Whitehall's understanding of
select committees
87. The level of knowledge of select committees,
and of Parliament generally, amongst departmental officials is,
we think, far too low. We are sure that this contributes to a
degree of suspicion and reticence which is unwarranted and unacceptable
- and which from time to time results in entirely avoidable errors
which expose and embarrass Ministers. There are honourable exceptions,
to be sure, but we think that Ministers should be aware that they
will be better served by officials who better understand the House
and its Committees.
88. This may already be recognised by some Permanent
Secretaries.[18] We note
that a Deputy Principal Clerk from this House has been seconded
to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as Head of the Parliamentary
Relations Department there.
89. But secondments (to and from the House) can
only scratch the surface of the cultural problem. Training and
familiarisation on a much larger scale is needed - not
excluding the more exalted ranks in the civil service. We are
sure the House authorities will be able to assist in this process.
Accountability of the intelligence
and security services
90. Under the Intelligence Services Act 1994
Parliament agreed to the creation of the Intelligence and Security
Committee (ISC) to supervise the work of the Security Service
(which in Government is within the responsibilities of the Home
Secretary), and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which are the responsibility
of the Foreign Secretary.
91. The ISC is a committee of Parliamentarians,
but emphatically not a committee of Parliament. Its members are
appointed by the Prime Minister, and it reports to him. We note
that Parliament's agreement to the role of the ISC was given in
the context of the explicit undertaking by the Foreign Secretary
of the day that it would not "truncate in any way the existing
responsibilities of existing committees".[19]
92. The Government has been reluctant to provide
information about these agencies to select committees, or to allow
members of the agencies to give evidence. Parliamentary accountability
of the intelligence and security services is a major issue, to
which we plan to return.
12 . See Annual Reports for 1997 and 1998 on Strategic
Export Controls, published as the Third Report from the Defence
Committee, the Second Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee,
the Third Report from the International Development Committee
and the Fourth Report from the Trade and Industry Committee, HC
225 of Session 1999-2000. See particularly paragraph 80. Select
committees have worked jointly on other occasions, but this has
been the most extensive example so far. Back
13 .
On 26 May 1999 for the 1998-99 Session, and on 9 December 1999
for the 1999-2000 Session. Back
14 .
Wiring it up: Whitehall's Management of Cross-cutting Policies
and Services: Performance and Innovation Unit, January 2000,
p 56. Back
15 .
Not including ad hoc select or joint committees considering
draft Bills. Back
16 .
Not including select committees served by staff in the Legislation
Service and the Journal Office. Back
17 .
Report to the Prime Minister, 1999; paragraph 16 and Annex C. Back
18 .
See the evidence given by Sir John Kerr, KCMG, Permanent Under
Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, before
the Committee on Standards and Privileges, 15 June 1999, HC 607
of Session 1998-99, Qq 170 and 171. Back
19 .
HC Deb., 22 February 1994, col. 164. Back