Select Committee on Social Security Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


Annex

Memorandum submitted to the Pensions Review by the National Pensioners Convention on 10 November 1997

THE FINANCING OF NATIONAL INSURANCE

  A note attached to Phillip Morgan's[70] letter of 16 October to Tony Lynes explains why expenditure from the National Insurance Fund is treated as public expenditure and included in the Control Total—ie thelimit set on Government expenditure for the financial year. The note says: "It is no different fromexpenditure financed by tax receipts, only the method of finance is different. Where National InsuranceContributions differ from general taxation is that the money raised can only be spent on contributory benefitsand the NHS."

  We accept that this is the conventional view held within government but we consider it in some respects misguided and dangerous. This note puts forward an alternative view for consideration in the context of the Pensions Review.

  It is not true that contributions differ from taxation only in being earmarked for the payment of benefits, although this is a vital difference which clearly distinguishes them from income tax and other taxes which provide a single pool of money for all forms of government spending. An equally fundamental difference is that NI contributions establish the contributor's future entitlement to NI benefits.

  This is both a moral and a legal entitlement. The legal entitlement is enshrined in social security legislation and can be removed or diminished only by an Act of Parliament. It is true that in some respects the legislation is less specific than one would expect in an insurance scheme where rights are related to contributions. In particular, the discretionary uprating provisions, leaving the Secretary of State to decide to what extent pensioners and others should share in rising prosperity, are anomalous and should be replaced by a clearrule linking pensions and other long-term benefits to average earnings. Despite this defect in thelegislation, however, it remains true that NI contributions confer in a unique way a legal entitlement tofuture benefits.

  The moral entitlement is equally strong and particularly important in a pay-as-you-go scheme. Pensioners frequently argue that, having paid their contributions throughout their working lives, they are entitled to the pensions they were promised, regardless of whether the contributions they paid were invested or used for current expenditure. It is highly significant that the last Government, with its passion for benefit-cutting, nevertheless felt obliged to respect this principle, or at least to give the appearance of doing so. The cuts made in SERPS pensions were almost wholly limited to the pension rights resulting from future contributions, the rights already acquired being protected. Again, this moral imperative to maintain the rights earned by past contributions is unique in the field of public finance.

  The rights conferred by contributions paid are matched by the obligation which everyone accepts to pay contributions in order to acquire those rights. Thus, if the Government were to decide that pensions and other benefits should in future be paid at a substantially higher level, it would be considered right and proper that contribution rates should be increased. No-one complained when the combined contribution rate was raised by 2 per cent of earnings in 1978, on the introduction of SERPS. On the contrary, the Government would have been criticised for promising generous pensions in the future without requiring existing contributors to pay more. A comparable increase in taxation would have been seen in an entirely different light.

  In terms of the impact on Government finances, this is crucial. A decision to spend more in almost any other area of Government activity has adverse implications for the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. But a decision to spend more on national insurance pensions can be neutral or even favourable for the PSBR, depending on whether, in a particular year, the increase in contributions exceeds the increase in expenditure.

  In considering the financial and economic consequences of any proposed improvement in state pensions, therefore, it is essential that the combined effects of higher pensions and higher contributions should be taken into account. To look at only one side of the equation must inevitably lead to misleading conclusions as to what can be afforded.


70   Phillip Morgan is a DSS official and a member of the pensions review team. Back


 
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