APPENDIX 23
Memorandum submitted by Joan Brown (CP
33)
THE PLACE OF NATIONAL INSURANCE AND THE CONTRIBUTORY
PRINCIPLE IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE FUTURE
PAPER PREPARED
FOR THE
JOSEPH ROWNTREE
FOUNDATION SEMINAR,
27 JULY 1999, BY
JOAN BROWN,
INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER
1. INTRODUCTION
The title I have chosen for this paper carries
three implications.
First, I believe there is a place for the National
Insurance scheme in the future social security system.
Second, although I believe that place should
be central, there is also a role for other kinds of social security
provision, such as means tested benefits. Third, I am not going
to suggest a big bang solution to current problems which moves
away from all these approaches. What we have is far from perfect,
but a sound reform based on present arrangements can produce positive
results, while a leap in the dark to untried provisions carries
the risk of serious disruption to some, perhaps many, people's
lives.
2. WHY SUPPORT
THE NATIONAL
INSURANCE SCHEME
AND THE
CONTRIBUTORY PRINCIPLE
MORE THAN
OTHER MEANS?
As a society, we need an orderly framework within
which earnings interruptions and long term inability to earn can
be managed. This framework is even more essential than it was
in the immediate post war years because economic and social change
have created both greater insecurity and new demands. At the same
time, we want to live in a society at peace with itself; one in
which the goal of social cohesion is seriously pursued.
There are those who argue that most people could
be left to provide for themselves, through private insurance.
Benefits would have to be provided for the poor but these would
be means tested to restrict entitlement. Rather less drastically,
policies in the past two decades have increased the use of both
means tested benefits and private provision, and downgraded provision
through National Insurance. The obvious problem here is that these
arrangements, especially if pushed to extremes, can hardly fail
to be socially divisive, with one section of society paying for
the poor—and for themselves—and sitting in judgement
on them. It would seem inevitable that there would be a desire
to limit the range of support available and to offer the minimum
to those who must be supported.
The alternative is to look for a means by which
society as a whole works together to build a good society, one
that respects human rights and human dignity and which seeks to
promote the well being of all its people. Giving a central role
to the National Insurance scheme based on the contributory principle
is one practical way to achieve this. It offers a means for all
in work to contribute to a common fund and to know that they can
call on this fund when they are unable to work. It reflects the
principles of social solidarity and mutual responsibility, principles
worth promoting and supporting, and especially in the insecure
labour market now operating.
We should not regard statements such as these
as sentimental idealism. Deciding on the nature of our social
security arrangements is not just a technical issue, nor is it
socially or morally neutral. They can help to unite society or
help to divide it. They will both reflect the kind of society
we want and promote the fuller development of such a society—for
good or ill. If you doubt what I am saying, just look back to
the Thatcherite years.
Our present social security system is flawed.
But if we are choosing a route for reform—a horse to back—there
are a number of indications that National Insurance based on the
contributory principle is likely to be a better option than an
over emphasis on means tested benefits.
We need to look for a scheme which can be adapted
to greater economic insecurity and to social change—one
that is as inclusive as possible. National Insurance now is by
no means as inclusive as it might be, but it is capable of change.
Its rival—means tested benefits—is by its very nature
exclusive. The position of married women, now forming a significant
part of the labour force, often carrying caring responsibilities,
is one example. National Insurance has accommodated them up to
a point; means tested benefits not at all.
Do we want to prevent poverty or only to tackle
it when it arises? Means tested benefits require that reserves
of savings are run down before benefit can be claimed, so that
benefit recipients begin a period on benefit already poor and
often with commitments than cannot be met. Benefits paid by right
of contributions leave savings intact, available to be used as
adjustments are made to a lower income and helping the family
to keep out of debt. If there is a return to earning, recovery
of the normal standard of living will be that much easier.
It follows from the last argument that means
tested benefits act as a disincentive to save, while contributory
benefits do not—that is unless the government decides to
apply means tests to National Insurance benefits.
We have to make decisions on the level of benefits
to be paid. Are they to provide minimum subsistence only or aim
to maintain an adequate living standard. It is sometimes argued
that if benefits were restricted to the poor—and therefore
expenditure better controlled—higher rates could be offered.
