Select Committee on Social Security Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 17

Memorandum submitted by the Catholic Agency for Social Concern (CP 15)

1.  INTRODUCTION

  The Catholic Agency for Social Concern (CASC) has made responses to a range of Green Papers/Consultation Papers on social security matters in the past 18 months. In a number of these (notably the Welfare Reform Green Paper, the Disability Consultation and the Pensions Green Paper) we have emphasised our support for principles of the National Insurance scheme. In the main Green Paper response (July 1998) we said:

    CASC believes that the National Insurance scheme, through which those in work contribute to a common fund and can call on this fund when they are unable to work, is based on sound principles of solidarity and mutual responsibility . . . National Insurance or an equivalent scheme should play a key role in the future welfare state.

2.  POINTS OF IMPORTANCE ON THE CONTRIBUTORY PRINCIPLE AND THE NATIONAL INSURANCE (NI) SCHEME

  2.1  First, we support the contributory principle in its broad application. In our response to the Green Paper we quoted from a publication of the Catholic Bishops' Conference entitled "The Common Good":

    "The common good . . . implies that every individual, no matter how high or low, has a duty to share in promoting the welfare of the community as well as the right to benefit from that welfare".

  A contributory scheme, such as National Insurance, to which all workers contribute, whether high paid or low paid, is one important way in which this duty to the common good is carried out. Moreover, such arrangements promote social cohesion, while means tested benefits tend to be socially divisive.

  2.2  Second, we support a scheme which offers benefits drawn by right of contributions, provided reasonable rules attached to the particular benefit are met. We think it important that, unlike means tested benefits, contributory benefits can be claimed without substantial invasion of privacy or loss of human dignity.

  2.3  Third, contributory benefits, not subject to a test of means, do not require that reserves of savings are run down before benefit can be claimed. Even with benefits by right, their relatively low level means that it is inevitable that the financial reserves of the family or individual will gradually be used up. But there will be time for adjustments to be made and if there is a return to earning, it is possible to recover more rapidly from the period of non-earning. Poverty and indebtedness are less likely to be the outcome of this type of benefit.

  2.4  Fourth, we support a scheme which does not discriminate against married women. Benefits that can be earned through contributions by working women meet this requirement; means tested benefits do not. Given the substantial role that women now play in the labour force, a role that is being strongly encouraged by government, it is right that they should have access to benefits by right during earnings interruptions.

  2.5  But while we support the enduring principles which stem from the Beveridge Report, and are in favour of the contributory principle and the National Insurance scheme, we are in no doubt that changes are needed to the scheme and the way it is allowed to function by government.

3.  THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE ATTITUDE OF GOVERNMENT(S)

  3.1  It has to be said that the attitude of this and the previous government to the National Insurance scheme has in many ways been unsatisfactory.

    —  successive governments have talked of National Insurance contributions as if they were simply another form of taxation and spoken of government or public expenditure on National Insurance benefits. But this is not "government expenditure", apart from a small government subvention. There is an important difference between tax, which for the taxpayer is open ended, and contributions which are buying specific benefits rights; a difference which is valued by contributors but often ignored by governments;

    —  the former government used the National Insurance Fund—the sum of the people's contributions for benefits payable under the scheme—to provide incentives to buy private insurance in the shape of personal pensions. Not only was this questionable on eithical grounds, but there was a serious danger that the financial health of the Fund would be threatened (HC 124, 1991). To offset this, a sacrificial victim was needed—so the Industrial Injuries Scheme was excluded from National Insurance on the spurious grounds that since it had no contribution conditions, it was not a contributory scheme. The fact that Contributions for the scheme had been paid by employers and employees for the previous 40 years was simply set aside as irrelevant;

    —  the contribution rates have been manipulated to serve purposes wholly unrelated to benefits—for example in the recent Budget, a cut in employers' contributions was given as a trade off for a new energy tax;

