Select Committee on Liaison First Report


SHIFTING THE BALANCE: SELECT COMMITTEES AND THE EXECUTIVE

"Joined-up committees"

64.  Matters of policy do not always fall neatly to a single government department. When two departmental select committees have an interest in a subject, potential overlap between them is normally avoided by informal agreement. However, when a policy affects several departments, or indeed the whole range of government activity, the select committee system can be at a disadvantage. For some subjects the "cross-cutting" committees such as Environmental Audit or Public Administration can bridge departmental barriers, but it is increasingly clear that something more is needed. "Joined-up government" must be scrutinised by joined-up committees.

65.  Most committees have power to meet jointly to examine witnesses, deliberate and consider draft reports - the main activities of any select committee inquiry. But there are in fact substantial practical difficulties, as the innovative quadripartite inquiry into arms exports conducted by the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees in this Parliament has shown.[12]

The problems are those of

  • membership: of these four committees, only the Foreign Affairs Committee had the power to appoint a formal sub-committee. The committees therefore agreed that they would each informally nominate a core of Members to take an active part in the joint inquiry; but all the members of all four committees (45 in total) retained the right to attend concurrent meetings - as must be the case under the present procedure. This can produce a shifting membership which makes it difficult to develop a corporate way of working and a co-ordinated approach. It can also result in a large (and less manageable) attendance and an unpredictable balance among the parties; and it is more difficult to support effectively.

  • procedure: all joint activities, including electing a Chairman, deciding on courses of action and - crucially - considering a draft report, must be by consensus, because there is no procedure for voting as in a single committee. Consensus is desirable, but of course there must be a formal way of resolving differences.

  • quorum: when two or more committees meet concurrently, each must have its own quorum present before the joint body can conduct business. For the quadripartite committee (each of its constituent committees having a quorum of three) this meant a minimum of twelve Members. The committees sought a reduction in the quorum to two for joint sittings. This was agreed on a temporary basis by the House;[13] but even with the reduction, eight Members had to be present for business to proceed.

  • reports: committees working jointly have no power to agree a report to the House. Amendments can be voted upon only informally. Even if committees agree a joint text - again, informally - each committee can thereafter amend that text before agreeing it formally as its own report to the House. This is a recipe for confusion.

  • staffing: support for the quadripartite committee was provided mainly by the staff of the Trade and Industry Committee, which reduced the resources available for that committee's own work. Joint activity needs flexible support which will not rob participating committees of the staff they need to discharge their own responsibilities.

66.  Select committees must be able to adapt to the joined-up approach which is an increasing priority within government; but these problems make effective joint working almost impossible. However, we think that the solution is straightforward.

67.  If two or more committees wanted to conduct a joint inquiry, they would make a case to the Select Committee Panel. If the Panel agreed that an inquiry was justified, it would be able to trigger a Standing Order provision which would set up a formal joint body, which would act as a single committee. The participating committees would nominate members to it, but the Panel would approve the final membership, ensuring that it was not too large for effective working, and that the correct party balance was maintained. We think that this power should be used very sparingly because of possible repercussions on other committee work. In addition, a joint committee of this type should be appointed for a Session only; it could be reappointed, but the Panel would have to consider afresh whether its existence was justified.

68.  The joint committee would itself have the normal powers of a select committee, including the power to report directly to the House. It would have a single quorum, which would be set by the Panel. Assistance to committees' own staffs would be provided by the central unit we recommend below.

69.  Overlap of responsibilities between government departments occasionally results in overlap between select committees. The present informal arrangements for dealing with this are extremely effective, but we would expect the Panel to be able to intervene if difficulties could not be overcome by these informal means.

Wiring it up: the report of the Performance and Innovation Unit

70.  We warmly welcome the Performance and Innovation Unit's work on cross-cutting issues, and we are in broad agreement with their views and recommendations. Wiring it up does not perhaps give this House credit for the progress that has already been made: the report notes that the House of Lords has cross-cutting committees but does not mention the Commons, whereas in fact this House has more such committees than the Lords. But overall the report's conclusions are entirely consistent with our own approach. We were particularly glad to see recommendations that the government should

  • "make available to Select Committees in both Houses, at an early stage in the policy process, information about the factual and analytical basis of cross-cutting policies, including joint appraisals";

  • "wherever possible, give Parliament early notice of cross-cutting issues which are being addressed by departments"; and

We note the Prime Minister's statement in the Foreword that the measures suggested in the report "form a blue-print for action" and we hope that these particular recommendations will now be implemented.