Experience in Australia, where means tested benefits predominate,
suggests the contrary (Castles, 1987). In fact, the means testing
of benefits for those not in the labour force facilitates the
process of limiting the benefit rates. When benefits are limited
to poor people, the danger is that the standards set cease to
be those applied to the rest of society, but become those considered
sufficient for poor people. As we saw under the former government,
their income is compared, not with the rest of society, but with
one another's and with those who are marginally better off. And
today we are still hearing many excuses to explain why higher
benefits for those not in work are not desirable or not affordable.
Contributory benefits are not exempt from this—particularly
for the unemployed. But the sheer number of people—voters—covered
by the National Insurance scheme does offer some protection.
For those who must claim benefits, the manner
of administration is important. Means tested benefits involve
a range of inquiries into personal affairs, repeated at regular
intervals. The contributory benefits, claimed by right, offer
much greater protection for privacy and for human dignity.
We can add some brief comments on private insurance.
This is inclusive and adequate only to the extent that it can
be afforded. Its costs are often high. It does not serve the poor.
Its role for the lower end of the income spectrum is quite limited.
For profit reasons it sets out to exclude high risk situations
and high risk customers—people most likely to need help.
It has a role to play, but over dependence on it is frankly unwise.
So we start from the point that National Insurance
is the better bet. But there is no room for complacency about
the scheme. There are many features of its functioning which are
unsatisfactory and in many respects is serving yesterday's not
today's society. Not least among its troubles is the way it has
been treated by successive governments.
3. THE NEED
FOR CHANGE:
THE ATTITUDE
OF GOVERNMENT(S)
Those of us who are old enough to remember the
injustices of the 1930s and the time of change in 1948 found the
concept of the National Insurance scheme to which we all contributed
and which would be there to help us when we needed it—by
right of our contributions—highly reassuring. Indeed, it
is the older citizen who probably has the clearest grasp of the
contributory principle, if not in today's language—"I
paid my stamp all these years and I am entitled"—to
a decent pension or whatever.
But since 1948, the National Insurance scheme
has had a chequered career. It suffered from relative, though
benign, neglect in the 1950s and 1960s. It had a fairly good decade
in the 1970s when improvements in its scope and the level of benefit
were made. But during the 1980s and 1990s, right through to the
present, successive governments have treated the scheme and the
contributory principle with near contempt. I will offer some examples,
but I have no doubt that you can think of others.
— Successive governments have talked
of National Insurance contributions as if they were simply another
form of taxation and spoken of government spending on National
Insurance benefits. But this is not "government" expenditure,
apart from a small government subvention. There is little acknowledgement
that this is contributors' money paid over for a specific purpose
and there to be managed for that purpose.
— An example of outright misuse can
be found in the use of the National Insurance Fund by the former
government to provide incentives to buy private insurance in the
shape of personal pensions. Not only was this questionable on
ethical grounds—since the money was not contributed for
that purpose—but there was a serious danger that the financial
health of the Fund would be threatened (HC 124, 1991). The offence
was compounded when to rescue the Fund, a sacrificial victim had
to be found. This was the Industrial Injuries Scheme which was
excluded from National Insurance on the spurious grounds that
since it had no contribution conditions, it was not a contributory
scheme. The fact that contributions for the scheme had been paid
by employers and employees for the previous 40 years was simply
set aside as irrelevant.
— The Government Actuary provides advice
on the level of contributions needed to meet the legitimate benefit
demands on the Fund. But governments also have their own agenda.
From time to time the contribution rates have been manipulated
to serve purposes wholly unrelated to benefits—for example
in the 1999 Budget, a cut in employers' contributions was given
as a trade off for a new energy tax.
— New contribution rules have sought
to exclude contributors from the right to benefits, no matter
how substantial their contribution record.
