Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness (Numbers 480 - 499)

TUESDAY 6 JULY 1999

MR R FOWLER

  480. It is a humanitarian disaster, a million dead, 800,000 on the move, etcetera. Is there any way in which we can encourage the media to focus more on this which one would hope might have positive impact? Perhaps this Committee might even help.
  (Mr Fowler) I hope very much it will and I have to say—and I hope I would have said even if you had not pointed out the BBC in the room—that the BBC has followed my travels wherever I have been and has been one of the very few media organisations to pay significant attention to this problem and I would go further and say to Africa generally. I think we could look beyond the BBC for the problem. The thrust of your question is absolutely clear. Why is it that everybody knows about Kosovo and nobody knows about Angola and they do not know anything about Sierra Leone or Liberia or Sudan or Congo; it is quite a long list. I wish that it were otherwise. We have become rather ethnocentric in our media preoccupations and I agree with you completely that anything we can do to encourage not only the media but instruments of government to concern themselves more broadly would be a good thing.

Dr Tonge

  481. What is the United Nations doing about controlling arms brokers in the West particularly? You talked a lot about supplies and armaments getting in via outside countries when it is in their interest. Presumably they get something out of it. What is the UN doing about it?
  (Mr Fowler) Questions like that always come back to the Pogo cartoons' misuse of Admiral Dakater's admonition, "I have seen the enemy and they is us". The UN is us. What are we doing about it? The issue is what are individual UN member states doing about it? The UN has no capacity to do anything.

  482. The Germans are proposing some form of registration of arms brokers in Europe, are they not? We are pushing the British Government to do that.
  (Mr Fowler) I believe the Germans are indeed speaking about that. The UN has of course had an arms' register for years.

  483. It does not have a brokers' register.
  (Mr Fowler) No, that is right. I agree with you that from my perspective this is a very happy development. Even the arms' register is an instrument that not everybody uses, not everybody uses at all, not everybody uses accurately, not everybody uses fully.

  484. If it cannot be implemented and monitored and enforced, what is the point of the UN.
  (Mr Fowler) How long do you have?

Chairman

  485. A short answer.
  (Mr Fowler) The UN does many many things, some of them well, some of them not at all well and those it does not do well, it does not do well because its member states are not committed to seeing it do that. Why has the UN not fixed many of these problems we are talking about in Africa? It is because we, the member states, have not given it the wherewithal to do so and because frankly we have not been that interested in seeing those things occur. This is yet another one of those.

Dr Tonge

  486. Yes, but it is not just to do with the member states, is it? It is to do with the organisation of the UN and the way it goes about its business as well. The UN is an entity, it is not just the member states.
  (Mr Fowler) It is tiny by any measurement. The UN's regular budget is smaller than the Canadian aid agency. The UN Secretariat is smaller than Canada's defence headquarters. I do enjoy telling my American colleagues at the UN that this bloated organisation which they consider needs significant reform, in New York numbers some 9,000 people and when I last checked, support to the legislative branch of government in Washington numbered 34,000.

  Chairman: Order. I do not think we can continue on the reform of the United Nations.

Mr Robathan

  487. I understand you have encountered some problems in the chairing of the Angola Sanctions Committee. Could you comment on that?
  (Mr Fowler) Are you suggesting that we have a poor chairman?

  488. No, not at all. What problems have been encountered in chairing the Angola Sanctions Committee, if any?
  (Mr Fowler) This is very brave. I am trying to look where your question may be coming from.

  489. Information provided by the Clerk actually.
  (Mr Fowler) As Chair for seven months I have encountered no particular problem. These are early days. In May the Security Council passed resolution 1237 which set up two panels. It is the first time the Security Council has tried this sort of thing. Six experts to examine where Savimbi gets his money, looking principally at financial transactions, diamonds and how he gets his oil. The second panel of four experts to look at where he gets his war materiel and how he gets it into his country. We expect to announce the composition of those panels at the end of this month and to see their reports by the end of the year. Rather than a problem for the chair, the Council has been remarkably flexible in allowing us to consider this kind of vehicle. We shall see how that goes.

  490. That is perhaps the answer we wanted to hear.
  (Mr Fowler) In that case I should note that the first offer of support for these panels came from the UK, which was very gratefully received by the chair. The latest information suggests that we might actually be paying for this whole thing. It will cost about US$1 million through the regular budget as opposed to voluntary contributions. That has to be settled in the next couple of weeks.

  491. This particularly applies to Angola, but you might want to comment on elsewhere. To what extent have sanctions been responsible for increasing black market activity?
  (Mr Fowler) That is extremely germane in other sanctions regimes administered by the Council I would think. In this case, it is generally assumed—I see no reason to believe otherwise—that as long as Mr Mobutu was in charge in Zaire/Congo Monsieur Savimbi marketed most of his diamonds through Monsieur Mobutu. Now that resolution 1173 is passed and it is illegal to assist in the marketing of UNITA diamonds, diamonds are necessarily black market in some manner or other; laundered through other countries or simply taken to the diamond markets in London, Antwerp, Tel Aviv, Bombay and marketed as something else. Yes, necessarily this large production of high quality diamonds is marketed through a black market of some kind or other.

