Memorandum submitted by the National Federation
of Fishermen's Organisations (T12)
Since the Agriculture Committee reported on
the fishing industry in 1999, the two most significant developments
have been the dramatic rise in fuel prices, which has pushed parts
of the UK fleet beyond economic viability, and the emergence of
EU stock recovery programmes for cod and hake, following very
severe scientific advice for these stocks.
The Government's response to both of these crises
confirms our view that the fishing industry, and particularly
the fishing industry south of the border, is systematically disadvantaged
by the UK Government policy. It also suggests that the Treasury,
through its short-sighted influence, constitutes a significant
part of the problem faced by our industry, rather than providing
part of the solution.
FUEL CRISIS
AND PARITY
ACROSS EUROPE
Fishing, particularly mobile forms of fishing
such as trawling are relatively fuel intensive. This, and the
fact that most whitefish is sold through the auction system and
increased costs cannot therefore be passed on to the consumer,
is sufficient to explain how the increase in fuel prices—combined
with the lack of availability of fish on the fishing-grounds—caused
major economic turmoil in the fishing industry in the first half
of the year. Unlike the governments of Spain, France, Netherlands
and Belgium, the UK Government provided no relief, despite desperate
pleas for assistance and equity of treatment.
The Committee will recall from our earlier evidence
that the absence of equity in access to European construction
and modernisation grants has been a consistent thread in the industry's
decline. The absolute and relative ageing of the UK's fleet profile,
which is closely related to the absence of UK match funding, was
a central feature of our 1999 submission to the Committee. It
is also worth remarking that the Committee's finding that the
link between age of vessels and the casualty rate was "not
proven", caused the Fishing Industry Safety Group to revisit
the issue and to arrive at the conclusion that there is an inarguable
correlation between age of vessel and casualty rate. Attached
paper [not printed] refers.
RECOVERY PLANS
The implementation of stock recovery plans for
Irish Sea cod, North Sea cod, West of Scotland cod and northern
hake (in terms of measures adopted, speed of implementation, regional
focus, legal instruments employed and consequences for the fishing
industry), represents the most dramatic development within the
CFP in many years. Although there are some positive aspects to
the recovery plans (not least the recognition that the over-centralised
form of decision-making within the CFP is redundant), there is
also much for the fishing industry to fear.
The Commission's use of its emergency powers
and the justification of draconian measures by reference to the
existence of a crisis, has severely threatened the viability of
many UK vessels already struggling with the impact of the fuel
crisis.
The Minister acknowledged that the recovery
programmes would have economic consequences and our case for strategic
government assistance was submitted on 30 January. (See attached
[not printed])
It comprises two elements:
DECOMMISSIONING AND
TRANSITIONAL AID
The Treasury's response to our plea for financial
assistance has been of a piece with its previous policy towards
the fishing industry. It has focused exclusively on short-term
expenditure rather than an appreciation of where these policies
are driving the UK fishing industry in the longer term. Treasury
inspired delay over decommissioning in 1992-95 allowed the quota
hopping problem to grow to the extent that over 50 per cent of
key UK quotas are now owned by Dutch and Spanish interests. Equally
blinkered policies since 1989 have allowed the UK fleet to fall
from somewhere close to the top of the European league in terms
of modern, safe fishing vessels, to somewhere close to the bottom.
The do-nothing approach in the fuel crisis, likewise saw other
member states supporting their fleets through a short-term crisis
to ensure their survival.
Paradoxically, it is only the devolved administrations'
flexing of their own muscles, to provide aid packages for the
Scottish and Northern Irish fishing fleets, that has obliged MAFF
to scrape together a minimalist package for the English fleet,
from within existing budgets, which is portrayed as some sort
of equivalent. That it is nothing of the sort, is evident when
comparisons are made in terms of numbers of fishermen, fleet tonnages
and value of landings.
The fishing industry ought to have a bright
future, based as it is on a renewable resource for which there
is high and increasing demand. Rebuilding stocks to sustainable
levels and maintaining them is the key to prosperity; a prosperity
which would bring rewards not just to the fishing industry but
to the Exchequer through increased revenues. This ought to be
the basis for strategic Government assistance that would allow
the fishing industry to take the conservation measures (and absorb
the short-term losses associated with them) that are necessary
to rebuild stocks.
What is missing, or at least not shared by the
Treasury, is a vision of a modern, safe, economically viable,
UK fishing fleet, operating sustainably, or any plan of how to
get there. It is important to keep a close eye on expenditure
but when that becomes an obsession, displacing strategic vision,
it is time for a change. Recovery programmes should be supported
by transitional aid.
CONCLUSION
The decline in the UK fishing industry results
from two root causes. The Common Fisheries Policy has failed to
halt stock depletion and the UK Treasury has overseen a policy
which has systematically disadvantaged the UK industry and in
particular the English industry, by obstructing parity of treatment.
Our hope is that the Zonal Management will address some of the
differences in the CFP. Home grown damage—mostly derived
from myopic Treasury polices, is something that will have to be
tackled domestically.
30th April 2001
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