The former government introduced tougher contribution
rules for Unemployment Benefit, which as an immediate effect was
expected to exclude 350,000 claimants (Hansard, November 2 1987,
col 670). Later, the duration of the insurance benefit (now renamed
the Jobseeker's Allowance) was cut from 12 to six months. The
present government is engaged on a similar exercise in relation
to Incapacity Benefit, producing tougher requirements which over
time will exclude an estimated 170,000 people from the right to
the National Insurance Benefit because they become incapacitated
during a long period of unemployment (Cm 4103, p 21). In both
cases, people who have contributed to National Insurance perhaps
for 20, 30 or 40 years, and then meet the contingencies for which
the scheme provides, find they have no insurance benefit rights
and will receive means tested benefits at best.
— The exclusion of the self employed
from unemployment benefits, is not only unsatisfactory in itself,
it also rebounds on employees who have been long time contributors,
who are made redundant, are encouraged by government agencies
to try self employment but fail and then pay for their additional
efforts to be self supporting by losing any right to a National
Insurance benefit in unemployment;
— In 1980 and again in 1988, rules
were introduced by the former government to reduce the National
Insurance Unemployment Benefit for people 60 and over, and later
55 and over, where occupational benefits were being drawn. The
present government is engaged in introducing similar provisions
to cut NI Incapacity Benefit where an occupational ill health
or other pension is being drawn. In neither case was/is the government
prepared to acknowledge that the NI benefit has been earned by
right of contributions.
It is claimed that there has been an erosion
of support for the National Insurance scheme and the contributory
principle, and if this was the case, it would not be surprising.
The persistent breaches of trust by governments in the past 20
years could hardly fail to erode confidence in the present arrangements.
Indeed if some of these actions had been carried out by private
insurance, the companies would have been "named and shamed".
But recent research has shown that when people are given information
about the funding of social security and the benefits received,
there is still a strong commitment to the contributory principle
(Stafford, 1998).
So, in spite of the worst efforts of government,
the validity of the National Insurance scheme is still recognised
and valued. But it remains the fact that it was designed for an
age that has passed. This has to be addressed.
4. THE NEED
FOR CHANGE:
THE UNDERLYING
ASSUMPTIONS
At its inception in 1948, the National Insurance
scheme was built on certain (sometimes unspoken) assumptions:
— that there would be a policy of full
employment;
— that the labour force would be largely
made up of men and single women who, in the great majority of
cases, would be in full time, long term jobs, and if unemployed,
could find work again without much delay;
— that a National Health Service would
provide free health care to all and that this would, in time,
reduce the incidence of sickness and disability;
— that married women would be content
to be economically dependent on their husbands, and would in most
cases be at home engaged in caring for children and with other
household tasks;
— that most marriages were stable and
divorce rates would remain low;
— that retired people would, on average,
live around 5-10 years after retirement.
These assumptions cannot now be made. So what
would be today's assumptions?
— While there will be an objective
of full employment, greater frequency of unemployment than in
the immediate post war years can be expected and some unemployment
will be prolonged.
— While full time secure employment
is still part of the pattern of work, life long employment is
far less likely. In addition, part time work, temporary employment,
employment on short or medium term contracts, and self employment
both full and part time are now major features of the labour force.
— Changing technology, and changes
in demand for goods and services will require a skilled labour
force and periodic retraining, both part and full time.
— Being engaged in paid work will increasingly
be the norm not only for single women and married women without
dependent children, but also for married and cohabiting women
with children, and lone parents. Their wages will typically form
an essential part of the household economy.
— Divorce rates are high and likely
to remain so. In addition account now has to be taken of cohabitation
breakdown.
— Child bearing and child rearing will
continue to affect the ability of women—and to a lesser
extent men—to maintain paid work or to work full time.
— Ill health and disability have not
diminished as hoped.
— People are living much longer than
in the 1950s so that 20 or more years in retirement is now common.
— Both women and men—married
and single—will be called upon to provide care for disabled
and infirm family members. This may reduce the ability to earn
or prevent work altogether for a period.
— Family and carer friendly employment
will be promoted by governments, including provision for maternity
absence, and for paternity leave and parental leave.
5. THE NEED
FOR CHANGE:
THE APPROACH
OF GOVERNMENT(S)
It could be expected that in 50 years, changes
would be needed in National Insurance to keep it up to date with
workforce and social change. But it has been modernised only to
a limited extent since 1948 and the process has often been characterised
by one step forward and one or two steps back. I will give a few
examples and doubtless you will think of more.