    —  new contribution rules have sought to exclude contributors from the right to benefits, no matter how substantial their contribution record. The former government introduced tougher contribution rules for Unemployment Benefits, which as an immediate effect was expected to exclude 350,000 claimants (Hansard, 2 November 1987, col 670). Later, the duration of the insurance benefit (in the renamed Jobseeker's Allowance) was cut from 12 to six months. The present government is engaged on a similar exercise in relation to Incapacity Benefit, producing tougher requirements which over time will exclude an estimated 170,000 people from the right to the National Insurance Benefit because they become incapacitated during a period of unemployment (Cm 4103, p 21). In both cases, people who have contributed to National Insurance for 20, 30 or 40 years, and then meet the contingencies for which the scheme provides, find they have no insurance benefit rights and will recive means tested benefits at best;

    —  the exclusion of the self employed from unemployment benefits, is not only unsatisfactory in itself, it also rebounds on employees who have been long time contributors, who are made redundant, are encouraged to try self employment but fail and they pay for their additional efforts to be self supporting by losing any right to a National Insurance benefit in unemployment;

    —  In 1980 and again in 1988, rules were introduced by the former government to reduce the National Insurance Unemployment Benefit for people 60 and over, and later 55 and over, where occupational benefits were being drawn. The present government is engaged in introducing similar provisions to cut NI Incapacity Benefit where an occupational ill health or other pension is being drawn. In neither case was/is the government prepared to acknowledge that the NI benefit has been earned by right of contributions.

  3.2  Underlying these kind of problems is the fact that there is no mechanism for action on behalf of contributors to the National Insurance Fund, or the exercise of control over or even influence on policies towards to Fund and its management. In many other European countries, representatives of employers and trade unions, together with independents are, with government, part of the governance of such schemes. Occupational schemes have their bodies of Trustees, often representative in nature. But the National Insurance Fund is in the hands of the Treasury and the Social Security Ministers, often taking decisions without prior consultation or, as in the case of the changes to Incapacity Benefit now before the Commons, consulting and then ignoring the weight of opinion of the large number of organisations who responded.

  3.3  If it is the case, as is sometimes claimed, that there has been an erosion of support for the National Insurance scheme and the contributory principle, it cannot be a cause for surprise. The persistent breaches of trust by governments in the past 20 years could hardly fail to erode confidence in the present arrangements. Indeed if some of these actions had been carried out by private insurance, the companies would have been "named and shamed". But the solution is not to abandon a sound principle. Instead we have to consider how best the National Insurance scheme can be adapted to present day needs.

4.  THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE TASK OF THE SCHEME

  4.1  At its inception in 1948, the National Insurance scheme was built on certain (sometimes unspoken) assumptions:

    —  that there would be a policy of full employment;

    —  that the labour force would be largely made up of men and single women who, in the great majority of cases, would be in full time, long term jobs, and if unemployed, could find work again without much delay;

    —  that a National Health Service would provide free health care to all and that this would, in time, reduce the incidence of sickness and disability;

    —  that married women would be content to be economically dependent on their husbands, and would in most cases be at home engaged in caring for children and with other household tasks;

    —  that most marriages were stable and divorce rates would remain low;

    —  that retired people would, on average, live around five to 10 years after retirement.

  4.2  These assumptions cannot now be made. What is needed now is a scheme designed for the modern labour force and for today's society. In the modern labour force:

    —  life long employment is likely to be increasingly rare. Full time secure employment is still part of the pattern, but part time work, temporary employment, employment on short or medium term contracts, and self employment both full and part time are also major features of the labour force. We need a scheme which can respond adequately to the "flexible" employment patterns in today's labour force.

  4.3  In today's society:

    —  far more women are working. Women no longer resign themselves to economic dependence. Indeed, the increase in divorce, as well as in cohabitation makes it important that they make provision for their own future as far as they can. This raises questions about the periods when they try to combine caring with part time work but earn such low wages that they are excluded from the National Insurance scheme, and about the periods they spend out of the labour force altogether caring for children and for adult disabled and infirm people, usually family members;

    —  the number of elderly and of very old people has increased, while the hoped for reduction in sickness and disability did not eventuate. These factors raise issues for pension policy, for provision for incapacity, for the cost of community care and, as just suggested, for the social security needs of family carers.

5.  THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE APPROACH OF GOVERNMENT(S)

  5.1  Reform is certainly needed, but National Insurance has been modernised only to a limited extent. And the task of reform is not made any easier by the contradictory messages coming from governments.