Staffing

71.  No-one could accuse select committees of being profligate in their staffing. A typical staff consists of a Clerk (who has overall responsibility for the support of a Committee and the advice it receives), normally also a Second Clerk, a Committee Assistant (responsible for administration, travel, printing and so on), a Committee Specialist (an expert, usually in early career, on short-term contract) and a Secretary. The permanent staff is supplemented in most cases by one or more part-time Specialist Advisers paid at a daily rate. In all the Committee Office has 107 permanent staff (some of whom have duties in other parts of the House) serving 25[15] permanent committees and sub-committees.[16] They are assisted part-time by some 145 specialist advisers.

72.  The quality of committee staffs - in inquiry management, briefing and report drafting - is very high. Given that most committees have as many as half a dozen inquiries under way at the same time, the economy and effectiveness of their support compares extremely well with support of comparable investigative activities elsewhere in the public or private sectors.

73.  We have noted that the scarcest resource of a select committee is the time of its Members; but it is also the case that the burdens on committee staffs increase Session by Session. For good reasons staff of the Clerk's Department may not take leave while the House is sitting; but the work of select committees now also routinely extends across recesses. We cannot urge committees into more extensive activity without ensuring that staff workloads are manageable and that additional committee business can be properly supported.

74.  Some committees have already undertaken pre-legislative scrutiny, and most have carried out work on the Estimates. Both types of activity will become increasingly important, and both will be in addition to committees' existing types of inquiry. These tasks will not be spread evenly throughout the year for every committee, and so we do not propose increases in individual committee staffs. The most effective way of providing this support will be through a central staff available to committees when they need it.

75.  In their July 1999 Report the Procedure Committee suggested that a central staff could assist committees with their examination of the Estimates, and put forward a number of ideas as to how such a staff might be used. Our proposals build on their suggestions.

76.  The Committee Office should establish a unit specialising in public expenditure and pre-legislative scrutiny (the skills required will be different but by no means mutually exclusive; committee staff are already required to turn their hands to a wide variety of work).

77.  The unit should be of modest size to begin with; its long-term future will depend on the use made of it. Its "engine-room" should be perhaps half a dozen contract staff of the Committee Specialist type; we have been impressed by the successful way in which such staff have been employed in the support of individual select committees. These people should have a range of skills and subject experience.

78.  For Estimates work, we think it important that the unit should be able to draw upon the special expertise of the National Audit Office; and we welcome the readiness of the Comptroller and Auditor General to second staff for this purpose. We hope that, in the first instance, he would be prepared to second three staff of appropriate experience and seniority (in addition to the two officers already seconded to the Defence and Environmental Audit Committees). Secondments from the Research Division of the Library might also be a possibility.

79.  On the Estimates side, the unit would be self-starting. It would carry out a preliminary examination of Estimates and Supplementary Estimates, and Output and Performance Analyses, in the context of each departmental plan. It would provide briefing, bringing points of interest, or those needing more extensive examination, to the attention of the committees concerned. It would be up to individual committees to decide how to take things forward - the unit would provide them with ammunition, not write their script.

80.  Committees would be able to commission work, and it would be up to them to decide whether to direct their own staffs to build on the unit's work in a full inquiry (in which, of course, the unit would be able to help).

81.  We see great advantages in this approach. It would be flexible; and it would maintain a centre of expertise in public expenditure matters complementing that of the Treasury Committee, and readily available to all committees with an interest in finance. The Procedure Committee was concerned about under-employment at certain times of the year. In our view this is not a problem; we are sure that there would be a year-round role for the NAO staff, and other members of the unit could either help committees which were hard pressed on "conventional" inquiries, or could assist in pre-legislative work - or the examination of treaties, which is of increasing interest to some committees.