Chairman

  492. You said that the only thing you can do to a country which is not implementing sanctions, such as under Resolution 1173, is that you can name them and shame them. Is there nothing else you can do?
  (Mr Fowler) As chairman of the Sanctions Committee that is what I can do. That is what I suppose therefore the UN and the UN Security Council can do; the same thing. Individual countries can do much more and are supposed to do much more. In other words, when each of us joins the United Nations we pass something which most of us call the UN Participation Act, which requires us, each member state, to give force of law to the decisions of the Security Council. In this regard it is somewhat supranational. As soon as the Council passes a sanction each country is supposed to adapt its legislation to give force of law to that sanction. If there is a sanction against selling arms to UNITA in Canada, usually by regulation, we would pass an Order in Council which would add that activity to the existing legislation barring certain kinds of activity. That means that if any Canadian were caught and action was brought against the Canadian engaged in the selling of arms to UNITA we could apply the law and perhaps put that individual in gaol.

  493. Yes, but the problem is the culture of impunity in southern Africa, is it not, or the states surrounding Angola? How can we get them to take a similar action as you described in Canada in their countries?
  (Mr Fowler) You are absolutely right and again this was one of the principal messages I brought to the region a month ago. The intensity, the seriousness with which the countries of the region apply sanctions varies enormously. Some countries in the region are very forceful and steely eyed about the extent to which they are determined to see these measures effectively enforced and others seem to be less committed. The Government of South Africa for instance has taken extraordinary measures to make illegal the recruitment and deployment of mercenaries. I think the Government of South Africa will agree that they still have to work out the application of these regulations and laws, but they are in advance of most others of us in this regard. Certainly we shall continue and in subsequent reports and in the work of the panels which I just mentioned, they will work to encourage governments to enact this legislation and one of the things you may have seen in our report is that the UN Legal Office is producing a sort of legal template which we shall make available to all countries, and which I shall very particularly seek to make available to people I met in the region, suggesting that if part of the problem is not knowing exactly what kind of legislation to enact, here is a good example of the kind of thing they might wish to enact.

  494. The trouble is of course that even if you have the enactment and laws it is clearly a step in the right direction, but the question as to whether or not they have the power and the bureaucratic administration to enforce it is another matter.
  (Mr Fowler) Of course it is. In addition, it is fair to point out that all the countries in the region in one way or another mentioned that it was not they who were buying the diamonds and it was not they who were selling the war materiel. Whatever imperfections there are in their own application of these measures, they are not supplying Monsieur Savimbi with US$4 billion and they are not supplying him with BNP2s and tanks and endless amounts of ammunition.

Mr Worthington

  495. Can we talk about the way the Sanctions Committees operate. You chair this particular Sanctions Committee. One of the jobs it does is decide upon exemptions from those sanctions. I understand that you work in secret and by consensus. Do you agree with that?
  (Mr Fowler) Yes, I guess in secret; they are closed meetings if that is what you mean. Yes, by consensus, although any chairman can decide to bring an issue. Each of these Sanctions Committees is a committee of the whole, that is they have the 15 members of the Council and as you know in the case of the elected members, those members change every two years. There is a fair amount of coming and going which is perhaps not ideal to the pursuit of some of these things which have a much longer focus. I have been very clear in the report we have already produced and in the work of these panels that we are going to work very publicly. The moment my report was made available to the Council, it was also distributed publicly. The work of the panels will be public, the panels will report, publicly that is. Ultimately the Council, significantly because of the veto, works by consensus. As you know, it takes nine positive votes to pass a resolution, but any one of the five permanent members can defeat it. Therefore consensus is really the order of the day within the Council. It is not surprising that is the rule of thumb in the Committees as well.

  496. I can understand that but going round the world and assembling 15 nations, finding 15 which are totally pure all the time with regard to any particular sanction must be quite difficult.
  (Mr Fowler) Including five who are always there.

  497. Yes; indeed. Do you not think there will come a time when there is a qualified majority voting on Sanctions Committees because of the issue of delay? How do you have effective sanctions if you have to have everything argued through?
  (Mr Fowler) No, I do not, so long as the Council works the way it does and is formed the way it is formed, which dates back to the Charter and I assure you that for five years we have been debating reform of the Security Council and we have not agreed on recommendations with respect to working methods.

  498. And the numbers will only go up.
  (Mr Fowler) In terms of membership of the Council?

  499. In terms of any reform of the Security Council the numbers will go up.
  (Mr Fowler) They certainly will not go down; I agree with you. I also think that as long as there are vetoes—and this is a very delicate and active issue at the United Nations—the thrust towards consensus will be there. Other than that, you just have vetoes being flung around back and forth and you go absolutely nowhere.


 
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