  5.2  The first is that we must return to the "true nature" of the Beveridge provisions. When making more stringent the contribution conditions for unemployment benefit, the former government argued that it was re-inforcing the original purpose of the benefit, which it defined as "to insure those who are accustomed to earnings from employment for short periods of unemployment while they seek work" (Hansard 2 November 1987, col 659). But Beveridge, in fact, recommended indefinite benefit payment, though where unenployment was prolonged, with additional conditions to be met (Beveridge report, p 57).

  5.3  Similarly, the present government defended its proposed changes to Incapacity Benefit as restoring its original purpose of "helping people who lose their income when illness or disability causes them to stop work" (Hansard, 23 February 1999, col 224). The Minister produced no proof of his statement about the original purpose, but presumably was referring to the Beveridge Report which said: "As regards insurance against disability, this is proposed only for those gainfully occupied and not for persons who, since they have no earnings, do not lose income if sickness prevents them from earning" (ibid, p 53). But Beveridge at that point was discussing the inclusion in the benefit of self employed people. There was no reference to the position of the unemployed, who in any case have always been regarded as potential earners who continue to form a part of the labour market.

  5.4  The alternative argument is not that we must restore the purity of the past—imagined or otherwise—but we must recognise that social and other changes have occurred since 1948. This one was used by both governments to justify the benefit cuts in respect of private provision described earlier. Here to quote Beveridge would have been inconvenient, since he specifically left room for private provision to top up the flat rate subsistence benefits which the National Insurance scheme has typically provided (ibid p 143).

  5.5  On a more positive note, the introduction of the Home Responsibilities Protection by an earlier Labour government has been an important factor in ensuring rights to the NI Basic Pension for carers of children and of disabled or infirm adults. The proposed extension of credits for the State Second Pension to carers and to some long term disabled people is a welcome move on similar lines (though we will be querying the child age limitation later in this paper). Carers are also to be exempt from the proposed new and more restrictive qualifying rules for Incapacity Benefit. On the other hand, credits for unemployment benefits for carers who have had to leave the labour force for a period were withdrawn by the former government and have not been restored by the present government. The fact that the New Deal is to be extended to carers is good, but it does not overcome the lack of bridging income when income related to caring ceases—due to the death of the person being cared for, for example.

  5.6  So at present we have a mixture of negative and positive government attitudes to the National Insurance scheme and the contributory principle, but it is difficult to discern any coherent overall policy. In these circumstances it is not easy to have full confidence that the contributory principle and the related scheme is "safe" in the government's hands.

6.  SOME NEEDED FUTURE ACTION

  6.1  Making the scheme as inclusive as possible.

  6.1.1  As a general principle, government should cease, and where necessary reverse, actions designed to exclude groups from the scheme by the manipulation of contribution conditions, usually as a means of saving money. Whenever this is done, it not only withdraws rights from people who faithfully carried out their responsibilities to contribute at whatever rate had been set by the government of the day, but it directly descriminates against married women. This is because the alternative means tested benefit are based on the income of both partners and as a result will typically exclude the women from benefit.

  6.1.2  In recent decades, the labour force has become more and more "flexible", while the National Insurance scheme has become more and more inflexible. What government should be doing is to devise contribution conditions which take full account of today's working patterns and seek to provide benefits by right of contributions which will tide people over the many changes they must experience during their working lives.

  6.1.3  We spoke at the beginning of this paper about a scheme to which all workers contributed, whether high paid or low paid. In fact it is necessary to qualify this statement because at present over 2 million workers—mostly part-time women—whose earnings fall below the Lower Earnings Limit (LEL) are excluded from benefit rights. As seen earlier, the carers among them may qualify for credits for some benefits, but what is needed is a much more comprehensive approach to bring this low paid group fully within the scheme. Two suggested solutions have been put forward—the payment of very low contribution rates or simply crediting them into the scheme (Brown, 1994, pp24-6 and Social Justice Commission Report p233). In the Pensions Green Paper it was indicated that further study of this issue was planned and this is welcome. We believe that government should be making firm plans to bring very low earners into the scheme by one means or another.