— The scheme was forced to adapt to
the large scale entry of married women into the labour force.
But equal treatment was ceded reluctantly, and when changes are
proposed in the scheme—for example involving tougher contribution
conditions—the interests of married women are readily sacrificed.
— Provision for credits was generally
improved in the 1970s giving greater access to benefits, including
provision for those in education or approved training. Carers
also gained in 1975 from the Home Responsibilities Protection
which gave protection to the NI basic pension. But they lost ground
in 1988 when credits for unemployment benefit for those drawing
the Invalid Care Allowance were withdrawn.
— Efforts were made in the 1970s and
1980s to transfer National Insurance benefit responsibilities
to employers, including meeting the cost. New and fairly workable
arrangements involving employers were introduced for National
Insurance maternity and sickness benefits, but efforts to induce
employers to meet the cost of these were unsuccessful—they
remain largely National Insurance funded.
— The period for which National Insurance
unemployment benefit would be paid was increased from six months
to 12 months in 1966, and decreased from 12 months to six months
in 1996.
— The treatment of long term incapacity
was improved in the 1970s and changed again—not always for
the better—in the 1990s. Recent proposals will reduce access
through stricter contribution conditions.
— The basic retirement pension remains
largely as it was when introduced. Access to it has been increased
through credit arrangements. Provision for uprating was improved
in the 1970s and downgraded again in 1980.
Change though related pension reform has been more
active.
— Contributions levels have frequently
been altered and earnings related contributions were introduced
in 1975. Earnings related short term benefits came in 1966 and
departed in 1981.
— The treatment of the self employed
has scarcely improved since 1948. Proposals in a Consultation
Paper in 1980 to give them rights to Unemployment Benefit were
never followed through. Proposals by the Industrial Injuries Advisory
Council in 1993 to bring those most at risk of injury at work
into the Industrial Injuries Scheme were summarily rejected by
the former government.
— The exclusion from the scheme of
very low earners has not been tackled and until recently it had
scarcely been acknowledged as a problem.
The task of reform today is not made easier
by the confused messages coming from government. Both governments
have used their own dubious interpretation of the Beveridge Report
to claim a return to Beveridge to justify more restrictive contribution
conditions—the Conservatives for unemployment benefits,
Labour for incapacity provision. Both have claimed to be bringing
the scheme up to date by reducing benefits in respect of occupational
pensions—the Conservatives for unemployment, Labour for
incapacity. Neither government has seriously addressed reform
of the scheme. The Conservatives looked at it in the 1984-85 Social
Security Review, but preferred to concentrate on changes to the
means tested benefits (Green Paper 1985). The present government
has no discernible policy on the National Insurance scheme. None
of the Green/White/Consultation Papers has offered a proper analysis
of this important part of current social security provision or
proposed a coherent policy for reform.
6. THE GOALS
FOR REFORM
(a) Flexibility
If the government wants a flexible labour force
for economic reasons, then it has a responsibility to match this
with a flexible National Insurance scheme which can cope with
the diversity of labour patterns. This will require a thorough
review of contribution conditions and credit provisions, with
the objective of ensuring that the bulk of workers can be tided
over periods of unemployment, short-term sickness and maternity
absence (where appropriate) through contributory benefits and
with the assurance that rights to long term benefits for incapacity
or retirement are protected.
Protection of benefit rights through credits
will have to be maintained for approved training and other forms
of lifelong learning which a flexible labour force requires.
(b) Preventing poverty
The aim of the scheme should be to prevent poverty
by providing to those entitled to help a benefit level which offers
a decent, if modest, standard of living, without the need for
means tested supplementation and so without the need to use up
reserves of savings first. We need a systematic review of all
benefit rates, but especially those for 18 to 24 year olds. The
introduction of lower rates for this age group by the former government
had a poor justification and has been criticised many times by
responsible bodies for the low standard of living the rates offered
and the increased homelessness caused. The general goal of maintaining
an incentive to save to achieve a standard of living above poverty
or near poverty applies also to efforts to make additional private
provision for long term needs.