82.  The draft Bill side of the unit's work would be twofold: taking some of the weight off the staff of a departmental select committee which found itself landed with a draft Bill in addition to its other commitments; and staffing ad hoc pre-legislative committees (or providing the Commons contribution in the case of joint committees). Staff earmarked for draft Bill work would of course be available to assist in Estimates inquiries if there were no other call upon them. We think that the staffing of this part of the unit should also be on a modest basis: perhaps a Clerk, a Committee Specialist with legal qualifications, a Committee Assistant and a Secretary.

83.  The unit should be directed by a Clerk, with an NAO officer (preferably one with select committee experience) heading the Estimates section, and have appropriate executive and clerical support.

84.  The unit's use of seconded and contract staff means that it need not be a rigid structure in the long term. It could easily be redeployed or expanded; indeed, it could form the basis of a Parliamentary Budget Office as some have advocated. We are sure that it will provide a real - and much needed - enhancement of Select Committee resources at a modest cost.

Secondments

85.  In addition to the valuable secondment of NAO staff, we would also like to see secondments - either to the central unit or to individual committee staffs - of able individuals from the civil service or from the private sector; although, to minimise any possible conflict of interest, it might be best for a civil servant not to be involved with a committee shadowing his or her parent department.

86.  Almost every member of the Clerk's Department will spend a large part of his or her career in the Committee Office. Although outward secondments are harder to accommodate in a small organisation, we think relevant secondments could broaden expertise in the support of select committees and in the service of the House more generally. (We note that more extensive secondment from Whitehall is also a theme of Sir Richard Wilson's report on civil service reform.[17])

Whitehall's understanding of select committees

87.  The level of knowledge of select committees, and of Parliament generally, amongst departmental officials is, we think, far too low. We are sure that this contributes to a degree of suspicion and reticence which is unwarranted and unacceptable - and which from time to time results in entirely avoidable errors which expose and embarrass Ministers. There are honourable exceptions, to be sure, but we think that Ministers should be aware that they will be better served by officials who better understand the House and its Committees.

88.  This may already be recognised by some Permanent Secretaries.[18] We note that a Deputy Principal Clerk from this House has been seconded to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as Head of the Parliamentary Relations Department there.

89.  But secondments (to and from the House) can only scratch the surface of the cultural problem. Training and familiarisation on a much larger scale is needed - not excluding the more exalted ranks in the civil service. We are sure the House authorities will be able to assist in this process.

Accountability of the intelligence and security services

90.  Under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 Parliament agreed to the creation of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) to supervise the work of the Security Service (which in Government is within the responsibilities of the Home Secretary), and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which are the responsibility of the Foreign Secretary.

91.  The ISC is a committee of Parliamentarians, but emphatically not a committee of Parliament. Its members are appointed by the Prime Minister, and it reports to him. We note that Parliament's agreement to the role of the ISC was given in the context of the explicit undertaking by the Foreign Secretary of the day that it would not "truncate in any way the existing responsibilities of existing committees".[19]

92.  The Government has been reluctant to provide information about these agencies to select committees, or to allow members of the agencies to give evidence. Parliamentary accountability of the intelligence and security services is a major issue, to which we plan to return.


12  . See Annual Reports for 1997 and 1998 on Strategic Export Controls, published as the Third Report from the Defence Committee, the Second Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Third Report from the International Development Committee and the Fourth Report from the Trade and Industry Committee, HC 225 of Session 1999-2000. See particularly paragraph 80. Select committees have worked jointly on other occasions, but this has been the most extensive example so far. Back

13  . On 26 May 1999 for the 1998-99 Session, and on 9 December 1999 for the 1999-2000 Session. Back

14  . Wiring it up: Whitehall's Management of Cross-cutting Policies and Services: Performance and Innovation Unit, January 2000, p 56. Back

15  . Not including ad hoc select or joint committees considering draft Bills. Back

16  . Not including select committees served by staff in the Legislation Service and the Journal Office. Back

17  . Report to the Prime Minister, 1999; paragraph 16 and Annex C. Back

18  . See the evidence given by Sir John Kerr, KCMG, Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, before the Committee on Standards and Privileges, 15 June 1999, HC 607 of Session 1998-99, Qq 170 and 171. Back

19  . HC Deb., 22 February 1994, col. 164. Back


 
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