Select Committee on Social Security Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 20

Memorandum submitted by Peter R Ward (CP 18)

  1.  The contributory principle, in its broadest sense, means individuals paying on a regular basis, in the expectation that this will lead to the provision of a benefit at a promised date in the future or when defined circumstances arises. Employers are also involved in making related contributions on behalf of their employees for the provision of the above benefits. Usually the contributions are earnings related. The benefits received can be flat rate benefits, earnings related benefits, or a combination of both.

  2.  Since Beverage, and particularily since the 1940s, the general trend has been the gradual improvement in State pension provision, except for short periods usually during times of austerity. The main period of sustained progress came in the 1970s. In the late 1970s significant improvements were made to State and Occupational Pensions. Also introduced during this period were earnings related sick pay and unemployment benefits. The membership of Occupational Pensions and related benefits increased significantly during the 1970s particularly for lower paid staff and manual employees.

  2.1  Virtually all contributing employees experienced significant benefit improvements, especially women and low paid workers with earning above lower earnings level (LEL) which reflected the value of the single OAP for each year.

  2.2  Most of the cost of these improvements to State benefits was sustained by modest increases in National Insurance contributions plus additional support from general taxation.

  2.3  The improvements in both the State and Occupational pensions, in the 1970s, was undermined by legislation during the 1980s. The detrimental effects will continue unless improvements are introduced. The most significant reductions have been suffered by the low paid. Women are to carry the full burden of pensions equality. They will pay more for longer for significantly less State pension benefits.

  2.4  Some have benefitted from Personal Pensions but millions of others, including those persuaded to opt out of Occupational pensions and Serps, have suffered substantial benefit losses. Final salary Occupational Schemes are experiencing reductions in the important Serps guarantees. They are being overburdened by legislation biased against Occupational Pensions and contributing to their decline.

  2.5  These detrimental changes, to UK pension provision, have been accompanied by substantial increases in National Insurance contributions (see graph and tables) and especially so for women. Employees and Companies are paying twice to fund the transfer from State to private pension provision and trying to compensate for the reductions in State Pensions—costing about 9 per cent extra for the lower paid. State and insurance Companies have lost billions of pounds during the Personal Pensions fiasco, causing higher charges.

  3.  Current developments outlined in the recent Green Paper offer some improvements but will not halt the general decline in State Pension provision, except for the increasing number of poor pensioners who will need, and be eligible for, means tested benefits. The SSP proposals are inadequate and costly. The financial burden of paying twice to compensate for declining State Pensions illustrated by the proposed shift from 60 per cent and 40 per cent private to 40 per cent and 60 per cent respectively, will adversly affect most workers pensions. After another 30 years, with employees and businesses paying further increases in NI contributions, most employees will obtain State Pensions worth even less than today, nearly 10 per cent less than their peak value and over 25 per cent below their 1978 projected value.

  4.  Paying National Insurance was welcomed by virtually all employees when it was first introduced because of the valuable security it promised to most workers. Surveys and personal experience show it was far better accepted than most other taxes, up to the beginning of the 1980s when NI payments did offer good benefits for most workers, pensioners and the lower paid. The series of cuts and detrimental changes to pension provision in the last 20 years has undermined, but not ended, its general public support.

  5.  The advantages of National Insurance contributions are: Its universal benefits for virtually all employees. The re-distribution effects in regard to benefits towards the lower paid and carers. The safety net it provides for virtually all employees who face redundancy or low earnings for significant parts of their working lives. The very low administrative costs. Security from fraud, high charges and falls in the Stock Market. Its deduction from wages which stops the money being spent on non essentials especially by thoughtless, irresponsible, or uneducated workers. Its immediate deduction from those earning above LEL which maximizes its income. The important way it spreads pension risk from total dependence on the private sector, and also, causing further UK finance inflation.

  5.1  The weaknesses of NI contributions are: The vulnerability to political changes in benefits. A lack of frequent, understandable, and individual State Pension benefit statements. Changes which segregate pensions from the National increase in prosperity. The moves to mostly flat rate benefits will alienate most who are not low paid. Not catering for self employed who are not on high earnings.

  6.  The State contributory system must have a future if the vast majority of people are to have decent low cost benefits with the many advantages described in para five above. The drawbacks could be overcome by reaching binding all Party consensus on this subject. Also assisting a better understanding and support for State Benefits by giving contributors better information and perhaps to buy units of benefits, each year, so that any changes would be much more obvious. Demographic and cost implications must be more fairly assessed.

  7.  Tax and benefit reforms are overdue especially for the lower paid and to spread the burden of redistribution by lifting the Upper earning level. National Insurance rebates should be without cost to State finances. The planned Second State Pension must be changed.

  8.  The contributory system of State Pension benefits, after the second world war. State Pension benefits were worth about 18 per cent of average earnings. Its lowest level was in the late 1960s when it fell to 16 per cent. During this period new Governments brought in different unco-ordinated versions of supplementary small State pension schemes.