(c) Inclusiveness
The object of National Insurance policy should
be to include as many people as possible in the scheme and its
benefits. Contribution rules for benefits should be devised with
this objective. These rules should not be manipulated with the
deliberate intent of excluding groups or categories of contributors
from benefit—even those with a substantial contribution
record. Government should cease this practice and where necessary
reverse previous actions of this kind. In addition when deciding
benefit eligibility, some account should be taken of the whole
contribution record, and not only the period immediately preceding
the claim. All of these steps would help to ensure a sense of
predictability and fairness.
We should add here that in any collective provision,
there are mutual responsibilities, so there must be rules and
requirements to govern the award of benefit and its retention.
But these rules should aim to be reasonable and fair. There should
be no discrimination against particular groups or categories;
no arbitrary decisions by administrators; and no sense that retaining
the right to benefit involves a battle of wits between claimant
and administrators. Appeal arrangements should be independent,
efficient, free and fast—the last quality being notably
absent at present.
We need also to examine several excluded or
partially excluded groups.
— Action should be taken to end the
exclusion of workers whose earnings fall below the Lower Earnings
Limit (LEL). Some 2.5 million workers at any one time are excluded
by this rule, four fifths of them women. For a good proportion
of the women, the period in such jobs is extensive (McKnight et
al 1998). This has an impact on rights to benefits for unemployment
and sickness, for incapacity benefits and, for non-carers, a serious
impact on pension rights. Two suggested solutions have been put
forward—the payment of very low contribution rates; or simply
crediting them into the scheme (Brown, 1994, pp 24-6; Social Justice
Commission p 233). The matter has been complicated by recent moves
to raise the level of the Lower Earnings Limit to the tax threshold
while maintaining benefit rights for all those above the old LEL.
This could raise further difficulties, or it could point the way
to an extension downwards—below the present LEL—of
benefit rights. A review of the exclusion of the lowest paid group
has been promised (in the Pensions Green Paper, Cm 4179) and pressure
for this to be undertaken should be maintained.
— A second group overdue for review
of their position in National Insurance is the self employed.
For too long, the best self employed people could expect of Green
and White Papers was to be dismissed in a few throwaway lines.
The last substantial examination of their social security needs
was almost 20 years ago. There are now more than three million
self-employed people. There ought to be a specific and full examination
of their situation with the objective of bringing them into the
National Insurance scheme to the maximum extent possible, starting
with rights to benefits in unemployment and with a re-examination
of their right to be brought into the Industrial Injuries Scheme.
Their position in SERPS and the proposed new State Second Pension
also needs attention. All of this may require an increase in their
contributions and/or a restructuring of their contribution arrangements.
This could be acceptable, provided there are compensating gains
in benefit rights.
— The position of the Industrial Injuries
Scheme itself ought to be re-examined, with a view to bringing
it back into the National Insurance scheme. There are reforms
to the Industrial Scheme that need considering, but this task
would be better undertaken in the context of the National Insurance
scheme, rather than parked where it is in the Consolidated Fund.
— A group of continued concern is 16
and 17 year olds whose right to benefit was withdrawn in 1988.
Although the key issue here is their right to Income Support,
prior to 1988 some 17 year olds did qualify for National Insurance
benefits and all 16 and 17 year olds could build up contribution
rights for their 18+ years. The present government shows no sign
of restoring benefit rights. While it is right to focus the main
attention on education and training, those young people who do
enter the labour force should not be deprived of social security
rights available to others.
(d) A scheme which recognises important social
roles
We need a scheme which recognises the range
of roles through which people contribute to the common good of
our society and which may prevent them from taking full or even
part time paid work. In particular we need to protect the parenting
role and the task of caring for disabled and infirm people, usually
family members. To a considerable extent this is being recognised.
The Home Responsibilities Protection (HRP) in 1975 was an important
step forward. There are proposals that carers on care related
benefits should be credited in to the new State Second Pension
and should be exempt from the more restrictive rules on Incapacity
Benefit.
But the way HRP rights are calculated needs
to be reviewed and it is regrettable that the cut off point for
children who qualify a caring parent for crediting in to the new
pension should be set as low as five years, since it fails to
recognise that there are times when full time parenting even for
over fives may have to take priority—after bereavement,
after family breakdown, when the child is going through a difficult
period, are all examples. We expect parents to take full responsibility
for the actions of their children. We should not punish them by
depriving them of social security rights if they decide that full
time parenting is essential for a time.