  6.1.4  The Pensions Green Paper also found itself wrestling with issues related to the self employed. For too long, the best self employed people could expect of Green and White Papers was to be dismissed in a footnote or a few throwaway lines. The last substantial examination of their social security needs was almost 20 years ago. There are now more than three million self employed people. There ought to be a specific and full examination of their situation with the objective of bringing them into the National Insurance scheme to the maximum extent possible, starting with rights to benefits in unemployment. This may require an increase in contributions and/or a restructuring of their contribution arrangements. This could be acceptable, provided there are compensating gains in benefit rights.

  6.1.5  We need a scheme which recognises the range of roles through which people contribute to the common good of our society and which may prevent them from taking full or even part time paid work. In particular we need to protect the parenting role and the task of caring for disabled and infirm people, usually family members. To a considerable extent this is now being recognised (as seen earlier), but the cut off point of five years of age for children who act as qualifiers of credits for the State Second Pension is a backward move. It fails to recognise that there are times when full time parenting even for over fives may have to take priority—after bereavement, after family breakdown, when the child is going through a difficult period are all examples. We expect parents to take full responsibility for the actions of their children. We should not punish them by depriving them of social security rights if they decide that full time parenting is essential for a period of time.

6.2  Paying for Being Inclusive

  When the National Insurance scheme was founded, a State subvention (then 20 per cent of the total) was seen to be necessary so that an early start could be made to paying pensions and other benefits under the scheme to people without a long contribution record. For similar reasons, a pay as you go approach was seen as appropriate for a social insurance (as opposed to commercial insurance) scheme. The subvention was largely withdrawn under the previous government and it remains fairly marginal now. But there is a case for re-examining the role of a State subvention. If we want to bring people into the scheme because we value the parenting or caring role or for any other valid reason, we can take one of two views. The first is that, since most of those involved will usually be contributors and only sometimes will be receiving credits, it is not unreasonable for the contributors as a whole to carry the "cost" of the crediting arrangements. The second is that since specific provisions for crediting in are usually related to a recognition of roles through which people contribute to the common good in our society, then it is appropriate that society as a whole should meet the cost through taxation, in this case through the State subvention. It is an issue that needs to be fully examined.

6.3  The Governance of the Scheme

  We referred earlier to the matter of the governance of the National Insurance Fund. At present it is wholly in the hands of government. Clearly government must have a strong role to play, because of any State subvention and because in the event of financial difficulties government, through taxes, would have to come to the rescue. But there is a good case to be argued for the inclusion in the governance of the Fund representatives of the contributors—employees, self employed and employers—as well as independents who would represent the community. It would be important that both on the employees/self employed side and in choosing the independents, that the outcome would be fully representative of today's labour force and today's society. We would like to see the Social Security Committee examine this question and the extent of influence on that scheme that would be desirable.

7.  FINALLY

  We look for social security provision which offers predictability, reliability, the maximum personal privacy possible, the avoidance of any form of discrimination and respect for human dignity. We think this is most likely to be found through the full development of the contributory principle and a reformed National Insurance scheme. This is a goal worth striving for.

13 May 1999

REFERENCES

  Beveridge, Sir William, Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmd 6404, HMSO, London, 1942.

  Brown Joan C Escaping from Dependence: Part-time workers and the self-employed: the role of social security, IPPR, London 1994.

  Catholic Bishops' Conference/CASC. Presentation to the Pensions Review, October 1997.

  CASC, Response to the Green Paper: "New Ambitions for our Country. a New Contract for Welfare" July 1998.

  CASC, Response to the Consultation Paper "A new contract for welfare: Support for Disabled People", December 1998.

  CASC, Response to the Green Paper, "A new contract for welfare: Partnership in Pensions", March 1999.

  Commission on Social Justice, Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal, Vintage, London 1994.

House of Commons Hansard

  House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, The Elderly: Information requirements for Supporting the Elderly and the Implications of Personal Pensions for the National Insurance Fund, HC 124, HMSO, London, 1991.

GENERAL REFERENCES

  Brown, Joan C, Social Security for Retirement, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, 1990.

  Brown, Joan C, Victims or Villains: Social Security in Unemployment, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, 1990.

  Brown, Joan C, A Policy Vacuum: Social Security for the Self-employed, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, 1990.


 
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