures without having to renegotiate the resolution text.
377. This has been a very valuable session with you,
Mr Bruderlein, in exploring the difficulties as well as the opportunities
in the reform and targeting of sanction. I would like to thank
you on behalf of the Committee very much indeed for coming here
and spending your time with us. It has been very, very valuable.
Thank you very much.
(Mr Bruderlein) Thank
you very much.
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