Government should also review the backward step
taken by the former government when it withdrew from carers of
disabled and infirm adults the credits for unemployment benefit
to which they were entitled. Carers have been left without any
bridging income when caring ends and while they seek work, unless
they are entitled to Income Support. As long as they are seeking
work, and have the requisite contribution record from earlier
work, they should be enabled to claim the National Insurance benefit
for unemployment.
A further area for examination is the role that
National Insurance might play in providing for paid paternity
and parental leave. The latter may be seen as having priority
in that a right to a short absence from work for paternity leave
can often be taken up, perhaps with the aid of holiday pay. Longer
periods of unpaid parental leave are typically not affordable
for the average family. Paid parental leave is available in a
number of European Union countries, and for much longer periods
than currently on offer here, We should examine how this is financed,
and what our options are.
(e) Paying for being inclusive
We might note that the labour force—and
so the number of contributors—has increased since 1948 from
around 22 million to 26 million (British Labour Statistics and
Social Trends, 1999). Part of this increase in the number of contributors
is due to the large scale entry of women into the labour force.
There are of course more potential claimants, but the National
Insurance Fund has been strengthened by these additional contributors.
The Fund could be further strengthened by a review of the Upper
Earnings Limit (UEL). Raising, or even abolishing the UEL should
be seriously examined.
The issue of the State subvention must also
be raised. When the National Insurance scheme was founded, a State
subvention (then 20 per cent of the total) was seen to be necessary
so that an early start could be made to paying pensions and other
benefits under the scheme to people without a long contribution
record. The subvention was largely withdrawn under the previous
government and it remains fairly marginal now. But there is a
case for re-examining its role. If we want to bring people into
the scheme because we value the parenting or caring role or for
any other valid reason, we can take one of two views. The first
is that, since most of those involved will usually be contributors
and only sometimes will be receiving credits, it is not unreasonable
for the contributors as a whole to carry the "cost"
of the crediting arrangements. The second is that where provisions
for crediting in are related to a recognition of roles through
which people contribute to the common good in our society, then
it is appropriate that society as a whole should meet the cost
through taxation, in this case through the State subvention. It
is an issue that needs a both thought and discussion.
(f) The governance of the scheme
Underlying many of the problems in the way the
National Insurance scheme has been handled by governments is the
fact that there is no mechanism for action on behalf of contributors
to the National Insurance Fund, or the exercise of control over
or even influence on policies towards to Fund and its management.
In many other European countries, representatives of employers
and trade unions, together with independents are, with government,
part of the governance of such schemes. Here in the UK, occupational
schemes have their bodies of Trustees, often representative in
nature. But the National Insurance Fund is in the hands of the
Treasury and the Social Security Ministers, often taking decisions
without prior consultation or, as in the case of the changes to
Incapacity Benefit now before Parliament, consulting and then
ignoring the weight of opinion of the large number of organisations
who responded (Hansard, 26 March 1999, cols 435-8).
Clearly government must have a strong role to
play, because of any State subvention and because in the event
of financial difficulties government, through taxes, would have
to come to the rescue. But there is a case to be argued for the
inclusion in the governance of the Fund of representatives of
the contributors—employees, self employed and employers—as
well as independents who would represent the community. It would
be important that in choosing these representatives, the outcome
would truly reflect today's labour force and today's society.
The question then would be the extent of influence such a group
of representatives should have. It has to be added that the models
offered by the Social Security Advisory Committee and the Industrial
Injuries Advisory Committee do not necessarily point the way.
All too often these bodies have been consulted and then ignored.
The aim of a change in the governance of the National Insurance
Fund should be to open up policy to real influence, not just to
offer a cloak of respectability.
7. FINALLY
This is a sizable agenda and will take time
to achieve. But it is an agenda which could attract wide support
if it is presented properly to the public. We would hopefully
emerge at the end with a better scheme, fitting for the better
and fairer society we want to build.
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Joan Brown
November 1999
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