  9.  In the 1970s a major expansion of contributory Occupational Pension schemes took place, in virtually all but many of the smaller Companies. This extended membership to lower paid staff and to manual workers. These schemes gave a significant improvement in pensions, usually based on 1/80s of final pensionable earnings, and other benefits such as chronic sickness pensions. The contribution rate was usually 5 per cent of employees salary and 10 per cent, on a similar basis paid by the Company.

  10.  In 1978 Barbara Castle reached an agreement with Ted Heath—for an all Party consensus—for two new major policy initiatives to end the stop-start short term State additional pension policy initiatives of the 1950s and 60s. These policies struck a new balance in pension provision between State and privately funded Occupational Schemes. One decision was to link the OAP to avarage wage increases so that pensioners would share in the national prosperity. It was set at about 20 per cent of average earnings.

  11.  The other main decision was to introduce the State Earnings Related Pension. Serps gave earning related pensions to millions without a decent Occupational Pension based on 1/80s of their 20 years best earnings, indexed to national average wages. Serps also gave significant minimum pension guarantees to Occupational Pensions. The two State Pensions would have guaranteed nearly all workers who had paid full National Insurance contributions, especially the lower paid. Over 40 per cent for those retiring with National average earnings. Over 60 per cent for those with half National average earnings as a pension from the year 2000. Total State Pension benefits in 1979-80 were 23 per cent of National average earnings.

  12.  The new Government, elected in 1979, scrapped the all Party consensus on Pensions. First the indexing of the OAP, after retirement, to National average wage levels was scrapped and its indexing to the retail price index established. Then the retirement value of Serps was reduced first by changing the pension fraction from 1/80s down to 1/100s, and second, by changing the best 20 years earning to the individuals lifetime earnings. These two changes would start in the year 2000 gradually reduce the value of this pension by, on average, between 30 to 50 per cent, depending on earnings. The widows/widowers pension is to be cut by 50 per cent from the year 2000. These changes are damaging to most people, especially women, pensioners, those not in an Occupational Pension and those on lower incomes. Later in the 1980s the deduction of LEL details were changed, again reducing the value of Serps by, on average, a further 2 per cent. These cuts, in total NOW mean that the OAP is worth about 16 per cent of National Average Earnings and Serps 17 per cent. Total State Pension in 1998-99 are about 33 per cent of National average earnings.

   If this decline continues by the year 2025 the OAP would be worth about 11 per cent and Serps 12 per cent. Total State Pension by 2025 of about 23 per cent of average earnings. The cost for individuals compensate for these losses is about 6 per cent extra for those on average earnings and 9 per cent for half average.

  13.  If the recent pensions green paper proposals are implemented the steady decline of the real value of the OAP and Serps will continue until it is worthless. The increase in the means test level for pensioners is welcome but the vast majority of pensioners feel very let down and by these proposals and trust they will not be forgotten by the Government. The proposed Second State Pension which will gradually replace Serps will not halt the decline in pension provision for most people, but will slow it down for those below half National average earnings. The Second State Pension will be more costly, will not give the same value for money as a wage indexed pension or as did Serps and it will alienate those above half average earnings from contribution. The cost to buy private to compensate for State cuts will still be high. A modification to the indexing of the OAP and modest Serps improvements could give more acceptable improvements and be less costly. By the year 2025 the OAP will still be worth 11 per cent and SSP 13 per cent. Total State Pension by 2025 of about 24 per cent of average earnings.

  14.  The Green Paper proposals to address some of the legislative burdens placed on Occupational Pensions are welcome. It must also ensure a level playing field with similar concessions as those given to Personal or Stakeholder. Both could stop the decline of these pensions. It could without increasing cost give a fairer deal to early leavers who are still treated poorly by most schemes. Also welcome are the plans to give better value to contributors to Stakeholder pensions but these will need further strengthening to adequately reduce further deceit and mis-selling by the pensions industry. Some Personal Pension providers offer very beneficial final salary schemes it would be a tragedy if the Government did not give positive encouragement for these to be provided, as well as the risky money purchase schemes.

  15.  National Insurance contribution rates for average income employees (reference DSS Pensions Actuary).

Percentage

Year
1975-76
1985-86
1990-91
1998-99
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Serps Employee
5.1
8.0
7.95
8.95
8.5
8.1
8.3
7.7
6.8
SSP Employee
  
  
  
  
8.5
8.3
8.7
8.3
7.9
Serps Employer
7.7
9.65
9.55
9.1
10.6
10.2
10.4
9.5
8.4
SSP Employer
  
  
  
  
10.7
10.4
10.9
10.4
9.9


  16.  National Cost of Serps/State Second Pension (reference DSS Pensions actuary).

£billion

Year
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Serps
9.4
12
14
14
14.6
SSP
9.0
11.9
15.6
18.8
25.1

11 May 1999

Figure 2



Figure 1





 
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